Power wins wars, but a lot depends on what kind of power you use and when

Posted By Thomas E. Ricks Monday, October 22, 2012 - 7:20 AM Share

By Col. Jason Brown, USAF

Best Defense guest columnist

In years to come, historians will ask important questions about the role of power in the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns. Specifically, they will ask how Afghanistan became America's longest war, and how we were able to invade and leave Iraq within the bookends of the Afghan conflict. It is especially hard to understand how we recovered power in Iraq after Abu Ghraib and a fractious civil war. Although arguments over what we accomplished in Iraq will endure for years, we regained enough power to leave Iraq without a debate. We subsequently attempted to carry the momentum of the Iraq counterinsurgency campaign to Afghanistan in 2009, but still struggle to achieve something resembling the ambiguous success in Iraq. The disappointment in Afghanistan goes beyond a misapplication of what worked in Iraq; the power equation between Iraq and Afghanistan was altogether different.

In war, power wins. Individuals often confuse military might with power, but in reality, there are many power factors relevant to the outcome of war. Power flows from diplomatic, political, and economic strength as well as strategic, operational, and tactical effectiveness. Sound analysis of warfare will avoid focusing on any one of these sources, and will instead examine relevant power, which accounts for the interplay of power sources within the context of conditions and rivals in a war.

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, our relevant power ebbed and flowed due to changes in our power sources. We did not have adequate power to influence conditions in Iraq before 2007 due to limitations across the power spectrum, from diplomacy to military tactics. Changes in leadership and an effective counterinsurgency campaign adjusted our relevant power to influence the human terrain, the adversary, and the diplomatic and political environment. While many credit the increase in U.S. troops as the key factor in the Iraq campaign, in reality political settlements with the Sunni population, a counterproductive terror campaign by Al Qaeda, and the decision by Iran to no longer incite Shia resistance had greater impacts on stability and thus increased the coalition's relevant power. As conditions changed in Iraq, military coercion became relevant when we coupled it with an acceptable political alternative. In contrast, increasing economic pressures, tensions with Iran and Pakistan, and corruption within the Karzai government have likely created insurmountable conditions for a similar outcome in Afghanistan. Consequently, our military-centric Afghanistan "surge" lacked the political component which boosted our relevant power in Iraq.

Additionally, the Taliban affected the power equation in Afghanistan by using available time and space, provided by our shift in focus to Iraq, to mitigate our counterinsurgency campaign. The Taliban attacked our strategy directly by weathering drone strikes in their Pakistan safe havens, and adopting tactics with strategic payoff-namely IED, high profile, and insider attacks. They understand the parameters of our relevant power in Afghanistan, and to some degree, they learned how to leverage their own power to counter ours.

To understand the relevant power equation between Iraq and Afghanistan, we must keep two things in mind. First, we cannot assume political, economic, or military strength will translate from one conflict to another or will even endure throughout a war. Because power fluctuates between and within wars, the conditions that define a conflict provide the first measuring stick for relevant power. Conditions in Iraq were eventually ripe for our power to influence the political and security situation. Not so in Afghanistan. Second, we cannot always compensate for deficiencies in one source of power by increasing strength in another. War is a duel, and any ability to adjust or adapt depends on the capability of our adversary to do the same. The Taliban exploited conditions to evolve into a strategically savvy opponent, whereas Al Qaeda in Iraq diminished due to their own strategic ineffectiveness. Our relevant power depends on internal factors as well as the external ability of our opponent to counter our strengths, exploit our weaknesses, and adapt and influence at a faster rate.

Power plays the leading role in war, but assessing power is not straightforward. Iraq and Afghanistan proved power in war is neither broadly applicable nor enduring, it is relevant to changes in conditions, our opponents, and ourselves. Good strategy must account for the give-and-take between power sources, and their changing value within and between conflicts. It is far easier for strategists to measure strength in isolation and assume it translates to power, but that shortcut does not serve them well when preparing for war. Success in war requires an understanding of when and how to expend or preserve power -- and when and how to end a war in order to retain future freedom of action. The consequences for misunderstanding relevant power could cause a nation with considerable military might to lose a war by stubbornly pursuing an unrealistic end state, significantly draining its power in the process. Avoiding that outcome requires asking two simple questions. When told our nation inherently possesses power due to military, political and economic strength, our military strategists and the policymakers they serve should ask, "power to do what ... to whom?"

Colonel Jason Brown is an active duty Air Force officer attending the Air War College. He is a graduate of the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting. He commanded the 13th Intelligence Squadron and has deployed to multiple locations including Iraq and Afghanistan. The conclusions and opinions expressed are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or Air University.

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JPWREL

1:55 PM ET

October 22, 2012

Col. Jason Brown’s remarks

Col. Jason Brown’s remarks are all well and good but I think that over the past decade a lot of people in and out of the armed forces have been making the exact same observations. Not meaning to be impolite but there is not much new here. What would be new would be the powers that be actually demonstrate that they have learned something from experience and I don’t see much evidence of that.

 

MARTY MARTEL

3:36 PM ET

October 22, 2012

Power wins wars, but a lot depends on what kind of power you use

Sometimes power is trumped by a duplicitous ally as is the case with Afghanistan.

Retired Admiral Mike Mullen told the US Senate Armed Services Committee on 22-Sept-2011 as follows: ‘The fact remains that the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani Network operate from Pakistan with impunity. (These) Extremist organizations serving as proxies of the government of Pakistan are attacking Afghan troops and civilians as well as U.S. soldiers. For example, we believe the Haqqani Network—which has long enjoyed the support and protection of the Pakistani government and is, in many ways, a strategic arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Agency—is responsible for the September 13th attacks against the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. There is ample evidence confirming that the Haqqanis were behind the June 28th, 2011 attack against the Inter-Continental Hotel in Kabul and the September 10th, 2011 truck bomb attack that killed five Afghans and injured another 96 individuals, 77 of whom were U.S. soldiers. The actions by the Pakistani government to support them (Quetta Shura and the Haqqani Network ) —actively and passively—represent a growing problem that is undermining U.S. interests (in Afghanistan).’

Following are the verbatim quotes from what Gen (rtd) Jack Keane said at a discussion on Afghanistan organized by the Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based think-tank on 6/30/2011:
1. "The truth is, the (Pakistani) ISI aids and abets the sanctuaries in Pakistan that the Afghan (Taliban) operate out of. They (ISI) provide training for them, they provide resources for them and they provide intelligence for them. From those sanctuaries, every single day Afghan fighters come into Afghanistan and kill and maim us".
2. "There's a direct relationship of (Pakistani) ISI's complicity and the deaths of American soldiers and the catastrophic wounding of those soldiers.
3. "There are two ammonium nitrate factories in Pakistan. 80 per cent of the explosive devices that are used to kill our soldiers, kill Afghan security forces and kill Afghan people come from Pakistan.”
4. "All of what I just said to you, when we confront them (Pakistanis) with this, they lie to us.”

As Washington Post reporter Bob Woodward said not long ago, Pakistan is living a lie.

And the very fact that US continues to shower same Pakistan with billions in aid year in and year out ever since 2001 shows the sheer helplessness of American power against duplicitous Pakistan. US can not use its aid leverage to force Pakistani government to crush Haqqani/Mullah Omar terror networks because US needs Pakistani supply routes to maintain its troops in Afghanistan. This is Pakistani blackmail – pure and simple and US has willingly succumbed to it.

So in a way, US government itself is complicit in the deaths/injuries of its own troops as well as that of NATO troops and Afghan civilians and troops at the hands of Pakistani government supported/sheltered/protected Haqqani/Mullah Omar terror networks operating from Pakistani soil.

The worst part is US continues to claim that Pakistan is threatened by the same terrorists as US! How can Pakistan be threatened by the same terrorists as US when Pakistani governments have been supporting, sheltering and protecting those very terrorists?

 

RVN SF VET

7:43 PM ET

October 22, 2012

Power wins wars, but a lot depends on what kind of power you use

"REPLY" to a specific comment appears to be broken.

We could have taken the bribery money we give to Pakistan and used it to rebuild the Northern route to include improving the failing Russian tunnel.

Some of Pakistan's internal enemies are our enemies - just to confuse things. Pakistan, like Saudi Arabia, bribes and supports the very elements inclined to overthrow them. One key element in our Pakistan policy is safeguarding their nuclear weapons which are threatened by these very same groups. This threat is one of the few valid reasons for keeping some SOF forces in Afghanistan.

 

KYZL ORDA

9:25 PM ET

October 22, 2012

Power wins wars, but alot depends on what kind of power you use

Thank you for this thought-provoking article. It’s important for our citizens, civilian and military, to also demand answers: “power to do what .. to whom” as well as ask for what outcomes?

The upshot of our power? For the first time ever, the Iranian defense minister was able to address the Iraqi parliament last spring and talk of security cooperation between the Iranian region and Iraq as well as praise the departure of our troops. We have wave after wave of fundamentalist groups getting elected to governments, and likely once we draw down further in Afghanistan, that country is reverting to the Taliban. Iran is in a stronger position. The economies are still in tatters and costly development programs seemed to benefit our contractors and certain in-country officials but never really got to be operational. Remember the great utility grid project we were to develop in Afghanistan? Project feasibility studies, if done, were very shoddy. We don’t talk about the human cost, the deepening of hostility toward our policies though with irony we might have improved relations with fundamentalists. A member of the Syrian opposition days ago requested a ‘Marshall Plan’ from us recently.

The irony is we don’t have much of any kind of security in Iraq or Afghanistan – ie political, societal, economic, military, etc. Unfortunately, our language only references military security, ignoring these other kinds of critical security. The American public was sold this was a war to preserve “freedoms”– never really defined – and to rout Al Qaeda and the Taliban, not preserve or expand power for our nation.

We also totally ignored the history and foundations of the countries we went into and never bothered to learn the languages of Iraq or Afghanistan. It’s Washington that has to hear us, not the indigenous communities for which we had/have oversight and where we and they are doing the living and dying, right? Unfortunately, our lack of awareness influenced us not only to make wrong decisions but to misread situations, get exploited, and be made vulnerable. We later got into conducting survey after survey, but a lot of these surveys were repetitive in theme and too late, and focused on themes that were Iraq 101 or Afghanistan 101 and should have been understood BEFORE going in. The administration that launched both wars sidelined Americans with critical knowledge of the region and language skills. Instead, preference was to hire people without any knowledge of the region for critical positions or contract out, bringing in either cronies or people who didn’t care about the importance of their job, except for the money. While the military was pursuing one direction, unfortunately there were other “interests” going in different directions, and here we are

 

Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.

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