Tom says: In the personnel area, I'd make an entirely different series of recommendations, focussing on rewarding success, punishing failure, and holding people accountable while still encouraging flexibility and adaptiveness.

But this is his guest column, not mine.

By "Petronius Arbiter"
Best Defense department of Army affairs

Personnel

  • Bring back Command Sergeant Major as a rank, not a position. We have too much structure tied up in making CSMs functional. Time to return to them being just the senior enlisted advisor. There can only be one commander in any organization and only one person responsible. Under normal circumstances, it is "tomfoolery" to relieve a CSM when a Cdr is relieved. The Cdr is the only one responsible for the actions of his organization and himself. The senior NCO works for him.
  • Remember CSMs are senior enlisted advisors to the commander, not strategic leaders.
  • Establish a policy where LTs are on probation until promoted to CPT. Commanders should have the option of transferring those not to be promoted to 1LT to the enlisted ranks where they will complete their service obligation. Some attrition is good. Bet that would shake up the attitude of some junior officers who think they are just buying time until they meet their five, four, or three year active service commitment.
  • SPCs in NCO positions of leadership must, no option, be laterally appointed to CPL. That imparts them with legitimate credibility and authority. At one time Corporal was the most respected rank in the Army. Make old and young alike respect Corporals again.
  • Address the issue of pregnancies and deployability. Don't run away from it. Solve the problem because it is having serious impact on unit readiness and military effectiveness. While attacking with vigor the impact of pregnancies on unit and combat readiness, also analyze why 16 percent of the Army is women but only 8 percent of the deployed force are women.
  • Certain branches/MOSs/units should be allowed/required to have branch specific physical fitness standards and tests to enforce those standards. They also must continue to meet APFT requirements also. Example; Cannon artillery and armor have requirements for extensive upper body strength other branches do not have (so do mechanics by the way), train, and test accordingly. Get over the one-standard-fits-all mentality.

lafrancevi/Flickr

 
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HUNTER

5:23 PM ET

November 28, 2011

This LT->CPT thing

I've given a lot of thought to this LT to CPT transition Petronius mentions. The Campaign on the Army Profession has too. The campaign has suggested that there is a group of aspiring professionals, who require certification before they are true professionals within the force. Certainly newbie LTs fall into that criteria.

Some think that the LTs should be certified before they are responsible for other soldiers' lives - therefore completion of OBC would meet that criteria. I hold a different opinion. I think that OBC is really just the educational/training element of the equation. LTs need experience leading troops and making decisions before they meet the certification.

If one looks at the medical model, med school students aren't certified upon completion of their schooling. They must go through internship and residency, under the tutelage of an attending physician. They typically do 4 years of that apprenticeship, then they get their cool coat and call themselves fully certified physicians.

It wouldn't be that hard to use that model in the military. After 4 years a LT is typically going to make CPT. That is the line of demarcation. Anytime up until that point there should be an opportunity to see that the officer isn't meeting the mettle and correct the problem or detach them from the profession. I don't like Petronius idea that a poor officer will somehow make it as an NCO or EM - its possible just not likely. I also don't like the signal that sends to the enlisted men.

I for one believe a similar apprenticeship model should be used for the enlisted soldiers as well with particular emphasis on those who are admitted into the NCO ranks.

To some this is academic whimsy but I think that if you want to be a profession, you need to act like one.

 

JPWREL

5:42 PM ET

November 28, 2011

Couple of questions to

Couple of questions to HUNTER:

H, would it make sense that all prospective officers must first demonstrate one to two years of successful service in the ranks similar to the Israeli model? Prospective candidates for officer selection would participate in a process where their service to date is evaluated and their academic and leadership potential gauged?

Would an officer selection board using this process have likely eliminated the likes of Col. Harry Tunnell? I can’t imagine any parent or wife of a soldier serving under this character being too pleased with a process that put him in command of their kids or husbands lives.

http://www.militarytimes.com/news/2011/11/army-report-blames-lapses-on-stryker-commander-112711w/

 

HUNTER

6:56 PM ET

November 28, 2011

JPWREL

I'll be honest - and biased - I've seen as many problems with mustang officers (aka former NCOs) as I have any other commissioning source. In the Guard they make up the predominance of the force. Some are good, others not so much....just like every other commissioning source. Most of the latter are the kind that never realize that being an O vs an E means doing some things differently, with a different focus.

So, while I see some merit in enlisted time before officer time I think the current mix has value too.

As for Tunnell, I don't know anything more than what I have read. It's not clear whether Tunnell was truly a toxic leader (I hate that term btw) or just a guy who didn't buy into the COIN guidance of his higher HQs. He may just have been a real bitter guy after getting shot in Iraq. That's understandable, but not acceptable.

In other words, we don't know enough to ascertain if he went wrong, or where? And even if we assume he was a terrible BDE CDR perhaps he was a good BN CDR. Peter principle and all that. It's clear that some liked him and some didn't. I certainly don't like to go back to when he was commissioned 35+ years before to make an assessment. That strikes me as both unfair and dumb.

I can't help think, sometimes, that there but for the grace of God, go I. I've made mistakes in my career, who hasn't? I like to think the good far outweighs the bad, but this willingness to tear a man apart and find every fault is no more healthy than having a bad character in the ranks. Doing my research, I read a Luke Mogleson article titled "The Beast.....", he interviewed a sociologist named Stjepan Mestrovic, who was a expert witness at the 5-2 Stryker trials. He notes that the American public will accept collective responsibility for her military's foibles, but that only comes when the force itself recognizes that the problems are institutional rather than individual. There's some real power in that. The Army loves to blame 'bad apples' and 'rogue platoons', that makes the problems go away when those individuals are put away. But the problem is usually bigger than that.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/01/magazine/mag-01KillTeam-t.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1322506520-awlqqOE4ESPRIix/VRLLVw&pagewanted=print

There needs to be some balance. Like I said, maybe Tunnell deserves all the acrimony....but maybe he doesn't.

 

HUNTER

6:59 PM ET

November 28, 2011

Oops, that's supposed to be

25+ years before.

 

JPWREL

7:32 PM ET

November 28, 2011

HUNTER, I don't know how I

HUNTER, I don't know how I missed that article but thanks for directing me to my evenings reading. Ah yes, now I remember I was visiting my daughter in Charleston, SC at the time and was in a self-imposed news blackout.

 

USAR_SUPER_SOLDIER

8:09 PM ET

November 28, 2011

Navy

Isn't the system you recommend analogous to the Navy's system of earning a rating? Don't SWO have to go through rigourous test throughout their JO years to earn the rating SWO? Same with Aviators? My thought, though, is that those test are very technically based ie propulsion for submariners, navigation for SWOs. What would be the tests to earn a certification for, say, an AG officer--my branch? If this is what you're intimating, then all we have to do is look at our sister service.

 

USAR_SUPER_SOLDIER

8:15 PM ET

November 28, 2011

Mustang Officers

I was a college option OCS grad. I chose the USAR because I already had a good civilian career. The USAR has a lot of prior-service officers--many of whom were Direct Commissioned (a "commissioning source" I don't much care for). I see a serious issue with many of these officers; they are still in the NCO mindset because they never had the acculuration that a true commissioning source can bring (and even some of those who go G2G via ROTC or OCS can miss the acculuration). I am deployed with a DC CPT--a company commander. He treats his company as if it were a giant squad. He's too hands on. I see this a lot.

That having been said, my rater, an LTC(P) is a prior-service NCO who went to OCS in the '80s. He's the best officer I've ever worked with.

 

ERIC_STRATTONIII

8:31 PM ET

November 28, 2011

Prior Es to Os

"The Army loves to blame 'bad apples' and 'rogue platoons', that makes the problems go away when those individuals are put away. But the problem is usually bigger than that.

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/01/magazine/mag-01KillTeam-t.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1322506520-awlqqOE4ESPRIix/VRLLVw&pagewanted=print"

HUNTER, what is the point you are attempting to make with this article in relation to the article written on the blog?

JPWREL,
Hunter is right about prior E's not always making the best O's, many have been my worst, seems to be a coin flip on how well they do in comparison to the regular officer corps. Some are the best O's I have ever seen and others shouldn't be allowed to lead a mouse to cheese never mind be put in charge of men in combat. That said, that problem and the problem as a whole for the military officer corps is mostly due to poor development, mentorship and professional military education in the branches. PME and development is done pretty well in the USMC, terrible in the Navy and Army, cannot speak to the Air Force though. Why not look at the model the USMC has and not re-invent the wheel?

 

JPWREL

9:14 PM ET

November 28, 2011

Otter, thanks for checking in

Otter, thanks for checking in with the comment. I certainly can see how a former NCO may not be suitable officer material. But that situation would likely be mitigated if the selection process for OCS were more rigorous than it seems to be at present?

Hope all is well with you.

 

ERIC_STRATTONIII

9:26 PM ET

November 28, 2011

JPWREL

Thanks, doing well, back at it soon enough.
I don't think it is the OCS process so much as it is the follow on process that is really lacking. You get a lot of top guys coming in and then they are left to do everything after OCS by On The Job Training. The Army and Navy both do not do a great job of developing guys via PME, Mentoring, Leadership Training (Not the Business Model) but man, they both do a great job with PC, feel good platitudes! ;)

 

RIFLE COMPANY COMMANDER

10:06 PM ET

November 28, 2011

apples and oranges

I agree that I've seen plenty of bad examples of NCO making the transition to the officer corps.. It seems like only a tiny percentage of them become good officers.

BUT.. the Israeli (and German) system would be different in my opinion. When EVERYONE has been enlisted before being an officer, I think the whole culture is changed. This would be very different than when we see former NCOs in our Army becoming officers.

 

PETRONIUS ARBITER

12:44 AM ET

November 29, 2011

LTs to CPT

Sorry, either I did not state well or you did not understand. I don't necessarily think a LT is going to make a good NCO or EM, should he/she fail as an officer. Just think it nice to hold the ability to revert them to EM over their head in order to put pressure on them to uphold their part of the free college education they receive. Understand that does not apply to the "rankers." If you don't revert them to EM, and just let them out of the Army, there will be many who use it to get released from Active Duty and to beat the system.

 

HUNTER

2:36 AM ET

November 29, 2011

I don't buy it

In all my time in the Army I've only seen one LT who was seemingly trying to get out of the Army. After much gnashing of teeth I facilitated his departure, even though when it became clear what I was doing - on his behalf, cough, cough - he backpedaled furiously. Just like Privates, most Lieutenants don't wake up in the morning thinking "what can I screw up today?"

 

RIFLE COMPANY COMMANDER

3:00 PM ET

November 29, 2011

We expect a lot more from LTs

We expect a lot more from LTs than to just not be waking up thinking what can I screw up today.

I like Petronius Arbiter's idea a lot. I like the German and Israeli system even better - everybody enlists, and all officers were former enlisted. This would create officers that are a lot different from the American experience of former NCOs becoming officers.

 

FELINE74

7:06 AM ET

November 30, 2011

Doesn't the Coast Guard and Navy do something similar?

They call it a cadet cruise or midshipman cruise.

 

LEROY THE MASOCHIST

6:11 PM ET

November 28, 2011

Disagree with the LT probation

Good points except for "Lt's on probation". That's a bad idea for the following reasons:

1) Having ex-Lt's in the enlisted ranks would be absolutely terrible for morale and mission accomplishment. Think about it, they would get no respect from pretty much anyone at that point. If you really think attrition is the answer, better just to AdSep them.

2) The possibility of being de-commissioned would take the pathetic risk aversion that already pervades the field grade officer community and spread it to the company grade guys. This would be disastrous.

3) Who makes the decision of who gets relieved? Is it the company or Bn CO? Is it a review board? Hard to see how this happens without chewing up a lot of resources.

We've all had to deal with incompetent Lt's who've dropped their packs, or never even rucked up to begin with. Of course that's a frustrating experience and it's tempting to ponder solutions like the "probation". Still don't think it's a good idea though. Ultimately, being in charge of 40 lives is enough of an incentive to try hard.

Also, as a follow-on comment to JPWREL.... any LCpl who gives you his unvarnished opinion will tell you that officers should have to be enlisted for a few years before getting commissioned. I kind of agree with this in theory; let's be honest though, it would kill the talent pipeline. Good luck getting guys to sign up for service academies, ROTC, and the PLC program when the pitch is, "you just have to do a couple of years as an enlisted man and then maybe, if you're good, you get to go to OCS." I'll say it again, this would KILL our ability to get talent in the door.

S/F

 

OTHER RANKS

7:35 PM ET

November 28, 2011

Maybe, maybe not

Perhaps in the short term or as long as the separation between officer and enlisted is more than just functional. Other professions with similar cultures such as policing or firefighting have no problem recruiting newcomers into the bottom entry level positions rather than midlevel. No one (or almost no one) starts off as a detective no matter how uninteresting patrol seems to be.

 

PETRONIUS ARBITER

12:54 AM ET

November 29, 2011

EM to officer

I have always felt that it was good for the services if an officer had served some time as an enlisted Soldier prior to getting commissioned. But, I don't think there is an proof that Dave Petraeus, Dwight D Eisenhower, George Marshall or hundreds of others would have been better officers had they been enlisted first. Now, they very well could have benefited for 2 years as a LT, but doubt it would have had any benefit as a senior officer. That said, given the choice, I would be enlisted first, then commissioned.

 

OLD INFANTRYMAN

2:48 AM ET

December 2, 2011

Lts serve on probation . . . are you really serious?

As one of my wise old Platoon Sgts once said, " If NCOs are the backbone of the Army, why is it that when officers were Riffed or passed over, they made them NCOs? Now, we have someone talking about putting ineffective officers in enlisted status. Oh give me a break! They are going to be better soldiers? Why not just get rid of them?
Oh , and the idea that an officer serve on probation until he makes captain, you have to be kidding! This has to have come from someone who has either never been in the military, or never been a company grade officer in an Infantry, Armor, or Artillery unit.

 

PETRONIUS ARBITER

11:17 AM ET

December 2, 2011

No, I am not "really

No, I am not "really kidding."

First, let me address your first point. In Reduction in Force (RIF) actions, largely due to a downsizing of the military, we reverted officers back to their NCO rank they held before they were commissioned. The reason to do that was usually to allow them to stay in the military and in particular allow them to continue towards retirement. It had nothing to do with dumping substandard officers on the NCO corps. Most of them were very good NCOs in the first place and either were direct commissioned or went to OCS in order to assist the Army in time of need of more officers. Morally, this was the Army taking care of people who had dedicated their lives to the service. I think absolutely the right thing.

Now, as to the second point. The purpose of the probation is to provide some incentive to those who receive an education from our country by attending ROTC on a scholarship, West Point or some other commision producing program. It would provide them the opportunity to "soldier well" during their initial years as an officer, or if they don't meet the standard of some administrative body, they would revert to enlisted status. There are just too many junior officers who are provided an education and then just go through the motions to their 5, 4 or 3 year obligation.

And, last, I have spent a few years in uniform.

 

HRAVENLANDEYE

6:31 PM ET

November 28, 2011

Good Bullets/Bad Bullets

With rare exception, a great many of the points offered by PA are reminiscent of the sort of errors an organization makes while concoting strategy offered up by "Good Strategy/Bad Strategy". There are a lot of vague endstates, without clear paths to achieving them, or even why a particular grievance exists. Sometimes the comments seem as petty as
>The Army should re-paint all of its interior walls sunshine yellow. This would improve the overall festiveness of military buildings, in addition to improving the general mood of Soldiers, because no one can be unhappy when they think about sunshine.<
Assuming that PA has had a broad and diverse career in the military, how was he so unfortunate as to go from one below-average unit to another, to feel it necessary to craft such a list? At times it reads like a vendetta. It is not that there are not legitimate grievances, and things within the Army that should/could be changed for the better. But it will take a far more coherent and well-crafted argument than what we find here. As it is we just have talking points from a disgruntled professional.

 

CDR D

7:10 PM ET

November 28, 2011

My take as well

This is just a "fire all the generals and make the JOs prior enlisted" rants that I have seen for the past 30 years. Coupled with 72 other random observations.

 

CHARLES IN AMERICA

7:25 PM ET

November 28, 2011

Agree and Disagree

I see the point, and some of this is ranting - we are all doing that a bit, right? It's a blog after all.

However, if we try to polish this up and craft it well, eventually it goes to PowerPoint or in some other way gets "Army-fied" and it will quickly lose its substance.

Pushing the sentiment, seeing the dialog, and forming opinions is the crux here. You and I may both see the same problem but we may also have different ways of fixing it. It may cause me to refine my opinion and possible solution. This is how we get to a consensus.

"Fire all the generals" may be the sentiment. Obviously it's not the solution. But there's no doubt we have problems with our GO community: too many of them, selection criteria poor, too much good ole boy, etc. I think we can find a workable solution but there must be some dialog first. I, personally, happen to believe that enough sentiment expressed will get to the GOs eventually. Will they push back? Yes, some will. But most will be pretty upset to see what the force actually thinks about them and their worth. They'll work to fix that. They are people and they have pride. I believe that will benefit the force in the end.

This is just one example. To ignore all of this is to embrace the status quo, which is not a very good status right now.

 

CHARLES IN AMERICA

7:13 PM ET

November 28, 2011

Personnel System is Broken

Totally broken. Needs overhaul. However, because it's so broken and because we've promoted too many "Tunnells", we need to be very, very, very careful in purging a LT to the enlisted ranks or to civilian life because his or her commander has judged thusly.

I'd say the problem is not just a CSM issue - it's with our entire force. It didn't start with 9/11, it was set in motion long before, probably in the early days of the post-Vietnam era. OIF and OEF have just highlighted the issues, especially in the Information Age with this blog and others like it.

As an officer I'd like the NCOs to know that I don't care about what degree they have. I don't care what other officers have either. It's about your job performance, not your educational pedigree.

Last note on personnel and the raging zero-defects mentality that will probably embrace our force along with austerity: Warren Bennis among others have said that just about every leader has gone through a crucible of some sort. They failed, screwed up, had their ass in a sling. It shaped them and made them better. If we deny that growth we will reinforce and amplify the current culture that covers up mistakes for the good ole boys and exaggerrates them for others not in the fold. Toxicity will only get worse.

As for PT - It should at least be 90 minutes, PRT needs to disappear - I like the warmup exercises and the cool down, but otherwise it's not very good. And, it's a flat out disgrace that we force many units to do the PRT yet they get evaluated on the APFT. 90 minutes is the minimum to do stuff with kit, which we should do at least twice a week. Unit runs need to go away. They contribute nothing to the Army. Looking pretty doesn't win a battle. No disrespect to the chain of command that created the PRT, but we need to simply charge the NCOs with getting their people ready for combat. That's probably going to produce the best PT program we can find. Soldiers are out there with Crossfit, Gym Jones, Military Athlete, and other programs - they know what they need to do and they come up with great ways to get it done. Cdrs need to authorize the purchases for resources similar to what you find with Crossfit gyms etc. Officers need to be out there with their Soldiers and commanders need to stop taking their subordinate officers out with them for officer runs and stuff like that. That doesn't help. Staff officers should do PT with their sections, build some unity and bring some esprit de corps to those staff elements. A clear indication that our PT is broken is how many people scam out of PT, use their rank to avoid PT, etc.

Make it challenging, abandon the phony metrics. That will bring people together and PT will be fun. People like to do fun things.

Very last thing, it's criminal to assess body fat the way we do. Buy accurate measurement devices. If you're going to ruin someone's career, you can at least do it on accurate data.

These PT standards need to be the same throughout the force, nothing special for different MOSs. Last thing, if it's good enough for SOF, Rangers, etc, then it's good for the rest of the service. Right now, SOF community has more available to them, more lattitude, etc. Fix that immediately. SOF does some great things with PT, physical assessments, and other items. Push that down to the rest of the force. Why are we holding back on providing good stuff to Soldiers simply because they're GPF instead of SF/Ranger etc?

 

FLAPPYTANGO

8:12 PM ET

November 28, 2011

"Tomfoolery" of dual CDR and CSM Reliefs

Based on the nature of most "good" CDR/CSM relationships, I suspect that the CSMs relieved knew of the misconduct and did nothing to stop or change the behavior of their commanders. Relieving complicit CSMs also sends a message regarding senior enlisted accountability and responsibilities. Perhaps no different than holding a platoon sergeant responsible in some regards for the development and performance of their platoon leaders. But then again, if the platoon leader only had a couple of years of prior enlisted service we wouldn't have any problems (heavy sarcasm).
Regards

 

ROCKSTAR-6

8:20 PM ET

November 28, 2011

Not as good as your last post

PA

I have generally enjoyed your guest column, however, with this installment I think you are farther off-target than usual.

I think you are way off on LTs.

1. We already have a system that does what you describe, less the reduction to enlisted rank (which is a terrible idea). The current promotion process can weed out bad LTs by not selecting them for CPT.

2. One of the worst things one can do for a bureaucratic process that isn't working is to put another process on top of it; you are almost certain to get two processes that don't work. If promotions are broken, fix promotions.

3. The underlying issue is scarcity. Bad officers are retained and promoted because there are not enough officers to fill the positions required. Instead of creating new systems why not address the scarcity problem with the tools available? Reduce officer billets by cutting staff, outsourcing, and conversion to warrant officer/enlisted positions. Move away from the concept of year groups to give more flexibility in when officers are promoted. Improve officer recruiting. Reduce junior officer attrition. A larger and more flexible pool of officers will enable the Army to retain more of the good and remove more of the bad.

I think your point on pregnancies is misguided for two reasons.

1. It is only a small part of a larger problem. As a medical/administrative cause of non-deployability non-combat injuries and chronic conditions are a far larger problem than pregnancy. I don't have current statistics to back the claim but my personal experience in three deployments has convinced me. I had a company of over 200 Soldiers, approximately 40 of whom were female. In the preparation for deployment I lost only one because of pregnancy. During the deployment I lost one more (her husband was also in the company). When I was part of battalion and brigade staffs the losses at those levels were comparable. 2 of 40 is 5%. During the readiness process I lost almost 30 (15%) to injuries and chronic illnesses. Many of these were junior Soldiers direct from AIT with no previous deployments. Everything from bad backs and . This was in 2009 when the full effect of lowered recruiting standards was being felt and when manpower demands in theater were beginning to diminish In 2005-2006 it wasn't unusual to have someone break a leg and complete the last half of a deployment in a cast while in 2009-2010 with the drawdown looming there was less pressure to keep injured Soldiers in theater.

2. You didn't offer a solution. What is your plan to prevent pregnancy from interfering with deployments? Any policy that singles out pregnancy and does nothing for illness/injury is misguided and probably discriminatory. A cap on how long a Soldier can be non-deployable for any reason coupled with a better process for knowing who is non-deployable would at least be a start.

 

ERIC_STRATTONIII

11:43 PM ET

November 28, 2011

Rockstar

"The essence of the military service is the subordination of the desires and interests of the individual to the needs of the service- US Supreme Court 1986 "Goldman v Weinberger"

Great quote huh? Too bad that the Media and usually a lot of people with little to no knowledge don't buy into that and see fit to make policy based on politics and PC. Wish some of our Flags would embrace that view. Anyway, you can either mandate birth control, clamp down on frat (never gonna happen, EO complaints would fly like bullets at Iwo Jima) or you can get rid of a woman who does get pregnant, which the military did the until the 70's. I would say cut down on the amount that come in by getting rid of the "goals", raise standards physically and get rid of co-ed boot camp, would go a long way to helping that and causing so many manpower problems.

Great books to read on the women in the military debate:

"Co-Ed Combat: The Evidence that Women Shouldn't Fight" by Kingsley Brown, has a whole chapter just on pregnancy. Also gives you stats on the whole "Injured vs Pregnancy" numbers, the real numbers skew toward pregnancy and family issues that come from that.

Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces 1992'

"How to Make War" and "The Dirty Little Secrets of Vietnam" by James Dunnigan

For kicks, google the PTSD rates of women in the services and the studies that are going with them and what they say. Look up the strength and VO2 max differences, the load bearing ability due to skeletal frame. If you go to Navy Times, they screw up and leave articles on pregnancy problems, look up rates of pregnancy on ships (estimated), etc...etc..
What is great is then reading female comments on suggestions that this be controlled or of course the Public Affairs Officer Comments, some are simply priceless. There are a lot of good books on the topic, most of the ones that are pro- almost always go with the "it's their right" argument but should read a few just the same, helps you understand the other side is not basing it's reasoning on logic or practicality.

 

DOUG KRUGMAN

6:11 AM ET

November 29, 2011

The problem with your first point

The problem with your first point is that for the past 8 years or so both the Army and Marine Corps have often promoted every Lieutenant to Captain, regardless of failure. On the Army side, this coincided with an accelerated timeline with 38 months total in service as a lieutenant, which helped reduce the effectiveness of whatever mentorship system should exist. The idea of routinely the average officer company command after 2 years of time in a battalion and a quick school cycle at captain's career course doesn't seem like a recipe for success.

It also doesn't help the Army was also promoting over 90% of officers to Major and Lieutenant Colonel at points during this period, kicking the weed-out can well down the road. It seems that a below average officer commissioned in the mid-90s could have made Captain by inertia before suddenly getting a nearly free pass up to Lieutenant Colonel (and the chance to stay past 20) in his branch or a functional area if his time in service was just right. The majority of officers holding those ranks would have made it under "normal" promotion rates but clearly a few that would have been weeded out are still here in higher pay grades.

The Marine Corps didn't speed up promotions and maintained their standard 99% promotion rate to Captain, but the once highly competitive augmentation/career designation program to allow officers to remain on active duty after their initial obligation essentially went on hiatus from about 2006 to 2009. That pruning of the junior officer ranks is now back with about 30% of junior officers around the 4 year mark (pilots and lawyers not included) not being invited to stay on active duty in 2011.

On the plus side, promotion rates for USMC field grades didn't spike like the Army's did, staying under 88% for Major, averaging 70% for Lieutenant Colonel, and about 51% for Colonel over the past six years.

I can't speak the Air Force and Navy during this period, didn't spend enough time around them. I will say that the contrast between the relatively non-competitive retention of the past years and the likely large scale personnel cuts to approaching is going to leave some people rather surprised and upset. I think the Air Force saw a preview this year as it forced a small group of Majors out short of their 20 year mark.

 

CHARLES IN AMERICA

3:16 PM ET

November 29, 2011

People are going to be Angry

You nailed it, people are going to be surprised. We are going to add to the unemployment numbers and morale will plummet. The ones paying the price will be the ones that had nothing to do with the mismanagement that created this mess.

 

SERTORIUS

9:10 PM ET

November 28, 2011

Professional Training Model

The traditional model for training LTs works pretty well. The problem is so few LTs actually get to follow the model.
The traditional four year model for an Infantry LT consists of a year at the Benning School for Boys (OBC, AB, RANGER, and a specialty course), followed by a year as a PL, a year as a Company XO or Specialty PL and then a year on staff, usually as a the Deputy to the Deputy S3 Air. During each of these phases the officer is mentored by a Captain and a Senior NCO, but at no point do they have UCMJ authority. In other words, they gain experience, but they cannot screw things up too badly. The unit leadership cost is high due to officer turnover, but the benefit to the officer and the Army is great because the end product is an officer with experience in leadership, logistics and staff-work. All of which are vital skills to a Commander. If they fail at any point in the process, they find themselves in a make-work assignment, doing tedious but necessary work (slide monkey) until their time runs out.
So, to use the medical analogy:
Medical Student = Cadet
Intern = OBC : First-year resident, usually not licensed to practice medicine
Resident = PL, XO, USR slide monkey
Licensed Doctor = Commander
If you view the LT years as an internship and residency akin to that for doctors, then the LT spends his four years (3 years now, I think, but that is a different issue) learning the skills and gaining the experience they need to become Commanders. A potential counter argument would be that a PL has the power of life and death over his subordinates in combat and that we should not trust the lives of our soldiers to inexperienced incompetents. To this I reply, 1) they have to get experience and be evaluated in the real world somehow, and 2) medical residents can screw up and kill people too.
The model works, but the model is often ignored or misapplied due to mission requirements (deployments), leadership selfishness (I’m keeping my best guy in that position until after I leave…), or incompatibility (if it works for the infantry it must work for MI, SIGNAL, Loggie, etc.).
If we are going to train and promote competent officers, than we have to accept risk somewhere. The institutional Army feels, not unreasonably, that the place to accept risk is at the LT level. It is better to throw a young officer into the deep end early and often in order to get a better leader in the long run. The model only works, however, when the Commander/Senior NCO mentorship is present and engaged, otherwise it is the equivalent of a Doctor telling a first year resident, “here’s your scalpel, doctor, I’m heading for the tees.”

 

HUNTER

12:36 AM ET

November 29, 2011

Therein lies the rub

"The problem is so few LTs actually get to follow the model."

Yeah I know the model I proposed is a good one, and I know that (as Sertorious notes) the normal glidepath of a LT would sorta meet that model.

But we let the model break itself don't we?

Now riddle me this Batman. Your sorta-certified doctor has gone through the ad hoc Army-way of certification, vs. the standard gates, tests, and constant implementation of specific terminal and enabling learning objectives, with direct supervision of an attending for four or more years....you going to volunteer to go under his/her knife?

Doctors deal in saving lives, military folks deal in taking and saving them. Where do you want your priorities? I know my answer.

 

HUNTER

12:37 AM ET

November 29, 2011

Therein lies the rub

"The problem is so few LTs actually get to follow the model."

Yeah I know the model I proposed is a good one, and I know that (as Sertorious notes) the normal glidepath of a LT would sorta meet that model.

But we let the model break itself don't we?

Now riddle me this Batman. Your sorta-certified doctor has gone through the ad hoc Army-way of certification, vs. the standard gates, tests, and constant implementation of specific terminal and enabling learning objectives, with direct supervision of an attending for four or more years....you going to volunteer to go under his/her knife?

Doctors deal in saving lives, military folks deal in taking and saving them. Where do you want your priorities? I know my answer.

 

ERIC_STRATTONIII

9:18 PM ET

November 28, 2011

This has NEVER been talked about before on this blog! ;)

"*Bring back Command Sergeant Major as a rank, not a position. We have too much structure tied up in making CSMs functional. Time to return to them being just the senior enlisted advisor. There can only be one commander in any organization and only one person responsible. Under normal circumstances, it is "tomfoolery" to relieve a CSM when a Cdr is relieved. The Cdr is the only one responsible for the actions of his organization and himself. The senior NCO works for him. Remember CSMs are senior enlisted advisors to the commander, not strategic leaders."-

It can't be a rank if you keep it the same name/title, maybe just reduce the amount of those positions and then re-work it? Navy CMC's have a lot more pull on how the command is run, at least a strong one does, Army CSMs seem to just know rules and regs on uniforms and come off obsessed with "appearance" instead of performance. They do not come off to me the same way a Gunny or Senior Chief of Master Chief would as far as influence and authority. Maybe re-work their focus and mission towards developing junior leaders and NCOs, ensuring that their NCOs get the support they need for tactical and mission focus, etc...?

"Establish a policy where LTs are on probation until promoted to CPT. Commanders should have the option of transferring those not to be promoted to 1LT to the enlisted ranks where they will complete their service obligation. Some attrition is good. Bet that would shake up the attitude of some junior officers who think they are just buying time until they meet their five, four, or three year active service commitment."-

Can't do this, most of the other posters are pretty spot on about how that person would be perceived, no way would it ever fly to go to recruiting all Officers from the enlisted ranks, no way can you promote the position of the corporal while then filling it's ranks with officer wash outs, etc...I just can't see that ever going over with the political influence the Academies alone have.

"SPCs in NCO positions of leadership must, no option, be laterally appointed to CPL. That imparts them with legitimate credibility and authority. At one time Corporal was the most respected rank in the Army. Make old and young alike respect Corporals again."-

Look to the USMC, stop re-inventing the wheel, can your bloody officer corps please, please, please just do this once? Please? :) I do not know why this is so hard. Why not ask yourself "Hey, what works?" or "What are the Marines doing right?" The Army really needs to transform it's whole basic and AIT school to have any real changes take effect. It is a cultural issue, the "Army Culture" needs to change drastically and then the rest will be an extension of that and a lot easier.

"Address the issue of pregnancies and deployability. Don't run away from it. Solve the problem because it is having serious impact on unit readiness and military effectiveness. While attacking with vigor the impact of pregnancies on unit and combat readiness, also analyze why 16 percent of the Army is women but only 8 percent of the deployed force are women."-

Ahh...my favorite! Let's call a spade a spade. Females are in the Branches due to "goals", nothing more. Every recruiter has a "goal'' of 15% females, we are not unable to function without them. The Navy had such a problem with pregnancies that they even went "gasp!", public with it! But what has changed? Nothing nor are they honest about it. But any officer who is not on-board for all women everywhere does not make flag rank, period. Happy to bring up a million reasons, stats, etc...to make this argument again as I am sure I will hear many. We need some but not anywhere near the numbers we have and they cause far more problems than they solve, so many bases are like "90210" when they should be a little more focused on the whole conflict thing.

http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,152426,00.html

"It's becoming like Mao's cultural revolution. Everybody knows it's a system built on a thousand little lies, but everybody's waiting for someone that's high ranking who's not a complete moral coward to come out and say so"-John Hillen.

That is a great quote by John Hillen on females in the military, I don't agree with some of his views but I think he is right on females. Of course we are still waiting for that moral courage and I have a feeling my grandkids will still be waiting too.

"Certain branches/MOSs/units should be allowed/required to have branch specific physical fitness standards and tests to enforce those standards. They also must continue to meet APFT requirements also. Example; Cannon artillery and armor have requirements for extensive upper body strength other branches do not have (so do mechanics by the way), train, and test accordingly. Get over the one-standard-fits-all mentality."-

No, they have to have a standard and everyone has to meet it. The Army needs to totally revamp their training and indoc process and eventually the huge amount of problems that are in that branch with be pushed out through attrition and you will have a better product.

Fitness that is available and can be accessed by General Purpose Forces is through the SOCOM Human Performance Initiative (HPI) now called the Human Performance Program (HPP). SOCOM has spent tens of millions of dollars on this program and it is mostly a combination of high intensity cardio and olympic lifts with functional training. Think Olympic Lifts, CrossFit and Cardio is incorporated via sprints, shorter runs (3-5 miles), etc....None of this stuff is secret, it is a matter of implementing it making sure that the folks from the time they enter the service are indoctrinated into it and that it continues throughout their careers.

A lot of these things also depend on the key factors that effect everything we do in the military, time, money and leadership.
Do we have time to do these improvements? Yes.
Do we have the money? I don't know.
Do we have the leadership? I doubt it.

 

RVN SF VET

5:37 AM ET

November 29, 2011

NEW DARPA RESEARCH PROGRAM

DARPA has awarded a research contract to Halliburton and Victoria's Secret to ascertain the causes of pregnancy, the remediation of pregnancies, and the roles that pregnant soldiers can play during gestation on Active Duty. Another line of inquiry will be why male troops do not become pregnant and how these lessons learned can be applied to female troops.

DARPA is confident of a successful outcome owing to DARPA's successful development of the first Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system, It is strongly felt that since they were able to stop incoming MIRVed warheads, they can certainly stop a single missile if research can satisfactorily identify a high correlation between a single incoming missile and pregnancy. A new method for shooting blanks will be explored. One possible concept to be pursued is the modification of current generation armor with a view towards extending coverage. It is believed that this armor will have to be adapted for long-term wear and would likely contain silver-based anti-microbiological halides. Two historical periods will be investigated: the Crusades and high school.

 

CHARLES IN AMERICA

11:09 PM ET

November 28, 2011

Great Comments from ESIII

Really good stuff there. Can't argue with any of his points.

One additional point regarding the LTs:
They are commissioned, they should be held to the standards that commissioned officers are held to. Very simple. Here's the problem: the Army has decided to train the LTs on the cheap. LTs get 4 months for OBC. That's abhorrent.

Train the LTs appropriately and you'll get good leadership.

What I suggest is that LTs get trained at an OBC that is much like OSUT: for infantry, they go to a school that combines a true education on logistics, UCMJ, medical and so forth; along with their tactical training added to by training about strategy and the operational levels.
Throw in some military history that teaches them history, not takes them on some terrain walk or pseudo-staff ride. Incorporate Airborne and Ranger School if it's that important to the IN branch. Make them compulsory for graduation. Integrate them with the PVTs at the end of their training: make them PLs and XOs for culminating training with CPTs and senior NCOs providing overwatch. Send them to the Force with the appropriate training. And, no LTs go to TRADOC - only FORSCOM.

 

VETERAN 9

12:47 AM ET

November 29, 2011

Hmmm...Not Sure...

I think a poor LT can screw up a platoon even without UCMJ authority, considering he or she may be leading that platoon in combat.

A PSG should not have to baby-sit the PL. One, he's got a platoon to take care of, and two, he may suck.

One year is not enough platoon time. Not if we seriously consider a PLT to be a fighting element. Perhaps one year as an "assistant PL" and one year as the actual PL.

I'm suprised no one has brought up the fact that you have to volunteer for the Infantry as an enlisted guy, but as an Officer you can be assigned to the Infantry against your will. That's pretty dumb.

I don't like the USMC concept of Infantry in practice. I don't like the fact that the 1st Sergeant or Sergeant Major is branch immaterial (and from what I'm told, mostly likely recruiter, drill instructor, or MSG, right?) Senior Enlisted Advisor should not simply be a repository of information on rules and regulations. They should also be leaders. You can't lead if you haven't been there, done that. (The Army screws this up too.)

I've encountered too many good soldiers in the Army, conventional and SOF, who were formers Marines. They're quite proud of their service, but the general consensus seems to be that they got tired of the 0311 life, especially in garrison.

This is not a rant against the USMC, this is talking about best practices. And I'm well aware that the Army screws up plenty.

 

LEROY THE MASOCHIST

3:13 AM ET

November 29, 2011

disagree

"One year is not enough platoon time. Not if we seriously consider a PLT to be a fighting element. Perhaps one year as an "assistant PL" and one year as the actual PL."

That's a terrible idea. Have you ever been in or around a line platoon? This would be an interpersonal disaster...too many cooks in the kitchen. What does the assistant platoon commander do, supervise the platoon guide?

"I'm suprised no one has brought up the fact that you have to volunteer for the Infantry as an enlisted guy, but as an Officer you can be assigned to the Infantry against your will. That's pretty dumb."

You can't be assigned grunts as an enlisted open contract? Are you sure?

Also, my own experience suggest this is a bit of a red herring; I have never met an 0302 or 11A who hadn't volunteered for that MOS. Then again, I don't have a lot of experience with Army Reserve/Guard units.

"I don't like the USMC concept of Infantry in practice. I don't like the fact that the 1st Sergeant or Sergeant Major is branch immaterial (and from what I'm told, mostly likely recruiter, drill instructor, or MSG, right?) Senior Enlisted Advisor should not simply be a repository of information on rules and regulations. They should also be leaders. You can't lead if you haven't been there, done that. (The Army screws this up too.)"

Look, I've had my trouble with first sergeants. My least professional moment in the USMC was during OIF when I (salty jaded 1stLt at the time) got in a screaming match with a 1stSgt from another unit who was harassing my Marines about wearing their beanies during the daytime (it was January and 25 degrees outside, and we'd been awake for a few days and were in no mood for "garrison forward" stupidity). If I had a dollar for every hour I've spent whining about 1stSgts getting all worked up about things like moustaches in combat zones....

At the end of the day though, it's two sides of the same coin. Yes, 1stSgts can be tiresome to deal with. That said, they are a huge value add in that they enforce USMC standards relentlessly, even when it's unpopular, and they tend to be very good at personnel administration, which is vital to mission accomplishment in any environment, combat or not.

You mentioned that PSGs shouldn't have to babysit PLs.... I could have used some mentoring when I checked into Lejeune, but my first platoon sergeant was a mess. Ultimately I had to fight to get him fired for gross incompetence and disobeying several direct orders during the workup. Guess who helped me deal with that very awkward and challenging situation? Yep, my first sergeant, who incidentally was a helo crew chief and former DI--by your logic shouldn't have gotten any respect--yet the Marines both loved and feared him.

S/F

 

VETERAN 9

6:21 AM ET

November 29, 2011

To clarify...

...I should have been less USMC focused. Again, the idea is best practices, not "my tribe is better than your tribe". But some quick thoughts, not in any order.

I get your view on "too many cooks in the kitchen", and I think the key is in clearly defining responsibilities. The "2nd Officer" can perform a variety of roles; he can relieve the PSG of the "beans and bullets" role, allowing the most-experienced (in theory) member of the platoon to focus on readiness and training, especially in supervising SL and TL development.

And yes, I have had 2LTs shadow 1LT PL's in the field and on ops. It can work, this isn't a pipe dream. There's a reason that some units want Officers who have proven themselves to be able to lead a platoon prior to assuming another platoon position; I'm simply stating that we can apply that concept to the line.

Outside the wire, the PL can focus on Key Leader engagement and terp management while static (as one method), while the PSG can focus on perimeter security and the "Asst PL" can focus on the radios (how many times have I been trying to fight a platoon whilst listening to higher asking for updates on the radio...)

In a major TIC, the Asst PL is there in case the PL is hit. If the PSG is good, the PSG can run the fight and the APL can set up the Casevac. If the PSG isn't tactically inclined, then vice-versa.

A PL should be able to be an asset to a platoon. It's okay to be mentored by the CO and the PL and 1SG. However, if that 1SG has never served as an Infantry PSG and SL, then there's not much he can offer regarding tactics and training. Hence less mentoring, b/c there's not the practical experience.

I don't think it's okay to say "the system is fine, we just don't pay attention to the system". If we don't use the system, then it is broken.

And yes...I have met too many 11A's who didn't have Infantry as their first, second, or third choice...

 

ERIC_STRATTONIII

11:24 AM ET

November 29, 2011

@Veteran and Leroy

Vet, I have had a different reaction to that, I think that the fact that a Marine is a Marine is one of their strengths. I know it is not always the reality, if given the choice I would prefer a Rifle Platoon over a Artillery, a Recon Platoon over a Rifle Platoon, etc...but there is a consistency with them and it is part of their culture. They of course, like all forces (even SOF suffers from this at times...sigh....) have their garrison POGs but that is something we can maybe change too with the right kind of focus or perhaps re-focus of what their SNCOs do?

Leroy, did the 1stSgts. use their "knive hands" in camp or was it a "no knife hand area"? ;) Have a lot of former marines in my community and they often have 'flashbacks' to those deadly, slicing killer hands.

 

MGUNNS

3:09 PM ET

November 29, 2011

Knife hands

For anyone who is not familiar with the knife-hand, a primer:

http://terminallance.com/2010/08/27/terminal-lance-59-knife-hand-anger-gauge/

 

LEROY THE MASOCHIST

7:06 PM ET

November 29, 2011

knife hands

Dude, there was a knife hand around every corner on Camp Fallujah...

I'll repeat again that I think the role of the 1stSgt is in fact to be a POG - a great POG who takes care of the admin stuff and reinforcing garrison standards and all the other unsexy, occasionally absurd USMC cult-of-motivation details which are vital to us remaining who we are. I think people who whine about POG 1stSgts are just totally missing the point. And I say that as someone who has complained bitterly about garrison-forward silliness on multiple occasions.

To Veteran 9's last post...did you not have a radio operator? The idea that you need another Lt in the platoon to handle comms - c'mon really?!?!

What happens when a salty former enlisted guy checks into the Bn, does he have to do a tour as an assistant PL under a guy who he is likely better than in terms of tactical/technial proficiency? Have you really thought through the interpersonal dynamics of this?

Also, sorry to hear that about 11As, didn't realize it was a problem in the Army, that's a bummer.....

 

ROCKSTAR-6

2:25 AM ET

November 29, 2011

Eric

Taking a hard line on women in the military isn't a winning plan. I stand by my assertion that pregnancy isn't our biggest problem. Efforts to reduce its impact are certainly hindered by political concerns, but are also hurt by arguments like yours. Excluding women, or even deliberately reducing their contribution to the total force isn't a realistic goal. The focus should be on getting the most out of all Soldiers. If non-deployability is a problem, and it is a big one, then attack that. Pregnancy is one condition contributing to the problem. A policy that reduces the number of non-deployable Soldiers makes sense and can be effectively argued to the public and the political class, particularly during a drawdown. A policy that aims to reduce pregnancy/motherhood will be an easy target for your PC crowd and will never get anywhere.

 

ERIC_STRATTONIII

11:04 AM ET

November 29, 2011

Rockstar

You are taking the classic PC company line. How does my argument hurt? It is the reality? Does it hurt someone's feelings? Does someone need council due to my argument? We do not need our armed forces at a 15% manning rate by females, they are not mission critical at that percentage. The Navy is even shooting for a new "goal" of 20%. You can stand by your assertion all you want but it does not add up when you see the rates for single mothers who get out due to pregnancy, females who cannot deploy or single females who cannot deploy due to inability to get child care. It is not just "getting pregnant", it is all those things that go with it as well. The Center for Naval Analyses reported the following-"a quarter of women and a tenth of men are lost from ships every year for unplanned reasons". The CNA report also stated that pregnancy alone was at 11% for losses by themselves. Now, that study is ten years old and for the Navy, I doubt the Army numbers would be much different. It is funny though, have not seen a similar CNA study since then and yet have not noticed a dip in pregnancy in that time and have seen an increase in females, hmm.......well, I am sure the numbers went down.

We are talking about improving the quality of the Army and IMO we should also be doing this in all the branches. You do not improve quality by ignoring facts. We need to raise physical fitness levels, raise standards and focus on the combat mission and developing people. The attitude of so many that maintains the status quo does nothing to improve the situation.

 

ERIC_STRATTONIII

11:17 AM ET

November 29, 2011

@Rockstar

I also gave a few solutions-mandated birth control, cracking down on frat, etc...those would go a long way but these are available now and yet it is only recently that getting pregnant in theater was actually acted on under the UCMJ. So, outside of mandated birth control, cracking down on frat, what do you propose? I assume you are an officer or a senior nco? So, you have to remember, it is not just the pregnancy itself that causes problems, it is the perception (usually the reality) that females receive preferential treatment due to those pregnancies, due to being female, going off deployment early, frat, etc.....and not being punished for those things. It is a huge morale problem and if you think it does not have any effect on your people I think you are mistaken. Let's be honest with each other though, no one is going to mandate birth control, it would be hammered on by Congress and various women's groups as well as being a statement that the Brass are just going to throw their hands up at frat. Cracking down on frat? Never gonna happen either, watched it time and time again and with a few exceptions I have always seen the guy pay more heavily than the girl when frat is enforced. So, moral courage is lacking in our officer corps and that flows from the top, what would you do to counter this problem? Keep in mind, it is not just the pregnancy, it is all the things that come with it.

 

JDSHEPHERD

3:27 AM ET

November 29, 2011

Probationary Officers

One or two posters have made reference to the Israeli and German models of officer selection. A key point to remember about the German system is that the candidate officer serves in a unit performing NCO-like duties. This gives his/her chain of command time to evaluate his ability to perform in close contact with soldiers. Joerg Muth documents this system (and the whole German officer selection process) in his book _Command Culture_, which Tom has referenced before on this blog.

 

RVN SF VET

6:22 AM ET

November 29, 2011

PEACETIME VERSUS WARTIME

Junior officers being developed during peacetime are in a completely different environment than the junbior officer being developed in wartime. Not the least of which is, that like doctors, young lieutenants are likely to lose a few men as a result of their inexperience.

I do not know about other services, but the Army develops modified Programs Of Instruction (POI) for wartime and the training entails a shorter period of instruction. I was on a board of officers at Benning who wrote the Infantry OBC mobilization (wartime) POI. We stripped all instruction not related in some way to combat. In addition, we added additional instruction on a very few areas like adjusting indirect fires. Shorter is not always better.

In peacetime, you get to work as platoon leader, and later company XO and Commander. There is much more time to learn from sergeants and officers in a peacetime environment. And, even in peacetime, there are locations and missions which closely approximate the pace and stress of combat. However, combat does concentrate the mind.

Other countries programs have been mention and the USMC has been lauded. I'd be interested in what the curriculum at Sandhurst is like.

One focus absent in our process is an officer's suitability for command. What is his or her psychological makeup and ability to relate to others both downward (in rank) and upward? Stress testing is one justification for Ranger School or BUDS-type courses. What are these folks made of? As pointed-out by another poster, which branch are these officers suited to? Do we ever think about that?

The Army appears to rely upon an amorphous agglomeration of experiences and assignments without method. Career managers or detailers are most interested in the assignment that they are going to get after they escape from DCSPER. I believe that the Marine Corps is small enough that eventually word gets around about who you are. That certainly happened in Special Forces.

Although not done now in Army Special Forces, there was a time in which you did not make a team nor did you become "3 Qualified" until you had gone on a few missions and been accepted by that team. I am not knowledgeable about it, but there is some sort of peer review in the 75th Ranger Regiment. I'm not even suggesting it works, but I believe it's there.

We are about to find out if our system can RIF the right people. Color me skeptical.

 

FG42

3:41 PM ET

November 29, 2011

@RVN SF VET

NEW DARPA RESEARCH PROGRAM

Hilarious satire, Ron! Glad that someone is keeping a sense of humor here. The tales of woe that are told on these pages and the unlikelihood of significantly changing the Big Green Machine sometimes get downright depressing.

 

CHARLIEECHO

3:57 PM ET

November 29, 2011

Old timer; Women and knife hands;

I'm not sure I understand the knife hand thing. Is it different threat levels terminating in physical contact? I went through boot camp in 1968 and I've seen and experienced hands on teaching. It got the point across when it had to be. In ITR I witnessed extreme hands on training that may have been a little on the perverted side. I have a grandson graduating in December from MCRD, SD. Can't wait to meet the new Marine.

Yesterday I was in a small variety store near home. Cool weather and I was wearing my flight jacket. The lady at the register said her daughter had been in the Marines. Four years. Though of making a career of it but the difficulty of raising two children was just too much. The girl was now going to school on her GI bill. On child born in Okinawa and one while stationed in Kansas City. The girl is and was not married. Would they even consider re-enlistment under such circumstances?

I hope I can find this again.

What I recall of our Sgt. Majors while I was serving was that they were the ones who took the bumps out of the road. The Command gave the orders the Sgt. Major made sure they got done and who got to do them. They didn't have to lead, they were followed.

 

MGUNNS

7:30 PM ET

November 29, 2011

More on the knife hand

The knife hand is not about physical violence; rather it is a directed hand gesture used to reinforce a point. Basically, it is talking with your hands in a way different than the aviators, in that it is direct and lacks accompanying airplane sounds

 

CHARLIEECHO

10:54 AM ET

November 30, 2011

Really;

"accompanying airplane sounds" That's funny.

 

Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.

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