Friday, December 16, 2011 - 9:38 AM

Here's another take on the reflective belts controversy, which says we should focus less on the belts and more on the number of billets for general officers.
Meantime, the mysteriously named commenter named "_B_" offered this astute analysis last Friday of why we see enforcement of petty regulations and such on bases in combat zones:
--
"When you can't accomplish the important, the petty becomes important.
I was in South-Central Iraq in 2008, on a multinational FOB which had been getting rocketed fairly regularly. A conventional brigade showed up; they were living in tents due to lack of CHU space, and highly vulnerable to IDF. They did not go out on a single raid that I know of to get the guys who were lighting the FOB up (fortunately, others did.) The only times those guys went outside the wire, it was to ferry their senior leadership across the province for unproductive key leader engagements (they killed an Iraqi police guy with an MRAP while going through a checkpoint on one of those field trips.) You know what their senior leadership's priorities were? Doing away with takeout trays at the DFAC (since, according to the brigade's CSM, the local nationals working on base were sneaking food out to feed to the insurgents) and enforcing ludicrous uniform standards (all brigade personnel had to wear gloves outside-in August-to avoid sunburning their hands, and noncompliance meant an Article 15.) I had to pry their CSM off one of my junior guys at breakfast one morning-we'd just come back in the wire after being out all night, and he didn't like my dude's uniform.
The main issue is this--a LOT of the senior leadership is lost in the sauce, has no idea what's going on or how to accomplish anything concrete. So, they attempt to make themselves feel like they're in control of the situation via a) imposing ludicrous chickenshit on those below them, and b) spending most of their time liaising with other senior Americans, doing coordination meetings, briefings, etc., etc., etc. That way, they feel like they are in control of their environment, and never have to encounter anything which would suggest differently. All this is done at the expense of their subordinates and of the war in general, but that's ok."
--
(HT to "Soldier's Diary")
b), Sounds like most senior management in corporate America.
That corporate managers' pettiness does not usually distract their subordinates from what are life and death situations.
Corporate leaders are accountable to a P&L, and there's this thing called "a competitive market" that benchmarks you against your peers. If you fail to do well against your competitors in the private sector, you run into outcomes such as "bankruptcy" or "getting fired". This simple level of accountability - not the oorah-Semper Fi "I'm responsible for everything my Marines do/don't do", but rather a basic factual identification of who is and is not doing a good job - is depressingly rare in the military these days.
I fully agree with _B_'s comments. The sad truth is that the field grade ranks are a bastion of mediocrity. I was not one of the top company grade officers in my cohort but I think that the majority of them, like me, left active duty after the completion of their minimum commitment. The "why the best officers are leaving the military" article from the Atlantic last year deserves a read by anyone following this thread who has not read it yet.
What's really infuriating (for me at least) is that the origin of so many of these stupid rules was/is Fobbits trying to think up something that they could put on their fitness reports. I'm sure the bullet reads, "Devised and implemented new protocols and procedures to increase warfighters' safety in austere combat environment" or some such crap.
I'm still coming to terms with the fact that much of what I did in OIF, even when I was leading Marines outside the wire with a wide degree of authority in my interactions with locals, was ultimately driven by guys whose first priority was not winning a war/counterinsurgency/whatever, but rather getting another medal, getting promoted, and getting the command/duty station/whatever they coveted. I'm sure there's a bit of this in any war, but it seemed particularly pervasive in OIF.
Leroy,
First, let me say that I agree with all of your post – except for the 1st paragraph.
“Corporate leaders are accountable to a P&L, and there's this thing called "a competitive market" that benchmarks you against your peers.”
Profits and Loss statements are a measure of effectiveness that can be highly dependent upon factors outside of your control. Regardless of what the news tells you, the business cycle is extremely difficult to forecast. Think of the market as an insurgency and know that extremely hard work does not always garner rewards. Intangibles and perceptions count. Don’t let all the math fool you, economics is a “social science”.
If you fail to do well against your competitors in the private sector, you run into outcomes such as "bankruptcy" or "getting fired".
In business you’re absolutely responsible for your actions, but the results of these actions are highly related to the “competitive market”. In short, your sales team can be doing everything right, but if the market is down, they could all “get fired.”
Sorry, I just had to get that off my chest. Too often I see officers getting out who feel that, unlike the army, those who do not work hard will get fired in the civilian sector. They also feel that their work ethic will slowly raise them to the top. To borrow from army parlance, “The market has a vote”.
Dog and Pony,
I think we may be in violent agreement here as I concur with what you wrote in your response.
Was not making the case that the free market rewards competence/excellence on a perfect 1:1 basis. There's certainly a fair amount of risk caused by randomness, chaos and inefficiency, as well as cyclical and sectoral volatility, for any given enterprise. That said, I don't think a private sector business as incompetent as, say, II MEF headquarters, would survive much longer than a quarter.
Also agree that many officers get out thinking the grass is greener..."I'll get a sweet job making six figures in the DC area", etc. They don't realize that the take-home cash income as a captain in NC making $55k on paper is better than a contractor making $100k salary in DC, due to tax-free allowances and whatnot. The USMC Reserve is full of guys who rue the day they convinced themselves that there was a huge pot of gold at the end of the private sector rainbow.
To reiterate my initial point though, you encounter levels of incompetence in the military, particularly in adminstrative/personnel/procurement sections, that you rarely if ever see in the private sector. The only regular exposure civilians have to this level of incompetence is in government offices like the DMV or post office. And I believe that this incompetence has consequences worse than the "average" general officer perceives....understand this is a mushy, non-falsifiable assertion, but I think you know what I mean.
It's not just the Army. I also am concerned about the corporate ethos and its effects in our air service, which is seen as the most corporate of all the branches. Between the corporate cultures and the political cultures, I think the military culture suffers. I tried to compare our culture with the culture of Enron in a "master's" thesis awhile back. Didn't turn out as valuable as I would have liked, but it's hard to research and write when you have a twelve hour day job.
For those interested: http://www.pickyourbattles.net/2010/05/smartest-guys-in-room-and-best-of-best.html
As to this article, I think the writer is spot on. With all the massive challenges we face, it's amazing how regularly we focus on silly stuff like mottos and uniform changes.
In Herat last year, while doing a JET deployment ...
I was astounded when a new mixed group came in to support the Regional Support Commander had the mandate from their CSM that they were to wear eye pro at ALL times while outdoors in uniform. If you walked outside from your B-hut to the DFAC, you had to wear clear eye pro. Not in tactical ensemble, mind you, but in any uniform. No one seemed to know why ...
Yep, eyepro at all times outdoors is a common uniform requirement in theater. And many, if not most, units make their folks wear gloves all the time outdoors to, at least in ACUs, and regardless of the weather. I even know of one battalion (in my brigade) which, for whatever reason (foolish consistency, maybe?) kept the requirement for eyepro and gloves in place AFTER we redeployed to home station at Fort Carson. Utter ridiculousness.
Did your brigade have a short, red-faced, mustached CSM on your deployment?
WARHORSE!
In my experience, the issue is not too many GOs -- it is too many COLs that are too senior to "do" anything, and don't have enough people to supervise. The high level staffs are full of them, and they do little but serve as gatekeepers, protect senior leaders from common sense, and generate work for subordinates.
As for eyepro -- I was always a big fan. That comes from living on bases that get mortared all the time. Pretty much every part of you will heal except your eyes, and I've seen a lot of dudes save by ballistic glasses.
Once you build the muscle memory of wearing them all the time, you quit having to force people to wear them off the FOB -- and you stop having to buy snuffy a new pair every week because they are on his face, rather than getting scratched up in his cargo pocket, or smashed in the bottom of his truck.
If you are going to pick a chickenshit standard, I think you are barking up the wrong tree with ballistic glasses.
RBB,
"This number (along with associated higher headquarters, staff, and resources)"
COL's as well as the rest of the bureaucracy are included. I just used numbers of general officers as a quick way to measure.
To clarify for your readers, I am not calling any one chickenshit or claiming that anyone is struggling for control. That's what you chose to call this title.
Honestly, I don't want to be associated with it.
The larger point of my article is that the more bureaucracy that one has in country the less effective a military mission becomes. You missed the point.
As a reader, it seemed to me that that was exactly what the article said:
"....a LOT of the senior leadership is lost in the sauce, has no idea what's going on or how to accomplish anything concrete. So, they attempt to make themselves feel like they're in control of the situation via a) imposing ludicrous chickenshit on those below them,..."
Seems rather clear to me, in plain English. And I totally agreed with the article, by the way. Why disclaim the article now? Is some higher authority exerting pressure?
No, it's just not productive. Let's please stop with the generalizations, describe the problems, and focus on solutions.
The problem is that senior officers are chickenshit, and come up with a bunch of chickenshit rules because they're chickenshit. In which case we would have pinpointed exactly what the problem is.
But the problems are GENERAL. If we look at specific solutions, that will solve nothing. In fact, a lot of what the military did after Vietnam was to address specific manifestations while ignoring the general problems which they were the manifestations of. So, tactical stuff like optics and CAS got improved, while the general problems that caused the war to be lost just got worse. Fast forward 30 years, and our military has awesome CAS and optics, but instead of it taking NVA regiments to bog us down for a decade until we declare victory and pop smoke, it only takes squad-sized bands of dudes in man-dresses with beat up AKs and mortar tubes.
I think the author is completely accurate. I remember being in Baghdad in 2006, with sectarian conflict tearing the country, the Brigade Commander going line by line discussing who would redeploy with the advon, the main body, and the rear guard. Since he couldn't control what was going on outside the gate, he decided to focus entirely on what was in his power to control.
Good Idea Fairies...especially dangerous at 0-6 and E-9 level...
Spot on.
Too many officers and senior NCOs with no necessary role running loose in theatre. Most of whom should be sent out to retire (and then continue to sup on the taxpayer teat with contracting and defense jobs).
One day when war ceases to be comfortable to the bulk of those fighting...I imagine this problem will solve itself. Especially the 'wet chus' the O-6 and E-9 level are so fond of.
In the mean time, CSMs will continue to fight the PT belt war and saving the Army from the Battalions of joes who would undoubtedly burn their hands off and be unable to fight by not wearing their gloves outside at all time.
Best slapstick I ever witnessed
was an E-5 Medic in a screaming match with an E-7 on whether a soldier with heat exhaustion can take off his gloves and helmet on the FOB. You could see the confliction between the E-7's heat-cat training and his standing orders for those gloves and helmet to be on.
That barely beat out witnessing a CSM dress down (from his brand new F-150, in the middle of Speicher) a group of soldiers because they had their ACOGs covered.
I wrote on a previous article and I will reiterate my previous point. This is a failure of senior NCO leadership. I will place them in to two groups. Those that can't stand up to there CO's and tell them how stupid some of these things are and those that come up with these ideas on their own. Either way the "backbone" of the army needs sac up and deal with this issue ASAP. Just because someone signed off on a memo does not make it a good idea. If the joe's are continuously grumbling about these "good ideas", then leadership needs to take a serious look at them. Oh and @RBB, ballistic glasses everywhere on the FOB for muscle memory, what a week lame excuse for crappy leadership. If you can't trust your junior NCO's to do proper PCC and PCI on their soldiers before they go outside the wire then we have already lost the war. If joe losses his glasses then smoke him till he pukes and i bet he won't lose them again and neither will his buddies. QUIT COVERING UP FOR POOR LEADERSHIP WITH STUPID RULES AND MADE UP STANDARDS! It only hurts good leaders and fails to identify poor ones.
"If joe losses his glasses then smoke him till he pukes and i bet he won't lose them again and neither will his buddies."
Damn right, but don't let the CSM see you. You'll get scuffed up for being mean to Joe. I'm not one for abuse or hazing, but "smoking" is one of those things that works, it makes one stronger physically (typically), and drives home the point much better than a 4856. It would never fly in the civilian world but in a military context, it works.
"QUIT COVERING UP FOR POOR LEADERSHIP WITH STUPID RULES AND MADE UP STANDARDS! It only hurts good leaders and fails to identify poor ones."
Damn right again.
Another thing that bothers me is to see commanders abdicate their responsibility to lead and somehow use that as a bullet on an eval. "I coordinated with unit x to have a,b,c done" when all of that could have been done by the leaders within that organization. Again, just poor leadership.
It isn't about not trusting NCOs -- it is setting rules that make sense, then ensuring NCOs enforce them. "Smoking the shit out of joe" for losing his glasses -- right before he goes on patrol is -- "good leadership?" Or smoking him after, when he should be in the AAR, maintaining his kit, or getting sleep? You sound like a clueless corporal who doesn't understand supervision any more than he understands leadership.
Maybe a better idea is coming up with a low cost, easy way to make joe remember his glasses WITHOUT "smoking" him. That is leadership.
Useless standards, enforced for no purpose -- are, in fact, stupid -- and counter to good discipline.
But the whole point of uniform standards is to train Soldiers to follow them -- even when his squad leader is not standing over him, threatening a beat down. I'm not advocating every guy in theater rolling around in full kit and MOPP 4. But units with crappy uniform standards on the FOB have crappy uniform standards off the FOB -- they don't wear PPE, because their NCOs don't enforce it, and Soldiers get killed because of it. I've seen that in dozens of units in two theaters of war.
Uniform standards on glasses make sense -- they are no physical burden on a troop, save the unit money ($40-100 a pop x your MTOE x 3-4 sets per year), and translate to near 100% compliance off the FOB. So what exactly is your issue? Just tired of the CSM telling you what to do? Then join the freaking peace corps.
The Army still has chickenshit -- but has come a LONG way toward common sense -- thankfully we are no longer enforcing uniform LBEs down the color of the duct tape to secure the "running ends".
Fight the BS, but don't throw out the baby with the bathwater when it comes to standards.
Maybe you're missing the point
Albeit, a point that is read between the lines...
You think it isn't about not trusting NCOs? It most certainly is. Do you look at 350-1 and other nonsense that officers and NCOs must comply with? There is so much dictated training that there is no other conclusion than to say there's rampant risk aversion and distrust. If you trust your subordinates to take care of their own, you don't have to then micromanage their training and mandate more training hours than they have available.
No one says smoking Joe is good leadership in an of itself - but it does provide some incentive not to do it again. Yes that falls under the big umbrella of leadership. Speak softly, carry a big stick - there's a time to use it. And yes, smoking Joe when OPTEMPO says to do otherwise is stupid. Again, no one advocates a smoke session just before you walk out of the ORP.
While I'm sure you don't intend it, your comments about finding a low cost way to get Joe to remember sounds, to me, like babysitting. Abusive treatment is bad, useless rules are bad, and so is babysitting. You build zero capability in your subordinates by babysitting them.
Your experience is unique and so is mine but I'll disagree about uniform standards. I've seen such an even mix so as to preclude any conclusion about carry over of performance outside the FOB. I saw 10th MTN enforce uniform standards inside the wire but once outside the wire their discipline with EVERYTHING was awful.
I don't think any comments said people had a problem with eyepro. Gloves yes, but not eyepro. Not sure where you were headed with that comment. Eyepro makes sense, hell most guys I was with carried goggles too due to blowing sand.
As for the CSMs...well yes people get sick of them telling us what to do. Especially when you see examples of them not following their own procedures, not leaving the wire, etc.
About the Army coming a long way - well that depends on where you are I guess. I still see units wanting duct tape standardized, eyepro standardized and so forth. I don't think it's come a long way at all. I think it's worse. We've replaced our guidance the color of duct tape to guidance on other things, additional admin mandates etc. But that's a matter of opinion. To each his own.
>But units with crappy uniform standards on the FOB have crappy uniform standards off the FOB -- they don't wear PPE, because their NCOs don't enforce it, and Soldiers get killed because of it.
Right. That explains all the SOF dudes rolling outside the wire having forgotten to put on their kevlar and body armor-it was because they were allowed to walk around the FOB with their sleeves rolled up and no eye pro. If only there had been some redfaced lifer around to scream at them, they would have survived combat.
Try 11B Staff Sergeant and now a warrant officer, oh and i was a POG as well, so I've seen it all. I guess you we're kinda of right because I was a corporal too. Now if you want to take swings be my guest but make sure you can handle the punch back. You, sound like some support punk sitting in his supply cage bitching about the price of eye pro. For the record smoking joe is not the only way to get a point across but it is a powerful tool that when used in a correct and timely manner will yield some amazing results, and it is incredibly cost effective if that's what your all worked about (PT is free). I would never smoke a soldier before a patrol but his a$$ is mine when we got some free time (if he has time to play xbox or watch a movie he has free time). Joe does not like doing extra work and neither do I but problems like this must be dealt with quickly and as a good leader and supervisor you owe it to your subordinates to reward and punish in a fair and timely manner. Do you really think that a young PFC gives two shits about a counseling statement in his jacket. I bet he cares a whole hell of a lot more about his free time.
We'll look into my own personal career to highlight my point. When I was a E-4 i overslept and got to work an hour late and I missed PT altogether. I didn't hear anything from my PSG or Squad leader but guess what? My team leader was their waiting for me. He told me to get to work and he would see me after the duty day. After work, as promised, there was my team leader. He told me that while I was a good soldier, he couldn't let an hour of tardiness go unpunished. He made me duck walk from the basement to the third floor for each of the 5 minutes I was late. Thirteen times I had to do go up those stairs, I couldn't walk the next morning. I let you guess how many times I was late after that, ZERO. No paperwork just a simple understanding that poor choices or failure to meet the standards would be handled quickly at my bodies expense. However the punishment must fit the crime. I'm not going to smoke a soldier who fails over and over again. I'm gonna do paper work and get rid of him, he is not worth my time after a point. Usually the best soldiers get smoked at least once, most more, in their career and they never forget why.
Thank you charles, RBB is missing the point. This is all about senior leadership micromanaging, not developing, their junior leaders, officer and NCO, and it is these types of blanket policies that prove the point even more. One soldier loses his glasses then all soldiers will wear them, all the time. One soldier burns their hands, all soldiers will wear gloves even if it is August in Iraq. "Hey idiot! Your in the desert wear sunscreen if your prone to getting sunburned. Secondly who is your NCO, cause we're gonna have a talk about checking up on our soldiers." The simplest ways to enforce these rules, dumb or not, is to let your young leaders lead from the front. If the BDE CO wants all soldiers to wear eye pro outside the wire then push that down to the companies. If a NCO can't be trusted with that then fire them and put someone in place that can. As a leader I see it this way, if I can't trust you with the simple things than I certainly can't trust you with my most important resource, soldiers lives.
To your statement about units with poor uniform standards inside the wire have poor standards outside. In reality what I have found is that the more elite the unit is the more relaxed they are with uniform standards in general, and this is true across all branches. SF, Rangers, LRRS, SEALS, Force Recon, Delta, PJ's, SOAR, shall I go on, barley wear a military uniform, don't shave and have crazy hair, but they are the razors edge at the tip of the spear. To this fact I will bet you a paycheck that these units 1) smoke the shit out of their soldiers for failures, even the small ones and 2) don't ever have to worry about their soldiers forgetting their eye pro.
Oh and one last thing I'm not tired of the CSM's telling me what to do, I'm tired of them not doing their jobs and that is mentoring young leaders and shielding joe from dumb BS.
SCOUTS OUT!
SF dudes are normally older, higher ranking and more mature, they don't need the NCOs to do that stuff, they are NCOs mature enough to do it themselves. So I don't buy the argument that just because SF does something in one manner, normal infantry platoons made up of 19 year old Privates with less than 2 years in the army should have the same dicipline and uniform standards.
Those privates have NCOs to watch over them and ensure they wear appropriate PPE. If those NCOs can't be trusted to make and enforce such rudimentary decisions, you've got big problems.
well played b!
This particular article and the comments directly relate to my comments in another part of the blog: we're told that we're the best fighting force ever, but screamed at and told we have no discipline because of this crap.
If you make it through training but can't lead a patrol you'll get a good eval because our leaders are, for the most part, scared to say that you suck for job performanc reasons. But, if you forget that reflective belt or allow those suede boots to get dirty, well you'll get destroyed for that one.
My first MILAIR flight into Iraq was a C-17 from Amman, Jordan to BIAP. It was summer 2008, and I remember the crew chief briefing all of us civilians on having to stay in our seats once we crossed into Iraq, since Iraq was an active combat zone. Nobody had PPE (body armor and helmets), since there was nowhere in Jordan to keep temporary sets. Working off a tip from a seasoned MILAIR traveler, I asked to ride jump seat, but there was an available attractive woman destined for that seat, so my request was for nought. While over Jordan, people got up, checked out the cargo pallets, went to the restroom, snapped pics, etc. The crew chief announced when we crossed into Iraq, and directed everyone to take their seats. Compliance. Within moments, apparently more seasoned or defiant MILAIR travelers got up, went to the rest room, passed things to their pals, and otherwise did not follow instructions. The crew chief kept rebuking the scofflaws, adding some edge to his voice, but otherwise just sitting in his seat, probably counting the minutes until he could rid himself of these civilians. Of course, the scofflaws could ask, "So what if I'm out of my seat? Are you going to send me to Iraq?"
On subsequent flights out and in, all personnel had to wear temporary sets of PPE since Iraq was an active combat zone. The C-17's were replaced by C-130's so it wasn't like there was walking around or acceptable pee break options anymore. Meanwhile, commercial air was going over Iraq and in and out of Baghdad. I suppose the insurgents might have taken an opportunitic shot at a C-130, but it never felt like PPE would have helped in that eventuality. The descent into BIAP was always a treat, especially if one could look out the window when the C-130 banked. It seemed to be easy to snap pics and take video of the aircraft; watching a C-17 do a tactical take off is impressive.
In my interractions with personnel at FOB's, it seemed like there was lots of pettiness, more so for the Army than the Marines. A particularly tyrannical and petty position seemed to be the NCO in charge of IT, who made civlians jump through all kinds of hoops for access to the DOD networks, which is sort of sad and funny because Mr. Wikileaks was an Army private. The Marines did not allow civilians to wear shorts or hats at their DFAC, and everyone's bags were searched for contraband when they arrived at Al Asad Air Base, which kind of sucked since not everyone was under GO 1. The internet service at Al Asad filtered out adult sites, or so I'm told....
At the Embassy, it was evident that the military personnel were more vulnerable to the chickenshit, but the prevalance of civilians probably cut down on a lot of that stuff. Some poor enlisted person had to stand watch at the DFAC making sure everyone scanned their CAC card, maybe even keeping a hand count with one of thise clickers, but I guess that might have been a better assignment than pulling security for a key leader engagement, or patrolling. There were clearing barrels everywhere.
I remember lots of O-5's and O-6's pulling staff duty, and not swaggering about. Lots of meetings. Not that many higher-level E's. Judging by their performance and comments from officers at the FOBs, I think many of the officers assigned to my office at the Embassy might have been viewed as shitbirds who were right where they needed to be. Maybe the COL's were authorized to manage 3 to 5 PP slides? One of the Air Force COL's who was relieved of command for something was at the Embassy, working for some redundant office, probably daydreaming about how good life would be once he got his command assignment.
Is not all this a demand for military reform? Or are we defeating our enemy (I've forgotten who we're fighting, but never mind...) by out-inspecting them? And can one imagine this crap in an army of draftees?
AVF my ass. AVW: All Volunteer Weenies. Please, someone, tell me how well this is working.
Because the draftee Army NEVER wasted time painting rocks.
Wait....
Not known for putting up with a lot of cheap shit. But you like it? Join the AVF.
Beneath it all, beneath the bravery and lives lost and trillion-plus dollars pissed away in the desert ... your vaunted AVF cannot prevail and did not score victory against a ragtag band of irregulars. Iraq worth it? By whose accounting? Afghanistan a win? In what fantasy land?
The expression is 'trial by combat.' The AVF has been found guilty, of incompetence and failure to fulfill its mission. That doesn't get less true from repetition.
Despite recent memory Baby Boomers have of a draftee Army, our Army has been an all-volunteer force for most of its history. We have had a draft for only about 35 years (2 years in Civil War, 2 years WWI, 1940-1946, 1948-1973).
If you want to talk to the REALLY old soldiers (pre-1940) they will tell you that the serious chickenshit started when we drafted lots of civillians into the Regulars and had to impose a bunch of arbitrary rules to keep the rabble of amateurs in line. But as we all know, it was always tougher/better "back in the day."
Don't bother with attempts to reason Ducky on this, those points have been taken up before, he is resolute in his position no matter what you say when it comes to the AVF. Dude does know his subs and naval history though.
But that volunteer Army was not the one we went to war with. Two wars. One the longest in our history. And that Army was a cadre Army, largely in garrison and incapable of mounting an extended war at the simple behest of the Commander in Chief. Our Founding Fathers abhorred a standing Army, wrote constitutional language to limit our land forces ("raise an army," two-year budgets), and placed the power to declare war in Congress.
The AVF is a standing army. Some variant of it (cadre plus draft augmentation) is vitally needed in our modern world. But placing all our land-war capability in it has proven a mistake: a.) it makes trivial war making far to easy (vide Iraq) and b.) it flat-ass cannot do its job (vide Iraq & Afghanistan). Hey, the US Army loves it, for its permanence, ease of training, quick turn to militarism, isolation from those shabby civilians it protects, and - especially - for the riches it brings in dollars and promotions. But what the US Army likes is not the determinant. What the nation needs, that's the only thing that matters. It does not need a hyper-expensive war machine that is incapable in its basic mission; it does not need the AVF.
Seems like most, if not all, of us who read this blog and it's comments are calling for or have recognized the need for substantial military reform. I have yet, however, to hear the President, Secretary of Defense, service chiefs or Congressional leadership calling for reform. The first step to recovery is admitting you have a problem, right? So far all I have seen and heard is General/Admiral X or Secretary Y or Congressman Z trumpeting about perceived threats that are so outlandish they would make a clinical psychopathic paranoid schizophrenic blush with shame. Or worse, calling for the insane funding needed to counter these "threats".
All anyone in a leadership is talking about is continuing the flow of gravy into the pork barrels, with no objective, non-partisan, calm, rational, intelligent or analytical discussion of national strategy and responsible ways to sustain it. When the national discourse in terms of defense is limited to finding money to pay for projects of dubious value and utility, I start to worry. Not one G.O. or flag officer in any service has stood up and said, "Dudes, we have some serious institutional problems and we need to fix them. Fast."
"leadership position"
Someone needs to use that as the title for the next Great American Novel.
I retired before the recent 10-year festivities, so I'm just an outsider looking in on a lot of the threads here. But this blog has some (indeed, many) insights and anecdotes out abour modern Big Green Machine, as well as calls for reform. You realize, of course, that things will probably not change significantly...they rarely do. So the great value of this blog is that it's therapeutic, a way to blow off steam, with no effect on the powers-that-be? On the other hand, it also could inspire one of your out there to write a novel about the craziness, a "Catch-22" for our millenium.
Sorry, I'm getting even more cynical than the norm. I'd better stop loggin on to this blog when I'm doing my 17:00 cocktail call.
Great post by _B_.
I've been the recipient of similar chickenshit regulation in Iraq, and it makes you want to scream...
Also, although just a captain, my limited experience with about 5 generals left me wondering, "This guy is running the show over here? OMG."
...higher command requires an ability to know/see how f@#$ed everything is, but stick to the plan anyway. Or maybe the lower ranks shield the Generals from the ground truth. I remember a few moments when it seemed like reports got cleaned up for prime time, or the same good news got rehashed for different audiences. I should have unloaded my views on General O when we both were in the restroom at the Embassy....
FOB Freedom in Mosul, early 2005. Young PV2 stops my group as we pass by his unit area, gives us a five minute class on why drinking water is important in the heat. I ask what he did wrong, and he tells me he forgot to bring water on patrol, and his squad leader has tasked him to give classes all day to passerbys on the importance of water. Common sense approach, and guarantees soldier will never forget again. No belts to be seen anywhere.
Fast forward FOB Victory Baghdad 2009 - first thing I see as I arrive from BIAP is an MP with a speed gun, and personnel wearing PT belts in a "combat zone", with senior NCOs running rampant on enforcing the belt rules. WTF happened in 4 years? :)
This whole thread has loads of good ideas and examples with the usual suspects giving great ideas but then "Debbie Downer" FG42 has to bring out the ugly truth that a lot of this won't change. RCC, Charles, BN, B, anyone have some ideas in how to change the culture we always talk about wanting to change?
Eric,
The fish rots from the head. We have a nominal democracy, which is, in reality, the New Deal scientocracy-most of the government's decisions are made not by the elected officials but by the guys working below them who can't be fired by the elected officials.
In the military, the guys at the top are selected by politicians' underlings. Those underlings are motivated by a simple cost-benefit analysis: the worst case scenario is a rogue cannon, and the best case scenario is a guy who does and says what he's told, enthusiastically spouts the party line and in general avoids embarrassing the commander in chief. So, that guy gets promoted. The people he pulls up behind himself, his entourage, are the kind of guys that impress a guy like that. As the saying goes, "A's hire A's, B's hire C's." Once mediocrity is introduced into the system at a high level, it rapidly propagates itself downwards, until middle and senior management is clogged with it, and all non-mediocre leaders spend a majority of their time propitiating it. There are only three ways this can change: the center falls apart through a governmental collapse, the military encounters an enemy which tears it a new ass through some Kasserine pass scenario while not finishing it off, so that it can recover and rebuild, or it gets completely defeated in a war.
Any other "solution" which is administered by the system will only make the problem worse, since the problem is really inherent systemic entropy. See the recent initiative to cleanse the ranks of senior Army NCOs by getting rid of the ones with letters of reprimands. Ostensibly, that filters out the shitbags. In reality, it selects in favor of careerist ass kissers who never did anything to cross their superiors and focused on jumping through all the hoops. If you read the scripts for "Yes, Minister," it really expounds on how an entrenched bureaucracy working for democratically elected leadership is very good at taking any attempt at reform and streamlining and using it as an opportunity to grow and entrench further.
...especially since "Yes, Minister" is one of the funniest sitcoms ever produced.
I know that is what is going on and has been going on but there has to be something we can do to encourage reform, this just cannot be allowed to continue, it is playing with peoples lives and our national security. It just has to stop, our system is broken. Has to be a way we can influence things and change it.
Well, it is all about the leadership, and to beat the ole GO drum again, it's up to them. In the end, unless we want UCMJ, we carry out the policies they carry out.
Sensing sessions are very ineffective, especially above the company level. Even at the company level the fear of retribution is too strong.
The COL/Capt for the Navy types and above must get out from behind their T-walls, leave the head shed and get out where they can't see their flagpole any longer.
Their conversations with Soldiers are too programmed, not genuine. For instance my BDE Cdr had a social for the holiday season. Greeted people as they arrived but hastily. This cdr didn't even give people a chance to learn someone's name. It can't work that way. There has to be dialog. Not going to solve the Army's problems at a social, but you set the conditions for honest dialog. If you just shake a hand and say 'thanks for coming' that does nothing. Exchange names at least.
I don't think our leaders are evil. I think most mean well, most of the time. But I do think they are misguided and that they don't see the ground truth.
GEN Ridgway recognized this when he took command of the Eighth Army in Korea. He got in the bird, walked the ground, drove the roads. He established austere CPs at the front - he got to the ground truth. I haven't read as much about the legendary USMC General, Chesty Puller, but I've heard his methods were much the same.
If the O-6s and above would stop having so many damn meetings, put down their "military buzz word dictionary" and start acting like Soldiers again, they'd start seeing the problems.
Seeing the ground truth is what Design is all about, it's what a perfect world MDMP session is about and it's what needs to happen if we're going to dispatch with the bad parts of our culture.
We live in a gilded military, from the artificial shine we put onto evaluation narratives, end of tour awards, leadership seminars, GO speeches, to status of the force documents. But, there is no competitor to the DoD for providing for our national defense. So, change must come from within and that means it has to start at the top. It's time to strip off the gold plating and get down to the essence of what we are, define our ethos, and live it.
ethos: the distinguishing character, sentiment, moral nature, or guiding beliefs of a person, group, or institution
profession: a principal calling, vocation, or employment
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