Well, one would like to think that the V-22 program was finally becoming useful but at what cost? I would like to see a trustworthy analysis on the maintenance cost per-hour of the V-22 vs. conventional rotary. Also, a military–use examination of ‘Return on Investment’ (ROI) vs. conventional rotary would also be enlightening. I will not hold my breath.

The 25-year old CH-53Es are doing most of the work in Afghanistan, which is why the Corps pulled four from HMX and sent them over. The CH-53E is the same size as the V-22, yet can carry twice as many troops, three times the payload, and has greater range. The new CH-53K will be even better, but has been delayed several years as the V-22 eat up all funds.

And even better example are the Corps 45-year old CH-53Ds. Instead of planned retirement, they were reengined and sent to Afghanistan when the V-22s failed. The Osprey is rarely used anywhere near the action, and can't lift anymore than the H-60s. The specs listed on websites are old failed program goals.

So what do the experts think? No one in the world wants V-22s or tiltrotors. Not even the Coast Guard and the U.S. Army, which started the V-22 program and pulled out when its experts saw its failed concept. And our Navy backed out of its order for 50. Even Boeing didn't bother to peddle its V-22 trash to the airlines, and Bell pulled out of its tiltrotor VIP project last year.

"The 25-year old CH-53Es are doing most of the work in Afghanistan,"

Most of the heavy lift mission work; including TRAP missions to recover Army CH-47s, yes, most of the overall rotary winged mission, no.

"which is why the Corps pulled four from HMX and sent them over."

Assets were reassigned from HMX-1; just as they have been removed from AMARC and returned to flight status, to the FMF because Es in the fleet are reaching the end of their life. Using four Super Stallions to haul OCS candidates around Quantico and reporters traveling with the President is overkill and a waste of resources during wartime. In addition HMX-1 has already begun transitioning to the MV-22. The CH-53Es on HMX-1s TOEs were long ago planned to be returned to the fleet.

"The CH-53E is the same size as the V-22,"

Incorrect.

"yet can carry twice as many troops, three times the payload,"

One would expect a heavy lift platform like the CH-53E to have a greater payload than a medium lift platform like the MV-22B. Once again you're engaging in an apples and oranges comparison. If you attempted this same nonsense as a combat engineer one can understand why your career in the Corps was as short as it was.

"and has greater range."

Incorrect.

"The new CH-53K will be even better,"

Everything is better on paper. Until Kilos actually begin flying and execute OTs your claim is nothing but your typical ill-informed gum flapping.

"but has been delayed several years as the V-22 eat(sic) up all funds."

Incorrect.

"And(sic) even better example are the Corps 45-year old CH-53Ds. Instead of planned retirement, they were reengined and sent to Afghanistan when the V-22s failed."

Increased tempo and sustained operations in OIF and OEF have necessitated the delay of retirement for the Deltas not due to any failue of the MV-22.

"The Osprey is rarely used anywhere near the action,"

That will come as a surprise to the Osprey crews that have come under fire.

"and can't lift anymore than the H-60s."

Incorrect.

"The specs listed on websites are old failed program goals."

How much time have you logged serving in a deployed MV-22 squadron, Meyer?

"So what do the experts think?"

We already know what a neophyte like you thinks. Actual experts have objective opinions, which differ greatly from yours, based on documented experience.

"No one in the world wants V-22s or tiltrotors."

Except for the Marine Corps, the Air Force, the Israelis; who spent several weeks at New River in May and June flying the Osprey, Canada, etc. ... In addition, any idea how many interested V-22 customers were in Dubai last month?

"Not even the Coast Guard and the U.S. Army, which started the V-22 program and pulled out when its experts saw its failed concept."

The Army did not start the Osprey program and James R. Ambrose; whose role in the decision for the Army to abandon the JVX you most likely have no knowledge of, is no expert on aviation matters. They were, however, the service that made the foolish decision to pour their R&D funds into the Commanche rathole. How did that ROI work out?

"and Bell pulled out of its tiltrotor VIP project last year."

Bell remains a limited partner in the AW609 as publicly announced in June of 2011.

Carlton, you should stick to making sure your wife has enough complimentary dental floss and toothbrushes to hand out and leave serious topics to those who actually know what they are talking about.

Google AA Cunningham and you will learn that he is a Bell employee tasked with roaming the net and "refuting" anything negative about the V-22 and demeaning anyone who exposes the truth. Its sad that open discussion is destroyed by PR hacks. Note he just joined this site.

The Corps now admits the V-22 has an empty weight of 35,000 lbs, and is larger than the CH-53E at 33,000 lbs. It is a heavyweight size lifter with poor medium weight performance. Since the V-22 first flew in 1989, no one else has placed an order, despite the constant PR "but XXX is interested."

Here is a link to a June story about Bell abandoning its failed civilian tiltrotor program.
http://www.compositesworld.com/news/augustawestland-buys-out-bells-share-of-ba609-tiltrotor-joint-venture It could not get FAA safety certification for passengers.

Here is a recent story about sending more H-53s to combat and keeping V-22s at home:
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/08/osprey-president-entourage/

A 2009 "Aviation Week" article "The Need for Speed" quoted Col. Clay
Hutmacher from the 160th Special Ops Aviation Regiment explaining why the Army spec ops was not interested in V-22s:
"Above 4,000 ft., there's a significant [hovering] limitation on the V-22," he said. Tiltrotor engineers concede that while the V-22 hovers well in many situations, the special twist and size of its proprotors leave it unable to carry as much useful load pound-for-pound as most helicopters hovering in similar conditions."

A month later, a USAF CV-22 with its most experienced V-22 pilot crashed while trying to land at 5000 feet in Afghanistan, killing four and destroying the aircraft. He was trying a short rolling landing since he couldn't hover at that altitude. The USAF General who performed the safety investigation was pressured to edit his report, and was forced to retire when he refused to blame the pilot.

Here is a recent story about the V-22's operational costs rising 61% in three years. Those lightweight plastic "composite" parts don't last long. http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/12/osprey-costs-soar/

Note the comments. No one disputes the story, yet lots of industry floggers attacking the messenger with childish comments. This has become common in the defense industry. They hire small, unknown guerrilla marketers to comb the net for articles about their products. If anything negative is found, the authors and negative commenters are blasted with childish attacks with facts from "experts." This is known as "flogging" and was made illegal in the EU. In places like military.com, the covert PR types volunteer to become moderators so they can censor and ban unwelcome comments about their multi-billion dollar projects.

That all: Fascinating.

Thanks, CMEYERGO, for blowing the whistle on flogging.

Re AA Cunningham;

I used to be a member of 'Togetherweserved.com'. I used to rant and rave a lot about the invasion of Iraq and the incompetence/criminality of Bush 43 and his minions. I used to get them pretty stirred up. That went on maybe for a year.

As soon as I linked to a crash video of an MV-22, seems like I was banned within about 30 minutes.

Walt

The Corps can buy 20 T-6B props for the cost of each F-35B, which are the size of FB-111s. These could provide the Corps with far better air support for ALL types of missions at a fraction of the cost. They would be unique to Corps, and an great example of practical and cost effective ideas. More here: http://www.g2mil.com/O-6B.htm

If we did give spend money on those magnificent projects, I get a feeling in my gut that they would run into the same kind of inefficiency, waste, and politicization. The Joint Strike Fighter was conceived in a happier time when we didn't have to choose between guns and butter, and now as the chickens come home to roost, we find ourselves backed into a corner - an aging fleet of planes that may not be able to protect in the future.

The procurement wheels fell off the train sometime in the late 80's/early 90's.

The F-35 program is a joke, having been in development since I was in high school. So much so that the Navy is now procuring more F-18s. DDX turned to Zumwalt Class Destroyers turned to another dead end and $10 billion sunk, so we're back to producing Arleigh Burkes (maybe we'll get 3 Zumwalts, but that will hardly keep the Navy afloat). Our strategic competitor unveils a new fighter aircraft, ship, and submarine class almost annually while we are limited to retreading old designs after tremendous sunk cost.

Cheers,

- HJ

Use CAS and naval gunfire as fire support while establishing a beachhead, after which you land artillery and accoutrements with LCUs.

Or, if landlocked, use air to land the arty and to resupply ammo until you can drive a 7-ton to the fight/build an EAF capable of supporting fixed wing cargo aircraft.

So not really.

The thing I have always loved about the notion of lifting 155s out of a battery position that has come under counterbattery is the propensity of the 53E to be turned into a flying avgas bomb.

Earlier CH-53s didn't have the muscle to lift 155s, so they added a more powerful engine, only to discover how short-ranged they had made the helo. You can't use up cargo space for fuel, so you add outboard tanks--which are vulnerable to shrapnel splash while the helo is entering, hovering above, or exiting a hot LZ. So, whammo, incerate the guns, the bird, the ammo, the people . . .

Eric -- good to hear from you with your usual pointed questions. I should have been more explicit in my note on replacements.

The F-35B should be replaced with new upgraded F-18s. The line is still open, and the latest versions are essentially 4.5 generation fighters. We use the British spare parts to keep the AV-8s going until end of life and then retire the STOVL capability. As I noted, it has been very useful but never essential and, in a time of falling budgets, we need to focus on essential material.

The CH-53K covers the heavy lift requirement. The new UH and AH models cover the light lift (and the UH can actually handle much of the troop lift in sufficient numbers.) Alternatively, we could look at new SH-60s for medium lift. We can wait for the pusher propeller helos which are being developed to mature before investing in a totally new design.

The new light 155 and 120 mortars provide early artillery support. The 120 round is as lethal as the 155 but of course lacks the range.

The EFV and AAV should be replaced by a combination of a "connector" (think smaller, but more numerous LCAC) and a Marine lightweight armored vehicle. The AAV was designed for a specific issue -- attack on a heavily defended beach. New weapons systems make that a near suicidal decision. The LCAC capability opens a much wider range of crossing points so the enemy has to defend almost everywhere. Once the first wave of light armor is ashore, the connector can continue to shuttle more forces. With reduced budgets, it is unlikely we can afford to buy a platform where we spend 70% of the cost and incorporate water design factors for a single trip. Once the amphibious tractor gets ashore, all the design factors that let it float make it much more vulnerable.

The combination of helo and surface borne forces can still conduct amphibious operations -- but at an affordable cost.

That is a separate subject -- affordability. It is not just about the cost of the platform but the cost of operating hours. With falling budgets, we will be hard pressed to maintain readiness if our platforms are very expensive to operate.

In any case, the point of my note was to start discussion about how we stay ready. Readiness combined with lower cost is what our nation expects.

Tom, when you and I met face-to-face for the first time at Camp Pendleton--late 1985--all the buzz in the Marine Corps was on "readiness". We're still--or back--on it, which is terrific. The Marine Corps lacks meaning if it isn't halfway out the door on a normal training day. That said, I doubt the Marine Corps is ready or will be ready until a host of issues are addressed and challenged head-on, with veracity.

Not discussed here yet is human capital. The ground services both need to reinvest in human capital, once they arrive at useful end-strength figures and determine how to divvy those numbers up into specific MOSs and billets. Skills are fungible. You can't use a half a generation of artillerymen on road-running assignments and expect them to be as precise as land warfare requires (especially if all the doo-dah electronic aids break down under field conditions). The ground services both have raised a generation of lower- and mid-rank officers and NCOs whose only experience in the field has been in these two very odd wars. True, the two wars might constitute a template for near-term combat, but what if they don't? Who are the respected trainers, planners, and leaders for a generational coventional war?

The Marine Corps absolutely and urgently requires an infantry-support tank. The M1A1 was designed for high-speed mobile warfare on vast plains. It's a pig in the streets, where overpressure from its 155 can kill the troops hunkering down behind it. The Stryker, if it's even considered, is not a tank. Mistaking it for a tank can have lethal consequences. (BTW, renaming the LVT-7 AAV-7 and beating it into an armored-infantry role didn't make the thing all was much more battleworthy.)

And on and on and on? Our long conversation on this stuff is ongoing.

One can move artillery and its prime mover from over the horizon via a LCAC. One problem among many, will be the logistics to support artillery, once ashore and firing, if we consider that the surface battlespace begins 25 to 30 nautical miles over the horizon, and might very well extend inland for another 100 miles or so?

You also get the sense that naval surface fire support is out of the question. . .ergo, the F35B flown from where the Marine air combat element is located aboard a LHA, so that fire support is flexible and responsive to the MAGTF commander: does the Corps need it? Maybe, but can it afford it?

Remember the "Thing," the Ontos? Too bad blunders and/or bad ideas aren't as cost effective anymore. Also, too bad the Corps may have squandered some its traditional good will on Capital Hill with its past digging in on the EFV, as well as using a great deal of favors on the Hill to keep the Osprey alive, and thus, may no longer be seen a the fiscal steward of the tax payers' money it once was. But instead, only a redundant smaller land force?

Re Osprey, EFV, et al, I think a lot of Marine generals in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s lost the bubble on USMC history and came down with a bad case of purchase envy. You know: Your budgets are bigger than my budgets, but I'm aiming to fix that.

JPWREL: A good friend stood up a new MAU in the late 1980s, just after the standard-issue 105mm howitzer was withdrawn to make way for the M198 155mm howitzer. This was before LCACs. He bemoaned his plight to me and I jokingly suggested he steal a few 105s and enough ammo to make him feel comfortable. Damn if he didn't follow my suggestion, all to become the last man to command a Marine Air-Ground Task Force with an artillery piece that could be manhandled across a beach.

ONTOS: A weapons system aimed at enemy troops who can see it back and thus manned by two crewmen who perpetually argued: "No, damnit, it's your turn to get out and reload!"

The school house reason: because back when dinosaurs such as I roamed, the Corps had three different artillery pieces, basically to fill a direct to general fire missions, with none seemingly able to satisfy anyone. Further, the munitions available for the old M101, 105mm howitzer was also limited.

Shot out. : o

A discussion of artillery...

M-101s were in use up until the 1990's and have never been replaced by a similar system. One can argue that the 120mm mortar comes close, but those belong to the infantry. Some nations still use pack howitzers, and the Army still uses the M-119 (derived from the British L118 light gun.

As a dumb PFC/LCpl I asked why we had M-101s with tube stamp dates no younger than 1946 (one could barely make out the lands and grooves when peering into the tube; it looked like a big bloody shotgun) when the 319th FA at Bragg had newer M-102 and brand new M-119. This was in 1986-87 in "E" 2/10 as we started working up for a Med deployment. We split the battery between one platoon (mine) with 4 x M-101 and the other platoon with 4 x M-198. I also asked why we were using 5-tons instead of humvees as prime movers for the 105s but I guess my platoon sergeant told me to STFU and go grease something. Years later...ta-da!....Marine artillery and 82nd both using humvees to tow 105s.

I like that the M-777 is better and lighter than the M-198 (a bitch for a short-handed section to manhandle, the aluminum base plate was prone to cracks and a spade dropped on a foot hurt a little bit). I think if the Corps was smart, turned away from being Land Army 2.0 and instead went back to its forced-entry, expeditionary, hold-the-perimeter-until-the-Army-decides-to-show-up roots, a new 105mm (possibly an upgraded M-119) would be ideal. A small section of 4 or 5 guys can handle the gun. 105mm also would fill in the gaps between NGFS (is there such a thing anymore?), CAS, 155mm and 60mm/81mm/120mm infantry mortars.

"I have a great shot from Saipan or Tinian of a 75mm pack howitzer lashed to a stony outcropping, way on high, so it could be direct-fired into a cave mouth."

Please, sir, may we view this remarkable image?

Sounds like the Old Breed used the "strong back, strong legs" delivery system, just like the Viet Minh gunners who gave the French a nasty surprise at Dien Bien Phu 10 years after Saipan.

I made considerable use of two pack 75s at my detachment in the mountains of the panhandle in Laos (mid 1960s).

We were in terrain with no roads and did not have the kind of rotary-wing logistic support available in Vn.

Our 75s dated from before WW1, but had almost no internal wear on the tubes.

An arty E-7 came out to my detachment for ~30 days to teach two crews of completely illiterate Nung tribesmen to fire and maintain the 75s.

With this limited training the Nung crews did a creditable job of proving effective indirect fire from relatively high elevation.

Definitely cost-effective.

I'll send a copy to Tom Ricks via email. Then it's on him.