Friday, January 6, 2012 - 9:27 AM

I got nothing new to say about Thursday's pronouncements, except this thought: These cuts are the beginning, not the end.
Also, President Obama's favorite metaphor, "the tide of war is receding," is more pessimistic than it seems. Nothing is more predictable than shortly after the tide stops going out, it starts coming back in.
From Wikipedia:
"There are different stages of withdrawal as well. Generally, a person will start to feel worse and worse, hit a plateau, and then the symptoms begin to dissipate."
Leaner and modern sounds like Rummy's "Transformation", but still better than bloated and obsolete. Real traction will be made when the MV-22, F-22, and some attack subs and carrier battle groups are cut.
Likely the Navy and Air Force have been spared in part because their weapon systems have strong(er) and more congressional backers. Easy to trim off a brigade without closing down an Army or Marine base. Harder to eliminate a ship or aircraft model without cascading effects all over the country. Good to know that security strategy is driving the bus.
Politics and Economics in Foreign Policy
The seemingly sparing of the Air Force and Navy bring forth an intersting light to the congressional influence of foreign policy and strategy as pointed out int the las statement. The optimistic side of me would like to believe that these cut backs are based more upon analysis of future threat as a new National Defense Strategy is published, but the pessimist clearly sees this point and somewhat agrees.
On future threat, and by the comments during the inveiling of this new win-spoil strategy vice our existing win-hold-win this approach to defense may hold some weight although I am wary. The newest focus seems to be in the pacific while assuming some risk in relying on optimistically positive outcomes of events like the Arab Spring in the middle east as well as a calulated risk of limited stability operations in Africa as seen in JTF-HOA and seemingly positive trends emerging in recently troubled areas as Ivory coast. The bottom line is, that if we focus on a Pacific/Asian (North Korea/Chinese) threat, terrain, location and capabilities lean towards the effectiveness of a stron Navy and Air Force. (Especially with the Air Force assuming responsibility for emergin cyber/space threats, which seemingly is the most significance from the Chinese)
However, I hesitate to return to the Clinton era policy, recalling historical reference of the Billy Mitchell's strategy, that air power and strategic precision munitions can effectively defeat threats. We've seen time and time again, that these approaches to a conventional lethal threat are highly effective but cannot alone win a battle (ie. we still have Ground Troops in Kosovo)
But aside from this defense, politics is a real player. Especially in this economy, who is producing the highest dollar, highest employing government contracts? Navy and Air Force. Who has effectively spread these projects spanning multiple congressional districts? Navy and Air Force.
With this in light, I pose the follwoing speculative question. Have out ground forces (USMC and USA) somewhat shot themselves in the foot? We have long touted the adaptability of the Marines and there reliance of tanacity over technology. The Army has become the most advanced, lethal Armt in the world. We have spent many congressional hearings quoting "battlefield calculus" that states outnumbered, we are still far superior. Although brought about in a sense of risk adversity, did this same policy of technology and skill enabling a minimal number of US Soldiers/Marines to be exposed to ground combat with extreme superiority over a larger foe somewhat set us up fo the cuts we are seeing today although senior leaders are seemingly backpeddling; no longer touting this calculus but returning to a need for more troops to ensure we maintain our advantage.
In reading your post, I can't help but agree with several of your points. What concerns me are the questions of lessons learned...they don't seem to apply or carry over to the future. The constant return of politics to the strategy of "bombs and more bombs" to keep our strategic advantage has never worked and it never will. Just look at the era of Eisenhower for an illustration of this concept...he wanted to strip ground forces and rely heavily on the AF and our nuclear capabilities to maintain our strategic advantage. Despite his efforts, we still ended up on the ground in Korea and Vietnam, and never gained strong footing in the latter as we failed to adapt to the challenges created by an enemy that often remained unseen. Somalia raised additional red flags, as did Iraq and Afghanistan. The underlying theme that strings these examples together is the struggle our forces have faced trying to support governments that will be effective in countries whose fundamental differences make their stability challenges so different from our own. Only recently has the DoD and Congress fully backed the need to understand a country's culture, history, religions and traditions in order to develop capabilities that are as important in some cases as a War Fighters' combat skills. Why are these skills important? Because wars are no longer won through decisive battles and how far away we can be while firing on a target is not relevant. The ability to establish a partnership among battling countries, however, is relevant and is likely to be the norm of the future.
A quick read of current war analysts underscores the importance of understanding globalization and how it has fostered our interdependence with other countries worldwide. Maintaining an AF and a Navy with investments in long-range weapon capabilities will never be able to resolve the second and third order effects realized by a strategic hit of an enemy target. Only ground forces are capable of dealing with the potentially long-standing fallout. They will always be needed, now more than ever. If the government and citizens believe that cutting a BDE or two from the Army or Marines will have little to no impact, I'm sorry to say they are kidding themselves. The failing states of Africa cannot be ignored, any more than the growing power of China can be dismissed. Our forces need to be prepared on all fronts. The process of cutting the DoD, only to build it back up again ten years later is a cycle that is ongoing and often due to the poor insight of its political leaders.
Anyone who is talking about concerns arising from the suggestion cuts to the defense budget is doing so out of political expediency or ignorance.
The facts are that the defense budget for the next fiscal year is slated to increase by ~$100 billion, and that so long as congress and the president agree, any further increases can be exempted from the cap on security spending in the Budget Control Act. Is the budget going to return to what it was on September 10, 2001, adjusted for inflation (roughly half of what it is today)? Of course not. President Obama even made this painfully clear in his speech yesterday when he said: "Over the next 10 years, the growth in the defense budget will slow, but the fact of the matter is this: It will still grow..."
There is no plan for the defense budget to shrink. Only that the increases, still above increases to account for inflation, might shrink. Even then there's no real guarantee. When are sensible people going to realize that these cuts to increases are not cuts?
Thanks for making the point that the cuts are cuts to growth. Crossing fingers that cuts into the ample fat reserves are to follow. Caution, compromise, and moderation are the hallmarks of BO and his team, though Iraq and AFG indicate that he means business, even if the pace of the change is not fully satisfying.
Reaction to Boeing's announcement of closing the Wichita tanker facility is an example of how local governments and interests can push back.
If there are no cuts, why are there 490,000 people at risk?
It is impossible to look at firing almost a half-million people, cancelling lots of programs, auditing every budget item, and then saying there will be no cuts.
When your paycheck stops - you've been cut.
You're not accounting for the massive increase in health care costs, infrastructure/base facilities, personnel costs and inflation. To have the military of 2000 the budget if 2000 won't do it...it would roughly take the budget of 2000 plus 40%.
You need to learn some basic economics and learn something about health care costs (which other militaries don't have to pay since other civilized countries have national health care).
Can't help but feel these are bad times coming for all of us: those that stay, those that don't.
If the cuts are brought on slowly, very slowly, with suitable transitions for personnel, mission sets, responsibilities, and equipment/materiel changes - then we have a chance to see this through without destroying our capability.
The problem is that haste will rule the day and dollars rule over people and technology rules over capability.
I sense that the biggest priority right now is to simply slash dollars. That's going to lead to poor decisions.
A confounding issue here is the election year: I think the POTUS can suggest anything he wants, so long as it falls short of the mandatory cuts prescribed in the event they don't come up with anything together. That, to me, is scary. It will turn our transition from one demanding debate into one of prescription.
Of course the other confound in the election year is that the POTUS may have to reverse course on these cuts if it becomes a true re-election threat.
Last election year issue is that the White House and the Congress may face overwhelming anger should they slash and burn the military, which means no re-election. This could mean short term actions to make the cuts easier on defense contractors and military personnel in order to save votes, but it could mean long term that bad decisions are still made.
Crazy times.
Except none of that is actually going to happen
The fear-mongering about hollowing out the military that has followed this announcement completely misses the point that these "cuts" are not cuts at all (see my earlier comment). The various accusations being tossed around are entirely for political expediency, as is this announcement to begin with.
Longer term do seem more promising in the current situation we face today. Specifically in manpower I agree with Secretary Panetta's response in that we must take great care to avoid hastily placing tens of thousand of our Veterans into the workforce in today's troubled economy. As well as his comments of a fear of ostracizing veterans and familys in feeling left behind, as they find themselves seeking employment and support, by a governemnt that they spent many years supporting and sacrifing for through over ten years of war.
Overall though, my optimism remains in this still follows the cyclic pattern of interwar trends in defense spending and strategy. We seeminingly struggle to learn the lessons of large cutbacks immediately following conflict (Desert Storm RIFs, WWI, WW II, etc, etc.) But yet our forces seemingly never "cut back" their strongest capability of flexibility, adaptability, and dedication to overcome the challenges of fewer resources following conflict to maintain a high level of readiness and maintain a stuture of the best, most professional military force in the world.
Re the One War At A Time Policy
I'm very pleased the Commander-in-Chief has ensured by the power of his personal character that the North Koreans will not cross the DMZ while we are fully engaged with the Iranians/Afghans/Russians/Chinese/TakeYourPick. Pleasant to be certain we only need to fight one small war at a time. Because that's all we're going to be able to do under this plan.
The budget for fighting 2 wars at once
We were postured to fight 2 major theater wars following the end of the Cold War. We did this with a budget in constant dollars that was half what it is now. With the precision revolution and our even increasing overall capabilities, how can people reasonably suggest we can't fight 2 major theater wars (even if there were actually 2 to fight) on a budget twice as big that's going to grow further?
The management of anything, whether it's a platoon, a corporation, or a nation, is going to involve trade offs between competing priorities because resources are not infinite. The defense budget could double and you could still come up with some fantastic scenario detailing why it's insufficient. "Oh, yeah? Well, what if the Chinese/Cubans/Hungarians/Soviets/Nazi Zombies/League of Women Voters ALL team up on us? What then?"
So...yes, in short. We're always going to assume some level of risk. I think this will put us well into the range of acceptable, particularly if we abandon the idea that we need to not only defeat other military forces but indefinitely occupy and fundamentally reorder societies.
I am not against slowing growth in defense budget. It is debatable if spending more makes Nation more secure or less secure.
I am no THAT confident. It is long since we had enough muscle for 2 MRCs (so taking it out of strategy is OK).
Programs like F35 are capable of consuming the entire DoD Budget.
I joined the Army during the Iranian Hostage Crisis after the "Disaster in the Desert". The Defense cuts (mainly slow growth) during the Carter administration really did produce a (as noted by GEN Meyer) a "hollow force". They also didn't have money for things like TP in the barracks, paint and lubricants in in the motor pool. Readiness levels sucked.
We're going to have to do this right. This was enough to break the force:
"During the 1976 campaign, Carter criticized Defense spending levels of the Ford administration and promised cuts in the range of $5 billion to $7 billion. Shortly after he became secretary, Brown suggested a series of amendments to Ford's proposed FY 1978 budget, having the effect of cutting it by almost $3 billion, but still allowing a TOA increase of more than $8 billion over the FY 1977 budget. Subsequent budgets under Brown moved generally upward, reflecting high prevailing rates of inflation, the need to strengthen and modernize conventional forces neglected somewhat since the end of the Vietnam conflict, and serious challenges in the Middle East, Iran, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. The Brown Defense budgets by fiscal year, in TOA, were as follows: 1978, $116.1 billion; 1979, $124.7 billion; 1980, $141.9 billion; and 1981, $175.5 billion. In terms of real growth, there were slight negative percentages in 1978 and 1979, and increases in 1980 and 1981. It should be noted that part of the increase for FY 1981 resulted from supplemental appropriations obtained by the Reagan administration,"
...force that the Bushies disparaged as "hollow" did quite well (for what little it did) in early-AFG, and Iraq, since it's hard to argue that the 2003 military was Bush's military, even when 43 congratulated himself on the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln.
The United States is protected from most military threats by two oceans, regional alliances, massive intel collection, and nuclear and conventional deterrence. Trimming the fat and some meat won't change those realities. What might change is the US ability to challenge/threaten regional powers, and allied countries' ability to get a free ride on defense. Americans might find they like a multi-polar world comprised of states that wish to trade.
"One war" capability is more than enough
Has been for a long time. Let's get real: Iraq & Afghanistan together barely amounted to a "war" -- in Iraq we lost about 500 men per year, fewer in Afghanistan. A fair number of "boots on the ground" if you total up both places, but nothing compared to Vietnam or Korea. & speaking of Korea, so what if NK decides to commit national suicide & invade? Is the South Korean army chopped liver? This is a realistic, sober look at the world as it really is, not the wet dreams of defense think tanks.
Search your memory and I'm sure you will recall that the reason Afghanistan became such a mess is because all the resources went to Iraq. So, one war capability wasn't enough.
Depends on what you mean by one war
I think what the strategy is saying that if the Army gets tied up in a Conventional ground war if another conventional war breaks out the USAF will simply shoot anything that moves on the second front. I think most would agree that you can't win a war from the air but you can certainly stop an advancing conventional force dead in its tracks. Besides, we are still talking about a war somewhere else, not directly against the US anyway.
Amazing that this needs to be said in 2012:
Invading Iraq was a bad, wrong decision. One war capability was enough assuming the foreign policy competence/decency not to start a war of aggression whilst another war was ongoing.
It was not that long ago that the Air Force complained that its F-15s had to be withdrawn owing to fatigue cracks, Yet they are able to rebuild 50 year old B-52s. As they angle to justify the F-22 and F-35, they must be neglecting the maintenance/refurbishment of existing fighter/bomber assets. Will the Air Force have enough assets to stop some conventional army as they play budget games? Just who is it that will launch a conventional attack and why? I can only think of North Korea as being stupid enough to do something like that and you are right; stopping them would me a massive use of air power since getting ground forces there in meaningful numbers would take time that we do not have.
I can see territorial disputes with China over oil fields as a possibility, but those are not our islands. Must we insert ourselves into every conflict? Ostensibly we need a Navy to keep the sea lanes open and project power. Nobody is attempting to close the sea lanes except, maybe Somali pirates. Who are these bogeymen that must be stopped?
Agree. Trimming the fat won't affect our ability to defend ourselves from a conventional attack on U.S. soil, only our ability to meddle elsewhere and/or protect our economic interests overseas. I am more concerned about our cyber vulnerabilities right now than a future conventional attack by China, Russia, Iran or other rising power...
If we are truly all in this together and trying to reduce spending, why doesn't congress take a cut? You could argue that their perks and benefits are much more generous than those of the military. On a percentage basis it wouldn't be much, but at least a symbolic reduction would show good faith. Is it because we are afraid that we couldn't continue to recruit and retain the talented, intelligent, visionary, altruistic public servants that serve us today? It seems ironic to me that the branch of government that controls the purse strings should get a pass when much of the current situation is of their making.
When you own the biggest bat and are in the bat making business, the automatic go to solution when a mole sticks its head up is to whack it.
Maye some cuts to the so called 2 war capability will get us to pause before whacking every mole that sticks its head up, knowing that a bigger mole may be learking
BlueLight, I agree, Congress should look at cutting their staffs, office space, perks, and retirement plans, at least down to what they offer everyone else
WASHINGTON -- In recasting his defense strategy, President Barack Obama is looking beyond the wars he inherited to focus on Asian security risks - mainly China and North Korea - that took a back seat to Iraq and Afghanistan.
This marks a turning point not only for the U.S. military but also for Obama, entering the final year of his White House term. Facing a re-election battle, he is declaring success in Iraq and Afghanistan and taking a forward-looking stance on the how to preserve U.S. military pre-eminence.
A prominent theme of the new strategy that Obama and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta unveiled Thursday is what Panetta has called a renewed commitment to asserting America's position in the Asia-Pacific region.
"This region is rowing in importance to the future of the United States economy and our national security," Panetta said. "This means, for instance, improving capabilities that maintain our military's technological edge and freedom of action."
The administration is not anticipating military conflict in Asia, but Panetta believes the U.S. got so bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan after 9/11 that it missed chances to improve its strategic position in other regions. He has yet to visit China as Pentagon chief but is expected to go as early as this spring.
Obama Defense Strategy
Pablo Martinez Monsivais
AP Photo - President Barack Obama speaks during a news briefing on the defense strategic guidance, Thursday, Jan. 5, 2012, at the Pentagon.
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External Link http://twitter.com/robertburnsAP
External Link http://twitter.com/robertburnsAP
AP Video Obama launches reshaping, shrinking of US military
AP Video New defense strategy sets Obama's gaze on Asia
The new strategy also identified India as a long-term strategic partner that can serve as a regional economic anchor and provider of security in the Indian Ocean region. And it said the U.S. will try to keep the peace on the Korean peninsula by working with allies and others in Asia to defend against North Korean provocations.
The eight-page document highlights the administration's efforts to deepen its engagement in the increasingly prosperous Asia-Pacific through diplomacy, trade and security ties.
"All of the trends - demographic trends, geopolitical trends, economic trends and military trends - are shifting toward the Pacific," Army Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said, standing alongside Obama and Panetta in the Pentagon briefing room. "So our strategic challenges in the future will largely emanate out of the Pacific region."
America views its military presence as key to ensuring Asian stability and the free flow of commerce, although it is a source of tension with China, which sees its military buildup as commensurate with its rise as a global power. Lurking in the background is the threat of China taking military action to force Taiwan to reunite with the mainland - a move that could draw the U.S. into the conflict
Some of China's neighbors have been unnerved by Beijing's assertive behavior and claims to disputed territories, particularly in the resource-rich South China Sea.
The new Pentagon strategy said Washington and Beijing share a stake in peace and stability in East Asia and an interest in building better relations.
"However, the growth of China's military power must be accompanied by greater clarity of its strategic intentions in order to avoid causing friction in the region," the document said.
Even as the Pentagon's focus shifts more toward Asia, Panetta said it would keep a close eye on the Mideast, where major problems persist, including the threat of increasing instability in Iraq now that U.S. troops have left.
The new strategy says the U.S. will emphasize Persian Gulf security in collaboration with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf allies who fear Iran's influence and its suspected pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability.
"To support these objectives, the United States will continue to place a premium on U.S. and allied military presence in - and support of - partner nations in and around this region," the document said.
Coincidentally, U.S. and Israeli forces are preparing for what Panetta has described as the largest-ever U.S.-Israeli military exercise. It is intended to test U.S. and Israeli air defenses against missiles and rockets. It happens to follow a 10-day Iranian naval exercise near the Gulf's Strait of Hormuz.
The strategy strongly suggests a reduced U.S. military presence in Europe, notwithstanding a continuing close relationship with NATO. The Pentagon is expected to propose pulling some troops out of Europe, although no plan has been announced. Obama said the U.S. would "continue investing" in important alliances, including NATO, although he did not allude to future U.S. troop levels.
---
Associated Press writer Matthew Pennington contributed to this report.
Robert Burns can be reached on Twitter at http://twitter.com/robertburnsAP
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EDITORIAL: Lessons learned from Iraq War
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Read more here: http://www.fresnobee.com/2012/01/05/2671721/obama-vows-us-will-stay-worlds.html#storylink=cpy
good
professional web design
I wish FP.com had a Tom Ricks for the Asia-Pacific
Seriously, what's a region gotta do to get a dedicated blogger?
So count your blessings!
Best,
Tom
To hear most of the Flag ranks talk
...it will be here soon. Be careful what you wish for....
Short memories of an ill equipped Army
"the Clinton era...
...force that the Bushies disparaged as "hollow" did quite well (for what little it did) in early-AFG, and Iraq, since it's hard to argue that the 2003 military was Bush's military, even when 43 congratulated himself on the U.S.S. Abraham Lincoln."
I guess you don't remember the stories of Soldiers "buying their own body armor" because there wasn't enough to go around.
Or Welding "haji" armor for HMMWVs out of sheet steel.
Or units not having even training sets of uparmored vehicles to train on prior to deployment.
Or enough optics, machineguns, radios, and NODs to go around, so every unit passed off their old stuff to the incoming unit -- and deployed back to the training base with huge shortages.
Talk to some Soldiers who lived it.
The Army took a procurement holiday for nearly a decade, and it made both Iraq and Afghanistan difficult operations.
Yes, some of that was self inflicted by the services (and Congress!) who sacrificed smaller programs for "big ticket" items like Crusader, F-22, and the various Navy boondoggles like the LCS and Virginia subs.
But the Clinton defense/procurement policy should be a cautionary tale -- not a defense of austerity.
Was something from the Bush II-Rumsfeld Era. As was the strategic blunder of invading Iraq, and choosing to do so with too few troops and no liberation/occupation plan. So I guess procurement and training equipment deficits were a function of 43's and Rumsfeld's frailure to anticipate or then to pivot Then the Iraqis started to use key fobs and mobile phones, that could not be countered by F-22s and B-2s.
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