"You have to decide who is going to get the access if you only have two for the fight." Yea, ain't that the truth. . .hopefully, the good Major has been on the less forthcoming end, and can emphasize, as opposed to asking for sympathy.

Anyway, good concise comments from the Major. . .remembering a major many moons ago that took me aside after I asked him what happened to my request, answering, "it hardly seems fair does it?"

Read any recommendations on counter-insurgency, and they always emphasize the small units. Something like "Counter-insurgency is one or lost at the company or platoon level." But look at what our battalion commanders can do now: with UAVs, command structures, radios and GPS the S-3 can fight the war for the companies and platoons on the ground. Often the reason decisions like support have to be made is because higher units don't push any real decision making down to lower level units. The most egregious examples are the fact that no brigade or even Regional Command, controls their own Air Force or aviation assets. How's that for directive leadership?

Finally, as a platoon leader I heard constantly about over-worked staffs at the battalion level, especially this idea that S-3s and such worked 20 hour days. Then I moved up to staff and found out how much time S-3s and their staffs wasted on trivial stuff. The best way to know this was an anecdote. Invariably, the staffs, like S-3s, were all in their office. However, the moment the non-secure internet (NIPR) went down, suddenly battalion headquarters was a ghost town, even if the secure internet (SIPR), the thing needed for work was up.

A battalion S-3 should not work 20 hour days, unless they are terrible at time management, delegating or both.

He has done a tremendous service to his profession and his country by helping bridge the gap between the military and the media.

Anyone who has deployed a couple of times has a range of experience with reporters, embedded and otherwise. Some good, some not so good. Some horrible and damaging.

Greg Jaffe is a guy who takes the time to learn the context and report the truth fairly -- not to make the biggest splash, but to give the most accurate picture (warts and all.) Everyone I have known who has worked with him in theater respects him greatly.

One of the hardest things about being an S3 is that sometimes you have to hand out the sandwiches, knowing that some of them are sh*tty, and there are lives on the line. Not all risks can be mitigated.

Even in the midst of a war if you are pulling 20 hour days in the 3 shop you are doing something wrong. You aren't capitalizing on your people or you are micro-managing. You are also losing effectiveness from lack of sleep and no doubt making dumb decisions as a result. I learned early on as a PLT leader - from my great exemplar CO CDR - that even in the midst of the most difficult field exercises 6 hrs in a day was attainable.

For me I had to fight the opposite notion. I had a higher headquarters that insisted that only field grades make decisions in my TOC. I made sure that there was always a field grade available on the installation (a phone call or approx 100 paces away from the TOC) but politely allowed my Battle CPTs to do their job (I was the BN CDR).

As for making all those life or death decisions, I thought that was largely the role of the BN CDR, not the S3. Maybe I need to recycle, give me another BN and I promise I'll do better the second time around.

Hunter is right, 20 hrs a day is too much, makes you stupid. You can carry a ruck or drive a truck for 20 hrs a day better than you can make good decisions.

If you gotta sleep during the day, sleep during the day. I realize that is when Higher HQs activate the Q&A machine, let your Battle Cpts handle most of that.

What REALLY gets on MAJs nerves is working all day and half the night between deployments. That is really stupid, but I'd regularly have my old staff groups calling from Ft Somewhere at 2200 (they are nice polite young officers so won't call any later than that) and say; "I knew why I was working 20 hrs a day while deployed, I don't know why I am working 20 hr days at Ft Campbell!?!?" Same rule applies in garrison, you tend not to get any smarter after the first 12-14-16 hrs of work.

The 20-hour work day is impossible, so it must be spin to impress us dimwits. Groggy folks do stupid things, like allowing five units to become involved in fights when you only have assets to support two.

I've always supported the idea of two command groups, A and B, each working a 12 hour shift. I saw it used in one exercise and it worked perfectly. Another advantage is that if an enemy strike mauls one command group, the other is ready. Otherwise officers feel pressure to impress the boss by pretending to work 20-hour days, and screwing up from fatigue and falling asleep "on duty" at critical times.

But the generals don't like the dual command concept, because it doesn't match their unit T/O diagram.

Twenty hour work days aside, the most important mindset that seperates the good staff officer from the also ran, is that he knows if his recommendation and/or plan is accepted by the commander, and given the go ahead to implement, in the end it effects the rank and file of the command.

That good staff officer, and specifically an operations officer will also know that he may work for the old man, but he also recognizes he works for the troops. . .never forgetting Henry Ford's axiom that motion shouldn't be confused for action. . .always planning backwards from the implementation to the finished product, keeping in mind the finished product isn't to make him look good, but to accomplish something actionably good.

My issue during my time in uniform is that I didn't have enough staff time, but what little I had, I recognized it was my job to have big shoulders for everyone to stand on, not for me to stand on everyone else's shoulders.

This has been a great blog for me to ramble on and I appreciate the opportunity. I find I have to leave for awhile, but I will return. However, unlike MacArthur, it won't be three years hence.

Fair Wind and good luck to everyone.

Great comments. I agree with most that working 20-hour days is ludicrous, at least on a continual basis.

As an Army, we suck at getting staffs to work efficiently. We are a "U". Most BN or BDE staff officers have simply never seen what right looks like. I know I haven't. I have seen staffs that get stuff done, but they are almost always the "20-hour day" types and end up getting burned out after a very short time.

What does it say when a presumably effective S3 is telling the world that -- at best, it seems -- his unit can handle only 40% of the battle tasks in front of it? And no experienced BD reader thinks that unusual?

Staff life is brutal as a SNCO or officer. Being on staff is similar to communism; there's really no advantage to working harder or longer because you'll get paid the same amount or be in the office until 1800 either way. There's no "light" or goal at the end of the tunnel; you're not working to get things done so that you can get off at 1600 instead of 1700 or get off earlier on Friday.

I remember when I first checked on to staff(having only previously served a few months on staff in Ranger bn), I couldn't understand why everyone took a 1.5 lunch or didn't show up at their desk until 0900. Then after working an extra 2 hours every day and answering everyone else's phone I broke down and started a doing a light workout during lunch.

Serving on staff definitely clarified my career prospects for staying in the Army. No way I can stay in the Army after I'm done with command and have 8 years on staff before the next time I lead men. I get too emotionally tied to my work which will cause you to lose your mind on staff; making sure training gets resourced, jumping through your ass to get new resources after your allocated resources fall through or are taken, doing short and long range planning, etc.

Great article. It seems that every regimes under transition nowadays, from Vietnam, to Egypt, to Russia, is having trouble throwing out the old remnants to start anew.

"Is war always forfait inevitable ?"
MaximB

Great article. It seems that every regimes under transition nowadays, from Vietnam, to Egypt, to Russia, is having trouble throwing out the old remnants to start anew.

"Is war always forfait inevitable ?"
MaximB

Nice to see that all armies everywhere still excel in mindless BSing (as the Brits call it) and pointless busywork and time wasting. My late father (who retired as a MG, Pakistan Army) was posted as Director 'X' at the Army's General Headquarters (GHQ--our Pentagon, at least the Army part of it) and liked to get to work early to catch up on the endless paperwork (he was incapable of sleeping past 5:30 am or so and this way he could work uninterrupted for an hour or so).

The official start time for GHQ in summer was 7:30 am (8 am in winter) and the first day or two that he got there at 6:45 there was no one else there. By the end of the first week, every single one of his officers was there by 7am and most by 6:45; a couple of eager-beavers/sycophants started showing up at 6:30 and making a point of bringing something to his attention before 7 am. He called them all in and told them that he expected them to show up at 7:30 am sharp--unless of course they actually had real work to do--and just because he couldn't sleep didn't mean that they lost sleep as well. And that he expected them to leave at 2:30 pm--unless of course there was an actual reason for them staying later.... (GHQ worked a six day week back then and had this timing.)

He followed the same sort of routine when commanding a unit. Of course I knew of other COs who made a point of checking to see which of their subordinated were in when they themselves got there....

I myself was told by my first boss that while my work was fine, I didn't LOOK busy enough and that the real route to success was LBDN: Look Busy, Do Nothing.

The point is not just to extol my father's virtues as a commander but to point out that the problems people are highlighting here are the fault of their extremely insecure and frankly mediocre-at-best COs/Brigade/Post/etc commanders and their inability to stop BSing and pointless timewasting. The more I read Tom Rick's blogs and the posts here, the more convinced I am of my (now decade plus old) conclusion that the real objection I have to the Pax Americana is that its run by idiots.

Said "If bread is the staff of life, the life of the staff is one long loaf."

The ones where insurgents that suit our geopolitical interests are ripe for CIA funds and "liberators" in the media, but the insurgents who are fighting our allies are labeled as "terrorists"..

"Is rio orange war always forfait sosh inevitable ?"
MaximB