Planning on attacking Iran? "Better pack a lunch," advises my friend, retired Lt. Col. Terry Daly, who knows a lot about war. His point was that airstrikes alone against Iranian nuclear facilities wouldn't do much. If you are going to attack Iran, you need to hit its ability to retaliate, and that means that pretty soon you have a big fat war on your hands.

I can't believe we are discussing this. I am hearing lots of depressing talk that there is a good chance that Israel will attack Iran sometime this year and that we will get sucked into the ensuing mess. In some ways, there already is a kind of shadow war under way with Iran -- Stuxnet, the drone intrusions, the recent explosions and assassinations, the sanctions.

But for all that, I just can't see Obama getting us involved in another Middle Eastern war. The American people certainly have no appetite for it. I think he almost certainly would lose reelection if a war broke out, because his base would fall apart and the left would go into opposition.

At any rate, an article by my CNAS colleague Colin Kahl that went up last night on the website of Foreign Affairs argues well that the "containment vs. attack" mindset is a false dilemma. In fact, he says, even if you attacked Iran, you'd still have to contain it afterward. So a series of airstrikes is not a substitute for containment, but a prelude to it.

"How does this end?" ask Elbridge Colby and Austin Long. Their answer: Not well. They advocate instead a policy of containment. I think they are right.

Also, someone killed another Iranian nuclear scientist. What do the little grasshoppers think of this assassination program?  I'd be interested in reading a history of targeted killings of weapons scientists and dealers. As I recall, the French killed arms dealers who were supplying the Algerian rebels during that war.

Wired' s "Danger Room" has a fun contest to guess Iran's next plot against America, such as "Build a giant horse, fill it with Quds operatives and leave it on the Tijuana side of the border." My favorite: "Finance Sarah Palin's campaign for President in the 2012 elections."

Not a good sign if the Kurdish militia is stepping to in the province as the Americans are heading for the exits.

By Joseph Sarkisian
Best Defense bureau of Iranian affairs

The Marine Corps University's recently published monograph titled, The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran, brings to light an unconventional viewpoint on Iranian grand strategy. Its author, Michael Eisenstadt, dispels the myths surrounding Iranian policy while providing an in-depth analysis of the creative calculus the regime uses when making its decisions at home and abroad. It is this calculus that the United States must solve in order to achieve more effective engagement.

Eisenstadt makes the case that the Iranian regime operates in a very pragmatic, calculated manner as opposed to the image of an "irrational, 'undeterrable' state with a high pain threshold," that its leadership likes to portray. Being able to see past the rhetoric of holocaust denial, destruction of Israel, and fears of a nuclear apocalypse, which Iran intentionally uses to paint itself as a fearsome enemy, will be key to making tangible diplomatic progress.

In his view, the image of Iran as an irrational actor is overblown -- but the idea that Iran seeks to become a regional power capable of exerting influence over the entire region and becoming the guardian of Islam is real. Iranian defense planning is formed around this goal, as well as to deter potential adversaries and to achieve self-reliance from the outside world.

The argument that, "The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) is an unconventional adversary that requires unconventional approaches in planning, strategy and policy" is underscored by the fact that the conventional method of sanctioning to change behavior has done nothing to stop uranium enrichment.

The unconventional approach suggested by Eisenstadt suggests a rewriting of the policy manual on Iran. The United States must spend less time countering Iranian hard power and more time countering its even stronger soft power, pay more attention to the effectiveness of Iranian psychological warfare, and brainstorm better ways to pierce the veil of Iranian ambiguity. Once more of these unconventional tactics are implemented, the end of the 32-year diplomatic stalemate may finally come within reach.

The Iranian president was going on today about a secret American plan to sabotage Pakistan's nukes. I thought he might be onto something in a Seymour Hersh-like way until I got to his revelation of American plans for a "massive presence" of presumably American and allied troops in Pakistan. I can honestly say I don't know of one American, in government or out, who thinks that sending a bunch of troops into Pakistan is a good idea. Not one.

Meanwhile, just to be helpful, Iran has deployed submarines to the Red Sea. I wonder if this is to pressure Saudi Arabia over the crackdown in Bahrain. But that is just a guess because I don't know enough about the Middle East to know if I am even in the ballpark. Maybe it is a response to the Israeli move of submarines through the Suez Canal nearly two years ago.

Here's an interesting comment made in yesterday's Senate Armed Services Hearing by one Gen. David Petraeus:

…the Iranians seem almost conflicted, frankly. On the one hand, they don't want the Taliban to come back. This is obviously an ultra, ultra conservative, some elements extreme -- extremist Sunni movement. They are, of course, a Shia state with a Sunni minority. So they're really not happy to see that happen.

Beyond that, though, they also don't want us to succeed too easily. And they certainly want to have influence in whatever state does evolve in their neighbor to the east.

A thoughtful BD reader asks what the fallout from political upheaval of the Middle East will be for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. He suspects that there will be less Arab money flowing to the Taliban, and so an opportunity for the U.S. to finish its work and leave. I don't know about that, but I think it is a good overall question. It will have some impact in Iraq, I think -- and already has had a bit. Afghanistan is more distant from the events, and doesn't think of itself as Arab. But if the unrest starts accelerating change in Iran, then that will certainly affect neighboring Afghanistan and Iraq.

Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, had an upbeat take at the Pentagon yesterday (Tues.) on the situation with Iran: "Iran is the real loser here, whether they want to admit it or not. And they've had no hand in the change sweeping the region, except they one they have used to slap back their own people."

A friend said to me recently that the time to worry about Iran getting frisky in Iraq is at the end of this year, when the Status of Forces Agreement expires, and U.S. forces all have to leave. There inevitably will be a dragged-out round of negotiations about the post-2011 American presence, he said, and during that Iran likely will enjoy free rein in Iraq. Unless they are too busy at home ...

Meanwhile, the new issue of West Point's CTC Sentinel foresees trouble on the horizon for the Muslim Brotherhood:

The next few months, however, will see the Brotherhood pushed out of its comfort zone and forced to play a more explicit political role. Given the presence of ideological trends inside the group hesitant to take on this role, it is likely that the requirements of an increased political profile will exacerbate internal divisions. To be sure, the group has, in recent years, developed internal consultative mechanisms that increase its ability to resolve debates while maintaining organizational cohesion. Yet with the advent of Egyptian democracy, this may not be enough. Repression, for all the problems it caused the Brotherhood, served to unify its ranks. When survival is at stake, a group can postpone answering difficult questions. Now, for the first time in decades, the Brotherhood will have little choice but to face them.

As for Libya, old Juan Cole estimates that Qaddafi has lost 90 percent of the country.

My CNAS colleague Amanda Pfabe wondered what was on the mind of former CIA director Michael Hayden. This is what she found.

Personally, I wish the general worried a bit more about the damage done to America by the government's embrace of torture as a policy under President Bush.

By Amanda Pfabe
Best Defense All American roving correspondent

Retired Air Force Gen. Michael Hayden, former director of the CIA, spoke the other day at Johns Hopkins University's Rethinking Seminar about six security concerns that would keep him up at night were he still in the government. All six, he said, have a degree of imminence to them:

No. 1: Proliferation (specifically concerning Iran)
Hayden noted that answering questions pertaining to Iranian nuclear capabilities is easier to do than articulating how the Iranian government makes decisions. No one seems to know who or what influences policy. The confusion and mixed messages coming from Tehran surrounding the detention of the three American hikers, two of whom are still being held in Iran, in 2009 underscores the fact that Iran is a fully functioning society with a fully dysfunctional government.  

His scary bottom line: Iran's quest to obtain nuclear weapons is a means to deterring the United States. Attempts to affect their nuclear capability, such as Stuxnet, will simply make them more committed to that quest.

No. 2: China
Hayden was quick to explain that China is not necessarily an enemy, as there are "logical non-heroic policies available to both sides" that can prevent conflicts. However, China's recent international behavior, such as the Chinese fishing boat's collision with Japanese coast guard vessels, can be described as triumphal and akin to that of a teenager whose strength has outstripped his judgment, experience, and wisdom. Several structural problems, including its uneven distribution of wealth, gender imbalance, and environmental disasters, promise to cause growing pains for China as it continues its ascent. Moreover, the legitimacy of the Communist Party governance is based on an unsustainable ten percent GDP growth per year. 

Read on

Recently, my CNAS colleague Greg McGowan, who is helping with research on my next book, eluded the Smokies on I-95 to go to zoom down to Quantico and retrieve some obscure documents about the Korean War, among other things. Being a policy nerd, while he was there he dropped by a lecture on Iranian foreign policy -- for CNAS staffers, that's like seeing Kanye West do a sultry duet with Angelina Jolie.

By Gregory McGowan
Best Defense bureau of the hard facts about soft power

Too often, Washington crafts foreign policy based on its own confined rational pretenses, thinking that if we do this, then that will be the outcome. But what happens when we are dealing with a regime or an organization whose reality -- its so-called "rational compass" -- is calibrated completely different from our own? This is the scenario Michael Eisenstadt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy sees with Iran.

The point of departure for our strategy should be the unconventional nature of the Iranian regime, Eisenstadt said in a recent talk at the Marine Corps University.

Here is how he suggested we respond to its reliance on soft-power tactics:

1. We must, if only momentarily, set aside our reality and enter theirs. "If one's own perceptions guide their actions, then their perceptions become reality," Eisenstadt said. The Islamic Republic of Iran was forged by revolutionaries determined to export their brand of fundamental Shiite Islam throughout the region. To a great degree, the theocrats in charge today abide by that precedent. This means that the regime's main consideration must be the interest of the state, as the survival of "Iran's Islam" is dependent upon the survival of the regime.

2. Understand that Iranian politics are guided by strong cultural undertones. One of the most significant Persian traditions is their capacity to endure: to fight a war of attrition. To perfect the doctrine of resistance. To achieve victory not by seizing land or suffocating an enemy's resources, but by waging a psychological battle until the enemy is so demoralized that he throws in the towel. Say what you want about them, the government in Tehran chooses its battles wisely. They fight in arenas they know they can win. They are the soft-power maestros, waging their physical battles through proxy militias (the Revolutionary Guards, Hezbollah, Hamas) on enemy ground, complemented by calculated policies (the nuclear program, anti-Semitic rhetoric, manipulating Iraqi politics, the list goes on...) from within. In this context, Iran doesn't necessarily need to physically possess a nuclear weapon to use the nuclear program to its advantage. The regime has used the psychological dimension of its nuclear pursuit to increase its soft power and frustrate its foes with a policy of ambiguity. This practice of "strategic patience," as he calls it, is a culturally engrained Persian ideal, permeating the country's religious and literary traditions.

3. Eisenstadt put forth a very strong case for Washington's need to recalibrate its strategic compass so that it can fight soft power with soft power. We must enter Iran's world in order to play this game, and upon entering this parallel universe, we must remember that, "In Iran, nothing is as it seems." This means, first and foremost, that intelligence operations should be dramatically increased, he said. We must use intelligence to hit Tehran where it hurts: sabotage its nuclear program through cyberwarfare, defeat its proxy militias by being one step ahead of them, and support the majority of Iranians who are willing to fight for freedom and dignity. Accounting for Tehran's tremendous emphasis on unconventional warfare will allow Washington to craft a strategy that takes a vital step in the necessary direction of understanding the adversary, so that we may more effectively address the challenge ahead. Only once we enter their arena do we give ourselves a shot to win.

Mookie is back in Iraq.

Relevantly, Joel Wing analyzes rumors that Maliki promised the Sadrists the governorships of four southern provinces in Iraq. "On the other hand," Wing notes soberly, "he could renege on his promises as he's done with others in the past."

Move along, nothing to see here, says the vice president. Joe Biden assures the Wall Street Journal's hard-working Gerald Seib that, "The really untold story here is the Iranians had virtually no influence." That would be good news if it were true. But given Biden's multi-year track record as a counter-indicator on events in Iraq … I mean, wrong in '91, wrong in '03, wrong in '07.

Let's see what comes out of the Iranian foreign minister's visit today. No slapping!

Here is Wing's told ya so, Joe.

By Elbridge Colby
Best Defense containment bureau chief

In a widely-reported speech on Nov. 8 to the General Assembly of Jewish Federations of North America, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu bluntly reasserted his view that "[c]ontainment will not work against Iran" and therefore that "the only responsible policy is to prevent [Iran] from developing atomic bombs in the first place." Netanyahu left no doubt that he advocates the use of military force to achieve that goal. Nor is Netanyahu alone in promoting this view, not only in Israel and in the United States but elsewhere -- for example, the UAE's ambassador recently did so.

Without question, preventing an Iranian nuclear capability should be the objective of Washington and the international community, but is Netanyahu right that seeking to contain a nuclear Iran would be worse than taking military action to prevent Tehran from acquiring such weapons? 

Most arguments against using military force to stop Iran's nuclear program focus on the costs to us, but the truth is that a bombing campaign is not actually necessary. Rather, there is good reason to believe that Washington, Tel Aviv, and their associates can deter Iran from transgressing their vital interests even if Tehran gets a nuclear weapon. Why? Containment or deterrence requires, inter alia:

• A regime whose behavior can be substantially influenced by credible threats and which values certain things that can be held at risk of damage or destruction;
• That the demands of the deterring party are tolerable to the targeted country, given the scale of the threat issued;
• And that this threat is backed by real capability and will.

U.S. and Israeli containment of a nuclear Iran would satisfy these criteria. First, the Iranian regime is malevolent, but it is not crazy. The regime in Tehran is dangerous, but experience and common sense indicate that it is sufficiently rational to understand the calculus of cost and benefit. Second, Tehran is vulnerable -- that is, the Iranians have much that they value that the United States and Israel can hold at risk. Third, the United States, Israel, and their associates clearly have the capabilities to follow through on their threats; indeed, the military balance, especially at the higher levels of warfare, is drastically tilted in the West's direction. Fourth, what we would ask for is reasonable; the vital interests that Washington, Tel Aviv, and their associates would demand a nuclear Iran not transgress are essentially status quo and would not need to involve the forced transformation of the Iranian regime. 

Let's explore these points:

Read on

By Zachary Hosford
Best Defense nuclear warfare correspondent

As diplomacy falters and the potential for an Iranian nuclear weapon edges closer, public discourse has increasingly focused on U.S. and Israeli options for preventing such an outcome by other means. And of late, the option most thoroughly debated in government and on the pages of the policy journals is an Israeli military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities.

With his recent National Interest article and last week's accompanying talk to a small group of journalists, academics, and think tank analysts in the journal's Nixon Center office space, Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer, veteran policy advisor, and current Brookings senior fellow, not only predicted that an Israeli attack on Iran would be calamitous but added that preventing it would require us to turn our focus from Iran's nuclear program to Israel's. 

But first things first. Should Israel attempt to delay the Iranian program by force, he said, the result would be particularly disastrous for the United States. Iran, at the very least, would view an Israeli attack as being American-enabled-and perhaps explicitly approved -- which would prompt the regime in Tehran to retaliate directly against U.S. interests in the region. The drawdown of combat forces in Iraq as well as ongoing operations in Afghanistan would likely become significantly more challenging as Iran maximized its considerable influence in both countries.

So, Reidel continued, how can Washington forestall an Israeli attack? Sure, President Barack Obama could tell Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not to strike Iran, promise to withhold the "IFF" codes identifying attacking Israeli jets as friendlies to the U.S. military aircraft patrolling the Middle East's skies, and threaten to reduce or halt Israel's annual military aid dollars, but these actions -- even if successful -- could only supplement a more substantial and lasting approach.

The crux of Riedel's argument? Convince Israel that it is safe to abandon its decades-long policy of maintaining a monopoly on Middle Eastern nuclear weapons. This argument might be easier for Americans to swallow, but if the goal is to dissuade the Israelis from attacking Iran, it will be a tough sell.

Riedel reaches back to deterrence theory by proposing that the United States offer Israel the benefits of American nuclear umbrella. This, of course, only works if those with their fingers on the hypothetical Iranian nuclear button are rational, and Riedel's mention of the Netanyahu quote claiming Iran is "crazy" casts doubt on the views of the Israeli leadership, to say the least.

Though Riedel could very well be accurate in his analysis, in order to keep his deterrence argument intact he needs to downplay the possibility that Iran would transfer a nuclear weapon to a third party. So, perhaps not surprisingly, he does not offer any evidence for why Tehran would keep it nukes to itself. On the surface, it does seem as though a Hizbollah nuclear attack on Israel would not be in the interest of either Hizbollah or Iran, but gut feelings and hunches are not likely to convince the Israelis to sit back and watch while Iran goes nuclear.

The second part of the two-fold Riedel plan would call for the United States to bolster Israel's second strike capability. That is, once the U.S. eases the Israeli population's fears with promises to employ the formidable American nuclear force in the event the unthinkable occurs, an arsenal of American-supplied hardware would ensure that a stricken Israel would still be able to retaliate with its F-15Is, Jericho IRBMs, and increasingly sophisticated missile defense system. This would enable permit Israel to maintain strategic dominance, even facing a nuclear Iran. Among other items, Riedel advocates selling F-22s to Israel, though they are probably not the most appropriate platform for Israeli defense needs, and are perhaps further obviated by recent Israeli cabinet agreement to allow the United States to give Israel 20 stealthy new F-35s.

Of course, one problem with publicly boosting the Israeli deterrent -- which Riedel readily admits -- is that it is exceedingly difficult to do without first acknowledging that Israel possesses nuclear weapons. While Israel should, in fact, officially announce its arsenal, there is little benefit for it in doing so, at least at the moment. It would gain little, given that everyone knows of the Israeli nukes anyway, and could potentially entangle them in international debates over the NPT and a nuclear-free zone.

So, could the U.S. out them instead? Doubtful. Washington has been extremely hesitant to adopt a tough approach toward Israel in the past, but if an Israeli action might risk significant consequences to U.S. personnel and strategic interests, perhaps we will be surprised …

Browsing Jeffrey Goldberg's Atlantic Monthly article on a possible Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, I thought once again that the more Israeli officials chat with journalists about it, the less likely I think it is to happen.

But then I got a note from retired Army Col. Peter Mansoor, formerly a brigade commander in Iraq, then a close advisor to Gen. Petraeus, and now a history professor at Ohio State, home of one of the best military history programs in the country. And I began to worry.  

By Peter Mansoor
Best Defense guest columnist

Whether it is Israel or the United States that attacks Iranian nuclear facilities, the Iranians will respond by trying to close the Straits of Hormuz and unleashing terror attacks in the ME and around the world. In the event of an attack, the United States will have to destroy Iran's capacity to close the straits, which means destroying their anti-ship missile batteries, submarines, aircraft, and the assortment of small boats and mine layers that can wreak havoc on Gulf shipping. Israel will no doubt have to invade southern Lebanon again to suppress the inevitable barrage of missiles from Hezbollah. The West will have to go on high alert against terror attacks.

The oil shock alone will no doubt spiral the West into a double dip recession/depression.

Not a pretty picture to contemplate, but a likely scenario. Despite the crowd of academics in the United States that says we can live with an Iranian bomb, Israel will not allow the Iranians to go nuclear -- at least, not while a Holocaust denier who has made pointed threats against the Jewish state remains in power.