Interesting all of the recent talk about cutting civilian faculty at AWC and CGSC and the hand wringing that it signals a decline in the quality of PME. Prior to our current conflicts, the presence of civilian faculty was a relative rarity. When my Dad went through CGSC in '68 and AWC in '81, I remember zero. When I went to CGSC in 2001-2002, there were precious few civilians, except in CSI/History Dept. As I walked through Bliss Hall this past year, I didn't see large numbers of civilian faculty showing up in faculty photos until 5-7 years ago. One of my AWC instructors, a former uniformed instructor and now civilian faculty, told the seminar that most don't know how close the Army came to shutting down the War College in 2005 to provide manpower for Iraq. Hiring more civilian faculty was part of the solution.

Now that those hired to fill the gap created by the wars are getting let go, it is seen as some sort of decline, or anti-intellectual conspiracy by the "knuckle-draggers." Reality is that it is part of the natural flow of mobilization and demobilization during and after a conflict. How much of the angst is over real degradation, and how much is folks concerned that their retirement jobs are going away? I will leave that for those currently at those institutions to figure out.

Of more concern is the larger question of what the Army values and where it puts its (supposedly) best and brightest so as to capitalize on our last 10 years of lessons learned, unlearned, and relearned. Other than perhaps duty in the 80's-90's as an observer/controller at a CTC, or perhaps a period when at least in the Infantry, which I can speak for, a concerted effort was made to put quality guys in Career Course instructor slots, a TRADOC/Training assignment has not been highly sought after or valued. Most "successful" battalion and brigade commanders, if not staying on to be a Div G3 or CofS appear to be steered to duty as executive officer to a senior general officer or key joint staff jobs. Seeking a teaching assignment is viewed (I think wrongly) as something for those who wish to coast to retirement and avoid deployment or field duty (and in some cases, this is a self-fulfilling prophecy). Training battalions and brigades are viewed, also wrongly, as "second tier" commands going to the also-rans in the pool of commanders. It's a shame, because some of these recent and current commanders could do much more for the future of our Army in the Training Base than as horse-holder to a general.

All this is quite different from pre- WWII when it appears that duty as an instructor or trainer was valued and a pre-requisite for moving into the Army's upper echelons. Marshall and his cadre at Fort Benning (Patton, Eisenhower, Bradley, etc) are the most notable examples. When TRADOC was a power to be reckoned with under General Depuy in the 70's, he sought out many of the Army's best and leveraged the Army's school system and training centers to rebuild the Army after Vietnam. You can argue his technique, and endlessly debate the type of Army he built, but he got it done and something similar needs to happen today.

Hmmm, so how many colonel friends does cdrinf know who are angling for orders to Fort Leavenworth or Carlisle--or career viable LTC friends still on active duty for that matter? And do they meet the criteria for being graduate level instructors in PME? Oh, that's right, ANYONE can teach in adult education once they are promoted to a certain level (0-4?0-5?). Or could it be that one of the few beneficial second and third order effects of the post-911 experience has actually eqauted to an improvement in the PME faculties around the country? Or not, but let's seem some real analysis on this point instead of reverting to myths to counter so-called myths.

That said, a trip to Jorg Muth's book Command Culture is a useful corrective for some of the interwar myths about the US officer corps,--or for something shorter for the busy colonel, some of the things Dan Bolger wrote when he was assigned to CSI and teaching military history at Fort Leavenworth "back in the day." I recommend an internet search, for example, for "Zero Defects: Command Climate in the First U.S. Army, 1944-1945." Military Review (1991). Bolger's "Ghosts of Omdurman," which he lives with on a daily basis now in the Army's most thankless job in Afghanistan, is also worth reading. Yes, I refer to the former G-3 of the Army, General Daniel P. Bolger.

The other issue is shrinkage of the faculty. The student class size is still the same. The number of instructors is now fewer because the Army ain't hiring. The green suiters ARE NOT coming in the numbers needed. Right now, according to my OPMEP (CJSC 1800.01D), CGSS is in violation of the instructor the student ratio mandated for ILC. Where is the PAJE team when you need em? Finally, I have made no secret that I think all the sister service or joint operations curriculum billets in these colleges should be J-coded. That will help "push" some active duty officers with viable careers back into PME.
regards,
bowie

CDRINF, good comments. I found the whole notion that we almost shut down the AWC in 2005 the most astonishing, truth be told. Last time we did that was for a mass mobilization, existential war against two peer competitors---a big war; not a small war/imperial policiing operation. More disturbing, I find it hard to believe that the senior leadership of our Army thought with any amount of belief that the shortfall in our operations in Iraq in 2005 was due to a lack of 05s and 06s in theater.

As a FG who has operated/commanded/led/served at BN, BDE, and DIV levels in this war in both IZ and AFG, I have found that we mostly had too many folks over there (all ranks), mostly doing nothing but eating chow, shitting it out, and going to salsa night.

Someone teaching graduate level courses without a Ph. D. and a significant record of published research is akin to teaching airborne training based on having 'watched it being done." This is nuts.