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Posted By Thomas E. Ricks
Friday, December 9, 2011 - 6:43 AM
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I wrote my first book about the Marine Corps, and I like the organization. But sometimes even old friends need a push, and it feels to me like the Corps is going off the tracks here.
The Marines will shrink from 202,000 to 186,000, but it would be risky to go below that level, Gen. Joseph Dunford, the smart assistant commandant of the Marine Corps, said at a CSIS session on Wednesday. That line worries me. Here is a fuller explanation of General Dunford's views, taken from his testimony before the House Armed Services Committee about six weeks ago:
… when we went through the force structure review effort, we came up with a size Marine Corps of 186,800. That is a single major contingency operation force. So that force can respond to only one major contingency. A hundred and fifty thousand would put us below the level that's necessary to support a single contingency.
The other thing I would -- I would think about is what amphibious forces have done over the past year: humanitarian assistance, disaster relief efforts in Pakistan, supporting operations in Afghanistan with fixed-wing aviation, responding to the crisis with pirates on the MV Magellan Star, supporting operations in Libya, supporting our friends in the Philippines and Japan. And quite frankly, at 150,000 Marines, we're going to have to make some decisions. We will not be able to do those kinds of things on a day- to-day basis. We will not be able to meet the combatant commanders' requirements for forward-delayed, forward-engaged forces. We will not be there to deter our potential adversaries. We won't be there to assure our potential friends or to assure our allies. And we certainly won't be there to contain small crises before they become major conflagrations.
So I think at 150,000 Marines I would offer there would be some significant risks both institutionally inside the Marine Corps because we will be spinning faster and causing our Marines to do more with less -- but as importantly, perhaps more importantly, the responsiveness that we'll have to combatant commanders' contingencies and crisis response will be significantly degraded."
Tom again: This just doesn't strike me as realistic. The Marine Corps almost certainly is going to get much smaller than 186,000, or 180,000. And so to plan around those larger numbers seems to me to be planning for failure.
I also am bothered by the way the Corps has attacked this issue. It does not feel to me like the institution I wrote about in Making the Corps some 15 years ago. Back then, as least, the Marines had a strong tradition of arguing hammer-and-tongs -- considering all sorts of arguments -- until a decision was made. Once a decision was reached, everyone in the Corps, no matter which side they had been on, would support that decision to the utmost. So as the budget crisis approaches, instead of drawing a line in the sand at 186K, it would be a sign of health if the Marine Corps Gazette were carrying articles these days that asked tough questions:
--Should we loosen the tie to the amphib Navy and supplement it with whatever shipping is available to move Marines? If so, what would that look like? How could we do the same things cheaper?
--Should the Corps move to a two-division structure? (And yes, today's Congress would go along with that, if asked to.)
--Should the Corps indeed move immediately to 150,000 -- but all the while making its line in the sand that it will always favor readiness over end strength?
Instead, I see General Dunford's public remarks as the Marine Corps leadership effectively shutting down discussion. Myself, I think it would be smarter for the Marines to announce as soon as possible that they are cutting to 150,000 -- and then go on to say, they aim to be the nation's small-but-ready force, able to go into a conflict early and buy some time for the country, not unlike Korea in the summer of 1950. This is the time to get creative, not the time to go into a defensive crouch.
I was discussing my concerns yesterday with some Marine types. One said, Don't worry, there's a Plan B. I think it would be more thoughtful and, more importantly, more honest, to roll that out now.
Just a guess, but I have a gut feel that the Marine Corps unique values over the past decade have become contaminated by its virtual integration with the U. S. Army in Iraq and Afghanistan. This forced marriage seems to have diluted in Tom’s phrase the ‘hammer and tongs’ traditional approach to their mission.
If the Marines want to differentiate themselves from their Army brethren they will have to do more than demanded a different and distinctive BDU. Their leadership has to return to their more Spartan roots (which they used to be proud) and in public discourse refuse to echo the Army’s traditional plea for ‘more and more’.
Just show the evidence that the Marines have been completely more effective at COIN in the region then the Army.
Then compromise by agreeing to eliminate MARSOC and call it a deal.
I'm sure this post is going to generate a long and heated thread, but my initial reactions:
1. Advocating a cut down to 186,000 seems like a good-faith effort by the USMC. If I'm not mistaken, it's going back to the size of the Marine Corps pre-Gulf Wars, with the mission of being forward-deployed in the Pacific and providing a "call 911" force for worldwide contingencies. It doesn't seem to me that their mission is going to change, even after a major review of strategy and missions.
2. Even if the USMC has an even lower figure in it's "back pocket" (like 175,000) it might not be wise to advertise it now, if Congress is going to play its usual horse-trading game of politics. In other words, if you say you're willing to accept $100, the other side will of course offer you $75. If you decide to play it straight and just say up front that you'll accept $75, then the other side will offer you $60.
On FG42's point no. 2: I think that having generals trying to out-negotiate with Congress would be like trying to have senators command infantry battalions. In other words, the Marines do best when they act like Marines, and worst when the try to be politicians.
So, don't negotiate. Lay down a marker and stick to it. Don't go with numbers, go with readiness. Say, "our guarantee is that we will be as ready a force as we can be with the budget you give us. And if that means shrinking, we will, to whatever size we need to be to keep faith with the American people."
Best,
Tom
Are you not presenting a false choice?
Tom, why should we insist on service chiefs denying the way the Washington game is played? What kind of defense policies will congress cook up if the actual military experts never stick their heads in the kitchen?
And while you criticize the Marines for focusing on numbers over capabilities, how did they settle on 186k if not as a required baseline to maintain a set of capabilities?
Change strategy and the force structure will follow
It must be noted that the 186,000 number came at the end of an extensive look at the Marine Corps, based on the expected greater military strategy and global environment. So far, what we know is that budgets will get tighter. Before the Marine Corps, or any of the services, should unilaterally decide where they will cut or change, the actual military strategy for the United States should provide guidance for what is important and what isn’t. Critical in this is that the joint combatant commanders, who are considered the “customers” for what the services produce, need to have their direction changed so that the expectations for their regional strategies are lowered along with the lessening of resources.
While things are not so simple, the services are still reacting to heavy demand from the overseas joint commanders. Afghanistan and Iraq drawdowns don’t necessarily mean that those commanders will want less forces—they will just want them in different places. This is especially true for the Navy and afloat Marine forces. Their role will not be affected by the expected withdrawals. In fact it may increase. I’d say the Marine Corps could envision a smaller force, if the national strategy makes it clear that there will be smaller demands. We can’t have it all—to be “engaged” all over the place, to be ready (trained and equipped) for significant contingencies, and to drawdown forces. Something has to give.
Right now, the Marine Corps interpreted the current and future strategy as requiring 186,000. That is the "risk" I believe Gen Dunford is referring to. The cuts are coming. Will the strategy change?
Of course we have a plan B, and a plan C, and a plan D. We're haggling about manpower, because we know that we're always the first to get hammered on draw-downs and budget cuts and would like to mitigate the damage as much as possible.
The thing that's frustrating to me is that from a purely budgetary standpoint, it makes more sense to cut personnel from the Army than it does to cut them from the Marines Corps. The last time the Commandant came to talk to us, the statistics he provided were that including the costs of naval support, we spend 7.8% of the DoD budget and provide 11% of the CAS, 22% of the tactical airlift, and over 30% of the ground forces. Obviously there's some service bias in those statistics, but I did the math on the FY10 personnel appropriations, and if the Army was spending as little per capita as the Marine Corps, they could fund an extra 200,000 personnel, or essentially an entire second Marine Corps worth of manpower.
The simple fact is that the Marine Corps is the most cost-effective service, and in terms of a ground mission, it provides a more versatile ground force for a wide spectrum of contingency operations than the Army, and it's available on much shorter notice.
Unfortunately, we're hampered by our thriftiness, because we have bases in fewer congressional districts and buy fewer fancy gadgets from defense contractors who lobby congress. Accordingly, even though the Marine Corps gets more bang for its buck than the Army, it will suffer disproportionately large cuts.
You might note that the Navy pays all the Corps medical and dental costs, and pays for all its aircraft. The Navy also pays for the ships it uses, and the manpower for the amphibs. Plug those numbers in and this "cost effectiveness" BS goes away.
I see the sea in the Corps' future
One issue that my brain housing group fires out my barrel has to do with the current Marine Corps’ operational doctrine that seems to li‘l ole me, to basically duplicates the Army’s mission of full spectrum warfare. . .in spirit anyway.
I would like to see that nuanced a bit. . .And, being from a bygone era, when amphibious creatures crawled, and flew forth from the sea, I would look toward sea-basing simultaneously several MAGTFs within differing regions of national security interest, as a rapid response force to varying scenarios, which we shouldn’t forget also includes disaster relief/humanitarian operations.
So Tom, when you ask about loosening traditional ties to the Navy-Marine team and its gators, I would offer forward that would be antithesis of what the Corps needs to be focused on. . .And yes, I am cognizant of the newly trotted-out anti-access/area denial threat by many, which might go to refute my opinion.
However, technology, doctrine, and training can over come that, but will leave that discussion to another day.
As for the Assistant Commandant lobbying? If he weren’t, he wouldn’t be doing his job. With the seemingly early pull-out of Marines from southern Afghanistan in 2012, I think the A/CMC knows where Corps end strength levels are pretty much going to wind-up, which is most likely below pre-2001 levels, but hopefully above 150,000.
We still have all our MEUs out, and still have MPF squadrons out. Granted, our attempts to step up our seabasing game keep getting thwarted when things like the EFV get canc'd, but we still have basically the same capabilities that we had prior to 2001.
Thanks for the reply Lester (I keep confusing you with LtCol David Galula). I would point-out the EFV probably should have been cancelled awhile back, but be that as it may, its cancellation has freed-up valuable funds to go forward.
Additionally, you will note who your (our) DC, M&RA is? The Corps has a most capable individual in that position that isn't wrangling for a third star or command, being an SES (and retired Colonel), but is working with long experience and unbroken continuity in manpower affairs.
Semper Fi. . .do-or-die (the former before the latter)
I've heard some YUT-YAS field grades say some pretty critical things about the EFV, but it would be nice to replace Vietnam-era amphibious vehicles with something faster with longer legs that's capable of stopping some larger caliber weapons. I think that we're also going to end having to fight a pretty extensive battle to retain our jet capabilities, if only because budgetary pressures will line up with the expiration of our current fight assets, and it'll hamper our ability to argue strongly in favor of new AAVs.
"One issue that my brain housing group fires out my barrel has to do with the current Marine Corps’ operational doctrine that seems to li‘l ole me, to basically duplicates the Army’s mission of full spectrum warfare. . .in spirit anyway."
That's the big problem currently, as I see things. For all their talk about 'expeditionary warfare', the Marines don't like to talk about what 'expeditionary warfare' is actually.
It's basically:
A1.) Flying into a US Embassy during unrest in a host nation to evacuate it.
A2.) Evacuating US Citizens and Foreign Nationals from a host nation in serious unrest.
B.) Performing humanitarian sealift missions, such as responding to the Japanese Tsunami.
C.) Sending groups of Marines ashore to kill lightly armed bad guys, such as Somali Pirates.
With that mission set; is there a genuine credible reason for the USMC to be at even 150,000 manning?
Get the Marines off their Okinawa prison camps and back aboard Navy ships. Put companies aboard deploying carriers, squads aboard surface combatants. UDP companies to Navy bases overseas and the three MPS.
One must not think solely short term, but strategic, as Rubber Ducky reminds us.
I should point-out that when you narrow down your options, such as lacking a credible forced entry capability from the sea (one of the last frontiers of maneuver for who controls it), you play to your potential adversaries, both state and non-state, because it is one or two less options they don't have to spend money on, prepare for, and keep forces ready to meet. . .as well as keeps them guessing. . .deterrence a part of the reason for existing.
Forced Entry is dead.
With modern weaponry, the days of Amtracs crawling ashore onto beaches while amphibious ships stand just off the horizon is obsolete; given that terrorist groups such as Hizbollah have modernish subsonic antiship missiles as well as modernish anti tank missiles and manpack SAMs.
All future combat amphibious operations (if they ever are done again), will land where the enemy is not; rather than where they are.
If you land where the enemy is not; you suddenly simplify your logistical base; as you suddenly no longer need specialist equipment -- you can just use standard US Army equipment with minor modifications; and this makes it cheaper to equip the Marine Corps, rather than wasting large sums of money to develop specialist equipment.
Most policymakers are looking to the Pacific as the source for any conflict in the future. For the occasional, inevitable unstable state that the US feels obligated to respond to, we'll be more inclined to use offshore involvement as opposed to a full invasion/occupation. This is the stuff that Marines are good at. IMO, I prefer to keep Marines at 200k and throw more cuts at the Army.
The use of the phrase "forced entry" might be better replaced with Operation Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS), which as I originally pointed out, is not without its issues such as the AA/AD threat, that has arisen since OMFTS was put forward.
Obviously, technology can only be developed up to a point, along with considering cost factors. But innovation has always been a strong hallmark of the Corps, and further, historically, the Corps has never shied away from acquiring equipment and hardware already available from the Army that might fit, using your example.
All the services are going to have to (or should) go beyond the more elementary of explaining their strategic end, by further explaining the specific threats, instead of generalities like China, this, China that, etc., and get down to the bottom line specific means to address those specific threats.
In the end it comes down to what Samuel P. Huntington said way back, "The resources which a service is able to obtain in a democratic society are a function of the public support of that service. The service has a responsibility to develop this necessary support, and it can only do this if it possesses a strategic concept which clearly formulates its relationship to the national security."
What bothers some people, and this was true during my time in uniform wearing the globe, anchor, and eagle, is that the Corps has this unique ability of getting out front and garnering the attention, although certainly the Army for instance, is doing some noteworthy things. . .and not, as well.
However, again, I refer to Huntington's quote above, and argue one can't fault the A/CMC in that endeavor.
As one Pentagon official said ‘I don’t think we have hit rock bottom yet in terms of budget cuts”. The Marine Corps has pulled out the stops to protect its major procurement programs (V-22, F-35B, new amphibious vehicle) thinking it will be easier down the road to get more people than recover these hyper-expensive projects if they are trimmed or terminated. Had they to do it all over again I bet the V-22 would have gone into the dumpster in favor of additional and more cutting edge rotary lift. But the Corps pride is on the line with the tremendous defense they have put up for the V-22 program thus they are stuck with this dog.
In a way, 150,000 makes sense if the Corps can both lighten itself and refurbish and modernize its equipment at the expense of personnel. I suspect in the future that the Marines will have little problem attracting high quality recruits in our new and likely permanent era of high under-employment and unemployment.
It would be nice to see the Marines also finally replace the ridiculous M-4 carbine with a proper 21st century personal weapon. Small arms are small change in this day and age. However, if the new IAR design is what the future holds for the Marine squad infantry automatic weapon then I don’t hold much faith that they will do much better with a personal weapon.
While the squad automatic M249 had its faults it at least was belt fed. I would like to see how they plan to sustain fire superiority with the IAR using 30 round magazines? What are they going to do borrow them from riflemen? The answer is to adopt the MK46 a scaled down version of the M249 currently used by Navy SEAL’s. The MK46 is belt fed, 750 rpm and lighter than the conventional M249. If the Marines would like to hire me to revamp their small arms program I am available. :-)
The market is rather boring today so some more gun thoughts for the USMC.
They key determinate in military small arms is not only the weapons design but also the cartridge. The 5.56mm round in its current M855 configuration is basically unsatisfactory in that it experiences notable ballistic deterioration beyond 300 meters. That is because light bullets (in this case 62gr.) inherently lack retained energy at extended ranges. Basically, the NATO countries led by the USA need to step forward and adopt a proper case or caseless cartridge in the 6.0 to 6.5mm category with an approximately 110 to 125gr. bullet for a new infantry firearm whose modern optics allow it to be effective far beyond the ballistic capabilities of the current 5.56mm round.
Don't hold your breath.
They're getting a drum for the IAR. Fortunately the intention was to supplement rather than replace the SAW.
Let us firm-up doctrine. . . .
before discussing what impact tiny varmit caliber rounds do or don't have in the beaten zone, as-well-as small arms selection. For instance: the squad should really revolve around the automatic rifleman, moving him (some day, her?) up onto the objective, not the other way around. . .wait a minute JPWREL, no you don't, I'm not going off on a tangent today!
Exactly, precisely the tactics the Wehrmacht pioneered seventy years ago based on the formidable MG42. But they were the losers so I guess they didn't know what they were doing.
OK, signing off on gun stuff and back to grand strategy,
But is the mission of a fire team's automatic rifleman to personally seize the objective, or is it to provide the automatic fire portion of the fire team's combined arms capabilities to allow the fire team as a whole to accomplish its mission. As far as I know, we're not an army of one.
I was doing some cyphering here (Jethro Bodine - Clamppett style). I reckon that the reduction mentioned is 8%. That's funny because certain generals have said a 4% reduction was what was planned (before sequestration) and 8% was still doable.
Then you get numbskulls like Barney Frank saying, cut them by 30%. (Glad he's retiring, course that shoulda happened long ago too).
So I figure that if the generals are all lining up on 8% and the pols are lining up at 15-30%. The answer is going to be in the middle, say 12-20%. Bad news for the stars if your plans say "WE CAN'T GO BELOW 186k PAX!"
See attached article from interview with CMC and you will see there is a concerted effort ongoing by leadership. Is this Deja Vu, 1920s? I reckon 136k.
For the Marines it is back to the future.
Published: December 4
With the Iraq war ending and an Afghanistan exit in sight, the Marine Corps is beginning a historic shift, returning to its roots as a seafaring force that will get smaller, lighter and, it hopes, less bogged down in land wars.
This moment of change happens to coincide with a reorienting of U.S. security priorities to the Asia-Pacific region, where China has been building military muscle during a decade of U.S. preoccupation in the greater Middle East. That suits the Marines, who see the Pacific as a home away from home.
After two turns at combat in Iraq, first as invaders in the 2003 march to Baghdad and later as occupiers of landlocked Anbar province, the Marines left the country in early 2010 to reinforce the fight in southern Afghanistan. Over that stretch the Marines became what the former Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman, Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, has called their own “worst nightmare” — a second U.S. land army, a static, ground-pounding auxiliary force.
That’s scary for the Marines because, for some in Congress, it raises this question: Does a nation drowning in debt really need two armies?
Gen. James F. Amos, the Marine Corps commandant, says that misses the real point. He argues that the Marines, while willing and able to operate from dug-in positions on land, are uniquely equipped and trained to do much more. They can get to any crisis, on land, at sea or in the air, on a moment’s notice.
He is eager to see the Iraq and Afghanistan missions completed so the Marines can return to their traditional role as an expeditionary force.
“We need to get back to our bread and butter,” Amos told Marines Nov. 23 at Camp Lawton, a U.S. special operations base in Afghanistan’s Herat province.
That begins, he said, with moves such as returning to a pattern of continuous rotations of Marines to the Japanese island of Okinawa, home of the 3rd Marine Division. The rotation of infantry battalions to Okinawa was interrupted by the Iraq war.
Amos says he plans to begin lining up infantry battalion rotations for Okinawa before the 2014 target date for ending U.S. combat in Afghanistan.
Another signal of the shift is the decision announced in late November to rotate Marines to Australia beginning in 2012 for training with Australian forces from an Australian army base in Darwin. Up to 2,500 Marines, infantry units as well as aviation squadrons and combat logistic battalions, will go there from Okinawa or other Marine stations in Japan and elsewhere in the Pacific for a few months at a time.
“As we draw down (troops in Afghanistan) and we reorient the Marine Corps, it will be primarily to the Pacific,” Amos told Marine aviators at a U.S. base in Kandahar, Afghanistan. “The main focus of effort is going to be the Pacific for the Marines.” He added that Marines will remain present in the Persian Gulf area and elsewhere as required, but not in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Versatility is the key to keeping the Marines relevant to U.S. national security requirements, he says.
“We’re not a one-trick pony,” he said. “We’re the ultimate Swiss army knife.”
The decade of war following the Sept. 11 attacks on New York and Washington began for the Marines in late November 2001 with an airborne assault on al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden’s turf in the desert south of Kandahar in southern Afghanistan.
Marines of the 15th Marine Expeditionary Unit flew more than 400 miles aboard helicopters launched from the USS Peleliu in the North Arabian Sea. A month later the Taliban, which had provided haven for bin Laden as al-Qaida plotted the Sept. 11 attacks, were routed and the war seemed largely over. It was not until 2010 that the Marines returned in large numbers to Afghanistan, where fighting had evolved into a stalemated.
By late 2002, the Marines and other U.S. forces were preparing for another land war, this time in Iraq. In March 2003 the Marines pushed north from Kuwait along with the Army’s 3rd Infantry Division, for the main assault on Baghdad. This war, too, seemed to be over within a few months.
But it took an unexpected turn even as the Marines left Iraq in September 2003. An insurgency took hold that fall and in March 2004 the Marines returned, this time to Anbar province in Iraq’s western desert, where the Sunni insurgency was entrenched and the outlook appeared grim.
The Marines’ death toll in Iraq was 1,022, nearly one-quarter of the U.S. total, according to Pentagon statistics. Thus far in Afghanistan at least 376 Marines have died.
For both wars combined, the Marines had the highest death rate among the four major services, 0.47 percent of all Marines who served in the two countries, according to an Associated Press analysis. That compares with 0.38 percent for the Army, which played the dominant ground combat role.
Marines had by far the highest rate of wounded in action for both wars combined: 4.28 percent, compared with 2.75 percent for the Army.
With an eye on the postwar outlook, Amos came into his job as the commandant in 2010 intending to slim down his force and shed some of its ground-oriented capabilities. He has developed a plan to reduce the service from its current total of 202,000 Marines to 186,800, and perhaps even fewer because of additional budget pressures, he told Marines in Afghanistan in late November.
Regardless of the number, Amos says he is determined to shape a postwar force that is smaller and better equipped for the kind of flexible duty he champions.
He plans to reduce the number of infantry battalions from 27 to 24, shed some artillery and armored vehicles and reduce the number of flying squadrons from 70 to 61. The idea is a force whose forte is not protracted ground combat but pop-up crises such as the Libya mission, as well as “power projection,” which the Marines do by keeping expeditionary forces aboard Navy ships in Asia, the Mideast and elsewhere.
It was evident on Amos’s tour of Afghanistan’s front lines over Thanksgiving that ordinary Marines, too, are looking beyond Iraq and Afghanistan.
“Who do you want us to fight next, sir?” a Marine asked Amos.
Gasp. . .hold fast here blog shipmates:
Let me get this straight: Did Gen. Amos really discuss plans to begin arranging the battalion rotation cycle to Okinawa from each coast? Yikes! Committing to something w/o knowing your actual end force strength (or was the CMC promised something by SecDef Gates before he left office?) might be a bit difficult to achieve.
After all, in the good ole days of pre-2001, supporting the rotation of battalions to Okinawa along with the continuous deployment of anywhere from two to three MAU/ARGs out, seemed demanding enough from my memory.
Yes, the plan is to return to the same old Cold War oki rotations that send Marines where they aren't needed nor wanted. Does anyone think four Marine infantry battalions with 3000 shooters worries any Asian nation? They are powerless should war break out. Yet the Generals love doing tours on those resorts.
Send UDP units where they are needed. Camp Leemore, in Africa, Bahrain, Italy ect. Piggyback aboard current Navy bases worldwide and save lots of money and manpower by closing half the Okinawa camps.
This talk about bringing down force numbers is going to affect readiness. There is no other way to look at it - we will hear the generals speak of a compromise, as well as congress.
Let me tell you what compromise means: trading dollars for bodies. That's what it comes down to, as well as trading dollars for mission accomplishment.
Look, when we go to war, let's put the mandy-pandy risk aversion aside, let's get out there and take it to the enemy and fight. But let's not dig our graves prematurely by sacrificing readiness and capability.
I find it disgusting that our congress and senior leaders are so willing to trade bodies and mission accomplishment for dollars, when there's so much waste that can be removed without affecting either. But the waste will remain because that waste is rooted in congressional districts, campaign donations, and the like.
With all due respect Charles, then where do you cut?
Annual US military spending is roughly what? $750.00 Billion? And I'm not sure if I'm filling in intelligence spending here which brings that figure over $800.00 Billion? I may be on the low side here.
That's approximately 1/3 of the US Federal Budget?
So, if not the marines, then where? And what? Personel? Equipment? Research? Bases? Where?
Close half the overseas bases which serve no purpose. That costs little. Freeze pay for two years like the Fed civilians are enduring, that is too simple, but requires a tiny sacrifice. That saves lots when retirement costs are considered. Pay has gone up 80% in 12 years, but no one wants to discuss that, or even look at those numbers.
The DoD can be cut but we are about 50% of the discretionary budget not the entire federal budget and not even close to be a large percentage of the GDP. Entitlements are still the biggest factor in our Federal Budget by far.
Finally found the chart I was looking for.
Back in 2010, the NY Times published a copy of the current year budget (FY 2010) and the proposed 2011 Federal Budget.
Here's the link:
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/02/01/us/budget.html
Total spending is set at $3.70 Trillion, and the chart breaks down the budget by section.
Military spending is listed at $738 Billion, or 20% of the budget, equal to the projected spending on Social Security. Seperate from this is $122.0 Billion for Vetrans benefits and another $51.0 Billion for military retirement, which if added, would increase total military spending to $911.0 Billion, ro 24.6% of the total budget.
The other major split for the budget is as follows. The above mentioned Social Security, Medicare, which clocks in at $498.0 Billion, and Medicaid, at $260.0 Billion. The combined spending on entitlements is $1.50 Trillion, or just over 40% of the total budget. Various other 'income security' programs (including the above mentioned $51.0 Billion for military retirement) comes to $567.0 Billion or $516.0 Billion, backing out the military retirement figure. Adding the latter number to the $1.50 Trillion, brings various entitlement and "Butter" programs to 54.5% of the total budget.
Interest expense on the whole mess is $251.0 Billion, or 6.8% of total spending.
Obviously, nothing happens without reducing the entitlement program, especially given the anticipated growth of spending as the 'Baby-Boomers' retire.
But, the 'big three' (military, entitlements, and interest), account for 86% of the total budget. Since we can't cut the interest payments out, that leaves 80% of the budget up for grabs. That means entitlements, and military spending.
I question the issue of 'dollars for bodies' or even more so, 'dollars for mission accomplishment' Neither the Iraq or Afghanistan conflicts were starved for dollars and I think both results could be placed in the questionable victory category (at best).
And the reality is, during a war, there has never been a lack of dollars (perhaps short of the Revolutionary war itself).
But the reality is we're spending more than every other state by a large factor, even when looking at China's rising spending. And since we're not going to war with every other state, the question becomes one of just what are we going to buy, and what is it going to pay for.
It may be crass to question any restriction of spending for military readiness, or the bodies over dollars, but that's economics 101, for any spending choice. One could easily make the argument that the dollars going for military spending, take away from dollars to 'save' the lives of Americans through research and medical care.
So too, the spending on entitlements. But dollars, as we have seen, are not infinate in value (if not outright supply). So economic decisions on what to buy, must be made.
Those numbers don't add up when the entire DoD budget is 662 billion if that budget passes and it won't. I go with the CBO for date on that. Right now the DoD is about 60% of the Discretionary according to that so not sure how they got those numbers but if you add Homeland Security, Coast Guard, Intelligence Agencies, etc....and somehow include those as being part of the DoD then the numbers could go that way and that argument has been presented before but otherwise it does not add up when talking about straight DoD numbers and percentage of budget and GDP.
is not about budget cuts and downsizing. The economic facts speak for themselves - our military, across the board - will get smaller in the coming years.
The issue is what we will do once those numbers are cut. With Iraq nearly 'over' and a plan for Afghanistan to wind down, few members of the Legislative Branch are looking at long-term security threats, and how to balance the current economic imperatives with the great unknown of future military commitments around the world. This is Grand Strategy, and it isn't easy. It's particularly difficult when there's no discreet future military event (ie, war) to count on, making it more difficult to justify continued defense costs when the Nation is hemorrhaging.
Upon the imposition of the cuts, the military will not be able to conduct all of the missions it could in the past. Over time, smart services will adapt, leverage technology, and improve efficiency to address these challenges.
Accept that cuts are coming. Anticipate it, in order to limit the damage that is surely coming, and to overcome it as swiftly as possible. Prepare your Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen to think creatively and broadly and to work together to make sure that the Nation remains militarily strong as it recovers economically.
LOCHAM, makes a sensible argument. However, one problem that the military shares with the corporate world is keeping talent. When companies downsize they often lose precisely the kind of people they need to keep. Top people are often imbued with creative energy and are looking at other opportunities that may be more remunerative and challenging. Consequently, large elements of the best talent go out the door and the less talented and energetic remain. It would be a shame for the armed forces to downsize and lose a good portion of their most experienced and high quality officers and NCO’s. How to prevent that is the question since the services are no better that their people.
JPRWL, agreed. I know the Army has had a significant discussion about talent over the past year, although I've yet to see any real changes. Has this permeated the other services?
The services will need to be smart to maintain quality while reducing quantity. The crappy, less rewarding/exciting jobs will probably not go away, meaning that the ostensibly 'better' officers and NCOs will have to fill them. Compensating them afterwards, or perhaps even ahead of time, may be necessary to lessen the blow and keep them in uniform. Additionally, I have many friends who have left the service not because they did not want to deploy, but because the personnel system is antiquated and inflexible. Each service will need to examine how they develop and maintain their leaders, and how strictly they will need to hit required 'wickets' before moving on to different jobs.
To reiterate, I think that the services will need to anticipate the coming challenges and take bold action to prevent a hollowing of capability. I'm not sure if they're up to it.
One problem is the myth of low military pay. GIs make 2-3 times more than civilians, and that doesn't count an extremely generous retirement plan. If the DoD would simply advertise that, great GIs would remain, who often find out the truth later.
For example, the Pentagon pay calculator http://militarypay.defense.gov/mpcalcs/Calculators/RMC.aspx
After four years of service, an E-5 with two kids makes over $52,000 a year, which is $10,000 more than the average college graduate. This is why recruitment and reenlistment haven't been a problem. So many want to stay that NCOs are kicked out for any reason, while thousands are forced out each year. An O-5 earns twice as much as the average American with a masters degree.
Just tell GIs the truth, but greedy Generals fear Congress would hear the truth and freeze pay for awhile. Last year they pushed through a 3.6% pay raise while inflation was zero.
And before anyone rambles about deployments, the DoD should increase combat and deployment pay. Nothing makes GIs more angry than all the never deployed GIs or sailors and airmen living in Hawaii or San Diego who are paid the same.
Its not about the pay check; money isn't the reason good leaders are getting out. The personnel system and idiotic Army policies are the reasons people, esp officers, are getting out and or frustrated/unhappy. Here's are some specific examples:
-having CPT a year group ahead of you decide where 80 other CPTs are going to move their families and spend the next three years of their lives after a 15 MINUTE CONVERSATION is stupid, irresponsible, insulting, and makes any CPT with options want to get out.
-watching the CPT next to you, who failed his APFT, get his 1st choice of unit and duty station while you get sent to you 5th choice
-watching the CPT who hasn't deployed, who is fat, who is physically weak, who is home every night with his family while you're away from your family continousily deployed watching men you love being injured and disfigured get promoted at the same time as you
- asking another 30 year old man to inspect your car(POV inspection), asking a 31 year old man to allow you to take your wife on a weekend trip(Milage Pass;on your off time when your not on recall), have that same man review your plan to get there(TRIPS), and then get a 30 minute safety brief about not drinking and driving, beating your wife, stealing, having unsafe sex, swimming without a swim buddy, speeding, jay walking, fighting, being late, etc
The Calculator is hardly right
You can add up how much someone gets a lot easier, go to pay charts and add on BEQ/VHA and do the average for it. Generous retirement? If I retire now I would get about 25k pre taxes, yeah, I am swimming in it and I have a college degree and working on a masters. Give it a break CMEYERGO, this has been on here a million times, misleading statements don't help and outright lies never help. I remember your past posts, the stuff is still on the blog man, maybe someone else will go look up some of your crazier rants too. Give it a rest.
...the largest peacetime military in the history of history. Defense budget equal to those of the next 7 countries? Keep the Marines and lose some Army divisions/brigades, some subs and flat tops, and the F-22.
Reducing the political appetite for a militarized foreign policy should be considered. Too bad a majority of American voters can't/won't demand a new set of principles for how the United States relates to the rest of the world.
If American voters could a get a clear and accurate view of just how secure they really are, they would not support these massive outlays on national security.
General Dunford is excused for his haggling and scare-mongering since he's working from the Marine Corps stated mission/s. If elected officials told him to do something different or less, no doubt he'd move out smartly.
"the largest peacetime military in the history of history"??
A bit of an exaggerration, don't you think? Calm down on the Chomsky-esque rhetoric. And thanks for joining in on the gratuitous Army-hating.
Large defense budget, I agree in terms of dollars spent and as a percentage of the fed budget; although not that big when you look at % of GDP and when you factor in that potential adversary states can maintain large ground forces at much lower cost than us (China, North Korea, Iran, etc). But the military's actual deployable combat forces are not all that big, especially once the planned cuts go into effect. The small number of ships can only cover so much - a ship can't be in more than one place at a time.
Over a trillion a year for "national defense" when you count all the money spent outside DoD. For example, $30 billion a year in military retirement is found in the Dept of Treasury budget. We have the largest military budget since WWII, even adjusting for inflation. Larger than the peaks of the Korean and Vietnam wars. It has doubled since 9-11, but when when some suggest a 10% cut, Generals scream the Chinese will invade! The current "drastic" automatic cuts would just take us back to 2007 levels.
And yes, let's discuss why we spend more and more on a smaller and smaller force. Where does it go?
1. USMC stays amphibious.
2. It is not light army.
3. It maintains its own attack air (airframe no big deal and tailhook-required OK).
4. It maintains its unique culture.
5. Any USMC solution offered by the US Army is rejected out of hand.
Attend to these 5 elements and the size of the Marine Corps - an output, not an input - will be right-size. Ignore a single one of them and we've killed the Marine Corps no matter what its end-strength.
Fundamentals of shipboard 5 card draw
I know where you're coming from. However, there is a wild card here: what happens now that the so called Super Committee failed to reach any agreement, which by law stipulates automatic, as well as deeper, cuts at the Pentagon?
If that actually happens, reduction below 186 grand in personnel will be the least of the Corps' issues, because if the Corps isn't now satisfied with the probable 33 amphibs the Navy has pretty much settled-on vice 38 the Corps feels it needs. . .what would less than 33 gators do to the Corps' 21st century mission ability?
As the Brits showed us in the Falklands,
... you can always augment lift with commercial ships taken up from trade. From a presence-mission viewpoint, the difference between 38 and 33 is not a lot and could be beefed up with two-crew manning and forward homeporting. The essential issue is retaining the essential Marine Corps. Everything else can be ramped up in time of need.
Influencing my thought on this is the inescapable fact that our current defense spending is obscenely grand, unjustified, over-ripe for slashing. Not cutting. Not a gyro-sandwich approach. Slashing. Should happen and might. If it does, having essence-of-Marine-Corps is a lot more important than its details. It's the recipe, not the soup-du-jour that counts.
We got it the last five thousand times you told us RD - you hate the Army and think it's always been worthless outside of WWII, and always will be.
While the budget can be cut it is does not need to be "slashed" for the reasons you think. We cannot return to the days of isolationism, as much as you would like to from what I have gathered from most of your posts, it cannot and should not happen.
As for the Army, the same things I despise in the culture of the Army Leadership are in all the branches, the Marines do a better job of keeping a combat focus and I think tactical focus, but the Navy and the Air Force at the top are no better and the people are poorly trained for what they are supposed to do-FIGHT WARS. It is not your Navy anymore Ducky, not by a long shot.
Seriously. In the grand scheme of things, it probably isnt a big line item in terms of either personnel or money, but MARSOC is an unwieldy appendage that is positively not suited to the "unique" nature of the Marine Corps and not very good at FID.
Cut MARSOC, and cut SFG 4th BNs
I have only anecdotal experience with MARSOC. There are some fine officers and soldiers, but I agree, it seems to be more about getting a piece of the SOF pie rather than value added to Special Operations. In terms of reputation within the ARSOF community, MARSOC is not very highly thought of - but that could easily be service nepotism.
As I understand it, MARSOC was developed largely because we needed "more SOF in theater than we have available." Demand was outstripping supply. The Marines, without representation in SOCOM, were a quick way to increase the numbers of SOF in OIF and OEF. It was, essentially, creating SOF at a time of crisis, in contravention to the SOCOM 'SOF Truth'. At a time of cuts, is this a necessary duplication of efforts?
There's balance here. ARSOF has done the same - adding a 4th Battalion in each of the SF Groups. I can't speak for the entire community, but these, too, have been less than successful for a few reasons. First is supply and logistics - in my experience, the 4th BN had was constantly robbing Peter to pay Paul. The unit was established before the Teams even had weapons, much less proper places to live and work. Secondly, there quality of the operator was watered down - we had a shorter Assessment and Selection, with greater acceptance rates. I don't have the physical, mental, and psychological test results from this period (although it would be a very interesting study), but anecdotally, there was a lowering of the bar on the quality of new soldiers and officers coming into SF. All SOF units, whether Army/Navy/Marines/Air Force are only as strong as their raw material coming in. Expanding the pie doesn't necessarily mean that quality will gravitate - eventually, you just have to fill all of the units with the 'best of what's left.' Not a successful plan.
So, cut out the 4th BNs, too.
I suspect that NAVSOF could stand some culling, but I'm not familiar with their development/growth over the past decade. In my experience they do not embrace the human side of FID as well as ARSOF, and have an ENORMOUS tail to tooth ratio in deployments - a deployed SEAL Company HQ is the size of an infantry company, whereas an SF Company is just slightly larger than an ODA. I don't foresee many changes there, though, as I suspect they'll be riding the UBL wave for a few more years.
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