Wow! This is news to me. I have always considered his book to be the "bible" on the subject. I'd be very interested to learn more about this. Can you point me in the direction of any writings and studies that you think are good critiques?

As pop-psych culture fiction

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/killing-for-their-country-a-new-look-at-%E2%80%9Ckillology%E2%80%9D

You can look up an actual argument between a guy named Tom Aveni and Col. Grossman, Aveni picks his theories apart. Col. Hackworth is another who was once in love with Marshall but quickly fell out and came to dis-like him greatly and writes about it in "About Face". A MD named Hagerman did research on claims of Grossman's claim that bayonet fighting or trench fighting rarely happened and Grossman placed the weight of his claim on casualties. None of that made sense to a lot of people and Hargerman researched it and found that the wounded numbers were low because KIAs were over 90% for that type of fighting. Hagerman was one of the founders of Tactical Combat Casualty Care in the 90's and he knows his stuff on wounds, when, why, how to treat, etc.....We also got to have Grossman lecture us a couple of times, not a bad guy and I actually like his teaching style (he hates PPTs) but his theories just did not make sense. People kill pretty easily and do not need the motivation or training that he claims, I base this on Aveni, Hagerman and my own experience. History is to full of people killing each other and tales of hand to hand through early wars and in modern such as WWI, WWII, Korea and even Vietnam are pretty bountiful. Then you can look at what Mike Few just posted to top it off.

That _Catch-22_ is on the 2012 CSAF reading list?

http://www.af.mil/information/csafreading/index.asp

http://www.theppsc.org/Grossman/Main-R.htm

for the endless lists people make for COIN (enemy-centric, pop-centric, leader-centric, career centric, etc) instead of just understanding that war and warfare is complex.

Mike Few:

I think the phrase "career centric" whether applied to small warfighting, big warfighting or being a local D.A., is just a sarcastic phrase meant to describe people who put personal ambition above duty. Just another way to describe a human failing.

Three Cups of Tea is fiction, and the author is a crook, but should we dismiss the idea of using non-governmental, non-military indirect (FID-like if you will) means to spread democracy and capitalism?

I'm dead serious on this point. Unless we want to occupy endlessly, we have to look at other options. I'm not defending Greg Mortenson, but just examing the ideas.

Mike,

Who said that spreading democracy and capitalism should be a goal of American foreign policy? Nobody can agree on what the latter means, and in some form it exists everywhere in the world. Can you tell me that the Pashtuns are not capitalists? Which is more capitalistic, Iraq in 2002 or today's Iraq?

As far as democracy is concerned, people have been aware of its problems since the Pelopponesian War. To the degree that it works, it works in places like the US and Europe and some places in NE Asia-places with high average IQs and a certain set of civic traditions. Even in those places, the government is more of a bureaucracy than a democracy, with unelected public servants making the mass of decisions. Every attempt to institute democracy in Africa and the Middle East that I'm aware of has been disastrous for the host population and the US taxpayers. The only people who benefited were the members of the "democratic" governments and their US govt and NGO advisors and pursemasters.

Of course, NGOs, whose name isn't even a misnomer but a lie-organizations which draw most of their funds from the government, derive their prestige from government-supported academia and make influencing government policy their primary business are anything but non-governmental by any reasonable standard, have a large vested interest in promoting democracy and "capitalism." These promote an environment conducive to power and money transfer from the formal government to the NGOs. Toxoplasma gondi, a microorganism transmitted from rats to cats as part of its life cycle, has a vested interest in its rat host behaving in such a way as to maximize its chances of being eaten by a cat, so it chemically shuts off the rat's sense of self-preservation. NGOs do things like produce and promote Three Cups of Tea for the exact same reason. Why should the rest of us assist them in this effort?

Supposedly, the schools he built didn't get torn down by the Taliban because they knew that locals wouldn't cooperate with folks who tore down something they built with their own hands.

The notion made intuitive sense and suggested a means of choosing development projects in the face of hostile guerrillas and perennial money shortages--if the locals don't see the need for it and aren't willing to put in their share of elbow grease, it gets put on the back-burner. Knowing he was lying still peeves me:P

Good call on the Van Fleet issue. Van Fleet suffered because Marshall did not personally know him, thus he was a victim of mistaken identity at a distance. In the book, Massengale worked for Marshall on the Army staff--and different memoirs and records show that Marshall did not suffer fools easily. My only point is that while Massengale is written as a despicable character, based on what happens to him, he had to have some level of competence. His ruthlessness may have actually worked to his advantage. I'm not holding Massengale as ideal to follow, but we need to realize it takes all sorts in the military, and rarely will we find those who are utterly contemptable in all aspects.
I'm reminded of the quote attributed to the German General Kurt von Hammerstein-Equord:

"I divide my officers into four groups. There are clever, diligent, stupid, and lazy officers. Usually two characteristics are combined. Some are clever and diligent -- their place is the General Staff. The next lot are stupid and lazy -- they make up 90 percent of every army and are suited to routine duties. Anyone who is both clever and lazy is qualified for the highest leadership duties, because he possesses the intellectual clarity and the composure necessary for difficult decisions. One must beware of anyone who is stupid and diligent -- he must not be entrusted with any responsibility because he will always cause only mischief."

German military leadership and competence, which is held highly by many, especially at the tactical level, makes little mention of compassion and "taking care of the troops." Its all about mission. The German leadership that was selected to "rebirth" their Army after WWI was primarily drawn from the General Staff, not necessarily front line commanders.

I'm not a fan of the German model because it had its obvious flaws--fatal flaws in both ethics and strategic leadership. However, it shows there are multiple paths and personalities that can be successful in a military.

Interesting point on Massengale's competence. I realize all these characters are composites, but any ideas who Massengale might be drawn from? I ask because someone once mapped Sam Damon's career onto Clarence Huebner:

http://once-an-eagle.com/docs/LookingforSamDamon.pdf

Not a perfect match, but good enough that you'd think one could also identify prototype Massengales. Talented, ruthless, and unusually slick -- and very effective in certain contexts. Mark Clark? Wedemeyer? Norstad?

(I wonder if Damon's father-in-law was based on John DeWitt?)

Good on you! Nice inclusion, which one can understand why a young officer, or NCO I might add, would overlook, but I see you understand its relevance at this time and place.

Shall we conclude with a passage. . .Yes, let's do: "The art of war, as generally understood, must be modified to suit the circumstances of each particular case. The conduct of small wars is in certain respects an art by itself, diverging widely from what is adapted to the conditions of regular warfare, but not so widely that there are not in all its branches points which permit comparison to be established."

"the fatal fallacy in the liberal theory of counterinsurgency, with the United States so often obliged to work through repressive local leadership, the reform component dwindled into ineffectual exhortation.” Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr (1977) Robert Kennedy and His Times

"…they [counterinsurgent] should be aware, too, that aid programs and various other attempts to raise the people’s standard of living have never yet yielded the desired results.” RAND, COIN symposium, 1962

In the case of the Greek Civil War, didn't U.S. military advisors and diplomats work through host nation folks with flaws in that ultimately successful effort, and wasn't 'massive' Marshall Plan aid to the Greeks a critical, non-kinetic element of that COIN campaign?

I recall watching 1990s CNN video of a grizzled Greek farmer with an warm, ear-to-ear smile describing the wonderful (read 'large' and 'strong') Missouri mule he got 50 years prior to replace dray animals he had lost during the Wehrmacht's occupation. Greek Communists didn't offer him that kind of tangible help plowing his fields.

It's easy to not be satisfied if not instantly gratified, but in the long haul of history, there are examples of operations where things that may have appeared to be a mess at the time reveal themselves as ultimately effective. Improving relations with Vietnam offer that kind of hope for what we have done more recently.

that took the wind out of the KKE (Greek Communists) and that was Tito and Stalin disagreeing on policy in Greece, causing the two leaders to split apart, further seeing Tito close the Yugoslavia border to Greece as well as close down internal training camps inside also.

I think one good observation in Mike Few bringing-up the 1962 (1963 published) Rand Counterinsurgency (no COIN back then), was the group discussed at length the controlling of borders to the insurgent(something that played a very important part toward success in Algeria for the French),which I remind you, we are unable to do in Afghanistan, nor were we able to in Viet-Nam. . .and the rest is history, or will be soon for the younger generation.

What does this have to do with reading lists? Nothing, but when did that ever stop me from commenting? : )

The Diane Rehm show today had an excellent account on how the Arab/Muslim world is rejecting neo-liberal economic policies (to include COIN, FID, and money for the IMF) in order to determine their own way of combing social justice (conservative capitalism) with Islam.

This is self-reliance.

I think the fact that Black Hearts is on there certainly fulfills the desire of examining leadership failures in conjunction with positive examples. Additionally, We Were Soldiers Once... And Young also has examples of poor leadership. In ever phase of my officer education, we've had ethics and LoW lessons which have examined My Lai, COL Sassaman, Abu Grhaib, etc. I think my peers choose to buy books mostly about the good examples, and read news/articles about the bad.

one devours what makes one feel good (I'm happy everyone is feted by "Once an Eagle").

However, diets change as one gets older, and in recently re-reading about the Ottoman Empire, I was reminded that von Moltke. . .the Elder that is, worked for the one of the Ottoman Sultan in the early 1800's

In that light, in answer that Maurice Challe was not necessarily admirable, I am reminded that Moltke in a letter to some legal expert, statedsometing to the effect, that the sole justifiable measure in war is the weakening of the enemy's military power, and further stating that all sources of support to the enemy must be considered, etc?

Perhaps Challe felt strongly about Moltke's axium that, "The greatest good deed in war is the speedy ending of the war, and every means to that end, so long as it is not reprehensible, must remain open."

The Greek Communists kidnapping kids and shipping them off to Albania for indoctrination didn't help their cause. Have been wondering at what point civilian deaths caused by insurgent-emplaced IEDs will begin having the same effect.

Keegan can be tough to get into and stay into. Excellent writing, as I was a history major and read a number of his works "way back when", but not particularly fetching for every junior officer out there.

As for Walzer, most of us have to read it for Philosophy or Ethics early on, before we're Captains, so that may explain part of it. That, or not enough care (yet)... but I don't think that's it.

Concur. I read it in high school and thought in passing that there was no way that could happen. Fast forward a few years, and I was climbing mountains and breathing dust there... although our adventure there is obviously quite different than the book.

This kind of war was about more than Korea; It was really about this kind of war. It was published about 1963 and if the "Best and the Brightest" had read the book and heeded the lessons learned RVNSF probably would not have been busting his tail in Vietnam. The real lesson of TKoW is a Nation needs to be careful about putting your young men in the mud and the blood of some 3d world dungheap.

The point about the timing of "This Kind of War" in relation to Vietnam is a good one. The folks who sent U.S. forces to deliver pizzas in Somalia, 1992-1993, also should have read it.

Fehrenbach was a Texan and wrote some TX history

This kind of war was about more than Korea; It was really about this kind of war. It was published about 1963 and if the "Best and the Brightest" had read the book and heeded the lessons learned RVNSF probably would not have been busting his tail in Vietnam. The real lesson of TKoW is a Nation needs to be careful about putting your young men in the mud and the blood of some 3d world dungheap.

Bearcat: It is probably well to consider that the 3rd world dungheap that Fehrenbach wrote about turned into today's South Korea, a 1st world powerhouse that gave us more help than anybody in Vietnam.

Fehrenbach also wrote a history of Mexico "Fire and Blood" that I thought was great.

I was disappointed to see the "Defeat Into Victory" by Slim didn't make the list.

Bearcat: It is probably well to consider that the 3rd world dungheap that Fehrenbach wrote about turned into today's South Korea, a 1st world powerhouse that gave us more help than anybody in Vietnam.

Fehrenbach also wrote a history of Mexico "Fire and Blood" that I thought was great.

I was disappointed to see the "Defeat Into Victory" by Slim didn't make the list.

McDonald is buried in Section 1 at Arlington. The words on his tombstone are from the book: "I am not the hero of my story."

Robert Graves' "Goodbye to All That" though usually thought of as an account of his break with the old order in the UK contains some of the most detailed and vivid accounts of trench warfare in WWI and the challenges of small unit leadership.

Sledge and G. M. Fraser deserve inclusion. As does Alastair Horne's book on the Algerian War. And Slim's 'Defeat into Victory.' Also one that no one hear has heard of, Brig. John Peter Dalvi's "Himalayan Blunder" on the Sino-Indian War (Dalvi was a Brigade Commander who was taken prisoner by the Chinese.)

There is nothing for "context" (re: Gen. Dempsey-related post) like Peter Hopkirk and Byron Farwell. Their particular illustrations of the follies and madness of the 19th century powers' adventures in Central Asia could be lifted from the front pages of the Times or the Post. I think Kipling is enjoyable and even melancholy ("A Sahib's War" or "The Drums of the Fore and Aft") but a bit light if one is trying to get some serious meaning.

"SO, we'll go no more a-roving
So late into the night,
Though the heart be still as loving,
And the moon be still as bright.

For the sword outwears its sheath,
And the soul wears out the breast,
And the heart must pause to breathe,
And love itself have rest.

Though the night was made for loving,
And the day returns too soon,
Yet we'll go no more a-roving
By the light of the moon."