A friend with decades of experience in intelligence makes the prediction that Iraq eventually will cease to exist, perhaps just five years from now, with the big pieces swallowed up by Syria, Iran and perhaps Turkey and some other neighbors, and with an independent Kurdistan in the middle:

Within the next five years I see Syria moving into southern Mesopotamia, then being pushed south by the Kurds, further thwarted by the combination of the desert and home problems from Lebanon and Israel, to be stopped no further east than al Haibbaniyah by the threatening Saudis. 

Iran will move on all fronts into Iraq except the southeastern corner around al Basrah where Kuwaiti and Saudi forces aided by the US will stop them . . .  and in the northeast arrested by Kurds supported by the US.

Meanwhile, here is more from Joel Wing, known to fans of this blog's comment pages as Jwing.

(HT to Blake Hounshell, who has yet to appear on Great Satan's Girlfriend)

I couldn't bring myself to write about the round of bombings in Iraq yesterday. More today. I have nothing useful to say about that.

Meanwhile, there is some word that payoffs to Awakening groups will stop at the end of this month. Interesting campaign move. 

And once again foreign fighters seem to be slipping into Iraq from Syria. 

Proven provider John McCreary's bottom line: "Day by day, the security situation is deteriorating  ... [I]t will get much worse in the next few months."

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Iraq's vice president, a Sunni Arab, says the recent killing of 13 people associated with a local political leader in eastern Anbar province was carried out by Iraqi army troops commanded by Colonel Raheem Kareem Resan. This somewhat undercuts the "those crazy Anbaris and their wacky tribal disputes" line previously issued by the Baghdad government.

Also someone is bombing the houses of policemen in Fallujah.

It looks to me like relations between Iraqi security forces and the people of al Anbar are deteriorating. If this is the wave of the future, fasten your seatbelts for 2010.

AZHAR SHALLAL/AFP/Getty Images

I didn't see this in my regular newspapers. It happened up in Baqubah. Police took two wounded, army apparently none. I don't know what it means. Maybe just a personal dispute, maybe more than that.

Photo:  ALI YUSSEF/AFP/Getty Images

One of the most interesting sub-genres of journalism is the article reporters write as they leave a country or beat. Often, they vent feelings and views they've kept pent-up for year.

Here is a classic of the type. As she leaves Iraq, Alissa Rubin of the New York Times summarizes the harsh lessons she learned from years of living in Baghdad:

. . . Army checkpoints -- legal ones -- are the only ones that stop you, but huge posters of Imam Ali punctuate the streets, a signal that this is now Shiite-land. Imam Ali is revered as a founder of the Shiite branch of Islam, but a poster of him is also a silent rebuke to Sunnis, a way of marking territory, of reminding them that the Shiites run things now. It is a sign of victory as much as peace.

And victory in Iraq almost always begets revenge.

In my five years in Iraq, all that I wanted to believe in was gunned down. Sunnis and Shiites each committed horrific crimes, and the Kurds, whose modern-looking cities and Western ways seemed at first so familiar, turned out to be capable of their own brutality."

I think this is a good prism through which to view Iraq's upcoming national elections.

Photo: ALI YESSEF/AFP/Getty Images

This is an e-mail that is circulating about a recent confrontation in Baghdad between non-Iraqi bodyguards and Iraqi security forces. I haven't been able to confirm it, but I am told by a second party that it came from someone he trusts and is accurate.

If this is a portent of things to come, Iraq is gonna get mighty interesting real fast. Bodyguards may have to put up with this sort of treatment, but I don't think U.S. military would stand for it.

Subject: Here's what's circulating regarding PSD incident

The Entry Control Points (ECP) into the International Zone (IZ) have been increasingly difficult to deal with. It is nothing that is intolerable. However, in an increasing basis Protective Security Detail (PSD) teams have been instructed to exit vehicles for search, download weapons and such. That is okay, because after all, Iraq, like it or not, is its own country and sets the ground rules.

Well, a few days ago the antics were ratcheted up again. As a team was entering ECP4 (old CP12) the last vehicle of the motorcade was stopped, which is not uncommon. This time though, the vehicles crew was harassed to give over smoke grenades. Lately IA's/IP's have been asking PSD teams for everything from water, to ammunition, to money. In following the guidance from the Department of State (DOS), Regional Security Officer (RSO), the vehicle commander of the vehicle attempted to find out the name of the Iraqi in charge of the ECP.

(Read on)

In my book The Gamble I wrote about how the U.S. military approach to handling detainees was revamped in 2007. The new approach was built on the recognition that many people planted bombs for the insurgency to make money, so teaching them skills would lessen that motivation. One of the skills taught was brickmaking. A friend wrote to me that the brick factory at Camp Bucca recently collapsed. (Photo above is of another brick-making operation in Iraq. Apparently, there are brick factories in Iraq fueled by oil that seeps out of the ground.)  

Meanwhile, for our less precise or perhaps slower readers, "unraveling" isn't a prediction, just a running commentary about what is unfolding every day before our very eyes. One is about the future, the other about the present. Big difference.

I ran into an old friend the other day who said Iraq really isn't unraveling because, he argued, the Iraqi security forces are more or less behaving. But I think this is a matter of degree. It isn't unraveling quickly, but rather in slow steps, as no political breakthrough occurs, as bombs are stockpiled in Fallujah, and as American influence wanes. As my friend and former colleague Anthony Shadid used to say, "The mud is getting wetter."       

QASSEM ZEIN/AFP/Getty Images

Colonel Timothy Reese's suggestion is appealing, of course. And he is good in listing everything that is going wrong. Reading his lists, you'd almost think the situation in Iraq is unraveling:

1. The ineffectiveness and corruption of GOI Ministries is the stuff of legend.
2. The anti-corruption drive is little more than a campaign tool for Maliki
3. The GOI is failing to take rational steps to improve its electrical infrastructure and to improve their oil exploration, production and exports.
4. There is no progress towards resolving the Kirkuk situation.
5. Sunni Reconciliation is at best at a standstill and probably going backwards.
6. Sons of Iraq (SOI) or Sahwa transition to ISF and GOI civil service is not happening, and SOI monthly paydays continue to fall further behind.
7. The Kurdish situation continues to fester.
8. Political violence and intimidation is rampant in the civilian community as well as military and legal institutions.
9. The Vice President received a rather cool reception this past weekend and was publicly told that the internal affairs of Iraq are none of the US's business.

And:

1. If there ever was a window where the seeds of a professional military culture could have been implanted, it is now long past. US combat forces will not be here long enough or with sufficient influence to change it.

2. The military culture of the Baathist-Soviet model under Saddam Hussein remains entrenched and will not change. The senior leadership of the ISF is incapable of change in the current environment.

a) Corruption among officers is widespread

b) Neglect and mistreatment of enlisted men is the norm

c) The unwillingness to accept a role for the NCO corps continues

d) Cronyism and nepotism are rampant in the assignment and promotion system

e) Laziness is endemic

f) Extreme centralization of C2 is the norm

g) Lack of initiative is legion

h) Unwillingness to change, do anything new blocks progress

i) Near total ineffectiveness of the Iraq Army and National Police institutional organizations and systems prevents the ISF from becoming self-sustaining

j) For every positive story about a good ISF junior officer with initiative, or an ISF commander who conducts a rehearsal or an after action review or some individual MOS training event, there are ten examples of the most basic lack of military understanding despite the massive partnership efforts by our combat forces and advisory efforts by MiTT and NPTT teams.

The question the colonel's memo begs is just how bad it gets after we leave, and whether Turkey, Iran and more intervene more than they have already. What are the chances of a regional war? Feeling lucky, punk? Well, are you?

What happens after we leave? How do we mitigate the damage done? I really don't see how hanging a "mission accomplished" banner would work any better for the Obama administration than it did for the Bush administration.

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The note below is from a reader of the blog who takes issue with the "unraveling" thread. I am quoting this with his permission and leaving out his name at his request. This is a guy who knows what he is talking about. His comments are especially interesting because the New York Times recently tagged Fallujah, near where he is operating, as one of the places where things are unraveling. He disagrees.

This officer's interesting bottom line: "we have taken it as far as Americans can."

Here it is:    

24 June, 2009

We are now more than halfway through our stint here in eastern Al Anbar Province, just west of the greater Baghdad area. Things have been going well, all things considered, and the days are moving along quickly now. We are living at a relatively large base with all of the amenities of an occupying force: laundry, plenty of food, gym, internet, phones, and (unique to this base) a small man-made lake that was once Uday Hussein's vacation retreat.  The base is called Camp Baharia...

My battalion currently operates in the Fallujah, Saqlawiyah, and Karmah regions, a space once occupied by a force about ten times ours.  We arrived as one of the first battalions to operate exclusively under the new guidelines set forth in the Status of Forces Agreement signed last fall. 

Early on our mission was to pair with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), which includes the Iraqi Police, Iraqi Army, and the Provincial Security Forces (a national guard of sorts) to conduct counter-insurgency and capacity building. We soon found that our ability to influence enemy activity was severely restricted as we could no longer detain suspects and we could no longer immerse ourselves in the population through the use of combat outposts within the cities.

This forced us to work through the ISF. Instead of doing the work for them we came to think of ourselves as instructors, not concerned with the who-did-what-to-whom, and more concerned with how they conduct police and security operations.

This means we are less concerned with who the high value individuals are (the really bad guys; our obsession last year) and are more concerned with the ISF's ability to conduct an investigation, obtain a warrant from the (albeit corrupt and feckless) local judge, handle evidence, handle detainees, conduct questioning, and develop a case to be heard at a higher court.

This has been halting and frustrating work. I have worked with our Battalion Staff Judge Advocate (lawyer), a very smart guy who speaks Arabic, to try to develop the ISF understanding of proper evidence and the judge's understanding of warrants and trials.  It has been a bit like Law & Order: Iraq, but without the happy ending and closed case.  The greatest hurdles we have are out of our control at the District level in Fallujah and the Provincial level in Ramadi.  Even when we do everything right at the local level there are hundreds of stories of a tribal leader paying off judges and police to release his wayward son who promises never to commit a crime again. Many of the local ISF won't know one of their detainees is released until they see him on the street the next week.

Another key part of our job has been to facilitate the transfer of the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program (also known as the Iraqi Civilian Watch) to Iraqi control.  This US-founded program hired thousands of disenchanted, largely Sunni, male youths, gave them a weapon, and told them to stand post.  It worked spectacularly well, largely by giving a population of potential insurgents a better alternative.  But now the US is done paying for it, so it is left to the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior to handle.  We helped with the security of these operations, though we have done our best to take the backseat.  Attached are some photos of the pay operations, which are at once chaotic, joyous, and hot (it's averaging around 110 these days) affairs.

In addition to the capacity building and SOI payments, we have been a part of the gradual release of detainees from US custody.  The US prison in Bucca has been releasing its less-threatening inmates to Iraqi custody for the last year now.  Our job has been to smooth the transition and ensure that the local security forces are aware of the releases.

Capacity building, hands-off security, and detainee releases all means that the average infantry Marine has been pretty bored this deployment, which is, of course, a good thing.  The Marines, to a man, would rather be in Afghanistan a conflict they see as simpler than the legalistic, restrictive environment here.  But they have done a terrific job at staying busy, conducting training, and staying active.

Despite recent reporting, the area is stable, while still not completely safe.  The attacks mentioned in the article are not part of a mounting trend, but are normal and to be expected from time to time in this environment.  If we want Iraq to return to normal it will necessarily mean making itself more vulnerable to these kinds of attacks.

But we have taken it as far as Americans can.  In my opinion, anything we do now may do more harm than good in delaying the inevitable and reinforcing their, at times, crippling malaise. The only enduring role for Americans is to provide the safety net to prevent complete collapse, chaos, and civil war; three things that I do not believe will happen in any event."

It seems to me that he is saying that he doubts an unraveling will occur, but if it does, there isn't a whole lot we can do to prevent it at this point, so we might as well leave.

Department of Defense

Here is a guest column by Adam Silverman*, who was in Iraq last year, explaining why he thinks the war there isn't over or won. This reinforces my view that the transition to Iraqi forces that is supposed to happen this year generally will be just one more instance of prematurely transferring security responsibilities to Iraqis. Back in the Bush days, doing that was called "rushing to failure." I am not sure what the Obama-era term will be.  Btw, there was a truck bomb near Kirkuk on Saturday that caused more than 250 casualties, and a string of smaller bombs in in Baghdad yesterday.

Anyway, here's Adam:

Just a word regarding your post from CNAS about GEN (ret) Keane and LTC (ret) Nagl: I'm not so sure that things are won.  In fact I'm not sure you can really win a COIN fight, you can definitely lose one, but winning -- how would you define it? Here's why I disagree with their conclusions:

1) As U.S. Forces pullback at the end of this month into a new form of overwatch, one we've got little to no experience with anywhere in Iraq, the local, provincial, and national authorities are supposed to step up, including ISF, but they're in no way broadly capable of doing that yet. While some units are, not all of them are.

2) The opening or space that the combination of the 2006 Awakenings, the Sunni/Shia cleansing of Baghdad and other once mixed urban areas, and the hard work of the military and civilian allies in the Surge created or allowed for was squandered by the Bush Administration both politically and diplomatically. The opening was supposed to be used for the reconciliation of societal elements, so that there would be tethering, both horizontally to each other and vertically to the state, in order to achieve actual progress in Iraq. The Bush Administration squandered that opening by trying for a pie-in-the sky SOFA agreement that media reports indicated would have kept large numbers of troops in Iraq in perpetuity on huge bases located to stage for Iran and Syria.  The Iraqis rolled us on this, then rolled us and IHEC/UN on the Provincial Elections. So our official occupation status ran out and we're now there on sufferance. And if you missed it, MSNBC reported last Wednesday, and I saw NO other coverage of this, that the Iraqi Parliament has appropriated the funds for the referendum on if we stay in Iraq. If they call that referendum we will most likely lose!

3) The Iraqis recognize this and that's why the violence has been creeping up. I think very highly of LTC (ret) Nagl and his work, don't know anything about GEN (ret) Keane, but everything I've seen while deployed in Iraq, seen in secondary sources, and know about the dynamics there, as well as how COIN works, tells me that things are going to get a lot  worse before they get better -- if they ever do. And this doesn't even take into account the effects of what's happening in Iran on Iraq,  which is basically an Iranian subsidiary."

*Here is the required disclaimer: "Adam L. Silverman, PhD is the Social Science Advisor for Strategic Communications for the US Army Human Terrain System and was deployed in Iraq in 2008 as a Field Social Scientist and Team Lead for Human Terrain Team Iraq 6 and served as the Socio-Cultural Advisor for the 2BCT/1AD. His views are his alone and do not necessarily reflect those of the US Army Human Terrain System, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command, the 2BCT/1AD, or the the US Army." Or Joe Torre.

Vermin Inc/Flickr

The news this morning that three U.S. soldiers and 12 Iraqis were killed by a roadside bomb in Doura hit especially hard because at CNAS lately I have been writing an introduction to a paper of how security was improved in that south Baghdad neighborhood in 2007-2008. It is an inspiring study of how to bring safety to a beleaguered civilian population, which makes it all the more disheartening to see those improvements erode.

John Moore/Getty Images

If you haven't yet reviewed the papers from the Midwest Political Science Conference, here's a little gem that will tell you more about Iraqi politics than a dozen Pentagon PowerPoints. It goes by the deceptively sleepy title of "Preliminary Results From Voices Of The Mada'in: A Tribal History and Study of One of Baghdad's Six Rural Districts," and is by Adam Silverman, who was an advisor to the 2nd Brigade Combat Team of the 1st Armored Division in Iraq last year, but who emphasizes that his views, opinions, and conclusions are his, not the brigade's, the division's, the Army's, the Pentagon's, Joe Torre's, or anyone else's.

His findings:

• Shiite sheikhs, as well as Sunni ones, perceived the central government as a subsidiary of the Iranian government. "Even by Shia, ... the members of it are viewed as either Iranian agents or Iranians."

• The central government isn't providing services, and so is disconnected from the tribes. "The lack of tethering ... of governmental structures to the most powerful socio-cultural dynamic in Iraq, the tribal system, is worrying." This lack threatens to undo the political gains of the last couple of years. "The concern is that unless the population layer, which is tribally oriented, is fully activated and brought into the mix, the hard work, grounded in the COIN reality of empowering the lowest levels,...will fail."

• The two groups with "broad based indigenous support in Iraq are the Sawha/SOI who are tribally oriented and the Sadrists." I am not quite sure what to make of this conclusion, except that certainly isn't where the U.S. government has placed its bets.

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Today I ran into an expert on Iraq who argued that I am being too optimistic, that a civil war is inevitable. He agreed that American troops are the glue holding the place together, but said that the American people will demand they be withdrawn, no matter what the possible consequences.   

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Juan Cole's blog has a good essay by Adam Silverman, who deployed to Iraq last year as an advisor in the 1st Armored Division. Here is his conclusion about how the Maliki government is undermining American goals in Iraq. (In it, "SOI" means "Sons of Iraq," the official U.S. government term for turned insurgents, while "GOI" means "government of Iraq" and "ISF" means "Iraqi security forces"):

All of these attempts to erode the Awakening Council and SOI, all clearly part of the politics and politicking within and around the GOI, seriously undermine the transition from Coalition Forces' control to Iraqi control. While the SOI are hardly perfect, in many neighborhoods and areas they were perceived as being an important component to establishing and enhancing security, and have often been well regarded by their local ISF counterparts. The GOI's unwillingness and/or inability to properly incorporate them into the ISF and the GOI structure, will make progress going forward that much harder, risks the hard won and expensively fragile stability that has developed, and risks destabilizing Iraq as US and Coalition Forces began to pull way back and transition out of theater over the next twelve to eighteen months."

Meanwhile, former secretary of State Condoleezza Rice thinks that Iraq is "on its way to becoming a strategic asset" of the United States. Someone in Baghdad who didn't get that memo set off a bunch of car bombs that killed about three dozen people today.

Wathiq Khuzaie/Getty Images