Wednesday, February 29, 2012 - 6:29 AM

I am hearing that the Army is increasingly alarmed that its general officers are being rejected for the top jobs at Centcom, which is taking on kind of a maritime feel (which makes sense if you are positioning the command for a possible air/sea assault on Iran). Back in the day it was dominated by Army officers, but lately it become something of a Marine/Navy baliwick.
Times change, and history knows many ironies. Didn't CENTCOM semi-formally formerly alternate between Army and Marine? And wasn't it perceived as a relative backwater until 2 August 1990? I think I recall accounts of Schwartzkopf (Woodward, "The Commanders?") having been placed there essentially due strictly to Vuono being his patron.
The Army has never produced strong strategic leaders. Those who have come out of the Army as good strategists have done so in spite of the institution, not because of it.
The Army has become a self-licking ice cream cone. The good GOs the Army has are there in spite of the system, not because of it.
It has been a long time since I read his autobigraphy, but I think he said that he had a choice between going to be Korea as the commander-in-chief of UN Command/Combined Forces Command/US Forces Korea or taking command of CENTCOM. He thought he could have a greater impact in the middle east instead of commanding in Korea where he thought that although the Koreans showed a lot of deference to their US "commander," he felt it was just for show. It worked out well for him as far as fame and fortune. He made millions off that book.
I wonder if this is the joint world's revenge for the Army sending Tommy Franks to Centcom.
Best,
Tom
Perhaps the Navy and Marines are emerging from these fiasco's in Iraq and Afghanistan with their reputations a little more intact? Odds are that Rubber Ducky would agree with me on that one?
The first question to ask is whether the Army's alarm is backed up by facts.
Second question to ask is whether it's surprising that GEN Mattis (USMC), warrior-scholar that he is, is having an impact on who he wants running CENTCOM directorates.
Third question might get into who the Army wants to send to CENTCOM. Maybe they want to send GO's that are not to GEN Mattis's liking?
So the commander is a Marine, the DCOM is Navy, the CoS is Army as is the CSM...so I am lost on how the army is shut out.
So the commander is a Marine, the DCOM is Navy, the CoS is Army as is the CSM...so I am lost on how the army is shut out.
Are the commander, the deputy, and the 3.
Best,
Tom
I thought, or at least would think, that at the level of a Combatant Command, etc., the 5 (Policy/Planning) slot would be, if not equal, then relatively commensurate in importance to the 3 (Operations) slot. Please correct me or expand?
Thanks
Anon_Anon (the infrequent poster)
Anon, you are correct, at the COCOM level the 5 has a lot f weight, specifically when it comes to plan development...and counter to Tom's opinion, in a COCOM, the Chief of Staff is important.
On another note, I am surprised that noone seems to remember that since Franks, Abizaid, Dempsy, and Petraeus had the CETCOM top job, Allen had it for 2 months, and Fallon for one year before he was fired. So again, I am lost on how the army is being shut out.
To say they will come out of the war with their reputation "intact" is more a reflection that they will come out of the war largely untested, other than as a bill payer and a filler for WIAS taskers.
Their last CENTCOM commander (Fallon) was not exactly a roaring success.
Winnefeld and Stavrides are the only other Navy flags that leap to mind as holding senior positions that directly impacted the war, and Winnefeld has only been in place 6 months or so.
McRaven?
the more I think about your comment the higher my blood pressure gets. You seem to be implying that the Army is full of ground pounder trigger pullers and since these are ground wars the Navy has been left on the sidelines and is therefore untested. That whole premise is wrong. The fact is that the vast majority of all positions, regardless of branch, are support for the few actual trigger pullers. Given that that is the case, the Navy folks who have contributed have made contributions every bit as valued as an Army contributor. It is not credible to say the Navy hasn't been tested, even if you leave out the special ops guys AND the Navy Corpsman who support Marine units as well as other medical facilities in the AOR. Look at some casualty lists. The Navy's contribution goes way beyond IA's. And actually, as a Navy guy with two deployments (in the sand, not the Persian Gulf) I haven't been especially impressed with the way the Army conducted any part of the war. Take Petraeus and a few other Army flags out of the equation and the whole thing has been a Chinese fire drill.
In the last ten years, three of the five CENTCOM commander's have been Army. Four of six, if you included GEN Dempsey's stint as acting commander.
The Army should be grumpier about loosing control of EUCOM.
...but maybe "loosing" IS more right. Hmmmm.
I was waiting for someone to mention Fallon.
But Tom's loaded comment above speaks to a real lingering impression about Army GOs that echoes the discussion of "meatheads" on this blog a few weeks ago. If nothing else it's poetic revenge, IMHO.
someone will show up and reiterate the senile Hersh's garbage that Fallon was what stood between us and an attack on Iran (yes, Hersh has had a long career that was once distinguished...but he also will clearly print any gossip no matter how outlandish -- remember the 12 AC-130's circling a single compound in 2002 or the secret JSOC-Knights of Columbus alliance from last year? he also attaches secret significance to commander's coins...since 2002 I've had the working theory that some of Hersh's sources are feeding him clear garbage just to show that he'll print anything -- I suppose it helps to discredit him in case he actually does land a scoop :))
My impression is that for years at Centcom, the 5 has actually been the de facto deputy J--5. The real 5 has been the deputy commander, especially for Iran.
Best,
Tom
Much thanks - appreciate it.
Regards
Anon_Anon
The center of gravity in the ME is shifting to a littoral, maritime-focused strategy to contain/annoy/deter the Persians and deal with skinny pirates. Our COG as a nation has always been maritime. Remember that from 1789 to 1865, then to 1898/1917, and then to 1940 the army was a loose collection of scrappy Indian-fighting and empire-policing independent regiments. I view the huge, wasteful, defiantly-unconstitutional and incompetent standing army of 1945-2012 as a historical aberration.
Best let sailors and Marines run the show.
Notice how I managed to not give any keystrokes to the air farce?
Let's give My Favorite Army and its leadership and the vaunted, touted, grandly praised All Volunteer Force full credit for our victories in Iraq and Afghanistan...
What's that?
What victories?
We got our ass waxed by ragtag irregulars?
Never mind.
It would have been much better if Holly Graf had been running the show.
The rot is not the provenance of any one service.
HAG is not the command structure of the US Navy. And she got fired - at the O-6 level - unlike the successful and ever-advancing generals of My Favorite Army who have done so well in the ME.
The more serious point is that the US Army is in dire need of wholesale reform. And the AVF's failures should cause a deep look at a return to the draft and abandonment of this outsourcing of America's wars to a semi-mercenary force (as would the Founding Fathers describe a standing army in time of peace).
There have been senior naval personnel in high places throughout the war (Admiral Olson, for instance.) No notable change has come from them, just more of the same. As the Russians say, horseradish is not sweeter than turnips.
And Admiral Fallon-let's not forget him.
And lest you say that there's only so much a Naval genius can do when put in command of a bunch of Army retards, look at the mustang guy's comment-it wasn't ALL Army retards on the ground.
I find it interesting that a brief "I am being told..." remark from Ricks with no supporting argument at all can can generate such a stampede of assertion about the "strategic incompetence of army leaders".
If Ricks can't even characterize his anonymous sources or elaborate an hypothesis on this subject, I find it hard to get too fired up about his couple of throw-away sentences.
But I will say this: I have entertained the hypothesis that the Obama administration feels that senior Army leaders are politically opposed to him. Remember the Petraeus-Kagan (AEI) linkage and the McCrystal speech in London and some of Odierno's off-the-reservation comments while he was running Iraq? I think it's possible that the Obama administration has perceived a politically hostile clique in the senior leadership of the Army and has taken measures to marginalize it. (Sounds like "Seven Days in May," doesn't it?)
If anything, I don't think this is a CENTCOM issue per se, except that CENTCOM is the politically hot AOR. Keep in mind that Obama wanted General Cartwright as his Chairman. I think it is possible that Obama sees the Marine Corps leadership as less politicized (in a threatening way) than the Army. When given the opportunity, the administration "banished" Petraeus to Afghanistan and then to CIA. McCrystal was ejected and Odierno was given the sought-after JFCOM AFTER it was already known that that command was going away. Odierno would be retired now if Cartwright's nomination has not been submarined in a way I find rather suspicious.
The notional shift from ground-centric to "Air-Sea Battle"-centric warfare does not explain what's been going on for several years.
Of course, this is just a hypothesis, but is it too much to ask Ricks, with all his entree, to provide a little more value added than what in his post above?
Xenophon--
You can't always get what you want, but . . . . sometimes you get what need.
That is, I gave you what I could. I wouldn't have put it that way if I didn't know more than I can say.
Your pal,
Tom
PS--Loved your memoir of fighting in Iraq!
TR,
Well, OK, if you say so, but don't you have any thoughts in general about the validity or lack thereof the things you've been passed? I think that would be useful for the readers.
In any case, thanks for the kudos for my Iraq coverage. Amazing that the Kurds were a problem even in 400 BC!
The Air Force might be a little light on strategic thinkers but we execute our assigned mission well and we've gotten pretty good at blowing up bad guys from Reapers and Predators. Which is more likely to be our strategy of choice for dealing with bad guys for a long while after the fiasco's in Iraq and Afghanistan. I don't see the U.S. playing the invade and occupy game for a generation. Frankly, the Anonymous crowd worries me more than Iran, Russia or China, though any and all can play helter skelter with our economy...
So here's a command/staff and GO question:
The CENTCOM COS is an Army MG, who's last command was a Brigade, though he was an ADCM and DepCG for XVIII ABN Corps.
So what does this MG go on to after CENTCOM COS? Are there LTG and GEN staff positions? Do a lot or most general officers retire as BG's and MG's? Are there general officer tracks for command? And staff? Does retiring as a BG mean that the general officer screwed up or got screwed?
"But I will say this: I have entertained the hypothesis that the Obama administration feels that senior Army leaders are politically opposed to him. Remember the Petraeus-Kagan (AEI) linkage and the McCrystal speech in London and some of Odierno's off-the-reservation comments while he was running Iraq? I think it's possible that the Obama administration has perceived a politically hostile clique in the senior leadership of the Army and has taken measures to marginalize it."
Is this about politics or policy disagreements? There is certainly a view that the administration believes Army leaders to be resistant to their policies in Iraq and Afghanistan, but that this is not about perceptions that they are "more Republican." I question how much there is a "clique" at the Army 4 Star level. They don't all see eye-to-eye.
Also, I don't think Cartwright was going to be the CJCS, regardless of events surrounding his aide. He was not really "submarined" -- though the whiff of scandal didn't help.
If anything, I think there is a bias in the Navy (and to a lesser extent the USMC) to drawdown the wars so they can get back to their usual business -- and that fits with some elements within the administration that have wanted to put a fork in Iraq/Afg from the beginning. Cartwright was a vocal supporter of that faction.
The Navy is the big winner if we shift from a land war focus to a maritime- based "Asia focus". The USMC has made no secret of the fact they want to get out of the Afghanistan rotation.
Rice bowls and Service interests probably explain this more than "D vs R" politics.
"Is this about politics or policy disagreements?"
I think that is a significant question.
Not sure what you mean by "Cartwright was not going to be CJCS." Obama wanted him in the position; he had done things that made him enemies in the Pentagon and Defense Industry (for which I admire him); and then "scandal," conveniently arose. I don't buy it.
As I said, it's a hypothesis, but one, I think, that deserves consideration if the topic is who is getting which top jobs and why.
but I'm pretty sure Cartwright had never deployed to AF or IZ over the last 11 years of the war so it wasn't like he needed a huge scandal to take him down(though having a drunk subordinate of the opposite sex passed out in your room prob wasn't the best idea. Cartwright is like the white male version of CSM King(senior political appointees who crash and burned in the end).
George Marshall didn't deploy to Europe or the Pacific.
Not sure I understand your point.
is only as good as the information he is given to give guidance and make decisions on. In CENTCOM there is a vast supporting cast, in which there are your usual superstars. I assure you that there is substantial representation of the Army in that subset. The GO/FO politics, career tracking, and inter-service rivalry make for interesting discussion, but don't lose sight of the significance of the behind the scenes sausage making . That is truly a joint undertaking - with a significant Army footprint. As _B_ alluded to, retardation affects all services...the Army just happens to be the biggest and have the preponderance of the responsibility, hence the largest number or retards.
Having worked closely with flag officers from all of the services I don't believe the Army has the market cornered on "meathead" general officers/flag officers, though the Army's high profile disasters really did some lasting damage (Franks, Sanchez), and have earned their disdain. I guess we could include Gen Odierno during his tour as a Div Cdr until he was later annointed into the "COIN gets it club" after some sort of metamorphis -Sorry, I've never bought that narrative, the truth is somewhere in between.
My experience with USAF, USN and USMC GO/FOs -especially the aviators, is that they are very process and "checklist" centric in their approach towards everything. The 3 and 4 stars of all the services "get it" in my opinion, but aren't immune to the effects of domestic politics or the parochialisms of their services. I would assert that many of our COCOM CDRs suffer from a complete lack of coherent strategic guidance from our government and are left to determine and execute policy on their own.
Army GOs may be completely outclassed by their sister service peers when it comes to acumen in operating inside the beltway, especially when dealing with the executive and legislative branches of our government. The annual budget is but one example.
Army GOs for better or worse are tainted by Iraq and Afghanistan, their visibility in the media, and their service during and closeness to the Bush Administration. Some may not only be viewed as tainted and untrustworthy, but worse, a political threat down the road i.e. Petraeus and need to be marginalized.
Regards
I wouldn't have posted it if I didn't believe it.
Your pal,
Tom
As we used to say when I worked on the staff at CENTCOM, the L in CENTCOM stands for leadership....
J1 AF
J2 Army
J3 Navy
J4 Marine
J5 Marine
J6 Army
J7 AF
J8 Civ
CDR Marine
DCDR Navy
COS Army
Winner is Marine Corps, Army second. I say this b/c the Navy leadership is not very "tight"; Centcom planning/l'ship at the O-6 level is deep w/Army
There is no way that he was there for years, outside the capital, only blocks from a major military school, and they claim they didn't know it. I say let them complain and whine, they need our money to much to do anything more than that lol.
"Is rio orange war always forfait mobile inevitable ?"
MaximB
(43)
HIDE COMMENTS LOGIN OR REGISTER REPORT ABUSE