Monday, December 3, 2012 - 6:15 AM
I'm finished with non-stop book touring, but still giving talks here and there. Tonight (Monday, 3 Dec.) at 7:30 I will be at the Hill Center in Washington, D.C., about 10 blocks southeast of the Capitol.
Tomorrow night (Tuesday, 4 Dec.) will find me in Richmond, Virginia, speaking at 5:30 the Jefferson Hotel at an event sponsored by the George C. Marshall Foundation.
Thence back to D.C. and a talk at the National War College at noon on Thursday, Dec. 6.
And no TV this week, if at all possible.
By the way, I think Best Defense commenters should resist the temptation to respond to partisan trolls. I feel like we have an infestation right now. They thrive on attention, irrationality, and incivility.
CHAD FOSTER
4:40 PM ET
December 4, 2012
Great read!
Sir,
I thoroughly enjoyed your newest book, "The Generals." I found the discussion of George Mashall and his "system" fascinating. My favorite portion was the examination of DePuy and his legacy.
A few things that I thought of as I read:
1. Is it harder to relieve senior leaders today because of the fact that these wars are so controversial. The elected leadership's political fortunes are so tied to the progress of the wars (the former President Bush and Iraq being an example) that firing a general in the middle of the fight is seen as an admission of failed policy? Wouldn't the political leaders see this as an unnecessary ammunition to provide to their critics? I know that part of your main argument is that the military leadership should be policing its own ranks and not waiting for the politicians to do it for them. But when the top brass is taking into account the "politics" (not the Clausewitzian conept, but the rough and tumble partisan world inside the beltway), it undoubtedly makes it more difficult to do so.
2. Is the favoring of a tactical emphasis over strategic thinking just the result of the fact that it is easier to master tactics than it is strategy? I'm not sure the US has ever had a truly great strategic mind, although there are a few arguments to be made. Your contrast of training vs. education in the book was right on the money. It takes education to be startegic in one's outlook ... and it takes a long time to educate. However, training can be accomplished in a relatively short period of time. It all just seems like the natural tendency to take the easier path and stay within one's comfort zone.
3. I think that the elements of COIN that seem to come up in most discussions (distribution of troops to live and operate among the population) is about the tactics of COIN and not strategy. The strategic elements of COIN vary depending on the operational environment. For example, determining how to deal with various tribes, ethnic groups, the indigenous military, national political leaders, neighboring countries ... these are all elements of strategy in COIN, but these get less attention than the tactical stuff - which is, understandably, much easier to comprehend (see comment #2).