Sir,

I think you need to study up on the mission of the Stryker organizations. There purpose in life is to provide a protective platform, with outstanding mobility and some small firepower to transport the finest light infantry around to the fight. Additionally those organizations have access to increased Mission Command and firepower enablers to bring lots of steel on the enemy.

Also please look closely at the TO&E of a Combined Arms Battalion and look at the weapons systems and platforms within them. If you can master all those systems well enough to know how to employ them, maintain them and allocate them, you are a far better man than am I.

A few problems with this statement-
"There purpose in life is to provide a protective platform, with outstanding mobility and some small firepower to transport the finest light infantry around to the fight."

Strykers cannot even take an RPG hit or .50/20mm round, not sure how much protection they really offer. Mobility is ok but the screens they put on them to in fact stop RPGs make them far less mobile. Firepower is also very limited. Strykers are great to ride in, like a "magic carpet" as a lot of our guys called them but they still attract lot's of fire with little protection. I might also go easy with the "finest light infantry", the Marines and Rangers might have a word or two to say about that.

I've been unimpressed with the Ranger BNs - yes, I expect death threats any minute. But, in reality the Army has stacked the deck in favor of the Ranger outfit.

Without question, within 90 days you could form a battalion from the 82nd or 101st, provided the same equipment and freedoms, and it would be the equal of any of the existing Ranger Battalions.

But, I don't say this to disparage the Rangers. I say this to point out that our infantry units, across all branches are pretty similar in capability. What I respect about the USMC is that they've created a force of infantrymen and women that then serve in transportation etc whereas the Army trains a transpo guy and then sometimes asks him to all of a sudden pretend to be infantry.

I would tend to agree with most of your statement, the Rangers have two more advantages though, a selection course and the cross-pollenation they get from working with the SMUs so much but I think your right, anyone who was given all of those things would rise to that level.

And IF you sister had a dick she would be your brother.

All snarky comments aside, you have a right to your opinion just the same as anyone else but having served in BN I think you're wrong. If you think Ranger BN is where its at(or not where its at based on your comments) because of equipment and freedom, I think you're completely wrong. Ranger BN is different from regular infantry because of its NCOs, its people, and you can't build institutional knowledge and experience in your NCOs in 90 days.

As far as the Marines go, having been a Marine( and therefore biased too) I think you are right. The Marines break down civilians and build them into cocky warfighters, some of whom also do logistics and transpo. That cockiness/confidence rubs other services the wrong way, but it's critical to Marines ability to thrive in conditions that would debilitate the some Army and most Air Force. Implementing something similar to TBS and MCT would greatly benefit the Army.

...would be a Sandhurst.

The profession of arms seems to be the only one of the classical professions in which one can be a practioner without having an extra year or two of study.

And I envy the Officer and Enlisted A&S and Basic Training for the Royal Marine Commandos. Impressive course of instruction.

....you would have an equal or better unit in 90 days and you won't convince me otherwise. Look in those formations at the 82nd and 101st and you'll see tabs on the left and scrolls on the right quite a bit. Lot of guys leave the compound for various reasons. The Rangers don't own the rights to infantry tactics.

Here's my litmus test and all the Ranger guys that hate SF can bust my balls for this but that's ok...when I work with guys from a Ranger unit I see good Soldiers doing good things, but very little in their way of business is different from the good 11Bs I encounter in the CF units. When I work with SF guys I see it taken to a new level (exceptions create the rule) in terms of approach, planning, skill competency, and professionalism. This is especially amplified when you take the SF or Ranger out of their community and place them with a GPF unit where you either see a stark contrast or you don't.

And again, this is not to knock any Ranger capability and I think we should take a lot of lessons from the freedoms the Ranger units are afforded when it comes to gear issue, combat load and so forth - if we applied those lessons with the same institutional freedom, to our conventional infantry, we'd be better for it.

What you bring up is one of a few important reasons many people do not consider us in uniform to be a profession. Personally, I don't consider the Army to be a Profession of Arms. Too many examples like you mention that point to the contrary. For some reason people think that it's a knock in the military if you say it's not a profession.

Are there professional Soldiers...yes, I think so.

Is the Army a profession...no, I think not.

OK, Brian, you got me. When I wrote this, several months ago, there was listed as the Chaplain in USAREUR a BG. Now, that may have been a temporary thing as he moved to Deputy Chief of Chaplains. That is what I get for not updating accordingly. I did it and accept responsibility. Or maybe someone has been listening to me all along on this one and got rid of one.

Bryan

I guess for a couple of days USAREUR did have a GO chaplain as in July the great former USAREUR Chaplain, Ray Bailey, got promoted to BG just before he PCS'd to D.C. to be the deputy chief of chaplains for the U.S. Army. Some documents may have listed him for a while as a USAREUR General Officer.
The real issue is that we are not top heavy; there are 5 fewer "stars" in this HQ than this time last year. CG went from 4 to 3; DCG went from 3 to 2 and took on the job of the 2 star Chief of Staff and that space with those 2 stars went away; and the G4 is currently a COL (P) rather than a BG.

Bryan Hilferty
Colonel, Infantry
Chief, Public Affairs, USAREUR

Thanks for clearing that up. I distinctly remember when I came across the BG as USAREUR Chaplain and being somewhat "startled" by that revelation. It was especially startling since I had 3 trips in and out of Europe and even with 2 corps, 4 2/3 divisions and massive numbers of echelons above corps units, we only had a Colonel at Hq, USAREUR. Technically speaking Army leadership should not have allowed there to be 3 Chaplain GOs even with one in the wings. But, I guess when US Code authorizes you 230 GOs and you have 382 (don't hold me to exact number as I am sure it changed as I typed this) and another 55 waiting in the wings for promotion (mostly in GO billets), you just don't have to worry about exactness. In all fairness to our service, rules for joint billets and ARNG and USAR on active duty are quite a challenge. It is not as bloated as those numbers first appear....but it is pretty bloated.

And, thanks for representing your command so well in these matters.

Usually it's some 16yr old-ish kid I see doing that, with a full bird blue sticker on the window.

Last time they put me in the "only available" housing. My neighbor was at first a SFC, then all of a sudden it was a PFC, across the street a SGT wouldn't come over and ask me for help with his car once he saw my rank. I had previously jumped off his battery. Later I saw a tow truck come and take the vehicle. He could have asked me to jump it off again so he could get it to the shop, for free. Conspicuously this was right after he saw me in uniform for the first time. So, ditto on the housing stuff. Don't like all the mixing, it's not good.

In principle I agree, but that's where it stops. I don't think we can enforce that type of policy. USMC Commandant tried that, he was publicly castrated for that move.

Great comment. The USMC tried this several years ago and it cost the Commandant significantly. He rescinded his words and changed his tune after much drumming by outsiders from the US public, Congress etc. But, militarily a sound and logical argument.

KUNINO, your reference to the ‘Black Day of the German Army’ (Ludendorf’s expression) on August 8, 1918 is quite true. The allied counter-attack (2nd Battle of Amiens) from the Villers-Bretonneux line was a British-Canadian-Australian ‘combined arms’ assault of the German lines in the truest sense of the term ‘combine’.

Extensive allied air power acquired air superiority over the immediate battlefield; infantry were focused not on the previous bulky battalion formations but rather companies and platoons based on mobile automatic weapons fire (Vickers and especially Lewis guns) and Stokes mortars. This was all preceded by hundreds of Mk.V tanks attacking German defensive strong points. Even artillery tactics were changed to allow field guns to follow the infantry right on their heels to increase the immediate offensive firepower and neutralize the Germans propensity for violent counter-attacks.

The Germans did in fact study the allied (particularly the British operations which were by far the most damaging and dangerous) 100 days offensive and learned many lessons in tactics, which they would refine, and use in World War 2. What they neglected however was to develop proficiency in operations and they virtually ignored strategy. This microscopic focus on tactics would make the Wehrmacht the most formidable ‘fighting’ force of the Second World War. But their undoubted skill at fighting could never in the long run make up for mediocrity in operations and a complete incompetence in forming strategy and in the ‘waging of war’ in its larger sense.

Although most of the DA civilians I had to deal with as an Armor Officer in Scout Platoon, Troop XO, and Squadron S4 slots treated me as if I were dirt and waxed poetic about their time as an E4 before being med-boarded out, our civilian movement officer supporting a deployment to Iraq (ex First Sergeant) and the civilian vehicle and MILES coordinators at Fort Irwin probably worked 20 hours a day for our brigade and interpreted every rule and reg to our unit's benefit.

Although two thirds of the civilians I had to deal with were a barrier to mission accomplishment, the minority were valuable enough that they made up for it. Also, doesn't every civilian that fills a billet in what used to be a support MOS free up another head in the Army's authorized end strength to carry a rifle? Perhaps in the circumstances of the last ten years the trade off to get extra soldiers in BCTs was worth it.

On the mixing of NCOs/Officers issue- our barracks in Korea was Sergeant First Class, Master Sergeant, 2nd Lieutenant and 1st Lieutenant, segregated by floor. Worked out pretty well, although that may have been because half the people in the building were in the field or at gunnery at any given time.

"Reduce SJA GO-level positions. Return TJAG of Army to MG. There are 7 JAG GOs serving now. At the height of the Cold War there were 2 on active duty. There are no JAG commands, so why so many GOs? The TJAG makes policy and personnel management decisions, so why so many senior officers? Is this one of those decisions just to give "hope" to those to keep them in the service?"

There are only six active duty JAG GOs currently serving in the Army -- and only five are in Army JAG billets (the other was a DCG in Afghanistan and is currently the Guantanamo Chief Prosecutor).

https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/852573690045C0BB/0/C7D97A5F2F0808FD85257808006CAE82?opendocument

Thus, there are five active JAG GO billets in the Army -- the same number as the much smaller AF and USN have.

Also, the Army JAG Corps didn't have only two GOs on active duty during the height of the Cold War. Here you can see that the Deputy was a 2-star as far back as 1949.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deputy_Judge_Advocate_General_of_the_United_States_Army

The decision to make the TJAGs as 3-stars was a political decision to strengthen the green suiters in the Pentagon against political appointees who approve torture and other unsavory acts.

There were 7 several months ago when this was written. One humming, one hoeing, one planting and maybe some going, make the numbers change sometimes quite rapidly. And, he can name the BCTs in Europe. Sorry, I refer to BCTs as the brigades you discuss and battalions as CABs or infantry battalions. If we get into all the denominations of things we will never get anything out to discuss, nor accomplish anything.

There are authorizations for five active duty JAG GOs. There have never been seven unless you're counting Reservists or IMA judges.

There has been a sixth for the past year or two because GEN Petraeus put one in a non-JAG billet in Afghanistan, who then moved on to a joint billet in Guantanamo.

Believe if you check the statute the services are limited to a number of GOs in each service. They are not mandated by position. The chief of service can do what he wishes. But, the statute stipulates the Congress can authorize accordingly to increase. Last I heard Army was over 100 over GO authorizations and AF was just as bad. Haven't checked numbers in some time but think it not better. So, in summary, believe there is no position authorization for JAG positions. Up to CSA and SecAr to make it happen with Congressional approval. So, I guess that means if CSA/SecAr wanted 100 JAG GOs they could try to do it.

The JAGs and DJAGs of the various services and the SJA to the Commandant of the Marine Corps are established by statute. See 10 USC §§ 3037, 5046, 5148, 5149, and 8037. They do not fall under the "normal" GO/FO promotion and nomination process. If you're selected for the position, you are promoted to the rank after Senate confirmation, etc. Probably worth noting that the increase in JAG/DJAG rank specifically resulted from assertions that the DoD General Counsel's legal advice bound the DoD and the JAGs were to follow that advice, even if they disagreed with it. I.e., the uniformed legal advisors were subordinate to the civilian advisors. Congress specifically disagreed and, in addition to increasing the ranks of the service JAGs, passed legislation directing that no officer of the DoD interfere with the ability of the JAGs and SJAs of all grades to provide commanders independent legal advice.

Not that this prevents the various military departments from allocating other GO/FO positions to the various JAG Corps. The only limit to that is the caps on GO/FOs establishe in 10 USC 525-26.

Go to posting of 1:09 PM ET, USAREUR Chappie, November 23rd and the facts are posted. It can be quite difficult to understand.

your spot on FLAPPY, I think taking on the number of GOFOs and the like makes for easy comments by people who really don't understand strategy and DOTMILPMF type process. I would recommend for those that really want to understand good ideas on fixing the force to pick up a copy of JFQ or Parameters...nothing taking away from this Blog site of course, some of the best discussions happen when Tom posts a link or comment about an article from one of those.

To me, it seems like what you're advocating is a form of Kool-Aid drinking. Figuring out how the DOTL....XXXX system works does nothing since we already know it doesn't work.

Chuck in america, that is the point..."DOTMLPMF is broken"...how so, how do you fix it? You can write a generic comment of its broken, we have too many GOs, and F35s (F35s due to congress, not the aquasition process)...but feel free to explain how it is broke, and how it should be fixed, or what should replace it

I hear what you're saying but it seems you're advocating a method to work within the system. The problem is that the overwhelming sentiment is that the system is so far broken that it's not worth working within.

Not trying to bicker or pick on this with semantics. Just my take.