Tuesday, December 13, 2011 - 10:15 AM

By Brig. Gen. Kevin Ryan (US Army, Ret.)
Best Defense kommissar of old school Russian affairs
It appears that Russia and the United States are about to embark on what may be the most peaceful and productive arms race in history -- a defensive arms race.
Russia, the U.S., and NATO have been unable to come to agreement over U.S. missile defense plans for Europe. Russia views the deployment of U.S. interceptors there as the first step to an eventual capability to negate Russia's only remaining deterrent to an attack by the West -- its nuclear offensive weapons. Russia has basically three responses it can choose: increase its offensive forces, increase its defensive forces, or do nothing.
On Nov. 29th, President Dmitry Medvedev announced that the Russian made Voronezh-DM radar warning station was moving to immediate combat readiness. It will detect incoming missiles targeted against Russia's exclave of Kaliningrad. "I expect that this step will be seen by our partners as the first signal of the readiness of our country to make an adequate response to the threats which the (Western) missile shield poses for our strategic nuclear forces," Medvedev said.
Russian leaders have previously promised to improve the survivability of their offensive nuclear missile force as a means of ensuring that they would retain an effective nuclear deterrent, and that will likely happen. But recent events and announcements indicate that Russia is also investing money in its own increased missile defenses. The Ministry of Defense is creating a new branch of service, the Aerospace Defense Force, which will unite defensive forces stretching from space-based platforms to land based systems, all intended to protect against external attacks, first and foremost U.S. strategic nuclear attacks. This is an unexpected development given that most observers, and even some Russian military leaders, predicted Russia would not follow America's lead in spending billions on expensive missile defense technologies.
The new aerospace forces are the Ministry of Defense's third priority according to a recent briefing by Russia's Chief of the General Staff, Nikolai Makarov. But according to some security experts, the aerospace forces are really the ministry's first priority, because they will receive the majority of the defense ministry's modernization funds over the next decade. So, this development has a budget and people assigned: a good indication that it will actually happen.
Medvedev thinks a Russian defensive system will be viewed as a threat by the US and NATO, forcing concessions from them on their defensive plans. But rather than forcing the U.S. and NATO to constrain their plans, such a move might actually remove any reluctance to deploy their systems. If Russia can equalize the strategic balance by expanding its own defenses, then the U.S. and NATO do not have to consider limiting theirs.
A defensive arms race like the one unfolding is not a threat to the U.S. or NATO or Russia. Instead, the development of a more robust missile defense system in Russia will make Russia a better partner in any future joint missile defense system with NATO. It will also generate more jobs in Russia and help strengthen a military that has been habitually underfunded and abused by the leadership. The best part is that, like U.S. missile defenses, Russian defensive forces cannot attack an enemy. They only protect.
It is true that Medvedev has also said he will deploy Iskander surface to surface missiles that could destroy U.S./NATO missile interceptors that target Russian ICBMs, but this is a meaningless threat if the U.S. and NATO are sincere in their promise that our defensive interceptors are not aimed at those Russian ICBMs.
The missile defense situation is not a volatile one, but it has thus far been a missed opportunity for improved cooperation on nuclear and security interests. Neither side is able or willing to retreat from their current positions on deployments, threat assessments, or cooperation. However, Russian leaders realize that U.S. missile defenses, especially for the next few years, do not yet threaten Russia's strategic deterrent, and U.S. leaders realize that Russia is not likely to increase its offensive nuclear power over the same period. The result will be a stable situation in which the U.S. can continue its missile defense deployments and Russia can build its new defensive forces. In both cases, domestic budget considerations will probably keep the pace of deployment slow.
Sometime after Feb. 2013, when both countries have decided their new presidents for the next few years, we can revisit the missile defense cooperation situation and perhaps find more common ground.
Retired Army Brigadier General Kevin Ryan is Executive Director for Research at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center. He served as U.S. Defense Attaché to Moscow and Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command.
2013 is just around the corner. Spend your dollars and roubles now. It can be only a matter of time before frozen Iranian assets are used to pay for these on at least one side. Perhaps on two, given a bit of dickering and not a little bickering.
NATO-US European Missile Sheild
It is clear that Iran is an excuse, and will NEVER attack any country except Israel and only if Israel is attacking first.___ The only reason is to encircle Russia and China to make their defences useless. ___Only NATO-US can attack Russia and China and they both know, also know that US never respect any treaty or agreement they sign, on disarmement economy or anything.___Irak was bombed on false excuses and Yugoslavia (OTPOR movement and Soros, bombing ordered by Clinton) and Libya after sending Al-Qaida muslim agents to make trouble and destabilize first.___NATO was founded at first to protect North America from the big bad communist USSR, then converted to protect European countries from an outside attack, nobody knows from whom, then converted again for terror purposes to bomb defenceless countries and chase their populations to neibhoring countries, to have them rebuilt (on credit) by Euro and American contractors, seize their banks and assets, steal their resources for the benefits of Euro-American banks (mostly GoldmanSachs who turned Greece bankrupt recently) as American Economy being bankrupt, has to use the military industry to stasy alive and keep its hegemony__This is the Only truth___Have a nice day.
The military certainly has a large element of ritual. SIOPs is some ritual from an earlier age, we don't know why we do it, we just do it.
You don't see Kaliningrad in the news everyday. I always figured that after Germans digested/integrated the Ost that they would get out their checkbook and buy Königsberg from the Russians. Just because Joe Stalin put the border on the Oder and everyone made Helmut Kohl sign on for that, no reason for Germans in the future to accede to that border policy.
"Just because Joe Stalin put the border on the Oder and everyone made Helmut Kohl sign on for that, no reason for Germans in the future to accede to that border policy."
Let's just not go there, please.
If Russia feels discomfited by the US led BMD network proposed for Europe then they have a number of effective ways of addressing that situation. The first and most readily available approach is to restrict or close down the US ‘Northern Distribution Network’ (NDN) which handles 70% of the supplies heading to ISAF forces in Afghanistan. The remaining 30% of capacity relies uncomfortably on both Pakistani air and ground routes into Afghanistan that happen to be largely closed at this time.
This alternative is far less expensive than financing an exotic BMD network to defend their offensive nuclear deterrent. Such a closure of our communications would be pretty much unanswerable by the US who has 130,000 American and foreign troops to supply in Afghanistan.
What is amazing is that the US military has chosen to violate a critical dictum of war in launching a military campaign without first securing reliable lines of communications. This reminds me of the Germans 1941 decision to launch a campaign across the Mediterranean in North Africa without the means to secure its communications and supply. Of course at the time the General Staff knew this but were overruled by the genius in charge that didn’t put much stock in logistics.
As of now our communications rest upon the mercurial disposition of the Pakistanis and the whims of a Russian government that operates more like an organize crime syndicate than a responsible democratic republic. Of course we many hold out the olive branch of WTO membership but that is weak tea as a bribe. Reason being that we cannot approve Russia for WTO membership unless Congress strikes down the Jackson-Vanik Amendment that bars trade relations with nations that violate human rights. Under no circumstance will you see this Congress or even a more Republican Congress ditch that law in relation to Russian WTO membership.
“Another fine mess we gotten into”, said Hardy to Laurel.
It rather alarms me that Gen. Ryan thinks there is a difference between offensive and defensive ballistic missiles. As any student of military history understands a shield can be and often was an even more potent offensive weapon than a sword.
If a BMD system is used to increase the survivability of an offensive missile inventory than how can they be considered defensive? This is like calling the formidable anti-aircraft fire of the WW2 carrier task force as being strictly defensive. The fact is that ‘defensive’ firepower preserved and protected the striking component of the task force.
Secondly, Gen Ryan writes: “It is true that Medvedev has also said he will deploy Iskander surface to surface missiles that could destroy U.S./NATO missile interceptors that target Russian ICBMs, but this is a meaningless threat if the U.S. and NATO are sincere in their promise that our defensive interceptors are not aimed at those Russian ICBMs.”
If the U. S. and NATO are sincere? Does the good General think that the Russians are going to take the word of NATO and the American’s that the targeting data is restricted to Iranian missiles? Would we take such assurances?
Fact is - someone will eventually crack the code on NMD and in an instant render the world's (except for theirs) nuclear weapons obsolete - or close to it. It seems foolish to not be the first ones to figure out how to do it and then modernize our own arsenal to defeat it so we're ready when someone else builds one.
Folks who say that it can't be done are either dumb or defending an agenda. We also thought we'd never fly, breathe underwater, travel to the moon, travel at the speed of sound, etc. etc.
I'm not saying we shouldn't manage our development carefully to prevent loss of funds, just that we're fools if we don't get serious about developing the technology first.
The core problem behind missile defense and stability is that once nations are sure that they can defend themselves against missiles, especially if that belief is erroneous, is that it will remove the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons. Why be afraid to launch if the enemy cannot hit you back?
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This was more relevant to the cold war context but expect the arms race in nuclear weapons to pick back up as nations attempt to maintain a viable "second strike" capability in the face of missile defenses.
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Odds are that China will begin to re-up its nuclear arsenal in response to increased US missile defense measures in order to maintain the credibility of their own nuclear deterrent.
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Not that keeping missiles out of US airspace is not a good idea but the effect on international security is far from a foregone conclusion.
So manned aircraft don't exist as nuclear platforms?
The Russians still have a decently sized force of Tu-160 BLACKJACKs and Tu-95 BEARs capable of striking US targets -- all the more so that we dismantled our force of interceptor squadrons following the Cold War; and long ago dismantled our SAM network (NIKE) in the 1970s.
Likewise, other nations have manned aircraft delivery platforms; so the idea that you will suddenly become invulnerable if you get an ABM system is erroneous.
Consider the Iran/Israel dynamic.
I'm sure that Israel's primary means of deterring Iran is through her maybe-it-has-nukes-maybe-not JERICHO IRBM force. What happens if the Russians sell a complete turn key ABM network/system to Iran that is then used to protect Iran's major population centers and a few key military bases?
Will the Israeli deterrent suddenly magically evaporate?
No. It just means that the Israeli deterrent against Iran will be delivered via a nuclear bomb on the centerline of F-15Is currently, and via F-35 from the 2020s onwards; and retaliation will take two or three hours, as opposed to the what, 15-20 minutes JERICHO gives them.
Also, unlike ballistic missiles; manned aircraft can be recalled right up to the moment of bomb release; which gives diplomats a chance to 'cool things down' before you go to the irrevocable step of lighting the blue touchpaper and unleashing Atomic holocaust.
Only the Chinese have enough money for an arms race. The US and Russians don't need to start the next arms race.
I don't think you are going to get a technology that is both affordable and reliable. Even if you get something that works pretty good against ICBMs (or any ballistic missile) that have decoys, 30 MIRVs, jammers etc... they will start using sub-launched cruise missiles, torpedoes, back pack nukes, Piper Super Cubs, anything BUT a BM. Just a gambit where somebody nuked our allies, overseas forces, carrier battle groups, Ramstein AFB etc... would be pretty painful.
BMD is targeted against Iranians, N-Korea etc... China will have to buid up their nuke force to ensure they have enough to overwhelm shield and maintain a deterrent.
Russia does not have the money for missile defense
China, as you rightly point out, is an entirely different story. Very smart science and engineering PhDs are sent home to China from the West every year. If America worries about other powers developing counter-measures to missile defense, I would consider giving those PhDs a green card instead of having to out think some of them later, as they work for the Chinese government or high tech sector.
....why back in December 2008; did the FTG-05 test of the GBI system partially fail when the target missile failed to properly deploy it's decoys and countermeasures?
If the US can't even get decoys to work properly, what makes you think North Korea or Iran can?
And yes; even if penetration aids successfully deploy; it's still very tricky to make them work.
Chaff for one is very hard to disperse successfully in the near-airless vacuum of space, resulting in a lower quality of the target cloud against ABM defenses; and it's kind of hard to get to hang around in the shape/size you want with virtually no air resistance slowing it down; resulting in low target cloud persistence.
Target missiles can fail, countermeasures deployment can fail, and interceptors can fail. What we need to worry about is what happens when nuclear ballistic missiles work, and the interceptors fail.
One of the simplest and robust countermeasures to the current US BMD systems is not chaff but the shell game: Hide the warhead inside one of a large number of aluminized mylar balloons. Make the balloons all a little different, so that the one with the warhead in it does not stand out. The BMD sensors just see a cloud of targets all with differing radar, optical and IR signatures. There is no way to tell which one contains the warhead.
Why do I keep seeing this line of reasoning coming from very credible sources: An ABM system will never be able to defeat the balloon countermeasure and therefore an ABM system is not worth pursuing.
It is beyond absurd to make such a statement but it keeps popping up. Is it correct in 2011? Barring some spectacular technology in the black budget, it is. Will that thesis be correct in 2015? Probably. In 2030? If you think you can say so with any degree of confidence I've got a bridge to sell you
Why are the ABM opponents so stuck on the idea that countermeasures are "impossible" to defeat. In 1950, it looked "impossible" to land on the moon. In 1910, it looked "impossible" to make a bomb that could level square miles. Has the point been made?
The problem is not whether it is possible to make reliable missile defenses, perhaps that can be done, but countermeasures are also likely to keep pace with intercept measures, that is the nature of war.
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The central problem is geopolitical. Building a missile shield forces other states to build up their nuclear arsenals to the point where they remain a credible deterrent. In the end missile defense is likely to spark an arms race that leaves the world more or less where it was before except with a few thousand more nukes and a lot of international distrust
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The issue is not that we can't shoot down ICBMs if we try, the issue is that any move to develop that capability will be countered.
Too bad that mylar balloons don't have the same re-radiative characteristics in the Infrared and Radar frequencies as the actual re-entry vehicles, which are made out of some rather specialized materials to survive re-entry, such as carbon phenolics.
Considering that GBI and SM-3 have infrared telescopes on them to conduct final terminal target discrimination; and that we're planning on adding two color IR sensors for the next round of kill vehicle upgrades -- further broadening the spectrum that we can use to discriminate...
About the best inflatable mylar balloons can do is fool a very simple 1950s ABM system that doesn't have a lot of processing power to discriminate.
Hiding the RV inside a balloon, hun?
Two big problems with that approach.
1.) At the altitudes that ballistic missiles debuss their warheads, there's still air -- it's why the International Space Station has to be reboosted annually -- so the mass of the decoy/warhead complex matters. Over several hundred miles of observation by an ABM system, there will be a small, but noticeable lag between light decoys and heavy warheads.
2.) Plutonium is self-radiative. It generates a decent amount of internal heat which over a long period of time warms up it's surroundings; specifically the RV it inhabits. This would show up on sufficiently sensitive infrared sensors during the discrimination phase.
Granted, you could get around this issue by having heaters placed inside the decoys; but that's adding even more weight and complexity to your decoys; and there isn't the assurance that they would be able to precisely replicate the signature plutonium causes by slow-soaking it's container for a long period of time.
Another Discrimination Technique...
Onboard the Kill vehicle is a gamma ray sensor. Why?
Because fissionable materials generate their own gamma ray signatures by simply existing. Due to the weight limitations of re-entry vehicles, it's impractical to shield the warheads' own gamma ray emissions enough.
Decoys will not be generating gamma rays, because they won't have fissionable material on board.
If sensor technology isn't yet up to the task; you can help the sensor by firing a neutral particle beam weapon at the decoy cloud to "excite" the fissionable material into generating even more gamma rays than it does naturally.
This is all covered by a US Army Patent: 5,611,502.
We can rule out the spectacular technology in the black budget for a number of reasons:
1. We can see what actually is being deployed because the programs are expensive and the hardware is extensive and involves very visible testing and deployment on ships and in large installations. Systems designed to address the mylar balloon shell game would involve further costly activities and sizable pieces of hardware (including very large rockets) which would be unlikely to remain secret for long.
2. The existing and planned BMD systems rely on radar and optical/infrared sensors because there is no physics for any other type of long-range sensor which could plausibly be used. And these sensors can be defeated by aluminized mylar balloons because the latter are opaque to microwave, IR and visible light.
Finally, in the future it might be possible to develop and deploy systems to defeat aluminized mylar balloons. This would only necessitate that opponents move to other countermeasures.
As the correlations of measure and countermeasure become too complicated to reliably predict, the bottom line is that if the attacker throws enough warheads at you, some of them will get through.
This will not change in 10, 20 or 100 years.
Oh boy.
1. The fact that mylar balloons don't have the same IR and radar emissivity spectra as the materials that RVs are made of is one reason why it is preferable to hide the warhead inside a balloon rather than try to make the balloon look like a warhead.
2. The IR and radar emissivity spectra of mylar balloons can be randomized by painting them with thin films of various materials in various patterns and by making them various shapes. This makes discrimination impossible on the basis of such signatures because they are all different by design. It doesn't matter how many colors your sensors can see.
3. If needed, drag/lag signature can be randomized not only by adding mass to decoys but also by randomizing the sizes of balloons and the relationship of their radar/optical/IR signatures to their ballistic coefficients.
4. Heaters can be lightweight (and could be based on radioistope sources, e.g.), and warheads can be pre-cooled to hide their thermal signatures. Heating of the balloon is then likely to be dominated by external radiation, particularly if in sunlight. Randomizing the shape and paint pattern on the balloon will serve to randomize the IR signature.
5. "Slow soaking"?
6. Onboard gamma ray sensor? The KKV is approaching at several km/s. KKVs do not carry gamma ray telescopes, and there is no such technology.
7. Neutral particle beam weapon? Hell, why not just a combination of a tractor beam to stop the warheads and phaser gun to blast them back to planet Klingon.
Americans are correct to say that currently planned US/Nato BMD deployments, in themselves, give Russia little to worry about.
The real questions are about what comes next.
What comes next in space, once the US has deployed a robust KE-ASAT strike force capable of quickly destroying any and all militarily critical satellites of Russia, China, or of any other nation, in Low Earth Orbit? What comes next if China, Russia, India and others follow this example?
What comes next in strategic nuclear weapons, once the US and NATO have deployed the currently planned SM-3 IA, IB, IIA and IIB systems as well as retaining the GMDs? Does the BMD program stop at that point? Or will it be poised for a further expansion on a larger scale? Does Russia stick to the START limits or insist on increasing its ICBM numbers to offset the BMD? Does China stick to low numbers, or respond with a build-up toward numbers more comparable to those of the US and Russia? Does Russia deploy BMD in large enough numbers to discomfort the US? Does China? What does India do? Etc.
What comes next if the US develops and deploys a substantial force of non-nuclear strategic strike weapons such as the proposed ArcLight and openly brandishes them as part of a strategy against China?
These aren't mere hypothetical questions, they are questions that policymakers must address now, given that the US is proceeding with these plans.
What comes next, in 10 years, or less?
I would also like to know what is going to happen in 10 years with this. I think right now the claims about their technology are highly exaggerated - however in the next 10 years I think all of this technology could come into fruition.
We can see what actually is being deployed because the programs are expensive and the hardware is extensive and involves very visible testing and deployment on ships and in large installations. Systems designed to address GarrisonSanders the mylar balloon shell game would involve further costly activities and sizable pieces of hardware (including very large rockets) which would be unlikely to remain secret for long.
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