We have created another Pakistan with our wrong-headed engagement approach in Afghanistan: rooted in our 'partners': the Afghan MOI, MOD, and NDS. Our population-centric COIN strategy (if one accepts there is and was one) was out-of-sync with our engagement strategy - centered on 'key leaders' which most kinetic military types accept as tribal elders or 'jefes.' In actuality through our bone-headed 'mailk of the week,' and 'three-thousand coups of tea' approach we created a new system for a lot of local gumbas to morph themselves into as the average Afghan sat back and laughed and soon cried. Our understand function through tragically-flawed HTS teams was unbalanced toward 'cultural anthropology' and other outdated lenses for looking at Afghan society. The SOF teams emotionally bought the BS but seemed to try to make a u-turn as the Tribal Defense Initiative turned into the Local Defense Initiative to today's failed Afghan Local Police (ALP) program - where the ALP crowd around ANP checkpoints in rural villages during the day while the Taliban cruise in at night. Petraeus's let's bring in the academics approach failed. (If I hear one more bromance with Kilcullen from ISAF's CAAT Team 'what a breathtaking speaker he is' . . . ) What we need is to regain the momentum there. It is NOT too late, but it will take bold ideas and bold implementation. All COIN is not local - there must be operational art and someone must drive. That is ISAF and IJC! And the RC's must see this shift thru a series of positive shocks to the Afghan social system which is really the center of gravity and is what is under attack. The SF'ers were more emotionally tied to their 'tribal lens' than their first born! The mythical 'tribal system' has for the most part decayed and been replaced by opportunists - not CPNs (whatever that means). In many a village we (SF/AID) placed knuckleheads at the helm when CDCs had elected proper reps by secret ballot. USAID gives Karzai's brother a $30M security assessment kickback (I mean contract)? They build an unusable road to Qal-e-Bost using imported Colombian labor? And we wonder why local Afghans are pissed? Is it their fault? We bought this 'graveyard of the empire' hokum hook-line-and-sinker . . . This is about 'them and them' . . . connecting the Afghans in a sustainable way to each other building a lateral network using the CDCs - who now report vertically - as footholds. I disagree with Petraeus ref 'think small' and 'money as a weapons system.' These two COIN guidance principles from him killed us. I am stunned at the lack of nuanced view and perspective brought by the last two US commanders of ISAF. Mc4 walks up with cameras blazing and asks average villager 'What do you need sir?" How about "Money? You got any of that would be my answer, can't blame anyone for that. We have to give the academics dawdling at ISAF HQ, the HTS, and the other usual suspects their walking papers and start anew, 'a fresh start for Afghanistan' . . .after maybe after one of our worst days there! It will take something bold to pull this out of the can for the Afghan people. If we weren't so "worried" about taking IEDs so we HAVE to talk to these tribals . . . Let's face it, we got suckered by the Taliban into working with the village idiots rather than those people who would have helped us for free and have been trying their best even in the face of stupid, laissez-faire US foreign policy around the world: women, youth, cultural actors (artists, poets, writers), small business owners, and media producers. We should have aligned with 'them' at the start as music popped from the streets in Kandahar from 2001-2004, women met unveiled on the Governor's compound lawn, et al. They remain the real Afghanistan . . one only has to look at who was elected when it came to anonymous means to the country's 29,000 CDCs . . . it was a new league of citizen . . . not the usual suspects we chose to work with with our Gunga Din foreign policy . . . Chalabi, A. W. Karzai (followed by young CIA, ISAF CAAT team members like puppies) . .

Tom-

Afghans [both Dari- and Pashto-speakers], along with Iranians and undoubtedly peoples of other nearby countries, celebrate Nowruz.

The POTUS and SecState Nowruz greetings are issued also in Farsi and Arabic. [From this, I assume some Arabs also celebrate Nowruz.]

We've been fighting a war in Afghanistan for 10+ years.

So, how come the White House and the State Department did not translate the POTUS and SecState Nowruz greetings into Afghanistan's two principal languages?

Granted, this is a minor little thing, but it's still, like, basic stuff, right?

I think you have it completely backwards. Who was the last president who took a non-interventionist approach to foreign policy. We've been in military conflicts all over the world almost nonstop since World War 2. What else do you want?.

"Is rio orange war always comparateur forfait inevitable ?"
MaximB

McCain pushed hard for the first debate to be on FP, so blame him. McCain thinks he can smash Obama in that area. Lets see what happens when he forgets where he is and mutters something about Country First and wanders offstage in a fugue..

"Is rio orange war always comparateur forfait mobile inevitable ?"
MaximB