Monday, February 20, 2012 - 10:21 AM

By Joseph J. Collins
Best Defense department of critiquing critiques
I spent yesterday morning with Lt. Colonel Dan Davis's 84 page report, Dereliction of Duty II. It is a dog's breakfast, written by someone whom I have met many times in the Army: People who see things as true or false, right or wrong, and people are divided into good guy truth tellers or bad guy liars. Davis's bad guys are generals Petraeus, Allen, and Caldwell, but he likes generals Chiarelli, Thurman, Perkins, (who have not been in the top jobs in Afghanistan) and General Dempsey. Except Davis hasn't gone over Dempsey's assessments on Afghanistan which -- no surprise -- sound much like Allen's and Petraeus's.
I was prepared for a real critique and came away profoundly disappointed. Every veteran has an important story, but this work is a mess. It is not a successor piece to HR McMaster's book on the Joint Chiefs during Vietnam, or Paul Yingling's critique of U.S. generalship that appeared in Armed Forces Journal a few years back. Davis is not a hero, but he will go into the whistleblower hall of fame. If years hence, he doesn't make full Colonel, it will be construed as punishment, but there is nothing in this report that suggests he has any such potential.
Let's look at the basics:
The title: Dereliction of Duty II ... sorry, this is tantamount to delusions of grandeur. McMaster's book by the same title was well-researched and well-written. Davis's work is neither. Davis's work should be called ‘Dereliction of Civility' or maybe, ‘Death by Semi-anonymous Anecdote,' or ‘My Turn for Warhol-hood.'
The work: 84 pages, but 41 pages are NOT about Afghanistan at all. 12 pages are about the politics of army acquisitions programs with material going back to the 1990s. 29 pages are about the Iraq surge, an essay within the essay that asserts that the troop surge was overrated and Iraqi socio-political developments --- not U.S. troops --- were what turned the tide. My view is that the troop surge was a catalyst; it exploited these developments, but both were necessary for "success," such as it was. Time will tell about the larger piece in Iraq.
The guy who has nailed the Iraq surge stuff is Doug Ollivant, who helped plan the troop surge and later went back to the NSC to push Iraq policy. Whatever points Davis has on Iraq have been made better by other people. In any case, the fact that the surge in Iraq did or did not work was not dispositive in the case of Afghanistan. Many of the same cast of characters were involved in both surges, but a new president called for their participation and worked himself for three months on the issue before he made the surge decision.
The thesis: Give Davis a point for BLUF, bottom line up front. His thesis is in the first sentence of the paper: Senior officers "have so distorted the truth" on Afghanistan "that the truth has become unrecognizable." Exhibit A here is a statement (pg. 6 6) by Petraeus in March 2011. He excoriates Petraeus for claiming that Taliban momentum "has been arrested in much of the country," and "reversed" in places. Petraeus goes on to say in the "damning" quote that progress was still "fragile and reversible," and that "much difficult work lies ahead with our Afghan partners."
On p. 8, we find out the real problem: things in Afghanistan are not as clear as they were during the Battle of the Bulge. No kidding! Davis craves clarity and surety in the case of protracted insurgency in a fractious country that has been at war for 33 years. The generals cannot deliver clarity in this sea of ambiguity, therefore, they must be liars. As for statistics, the U.S. government has never released more.
On p. 9 and on the last page (84), Davis shows that he is stuck on the fact that as we put more assets in, the number of security incidents increased, including those caused by the enemy. He finds these stats to be proof of surge failure, and prima facie evidence that all optimistic statements or projections are lies.
But much of Davis's stats -- which I can't verify as authentic -- have other explanations: 1) The enemy gets a vote and has himself gone all in to stop the surge. (It is clear from nearly all observers, but not Davis,that the Taliban have been soundly defeated -- even if fragile-y and reverse-ibly -- in much of RC S and RC SW); 2) Adding 40,000 combat troops to the mix has stirred things up, and 3) We still have "much difficult work lies ahead with our Afghan partners," in Petraeus's phrase.
Davis cherry-picks statistics, but he never picks on any of the voluminous data about night raids that shows the vast numbers of Taliban leaders killed or captured in past two years. He also castigates LTG Caldwell, but fails to walk through his impressive stats on ANSF development. He shames himself by writing that the ANSF are cowards who aren't fighting hard.
On the ANSF, the facts get in the way of Davis's argument. Since 2007, Afghan cops and soldiers have died and been wounded in greater numbers than ISAF forces. The Brookings Index, again using USG-released numbers, confirms that. On p. 41, Davis cites redacted material about poor ANSF performance. I was in Afghanistan last spring and heard lots of the opposite story and found many Afghans in uniform who had been in the fight and were spoiling for more, just as the Marines noted in the New York Times Magazine two weeks ago. Every man or woman in uniform has a right to his anecdotes, but no matter how many anecdotes you can string together, they don't constitute data or sound judgments.
At the end of his text in his epilogue, Davis tries to give the Taliban a writeoff. He says that al Qaeda wouldn't come back into Afghanistan and that the Taliban have every incentive to disavow the al Qaeda. Except they never have, even when asked by the King of Saudi Arabia to do so (See Dexter Filkins' 2010 article in the New York Times). I think -- but can't be sure -- that Davis is trying to say that the war is not worth it, and only the lying generals want to keep the farce in perpetual reruns. I could be wrong about that ... many things in this document are unclear, although obviously the "truth."
Let me summarize: This unclassified report is not worth the reader's effort. Davis's Armed Forces Journal article promised much, but this report delivers very little.
Joseph J. Collins, a retired Army Colonel, teaches at the National War College. From 2001-2004, he was the Deputy Asst. Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations. He wrote Understanding War in Afghanistan, published by the NDU Press in 2011. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government, nor even, perhaps, those of "Pumpsie" Green. Congratulations for reading this far. Slow day, huh?
A goodly chunk of this piece appears not to have anything to do with Afghanistan either. But onward, onward.
Night raids. One wonders, why does HK make such a fuss about them, linking their cessation to the signing of a US-Afghanistan security accord. A secret Talib sympathiser? That's sarcasm; thought I'd mention it, just in case. Now it's common knowledge that there has been at least one analysis that 'proves' that the night raids are not all that they are cracked up to be. Written by liars and friends of terrorists, I shouldn't wonder. In sum the achievement or non-achievement of night raids are less important than their evenutal continuation. Which seems set in stone for as long as Afghanistan has foreign troops 'helping' it.
Poor ANSF performance. It stands to reason that some recruits are not as efficient as others. One wonders, this is a catch-all as it must include a wonderful variety of forces. The place of the Afghan regulars in this must be questionable as in general a countr'y army is not tasked with pacifying portions of that country. Unless, that is, they are used as auxiliaries for the forces of other countries , or one other country. Whence, no doubt, the current popular chant of 'Afghan-led' operations. Just so long as there are no plans for F-15s in the Afghan Air Force and M-1s as the armour.
The icing on the cake is the critique that the Taliban have never disowned AQ. That's very nice. As we all remember, Saudi Arabia was one of only a few countries who recognised the Taliban government. From there to roaring the 'achievement' that some Taliban are now in the UAE negotiating sort of officially, oy, that is far. Of course, we'll be told that awed and shocked they have no other choice. Having recognised their Position Of Weakness. There could have been some time saved, perhaps, if the Taliban had never been derecognised. The next thing you know, the Qatarais and their puppet.-masters will be arguing that AQ is not what it used to be.........
Night Raids work, they cause fewer civilian casualties, fewer coalition casualties and play to our strengths when done by SOF. What study are you citing? I hope it is not the one by Amnesty.
Poor ANSF performance? Not sure if you are being sarcastic here or what your point is if you are not being sarcastic.
Night raids may be quite effective in the very short-term tactical sense but strategically they are self-damaging. The fact that they have become such a political issue should at least instill a modicum of doubt in your mind.
Davis may not have a Princeton pedigree, but he's credible
Davis was interviewed on PBS NewsHour last week, which at least gave his side of the story news value - if not credibility. And frankly, how credible is Tom's piece? Read his glowing review of Warrior Scholar General Doctor Yoda-Pretender Petraeus's new biography. (I recommend "The Operators" by Michael Hastings, which aligns well with Lt. Col. Davis's' report and has been a best-seller.)
"There have been several books written about parts of the career of David Petraeus, but this is the first one that could be called a biography of the most prominent American general since World War II. It is written with an insider''s lively understanding of the workings of today''s Army. I''ve known David Petraeus since he was a colonel and written two books in which he appeared, but I still learned a lot about him from this book. All In feels at times like we are sitting at his side in Afghanistan, reading his e-mails over his shoulder."
-Thomas E. Ricks, Pulitzer Prize-winning author of Fiasco and The Gamble
No worries, Tom. This is an election year and Everybody's Hero Petraeus as CIA Director has access to extensive information about D.C.'s most powerful and influential people. No accountability for the war this year. It will take a stunningly courageous journalist to bring down King David's bony little butt. One day, people will start talking, and it will happen.
I have long wondered why Karzai rails against night raids every chance he gets.
Night raids are killing and capturing the Taliban leaders and foreign fighters who plan and execute operations against US and Afghan forces. In addition to protecting our conventional forces, they erode Taliban morale as they have to send leadership replacements from Pakistan. I believe that these raids are leading the Taliban to the negotiation table.
In addition to being a corrupt fool, Karzai is an insecure head of government. Complaints about night raids reach him and threaten his control of those under him. In his short-sighted view, he thinks responding to these complaints will shore-up his position.
Screw him.
Steve, while I understand your point just because political hay is being made out of night raids does not mean they are not right. We have been doing them for years and it was not until certain members were picked up that it became a huge I/O campaign. The groups (like the groups Soro's funds that did the "study") who were already against the US Invasion and thought that to many wrong houses were being hit jumped on the chance to push the issue. While mistakes did happen, at the levels that most night raids were being conducted by SOF troops the mistakes were so rare that they would often just apologize, pay and be gone. The night raids cause fewer civilian casualties, no one knows you were there most of the time so there is no sense that we are making an occupation of their village when we roll through in the day time and to me that would mean to me that they are a better idea all around.
Ask yourself this, for years we were doing them on a large scale and hardly a word, then we hit some folks close to home for the powers in Kabul and now they are a great insult on a man's home? RVN is pretty close on this one.
The thing I take away from the library's worth of reports, critiques, committees, stats, speeches, briefings and bluster is that ambiguity is to 21st century warfare what the income gap is to 21st century economics-- that is, a salient and palpable issue. We have literally reached the point where the post-mortem is longer than the actual lifespan of the war. Regarding the phrase "when it's all said and done," we're still a ways off from it actually being done and I think it's all already been said at least three times. The analysis is choking it to death harder than anything John Madden ever did to a superbowl.
Here's the thing of it. Who won the American Revolution? Who won the Napoleonic Wars? Who won the Civil War? Who won the Spanish American War? Who won WWI and WWII? Who won in the Falklands? In wars where you have unequivocal outcomes, things get decided. If war be politics by other means, then the final vote is cast by a single hand waving a white flag.
But what about Korea? Vietnam? Desert Storm? Yom Kippur? Iraq/Iran? India/Pakistan? Any time you have a less than unequivocal end to the war, then you wind up with people who equivocate. And equivocate. And equivocate. The political decision is not made.
Did we win in Iraq? God, it's so convoluted that no one even types that question without putting the word "win" in quotation marks. And after the reams of metrics that are cranked out, and the reams upon reams of analysis picking apart the relative value of those metrics are typed, it will all boil down to a set of quotation marks around "win" in Afghanistan, too. All this senseless crap, just to obfuscate the obvious. If you can't definitively say that you won, then you didn't win. More to the point, you lost.
We hurt ourselves with all this data trying to measure out "to what degree" we "won," because it's pointless make-work to avoid analyzing why we lost. The reason we didn't achieve our objectives was because the objectives themselves and the plans for achieving them were flawed.
I'm sure people will attempt to argue the point. But it is undeniable that Washington beat the crap out of the British until they quit and went home. Grant and Sherman punished the hell out of the south until it gave up. The British decided the Falklands were theirs, so they went and stomped the island flat until Argentina quit.
Did we run anti-American elements out of Iraq and produce a duly-elected functioning government there? Are we going to stomp the Taliban and Al Qaeda out of existence in Afghanistan? No, we didn't. The best we can do is shrug our shoulders and say "time will tell."
I'm not a fan of letting anything other than our troops, standing on the high ground and planting an American flag, tell us if we won or not. I don't think any other American is, either-- especially those who give their sons and daughters to the fight.
The brain trust can argue it to death. The argument itself is a cover to keep us from acknowledging the truth-- at the end of the day we lost because top leadership screwed up from the get-go. So long as these arguments continue, we can't have a meaningful dialogue about how we enter into conflicts with a sincere plan to win. And that only means our future wars (and there will be wars in the future) will end as badly as these last two.
Britain lost the American Revolution, but so did the Bourbons,
albeit indirectly and not immediately in the latter's case. Similarly, Britain won the French and Indian war, but in doing so set in motion events that would lead to the loss of most of its North American colonies. Is the US in an analogous position? Having overextended itself, and perhaps preparing for another over extension against Iran, will the US not be prepared if a real crisis hits it?
IRe your final paragraph, I fear, Mr. Gourley, that the US will never have the meaningful dialogue we all hope for. There is a profound confusion in contemporary American culture and sense of self, which manifests itself throughout our private and public lives. Most people don't talk or think about the contradictions because this confusion doesn't very often result in death. The confusion as to what America is is hidden somewhat by the fact that our political class is defined by a surprisingly narrow range of behaviors and ideologies. Paradoxically, while they scream at each other, they tend to display a dime's worth of difference between them. Those who truly are distinct are quickly defined as dangerous or crazy, no further elaboration needed. A narrow range of behaviors and ideology does not, however, equal clarity of thought; there are institutions where individuals aimlessly wander back and forth in a narrow yard or room with no apparent purpose or to no good end.
JIM ON WINNING, LOSING AND SUCCESS
I don't intend this to be an exercise in semantics; although it may sound like it.
It is wrong to refer to winning (unless you are Charlie Sheen) when referring to Iraq or Afghanistan. The word "success" is more apt, albeit just as elusive. To win suggests that there is a loser (see Vince Lombardi) and there will not be an identifiable loser in either war unless you are referring to the losers who got us into the Iraq War and diverted resources from Afghanistan. They are losers.
In order to be able to use the term success, you must have defined some goals or criteria for a successful outcome. Instead we use moving targets as any real possibility of success slips away.
Our slipping away with our national reputation intact is a goal remaining to us, but success is highly unlikely.
We should not spill more blood in this venture and we no longer have the treasure to pursue this wasteful war. There are other defense related systems we can can spend money on - the money we do not have. At least those pursuits will not spill blood.
Lies, Damn Lies, and Semantics
Yeah, I get what you're saying. I just don't buy it.
Success is what occurs in a conference room or a science experiment. This was a war. I promise you, there are lots of losers. People who lose their lives. People who lose their loved ones. People who lose their minds, souls, limbs, etc.
I know there are lots of people who've been on the business end of an AK, but it still bears saying for the general audience-- your broad-based metrics and holistic gobbledygook get whittled down pretty fast once someone points a gun at your face.
If it can't be put in terms of win or lose, then it's not a war, and you've got no business sending warfighters in there to do it. We've got too many people out there today enamored with the heroic myth of Petraeus. I'm not saying he's not a brilliant dude. I'm saying he's the modern Sun Tzu-- which is to say the mystique is about forty stories taller than the actual being. Everyone is out there trying to be the next COIN genius boy who comes up with one brilliant counter-intuitive revelation after another. Well, sometimes the answer actually is intuitive, and being counter-intuitive is just plain stupid.
Some Korans got burned at a base in Afghanistan yesterday and the NATO commander apologized to the people after they threw some rocks at the gate. Now let me ask you something-- how is that guy ever going to "win the peace?" He looks like a pansy. Again, look at the decisive wars. The victors didn't win the peace. They dictated the terms of peace.
I would submit that we didn't lose Afghanistan when we invaded Iraq. Rather, it was the moment American sentiment turned from vengeance back into a concern for the enemy that we lost. Everyone was all about nuking Afghanistan in 2001. People wanted to see a body count. They wanted to see suffering. Our political and military leaders were the ones who showed restraint. Whenever we started concerning ourselves with the cultural sensitivities of the people there, that's when it was over. When your national will no longer has the stomach to inflict the kind of suffering required to make the enemy submit, you're screwed. The stupidest thing I ever heard a General say came out of Stan McChrystal's mouth. He said "you can't kill your way out of Afghanistan." My immediate reaction to hearing that was "Yes you can. You're just not trying hard enough."
I find myself agreeing with you totally on that post. Alexander was the last guy to really do Afghan right and he did it right by killing and dominating them but we have never been willing to do that unless we are in a war for survival. We could have done it in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan but it's just not our way.
OK, Jim, please define what winning would mean to you.
I'll give it a try. A win in Afghanistan would be if we left behind a sovereign democratic government firmly in charge of its territory with a national army to retain its independence and preserve the peace within its borders. Winning would mean that Pakistan had stopped pumping insurgents and foreign fighters along with arms across its border with Afghanistan. Winning would be leaving behind a viable or growing (no pun intended) economy. And, I would ask, "If we won; who would the loser be?"
I believe that "winning" is impossible. IMHO, succeeding is impossible as well.
The only thing we can do without equivocation is kill Taliban leadership and foreign fighters. I have no idea whether or not we can so discourage the Taliban that we drive them to the negotiation table. Much depends upon duplicitous Pakistan. It would help to find a way to squeeze Pakistan's nuts. Since the outcome would be a government in which the Taliban "shared" power; it would not fit your definition of winning because there would be no loser.
Much easier than reading that 84-page report
This was watching the colonel himself on the PBS Newshour a few nights ago. PBS tends to keep such things available for several days, and this interview could well be one such souvenir. Its interview transcript is certainly available.
The colonel is a nervous man. not very good at expressing himself orally. He has a few striking stories to tell. In the other corner of the ring, we now have Joseph J. Collins, a retired Army Colonel who teaches at the National War College -- exactly the kind of guy who could be expected to leap out and say Davis is Whack. Whether he is or not.
I am in no position to adjudicate between these men's differing views, and neither is Mr Collins in much of a position to evaluate the quality of Mr Davis's claims. He does say there's a lot of crap in the Davis report and is careful to avoid saying it's all crap.
The TV Davis had a few compelling anecdotes about what men facing the enemy in Afghanistan know and see. They bode ill for the future of American dreams for that part of the world and nobody seems to have refuted any of them. TV Davis also said he deeply respects his profession and hopes he will be allowed to continue within it. We'll see. I think future appointment to the National War College unlikely.
Having heard all the hubbub, I figured I would read LTC Davis' report and try to give it a fare shake as my experience in Afghanistan is two years old at this point. My first thought was "Boy, this guy is all over the map!" As pointed out by Mr. Collins, much of the "report" does not even deal with with Afghanistan.
As it does concern Afghanistan, it certainly is nowhere close to my experience which allowed me to see much of the ANA and situation throught the country. it largely appears to be a collection of anecdotal accounts; certainly not the kind of hard evidence that backs up the very serious charges he makes that many senior officers are lying. I saw him interviewed on the News Hour, and when Margeret Warner asked him directly, "What evidence do you have that senior officers are lying?" he never answered the question except to recycle the one "We don't go out because its dangerous out there" story about the ANSF. This story seems to be the one most quoted and I am starting to think maybe there aren't lot of other incidents. There are certainly a lot of of reports avaialible in both official and open sources that paint a full picture, both positive and negative, which he could have studied and used.
I am trying to figurer out where this guy is coming from and what his perspective is. He is quick to cite (multiple times) the 9000 miles he traveled in Afghanistan the past year, but some other things about his background are not so clear. He has not stated why he got out of the Army in the 90's. Knowing that might paint a clearer picture of his motivations. He has also not said how and why he has been able to stay mobilized as a Reservist for 10 years. He appears to have principally served in higher level staff positions during that time, rather than tactical command. At least Yingling, McMaster and several critics of an earlier era like Hackworth and Herbert have the credibility of command in combat at the eyeball level.
He is certainly no stranger to writing articles critical of the military. I count nine so far.
So, the picture I have is of a Reservist staff weenie who spends a lot of his time writing articles instead of doing his job. He got a chance to play "combat tourist" and then compiles the collected bitches and gripes of those he runs into. He then uses that as justification to accuse our leadership of lying and not coincidentally, enhance his published portfolio and stature in certain circles that may offer him future employment. Just my take.
This is Vietnam 2 America will try and dress this up as sucsess but it has turned into a complete failure America automaticaly took everyone for Al-Qaeda terrorists but this was not the case.
85% of Afghan's had never heard of 9/11 before the war and it is clear that the Taliban are not going to be easliy beaten.
After all how do you expect people to feel you invade their country kill their loved ones destroy their homes and lives and try and force their way of life on you for no reason?
If someone did that to my country i would not welcome them i would grab a gun and fight them too only cowards and traitors welcome ocupiers i do not understand why under these circumstances America expected to be welcomed i put it down to arrogance.
Thats what it is though i do not understand what gives a country with no history or culture of its own that has only existed for 250 years the right to decide the fate of a country that has traditions and culture dating back thousands of years.
As a country America is still an infant relitivly young without the wisdom that comes with age that other countries have devoloped over their long histories.
Infants cannot see things for others point of veiw and often have a hard time understanding how their actions affect others it is not until they have grown up and cast off their childish ignorance that infants become responsible adults.
As long as America continues to believe what they want is what everyone else wants then their childish arrogant behaviour will continue to spoil things for everyone else.
I for one am fed up with the annoying kid charging about in a cowboy outfit fireing plastic guns at imaginary indians someone should put the child in its place and maybe then the adults can have some (world) peace.
Only arrogant people believe their values and opinions to be worth more than others and just because America has the power to bully the whole world does not mean they should.
The people in Afghanistan are only protecting their country from invaders who can really blame them?
It is only in this late hour people are starting to realise the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda are not the same thing and if you are going to attack a country for no reason people will not react nicely.
It is obvious that this has turned into Vietnam 2 and the people do not want America in their country the job will never be done by 2014 and Bushes lie the Al-Qaeda want to kill us all is wearing pretty thin too.
Bush said they would not rest until they have destroyed all infedels the new leader said after Bin Ladens death they would not rest until the infedels were driven from their lands.
There is a big difference between the two and it was my understanding that the Al-Qaeda only started attacking American targets after they entered Kuwait and refuse to leave.
Bin Laden was concerned an American preasance in their part of the world would lead to wars and an end of their way of life turns out after a decade of middle east wars he was right America should go home and mind its own business these problems only started when America tried to rule the world.
If America would stop trying to make up everyones mind for them and telling them what to do these people would do us no harm Britian had a bigger empire and Hitler had greater control over the masses America will always be second place in those departments and are nothing but failures!!!
This is Vietnam 2 America will try and dress this up as sucsess but it has turned into a complete failure America automaticaly took everyone for Al-Qaeda terrorists but this was not the case.
85% of Afghan's had never heard of 9/11 before the war and it is clear that the Taliban are not going to be easliy beaten.
After all how do you expect people to feel you invade their country kill their loved ones destroy their homes and lives and try and force their way of life on you for no reason?
If someone did that to my country i would not welcome them i would grab a gun and fight them too only cowards and traitors welcome ocupiers i do not understand why under these circumstances America expected to be welcomed i put it down to arrogance.
Thats what it is though i do not understand what gives a country with no history or culture of its own that has only existed for 250 years the right to decide the fate of a country that has traditions and culture dating back thousands of years.
As a country America is still an infant relitivly young without the wisdom that comes with age that other countries have devoloped over their long histories.
Infants cannot see things for others point of veiw and often have a hard time understanding how their actions affect others it is not until they have grown up and cast off their childish ignorance that infants become responsible adults.
As long as America continues to believe what they want is what everyone else wants then their childish arrogant behaviour will continue to spoil things for everyone else.
I for one am fed up with the annoying kid charging about in a cowboy outfit fireing plastic guns at imaginary indians someone should put the child in its place and maybe then the adults can have some (world) peace.
Only arrogant people believe their values and opinions to be worth more than others and just because America has the power to bully the whole world does not mean they should.
The people in Afghanistan are only protecting their country from invaders who can really blame them?
It is only in this late hour people are starting to realise the Taliban and the Al-Qaeda are not the same thing and if you are going to attack a country for no reason people will not react nicely.
It is obvious that this has turned into Vietnam 2 and the people do not want America in their country the job will never be done by 2014 and Bushes lie the Al-Qaeda want to kill us all is wearing pretty thin too.
Bush said they would not rest until they have destroyed all infedels the new leader said after Bin Ladens death they would not rest until the infedels were driven from their lands.
There is a big difference between the two and it was my understanding that the Al-Qaeda only started attacking American targets after they entered Kuwait and refuse to leave.
Bin Laden was concerned an American preasance in their part of the world would lead to wars and an end of their way of life turns out after a decade of middle east wars he was right America should go home and mind its own business these problems only started when America tried to rule the world.
If America would stop trying to make up everyones mind for them and telling them what to do these people would do us no harm Britian had a bigger empire and Hitler had greater control over the masses America will always be second place in those departments and are nothing but failures!!!
Good comparison by the way. Hackworth and Herbert saw their careers end after they appeared, respectively, on "Issues & Answers" and "Dick Cavett" (I think). When I read "Stolen Valor" the author claimed that Tony Herbert was a fraud although he didn't produce any evidence to that effect. I contacted the author's publicist who emailed back and said she had received other queries along that vein.
Now, as a 12-year old in Pico Rivera, "Soldier" was a seminal book for me to read in my self-education about Vietnam. This was 1979 so there wasn't nearly as much material out there then as now, although strangely the older works like "365 Days", "12, 20 & 5", "One Morning in the War" were quite good and far better than the 1980's crap in which everyone and his dog claimed to have been a LRRP-Recondo-Green Beret-CIA-assassin or SEAL.
Sorry to divert the thread this way, but does anyone out there have any scoop on the "real" Tony Herbert? Hackworth is well-documented and I regret his early passing.
LTC ANTHONY HERBERT - SUMMER 1971
LTC Herbert passed through Fort Bragg and the Special Warfare Center on his way to DC. I was in the G-3 shop and never met him, but the officers above me to include General Emerson tried to persuade LTC Herbert to change his mind and stay in the Army. They spoke highly of him and referred to him as a soldier's soldier. In Wikipedia there is a great quote from a Sergeant Major in his section which essentially says: it is not your reputation in your 201 file that counts; it's what they say about you in the bars where soldiers gather. He thought highly of LTC Herbert.
Lastly, it is hard to believe that anyone would question the veracity of his criticism of our leadership. They were lying and using falsified statistics to back up their lies. Lawsuits came out of a "60 Minutes" program on Herbert which I never saw. There, the veracity of some alleged incidents was questioned. I know nothing about that and it does not bear upon the validity of his disgust with his leaders.
....are being carried out as if he were the only source of discontent with the way the war in Afghanistan is being prosecuted and sold.
There is a vast array of informatiion that tends to corroborate Davis' view of the situation. His is only the most high profile rendition of what is, essentially, the same story.
Just read the conclusion to Capt Jeffrey Bordin's study of the poisoned relations between western and Afghan forces. (A Crisis of Trust and Cultural Incompatability) Without being an identical telling of the story it most certainly leaves behind a strong belief that if one is the case, how can anything else be otherwise.
The other day I saw an article
...that impugned Davis using the word "Reservist" like it was a dirty word. Having seen his mishmash document I have to say I am doubly disappointed. I had hoped that a well-written and supported document from a member of the RC would be an advance for the RC. Sadly, his shoddy effort almost reinforces the "Reservist" insult. Also unfortunate, because his good points are lost along the way.
Hey Davis, we Reserve guys don't need your help reinforcing old stereotypes. Nothing good will come from this beyond his early departure from service.
Sorry for errors, typing one handed again.
I first learned of the "R" word from a Web Griffin novel. Those dirty unprofessionals... lol Is the reservists stigma as present as today as it was?
The Active Component, especially at the general officer level, plays games with the Guard and Reserve. When they need the Reserve Components, they are great. If the Active Component finds itself in competition for resources with the Reserve Components, then they attempt to screw the RC.
A few examples are in order. Prior to the first Gulf War, the DCSOPS (Sullivan) didn't want Guard maneuver units spoiling the AC's fun. Up to that point, Guard units had been outperforming AC units at the NTC (Ft. Irwin) time after time. I had access to the confidential reports in my job. The key to their success was the ability of their NCOs and junior officers to improvise and demonstrate initiative when separated from or out of commo with their parent unit. Then they were mobilized for the war. DCSOPS decided that these same units had to qualify for deployment by passing through the NTC again. They were determined to not be ready for deployment. So, they went to bases and most did not see the Gulf. Support units of the Guard and Reserve were a different story as the Active Army couldn't function without them - by design.
Another example would be officers and EM selected for court martial in the Second Iraq War. Mostly Army Reservists. Check it out. But remember, the AC selected all RC units and officers for deployment and assigned them their roles in the war. The Air Force has long been the service with the most integrated RC. Guard units fly tankers in regular support of of routine AF missions. Guard units form a significant portion of the AF tactical fighter capability. AF Reserve crews are integrated into AC airlift crews. They are often mixed. A C-17 crew might have RC pilots and an AC Loadmaster or Crew Chief and vice-versa. However, the AF is now facing budget cuts so what do they want to cut? They want to cut Air Guard A-10 units. The head of the Air Guard is protesting - out loud.
As the Services are all confronted with budget cuts, watch whom and what they cut. Sometimes it will be subtle like maintenance funds or fuel - both damaging readiness. It has happened before. The Guard and Reserve select their students for advanced schooling very carefully and they perform between well and superbly. So their peers form a positive impression from their scholl experiences.
Lastly, there are a few states that give the Guard a bad name. The scandals are almost always confined to the State Headquarters, but it tarnishes the entire state. I don't have a current tally, but California is slowly emerging from financial misappropriation and questionable promotions. Now, a new AG who unfortunately was part of the old regime. Texas is also under investigation and needs it. These scandals do not reflect on the quality of the Troop Program Unit personnel, however. And, the Guard peforms essential peacetime functions as well. It would be nice if the AC replaced the equipment stripped from the Guard for the wars. That is an issue to be monitored.
So, the Guard and Reserve aren't really loved unless they are needed and funding is an objective way to monitor the real attitude of the AC generals who make those decisions. When you get down to individual prejudice, I think that AC personnel should tread lightly lest their performance be scrutinized. There is a wealth of experience in the RC.
The Active Component, especially at the general officer level, plays games with the Guard and Reserve. When they need the Reserve Components, they are great. If the Active Component finds itself in competition for resources with the Reserve Components, then they attempt to screw the RC.
A few examples are in order. Prior to the first Gulf War, the DCSOPS (Sullivan) didn't want Guard maneuver units spoiling the AC's fun. Up to that point, Guard units had been outperforming AC units at the NTC (Ft. Irwin) time after time. I had access to the confidential reports in my job. The key to their success was the ability of their NCOs and junior officers to improvise and demonstrate initiative when separated from or out of commo with their parent unit. Then they were mobilized for the war. DCSOPS decided that these same units had to qualify for deployment by passing through the NTC again. They were determined to not be ready for deployment. So, they went to bases and most did not see the Gulf. Support units of the Guard and Reserve were a different story as the Active Army couldn't function without them - by design.
Another example would be officers and EM selected for court martial in the Second Iraq War. Mostly Army Reservists. Check it out. But remember, the AC selected all RC units and officers for deployment and assigned them their roles in the war. The Air Force has long been the service with the most integrated RC. Guard units fly tankers in regular support of of routine AF missions. Guard units form a significant portion of the AF tactical fighter capability. AF Reserve crews are integrated into AC airlift crews. They are often mixed. A C-17 crew might have RC pilots and an AC Loadmaster or Crew Chief and vice-versa. However, the AF is now facing budget cuts so what do they want to cut? They want to cut Air Guard A-10 units. The head of the Air Guard is protesting - out loud.
As the Services are all confronted with budget cuts, watch whom and what they cut. Sometimes it will be subtle like maintenance funds or fuel - both damaging readiness. It has happened before. The Guard and Reserve select their students for advanced schooling very carefully and they perform between well and superbly. So their peers form a positive impression from their scholl experiences.
Lastly, there are a few states that give the Guard a bad name. The scandals are almost always confined to the State Headquarters, but it tarnishes the entire state. I don't have a current tally, but California is slowly emerging from financial misappropriation and questionable promotions. Now, a new AG who unfortunately was part of the old regime. Texas is also under investigation and needs it. These scandals do not reflect on the quality of the Troop Program Unit personnel, however. And, the Guard peform essential peacetime functions as well. It would be nice if the AC replaced the equipment stripped from the Guard for the wars. That is an issue to be monitored.
So, the Guard and Reserve aren't really loved unless they are needed and funding is an objective way to monitor the real attitude of the AC generals who make those decisions. When you get down to individual prejudice, I think that AC personnel should tread lightly lest their performance be scrutinized. There is a wealth of experience in the RC.
"It don't mean nothing, man. It don't mean nothing...Come on, man...You owe it to yourself. It don't mean nothing. Not a thing man. It don't mean nothing. Not a thing. It don't mean nothing. Not a thing." (Hamburger Hill - Hill 937)
It is unfortunate that this officer has gained such high visibility and then produced a poor product. He has been published before and he got to interview many troops. I expect a better product from RC personnel. And, I anticipate that when the RC member is a Guardsman, I will get greater candor because their promotions are largely state driven and slot availability dependent - not federal.
But it does not matter because the powers that be are reluctant to confront reality and are moving with glacial slowness. The change to talking of an advisory effort is the conventional Army's equivalent to admitting that this will not work. The negotiations with the Taliban parallel what happened in the closing shadows of the Vietnam War. In the next two years, the Karzai government will not change sufficiently to make a difference. The Paks will not close the border. If, in fact, someone has encountered functioning ANA troops; it would be interesting to know to what ethnic group they belong. It would also be interesting to know if they are functioning independently of American troops. Sworn, notarized statements written in the presence of a chaplin would be helpful.
What we need is leadership which will be honest with us. That's a lot to expect in a presidential election year. What I'd like to hear is some 4 star honesty and I expect to be repeatedly disappointed. They may be snowing the president as well. This means poor planning for our withdrawal.
What it must not mean is a face-saving advisory effort which leaves our men and their advisees with inadequate support. That support includes CAS and IDF. Right now, for reasons that I do not understand, we seem to be short on helicopters.
It is almost no longer worthwhile talking about Afghanistan. These jerks will do what they want absent strong direction from the White House.
I've seen effective Afgan security contractors (ethnicity undetermined) and a battalion of Uzbeks in the SW who had everyone shit-scared, but were basically a warlord's private army in uniform. Not that that's something you'd be familiar with from Vietnam, right? :)
The problem with ANSF is that a modern nation-state, with a loyal and professional army of interchangeable units made up out of interchangeable officers leading disciplined troops towards an abstract goal is historically not the way business is done. Tribal levies answering to leaders they are related to by blood and feudally would work, but we won't do it because it doesn't brief well. That's compounded by the fact that we are attempting to create this strange creature via a semi-puppet government and I'll-suited trainers with crazy rules and zero command/disciplinary authority (it's like the Brits never did this in India or something.) And the LTC is right-the PR coming from Afghanistan is basically Soviet in nature.
Perhaps it was serendipity that led you to conclude that I might have encountered a warlord in RVN. The Regional Force Battalion we advised was in fact a unit under a bandit named By Dom (phonetic spelling). Although there are some humorous stories about our relationship, I was never convinced that they did much except to try to improve their own position and weaponry. You haven't lived until you've had a group of bandits finger your M-16 and offer to tradfe you a WWII cabine for it. When we visited their camp, my Team Leader had me cover the hut where they were meeting and told me to be prepared to fight our way out. In the Delta, there was a detente between the VC and government forces and there were rarely real battles between Vietnamese forces in our area along the Cambodian Border in 1965. There was theater, however,
Regrettably, the same was not true for US forces and my "B" Team staff and commander were wiped-out. So in RVN, as in Afghanistan, things were not clear cut or black and white.
YOU haven't lived until you've hung out in a warlord's (I mean, community elder's) guest room eating lamb barbecue with him and his eight henchmen, and an unarmed Afghan engineer who is scared shitless for backup :)
Then again, the guy did lend me his car whenever I needed to make a run to the FOB, and it hadn't blown up, so I figured we were cool.
The great secret to getting along with all those guys is this: they've all lived an interesting life, and they're all old. Meaning, their backs hurt ALL THE TIME, because they have pinched nerves and slipped disks. If you know how to pop a back (just pick them up and shake them like a rat terrier,) you're friends forever.
_B_: That back cracking story somehow someway should be remembered and passed on. I don't know how it could be done but it is such brilliant simple thing that nobody would ever think of that it should not be forgotten.
U. S. has deliberately deluded itself
Afghanistan is all about how U. S. has deliberately deluded itself about Pakistan’s double game.
It is far more about how Pakistani Army has fueled Taliban insurgency all these years since 2001 while U. S. deludes itself that Pakistan is facing the same terrorist threat.
It is far more about why U. S. is trapped in this never-ending Afghan war by its own supposed ally while U. S. foreign policy wonks pontificate about Afghan government‘s corruption.
Former Pentagon official Gen (rtd) Jack Keane said at a discussion on Afghanistan organized by the Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based think-tank on June 30, 2011 that "The truth is, the (Pakistani) ISI aids and abets the sanctuaries in Pakistan that the Afghan (Taliban) operate out of. They provide training for them, they provide resources for them and they provide intelligence for them. From those sanctuaries, every single day Afghan fighters come into Afghanistan and kill and maim us (US/NATO troops)". General Keane also added that “There are two ammonium nitrate factories in Pakistan . 80 per cent of the explosive devices that are used to kill our soldiers, kill Afghan security forces and kill Afghan people come from Pakistan."
Duplicitous Pakistan has successfully cornered U. S. - U. S. can NOT use its aid leverage to force Pakistan to stop supporting terrorist groups who kill US/NATO troops in Afghanistan day in and day out since 2001 because US needs Pakistan’s help in ferrying supplies to those very US/NATO troops.
And then Pakistani State has the tenacity to claim ‘victimized’ by one NATO raid that killed 24 Pakistani troops? How about all the US/NATO troops killed over the years because of Pakistani duplicity?
The irony of the US-Pakistan relationship is that the US may set the agenda, but Pakistan invariably maneuvers the results. Despite an outward show of compliance, Pakistan is the decisive factor in this relationship. AS THE NECK IS TO A FACE, PAKISTAN HAS INVARIABLY DETERMINED THE DIRECTION IN WHICH U. S. SHOULD TURN. The latest case in point is Hillary Clinton’s visit to Pakistan in October, 2011. She had gone there accompanied by the defense and intelligence brass on a mission to force Pakistan to act against Haqqani’s HQN and Mullah Omar’s QST, but Pakistani Generals stared them down.
With an ally like Pakistan, U. S. Afghan mission was doomed from the very beginning.
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/washington/articles_publications/publications/the-cost-of-kill-capture-impact-of-the-night-raid-surge-on-afghan-civilians-20110919/Night-Raids-Report-FINAL-092011.pdf
Not quite AI, but.........
The effectiveness of night raids obviously has its proponents and its detractors. However, IF the current Afghan government, in the person of its President, wants these to cease and is willing to stand by the condition that these cease or more reasonably that Afghans are more in the know then the effectiveness of night raids becomes a political football. Needless to say, some provincial governors are to be found who are only too happy to support night raid,s no matter what the government in Kabul might say. This is all a little similar to reports from Iraq when at different times Sunni and Shia figures could be found to speak up in support of the 'coalition' and against the official stand of government official in Baghdad.
If you think this war is going well over there. Please feel free t join those of us who have done tours and spend a year, not in the TOC either, then comment.
I served in the Army for 28 years, retiring in 1998 as a Colonel. I have been writing about Afghanistan since 1980. I have visited there 8 times since 2002, and not just to the TOCs. I am 63 years old, and so I can't re-up to go there as a soldier , but every adult should know that being on the frontline of any activity is not the only way of learning about it.
As for the Davis issue, my angst was not his point of view or his pessimism. My angst came from two facts: 1) I think he made a weak case, and 2) He called a lot of hard working senior folks "liars," when in fact, if you read the quotes he provided, the senior people gave a very nuanced view. This war is not another case of the military saying that there is a light at the end of the tunnel, only to be run over by a freight train.
If you disagree, I hope you make your case well, without impugning the integrity of those who are there trying to do their jobs.
my point proven.
Mr. Collins: It has been my observation over the years that when anyone connected with the the US military establishment or gov uses the the word "nuanced", they are ly...ah...the truth is not being well served.
All those "hard working senior folks" have known for years that the Pak Army/ISI has been taking our money and killing our men. And they haven't stopped it nor have they spoken the truth about it. For years. And for those years they have demanded, and received the loyal service and obedience of the low ranking soldiers subordinate to them. Loyalty is a two way street (at least at the sub multi-star level of life). Those "hard working senior folks" have not been loyal to their men. They have allowed them to fight and die without doing all they could to protect them from their most lethal enemy, the Pak Army/ISI. They have not even had the moral courage to say the truth let alone do anything about it. Yet year after year, merely by exercising their command, they profess to serve and be loyal to their men. They are not.
They may not be lying. They are dishonorable, disloyal, dishonest and morally corrupt. But they all have proven to be very promotable. Once you reach a certain level, the blood of your soldiers must wash off your hands more easily than before.
I have been advised to tone things down when making points like this. But in this case, how do you tone down plain old fashioned betrayal of the men? How do you not call stomach churning moral corruption and plain dereliction of duty to the men anything but that?
This back and forth was pretty funny. RE: RE: Mr Collins
There are a lot of folks on FP (not just Ricks blog) that get carried away. Maybe because I believe that it is such a large problem; that I think you stated it well. (Probably over stated. Like Lt. Davis when you bring the criticism you got to have support, and write well)
To many people have put their careers in front of what is right. This issue keeps me up at night, that I might fail in this way. It is tempting, you are a Lt. Col and you got a kid about to go to college if you could just make full bird...
Well, according to supporters, here's one.
"Afghanistan's Dirty War: Why the Most Feared Man in Bermal District Is a U.S. Ally"
"On Nov. 30, 2009, in the shadow of mountains that crumple up 9,000-ft. ridges, an Afghan mercenary bankrolled by the U.S. military and hell-bent on the destruction of Taliban rebels allegedly stopped three men heading home to celebrate 'Id ul-Qurban with their families. According to an elder from Bermal, the Afghan district where the incident took place, Commander Azizullah and his men bound their hands. Then, the elder told TIME, Azizullah drew his pistol and shot them. There was no evidence that these men were insurgents, the elder says. "But he killed them anyway.""
http://tinyurl.com/89b6cug
Only problem is that he's also a pretty effective recruiting SGT for the opposition and is probably responsible - along with his patrons - for the deaths of American troops. It may be expedient in the short term to have people like Azizullah out there killing "bad guys" on America's behalf but do the longer term ramifications (more dead Americans, stoking the potential for ethnic civil war, further delegitimization of the "host" government, and providing further obstacles to effective development) really justify the means?
I find it hard to believe that it does.
I mean, it's not exactly well-sourced.
Still, let's assume it's true. You ever notice how we assume that any behavior towards the population that wouldn't be acceptable from the Beverly Hills PD will have terrible repercussions, etc, and yet the violence applied to civilians by the Taliban hasn't lost the war for the latter? Why is that?
Another thing. If you want effective local forces, you're stuck with either Azizullah or Sepoys, and the latter are politically offensive to our state ideology.
Much of the sourcing for this is a UN report that was only internally distributed. That report noted consistent reporting - across a broad area - that appeared to show evidence of system.
Of course, unless that's tested in a judicial setting (problematically unlikely), we have only allegation and denial.
And perception. As the great General says, that's important.
As to the tolerance for casualties caused by Taleban: there was a Rand report on that last year. Based on ISAF's own data they found increases in violence against ISAF and gov't forces at district level following harm to civilians caused by those forces and that such incidents increased recruitment beyond provincial boundaries.
The same study found no such correlation or adverse effect following Taleban violence. The report doesn't venture an opinion as to why that might be. Something to think deeply about.
That may seem very unfair but there it is.
Uzbeks were among the most effective of the old communist regime's soldiers; Najibullah's fate was sealed when Dostum changed sides and joined the Mujahideen.
There is an old Afghan saying that goes something like "The anger of the Afghan [i.e., Pashtun] is less than the mercy of the Uzbek."
For what its worth, many Pashtun tribes resisted conscription and, essentially, negotiated exemptions from the draft for their men. Attempts to enforce universal conscription were one of the reasons for widespread resistance to Kabul (whether ruled by monarchs, republicans or communists). The British found that there was a huge difference between the reliability (i.e., would they mutiny and kill their officers or not) of trans-border and cis-border Pakhtuns. They often would have platoons of companies of Khattaks and/or Yusufzais to balance out the Mehsuds and Wazirs in a garrison. The Yusufzais especially were almost invariably loyal.
Najib's fate was sealed when Russia, under American pressure, cut off his oil. As Wordsworth put it, nobody wants to bet on a weak horse.
Steve-I have little faith in social science studies done in the US, not to mention ones done in an uncontrolled environment like Afghanistan. This particular one strikes me as similar to the Soros center one about night raids. They're both acts of psychological class warfare, designed to confuse and demoralize the class enemy and make them abandon effective tactics, demonstrate to the populace that they are the weak horse by, for instance, belly crawling and apologizing for every civilian casualty, etc. It's worked admirably thus far.
Remember when he and Gene Conley got off the BoSox bus in NYC and decided to go to Israel? I think they both may have had a cocktail.
FYI, I spent five years in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Davis is right.. We are completely screwed up and have no chance of succeeding. The Afghans HATE having us in their country.
I rather have Pumpsie running our involvement than any one who is running it now.
>Every man or woman in uniform has a right to his anecdotes, but no matter how many anecdotes you can string together, they don't constitute data or sound judgments.
Look, this does not matter when so much of what LTC Davis said keeps getting repeated by others privately and in print, in less public, less focused, less accusatory pieces. Even if they are not scientific data or sound judgments, his views have a qualitative ring of likelihood.
COL Collins in the thread says "My angst came from two facts: 1) I think he made a weak case, and 2) He called a lot of hard working senior folks "liars," when in fact, if you read the quotes he provided, the senior people gave a very nuanced view."
I don't disagree with these points, but that the case is weak doesn't make it wrong (it looks and smells, prima facie, right--in spite of its unctuous presentation). As for the accusations of "lying," there is a strong pull to lie to one's self, and just as Davis is likely as guilty of it as anyone else is, the optimisitc cheerleaders invested in a positive outlook in Afghanistan don't make me feel any better when they strain their nuanced observations. The "hammer" is right I think: self-delusion is written all over this war. Davis' initial piece appeared greasy, but it doesn't mean we should feel better for discovering that.
Davis not lone wolf; NIE 2010 report disputed P-4's numbers
He's but one of many who's spilling it. In fact, the U.S. was advised years ago by a panel of foreign policy and military experts not to remain in Afghanistan.
A year ago IPS News reported that that the NIE estimated the growth of the Taliban at much higher numbers than Petraeus did. The NIE felt so pressured by the general to show the number of Taliban decreasing that it actually deferred to him. The numbers in their official report agreed with his. The article also described "numbers management" as a practice of Gen. Westmoreland during the Vietnam War (Source: Inter Press Service 2/14/11;Gareth Porter, writer/reporter)
Davis's article represents the attitude of a good number of junior to mid level officers in Afghanistan: That we may be effective tactically at bashing Taliban but we are in strategic drift, with no appreciable strategic and policy gains after so many years of doing armed nation building there.
Joe Collins on the other hand represents perfectly the general officer consensus on Afghanistan; that we are succeeding, the end is in sight, as long as we are given the time that we need. It is as simple as that.
Moreover, at least Danny Davis had the moral courage to name names in his piece while the fair haired boy of Joe Collins, Tom Ricks and others--Paul Yingling--in his Failure of Generalship piece four years ago never did.
I find myself in agreement with COL Gentile and will be engaging in profound retrospection for the rest of the evening. It really is as simple as he says. And that is sad.
I plead complete ignorance concerning the history recounted in his 3rd paragraph.
Honestly disappointed this blog continues axe grind in such a petty manner.
For those who criticize LTC Davis' report as not being polished product, you might note the words DRAFT DRAFT DRAFT written on every page.
Night raids make for great theatre, great and impressive stats and lots of exciting things to do for various super soldiers and their supporters. For those reasons they have been a mainstay in struggle against Taliban & Co. and they will never go away. They are just too darn cool.
But you would expect that something so touted would make a difference in fight. It hasn't. Not much has changed. Taliban & Co. get stronger and our side doesn't.
You would think somebody in the military establishment would look beyond the cool factor and see that the night raids don't further the cause. The people at Frontline and Afghan Analyst Network have. Tim Lynch at Free Range International doesn't seem to like them much either.
When they get the right guys. The problem is that in the absence of a comprehensive governance package, to include persistent surveillance and ubiquitous and immediate enforcement, it's like continuously drinking sewage and taking vancomycin. All you're doing is selecting for vancomycin-resistant bacteria.
The issue is that CF, GIROA and ANSF are not pulling their weight, and really can't as they're presently constituted.
...don't let bad drafts, get off their computers. As I said before, I'd love to see a good document that tells this story, but this ain't it.
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