v Corps is currently a "deployable" corps HQ, preparing for Afghanistan. I thought they were supposed to de-flag once they returned, though. I also thought that was supposed to (generally) coincide with reducing the USAREUR commander to a 3-star.

I was thinking about this as I was responding to the last post. What is the purpose of Corps-level commands? Army group commands? Why does the "7th US Army" still exist--as a training command, no less?

I think US Army Europe has become increasingly top-heavy. All the smaller units packed up and left, and all the brass have been fighting tooth and nail to keep their jobs.

As Petronius implies, division commanders would be in charge of 4 BCTs and an aviation brigade, not a corps commander. Weren't reducing the size of staffs and "general creep" two of the biggest farewell points from the last SecDef?

On her CNAS report about military suicide. Sorry to go off topic, but you said you would on November 9. I hope to see it soon.

Agree with all with the following addition: keep infantry officers out of commanding armor/cav units entirley. I can't hardly go to Cav sites anymore without seeing CIBs on the commander and CSM command photos.

While I would agree that we should place the command burden of dismounted forces on the IN branch, AR can do that job pretty well. Nevertheless, keep the dismounted units with IN officers.

No reason for a CAV unit, even if it's light, to get an IN officer when an AR officer has been trained and developed for almost 20 years to serve in that precise role.

I have rarely, rarely seen an AR officer trample on infantry traditions for infantry guys in their formations. But I have often seen IN officers deny their AR guys from wearing stetsons, spurs, doing spur rides, and so forth.

There's definitely a disparity in how the two branches treat each other.

In any case the author is right about keeping commanders and units aligned.

Final thought about proper utilization of weapons systems: this is a force-wide need and we have commanders at all echelons BN and above that simpy don't know what they have in their formations and they don't know how to employ it. For example I was in a unit that had access to some good optics on mounted platforms, they wanted to use them for route security and recon. Meanwhile they were getting hammered by IDF with POO sites out of reach of organic direct fire systems but well within visibility of these optics, which could be used to bring in QRF, counter fire, etc. They were never used and the kicker was that these systems stayed on standby and weren't used for route issues either so it was combat power thrown to the wayside.

Many of our commanders are so busy attending meetings, satisfying admin requirements and updating FRG webpages that they don't have time to command - another issue. Still related a bit to what the author is saying about getting things lined up in proper order.

The branch parochialism in this post is a step back, not forward. The stereotypical view of Infantry and Armor officers is a relic of the past. Saying that Armor officers will treat Strykers like tanks, can't maneuver infantry, etc, betrays a rather dim view of their collective intelligence, unjustified in my opinion. The training pipeline for those two branches in particular have already been all but completely merged.

Regarding the point about the combined arms battalion being too hard for a chain of command to figure out, I would direct the author's attention to the recently-discarded MTOE of the heavy ACR. Each ground squadron had tanks, scouts, SP artillery, organic logistics, and enablers like engineers, ADA, chemical, etc. Those latter enablers were consolidated, one per squadron, in garrison for training purposes, and task-organized for deployment or major training. It worked out just fine, somehow the half-brain-dead chains of command were able to work out a way to train with their various MOSs and equipment.

Not to start a pissing contest between AR and IN but in the ACR, it's heavy with AR officers. I'd say there's your explanation for how the chain of command was able to figure out how to use the entirety of the formation.

Any comments about branch parochialism must be directed first and foremost at the IN branch, that in my mind, clammers the most about their importance but does the least to prove it.

The big reason I would like to see AR go with AR and Cav units and IN take the infantry units is that the blurring of the lines, as alluded to with the comment about consolidated training, will cease. There will be clear lines drawn between units. This will shed light on which branch(es) are doing well and which ones are not. It helps with competition as well. This is all beneficial to training.

That "one team one fight" stuff seems to exist in slogan only. Even in theater I still see the branch parochialism, so maybe we should just embrace it use it to our benefit. Better to have it out in the open rather than under the table.

Let us not forget that the highest ranking member of a particular MOS/Branch should be the advocate for that MOS's capabilities to the combined arms commander. It is certainly difficult to learn the details and nuances of separate branches, it is within a competent Commander's capabilties to set training goals and objectives, then have the operations section check them against the appropriate doctrine to ensure that they are proficient.
There have been plenty of commanders who have known everything that there is to know about a particular branch, but their Brigade as a whole has suffered for it. That is because they had professional tunnel-vision and could not grasp the capabilities brought to them by the FA, Air Force, EW, Cav, etc. The beauty of a Combined Arms Unit, and a BCT, are that they are self-sustaining up to a certain point. They require open-minded and dynamic thinkers who have the ability to lead, and make the whole greater than its disparate parts.

How about train all of your Soldiers as Infantryman first? I mean really train them like the guys in Benning are? Fully qualify them as 11B's? Why not spend some time on the basics of the weakness of the Army AND then worry more about Cav vs Armor? Just an idea.

Brigade Special Troops Battalion. They who ride the short bus to war.

You have MPs, Intel, Engineers, CBRN, Commo, and whatever other bastard children the Army can find to be neglected in a BCT. They are at the bottom of the barrel when it comes to training funds, training itself, and operational.

The reasoning behind the BSTB was for the Brigade to integrate force multipliers in training and garrison the build cohesion rather than receive their support units from some MI or commo BDE 3 weeks before deploying. In practice this doesn't happen in BCTs and it's the force multipliers themselves that end up taking the brunt of the damage due to the lack to training they receive. I would argue for direct augmentation by putting them in the HHC of the combat arms battalion directly but I know that would just make things worse, so we're left with reconstituting MI and Commo and CBRN BDEs where our soldiers will at least get the core competencies trained on with others.

Worse off is most BSTBs are in a brigade that also houses a Brigade Support Battalion as Arbiter alluded to. So you have your logistic and medical support coming from one battalion and your force multiplier support coming from another. Brigades will pay the money to get their medics trained up without hesitation, yet it's like pulling teeth to get the money to send some soldiers to get network certified or get soldiers qualified to use programs like Palintir to greatly improve intelligence support.

When the the BSTB deploys the entirety of the battalion is factioned off and sent to each combat arms battalion. This means most detachments have 3 daddies. Intel is the worst when there's no forethought brought into it and no decision for GS or DS has been made. With the MICO CO, Brigade S2 and Battalion S2 all demanding attention of the collectors and analysts. Most time it's easier to get personnel actions done through bribing the S1 of your supported battalion rather than try to call, email, fly or convoy to where your S1 is.

Then there's hilarity when BDE's like 1st Infantry's 4th IBCT gives a BSTB actual land ownership. They expected an Engineer company and a MP platoon to be able to operate with the same effectiveness as a full Infantry Battalion. They were extremely lucky the Iraqis got lazy by the end of 2010.

Here's another example when you try to get BSTBs to go to combat:

http://www.military.com/news/article/unlikely-unit-of-cooks-mechanics-leads-assault-on-taliban.html

"Re-encumber the divisions and the corps. It followed good military logic in a time when we had to separate divisions, BCTs and Corps in order to meet the requirements to deploy multiple headquarters to meet many real military needs. But, hopefully, those requirements are in the past. Time to get divisional supervision again on brigades and be able to bring to bear concentrations of fires, sustainment and support. "

Brigades have supervision from division or corps just as before while in garrison. They are just self-contained deployable entities now. The Division and Corps Headquarters have taken on the deployable role of being two sizes of joint force headquarters as well. The relationships in garrison are more or less identical to how they used to be.

"What does V Corps do in Europe? Is it a Corps Hq or not? Somehow V Corps and USAREUR just seem to be over supervision for 4 maneuver brigades that remain in Europe. Besides the center of gravity of activity has moved from the Western/Eastern plains of Europe to the Mediterranean a long time ago, and our military, not just the Army, just has not seemed to adapt. "

Its a Corps headquarters as it is understood, that is to say an intermediate headquarters between division/brigade and field army. You can see a good representation of the command relationships on USAREUR's website (http://www.eur.army.mil/organization/units.htm). V Corps has taken on the same responsibility that other Corps headquarters (deployable joint force headquarters) have and having one forward deployed in Germany also allows for a major headquarters to remain in place in the event of a need to build up forces there again.

"Restore unit designations that make sense and are understandable. We know what an artillery unit is and does. We don't understand what a Fires unit is and does. That goes double for Maneuver Enhancement, Maneuver Support, Maneuver Sustainment, Battlefield Surveillance Brigade, Sustainment, et al. There is no commonality in like-type organizations that make it simple to know what one is or does. "

Fires is only used for brigade level artillery units. All the assigned units remain designated as field artillery battalions and separate batteries. As for the other types of functional and multi-functional brigades, the reason there is no commonality is because the US Army is trying to make it easier to understand what a unit does outright, without having to rely on confusing designators after the designation as it has and continues to do as well.

In the past the need for multi-functional brigade headquarters meant that any suitable such headquarters was placed in that role, regardless of what sort of mission it fulfilled. "Maneuver Enhancement Brigade" sounds infinitely better than "Engineer Brigade" for units that are holding tanks for combat support and combat service support units rather than an actual single branch brigade. Engineer Brigades were previously the unit most often designated to provide administrative support to engineer, support, military police, chemical, and other units while in garrison. The MEB simply provided a more useful moniker for such relationships and a staff more suitable to the mission.

Also related to this, it would be infinitely helpful to everyone if units actually used their official designations instead of whatever they decide to go by that day. If the US Army should do anything, it should police up how information is presented to make sure that the average person knows what's being talked about. Informal unit monikers should be clearly noted. Oh, and while they're at it, can we stop telling units that facebook pages and twitter feeds are acceptable replacements for traditional websites that actually provided useful information?

Good, no excellent point about how the Army distro's information. How many people at the SGT level and above even know what ARFORGEN stands for, let alone what it means. Hell, I've read up on it and I still don't understand it.

Look at the Design material the Army has - no one knows what it is or where it belongs etc.

Uniforms - hundreds of ALARACTS and no AR 670-1 one-stop reference
Maneuver Enhancement Brigade - no idea what that is, where it came from, or why I should care that it exists

And the list goes on.

Holy cow, and someone mentioned the PT test and the new PT test, it's AWFUL. The Army looks at the PT test as an administrative requirement that is to be completed twice a year. It's not a measure of fitness for combat. When the GOs finally realize that the metrics are supposed to tell them how ready their force is for war, as opposed to how fast they can push the formation run, then they'll start making progress. Go out there risk your life in combat and get a ribbon; go out there and fail a PT test or ht/wt and get a discharge. Something is wrong with that.

Now, my eyes were opened a bit about Army branch stuff....I preach and preach and preach about combat mindset and requisite skills. But, I guess I've been so indoctrinated that I look at all the tactical skills, the combat mindest yet still look myself in the mirror and see myself as an armor, scout, loggie, medic, etc and so forth.

Now, why is the Army this way, why do the non-combat arms branches ignore combat mindset and combat skills....hell, I wish I knew.

Last point..whoever said the millenials will meet the bar at whatever height you set it at is dead on accurate. This "millenial generation must be trained like x,y,z" nonsense is indeed the lazy way out. They don't need Smartphones, and Apps, and text message alerts and simulations etc. Someone up high has paid (given tax payer money in the form of an Army contract) to some crackpot academician that determined today's kids are drastically different blah blah blah. It's all crap. Those new kids coming in will meet the standard and they will perform, so long as they are provided good leadership. That's how it's always been and that's how it always will be.

In addition to Europe:

U.S. Army Alaska - two star - commands nothing.

U.S Army Japan - three star - commands nothing, just a 1000 support guys.

8th Army HQ - four-star - commands half a division

And don't forget a four star (US Army Pacific) Hawaii, with 2000 HQ soldiers who don't command anything either.

I Corps could do all their jobs, commanding 2-3 divisions.

...that the US Army lacks discipline.

We can't be trusted to acquire the correct weapons, we can't organize properly, we can't have an Armor Officer lead Infantryman (or vice-versa), we can't march from point A to B, and we can't even be trusted to design a combat uniform for Afghanistan without Congress telling us we got the wrong color.

Perhaps we have a Human Resources problem? Specifically in how we train our "Management" at all levels?

I noticed your post in your last installment that "Restrepo" was greatly embarassing to the Army. Is this also due to a lack of discipline displayed by those Sky Soldiers? If so, how?

My head spins from reading the preceding posts about all the Army commands, branches, communities, etc., etc. Of course, that might be because that's all unfamiliar territory from the USMC perspective. But the impression I have is of an entrenched bureaucracy, staffs preserving their turf, branch-centric stovepipes, and fiefdoms all over the place. I'm not trying to revive an Army vs. USMC pissing contest. But seriously, In view of the ongoing discussion here about changes and reforms, how do you push change through such a monster of an organization? Is it even possible? From the historian's perspective, has it ever been done successfully?

Here in Europe will call USAREUR/7A "The Imperial Army of the Rhine". When it was still a 4 Star HQs it was 4 Star HQs that acted like a division staff only with bigger rank structure. In order to be successful we really need to behave and operate at a higher level. Our priorities are totally out of whack, because not only are we supposed to be trained and ready for the next deployment, but we also have to go to Latvia and teach them how to operate their radios.

Europe for sure has more than 4 BCTs and a CAB. You have the 21st Theater Sustainment Command that is about as diverse a formation as you can get. That "Division level" command has an MP BDE, and ENG BDE, and a Sustainment BDE, and probably the "Contracting BDE" as well. Europe also has an ADA BDE (-) and a bunch of other odds and ends.

One of the problems in Europe is that when alot of the CS and CSS units type unitsaren't prepping to deploy, they are almost constantly involved in theater partnership and cooperation exercises. So instead of providing Combat Support or Combat Service to manuever units, we're doing some other forgettable named exercise that really is not giving the nation enough juice for the squeeze.

Are not simply a function of number of troops under command or geographical reach. There are also critical political considerations related to security assurance. Our South Korean and Japanese allies would no doubt view with alarm any downgrading of general officer positions related to their regions. With the recent security announcements related to our Pacific Rim military presence it would seem that the idea of cutting back general officer ranks in that theater is a non-starter.

Our Asian friends are not fools, recall the phrase "paper tiger." They will not be impressed if we send ten four-stars to Japan. They would be impressed if we converted our support troops and HQs elements to combat units.

And our brigade staffs would be happy if the two-star HQ nearby did not hover around to provide "administrative support." I Corps should move to Hawaii and command our two divisions in the Pacific, while all the other GO Hqs and their outdated support elements were used to form another division.

with only a few exceptions. The discussion about AR officers leading IN outfits and vice-versa. An Armor BDE/BN/SQDN Commander, just like an IN BDE?BN/SQDN CDR will all have soon been trained in the exact same places and from CCC on, by the exact same cadre. They will have unique skills, but no different than the way a Cav officer has different skills than say a Tank officer - or a Mech Infantry officer from an Airborne Infantry officer - the rest will all be the same - good or bad - that's the future.

I don't know a single Armor officer who looks at a Stryker and thinks "oooh wheeled tank" (in fact most tankers would probably think the exact opposite). No one (well - no one worth a crap anyway) is going to fight the Stryker like a they would a tank.

I've worked a long time in the Stryker world and seen alot of different kinds of commanders (and branches) and their ability has nothing to do with their branch - it has to do with their ego. Arrogant Armor officers are just as bad at commanding as are arrogant Infantry officers. Taken to its logical conclusion - we could argue then that only officers who were light infantry and command light infantry, mech infantry for mech infantry, Stryker infantry for Stryker infantry, Stryker Cav for Stryker Cav, Tank Cav for Tank Cav, Armor for Armor, and so on - this gets silly quick.

Officers in my generation aren't the same as the officers before us - for the last 9'ish years everyone has been ramming the IN/AR concept down our throats - we've fought in task organized units in all kinds of different operational evironments and in most cases we've all used the same TTP's. In short we get it. In my case (and that of most of my peers) - and forgive my arrogance - I have no doubt about my ability to lead, command AND fight an Infantry, Stryker, or Tank unit; and I'd do it well - Stetson, spurs, and all.

I think that comment is really made to all 3 of your points, but not intended that way. Commanders today have taken on many challenges that their predecessors did not and taken them on well. Believe the complications of not knowing who the enemy is and worrying about political ramifications of every move made have caused the battlefield to be difficult and complicated to management, Believe the OE has caused a lot of branches missions to merge; infantry, armor, engineer (to some extent) and FA and others. That was caused by the need to get as many boots on the street as possible. In conversations now with IN, AR, FA and EN officers, largely major and above, they feel confident in their abilities to lead manever battalions and brigades. My fear is that confidence is based on their abilities on their last deployment and not on commanding their battalion or BCT for participation as a maneuver or supporting arm in the manever warfare fight that they now must prepare for. Perfect example of that is those commanders whose tank or artillery commands became "near" infantry in support of OIF. We have some work to do in the future to begin to fully re-understand the integration of all arms and capabilities on the none OIF/OND and OEF battlefield. I am sure we will get there but think it would be smarter and more efficient if we got back to our roots and experience, often and well. This is a great position to be in because we had lots of depth on the bench who are competent, confident and believe in themselves. I must admit I really am concerned about Stryker organizations because they were simply designed to move some pretty good light infantry in a mobile platform, with some small amount of protection and firepower to a point where they would/could conduct the dismounted fight. They will move mounted but are supposed to fight dismounted. We need people in command of them who have trained all their lives to fight dismounted.

Excellent point and I agree with you about brigade commanders basically only having to orchestrate combat power. A bde commander standing in the breach or following the lead unit in clearing a city is probably in the wrong place. The real problem with Armor officers commanding Stryker bdes, in my opinion, is the experience on the ground and the understanding of how to use the ground from the boot level. Dismounted infantry battalion commanders must be at the exact spot they are needed at the right time. But, so must all commanders. But, for a dismounted infantry commander on a breach that is dismounted with his dismounted CP at the breach, on the ground, not in a vehicle (probably) and able to operate everything needed via the means on his and his CP's backs. I really don't think you can just walk in the door as a bn commander and learn that. I think it must be a sense developed over experience on the ground as a LT, CPT and Maj, then to command. You are right. It is probably no harder to fight a dismounted infantry company than a tank company. But, it certainly is different and requires different levels of understanding of a lot and requires different leadership skills....somewhat. Having said that, I would also say Bradley commanders have similar problems on the ground. Truth is I doubt many could conduct a good fight on the ground largely because of a lack of manpower with only 2 companies of dismounts who are probably neglected in numbers anyway.

There are cultural differences between armor and infantry. You probably won't agree with this, but one of them is physical readiness for combat. Armor units must have great upper body strength to be able to load and maintain the tank. Infantry units must have a different form of stamina, strength in different places and endurance to continue to move the body, not ride the vehicle. Tough to learn this at the LTC level. Armor commanders manage a few weapons systems. Dismounted infantry commanders manage a lot of smaller systems.

The Stryker unit brings with it a lot of small weapons systems. The tank bn has a few weapons systems, largely platform oriented. The development of a training plan for a Stryker battalion is much more extensive than that of a tank battalion (CABs must be a real nightmare) if done right. But, I think we may have lost this in the last several years. Now that we have armor officers in Strykers there is a clamor for a gunnery program for the MGS (I am informed). Why? The MGS is a bunker buster, a hole blower, a tree feller, not a tank killer. Think this is a product of an upbringing, not a necessity.

Now, I know the leadership of the Army is convinced that armor officers, due to working largely on the ground, or in vehicles that last several years are qualified to be infantry unit commanders because they have been doing the same thing the infantry has been doing. Except not so in Afghanistan. They are living with the high successes of the last years. But, the OE is different and requirements on armor, mech, light and Stryker units are different out of Iraq.

I think you have hit on exactly the reason the Army has decided that armor officers should command Stryker battalions and brigades. That is that the armor force has gone through a drastic reduction in bn and bde commands over the last several years. I would bet there is a pretty significant over balance at the LTC and Colonel level of armor officers. As such, command of Stryker bns and brigades allows them utilization and potential for continuing to move in the Army. Some might say, a good decision for a bad reason. I would still say just a bad decision for the units. Don't get me wrong. I know there will be some armor commanders of Stryker Infantry battalions or brigades who will absolutely shine.

Not advocating by any stretch of the imagination an Army commanded by only infantry officers. But, do advocate units commanded by the most experienced and qualified commanders who have been through every echelon of that type of organization before they command. The Army used to take pride is saying that it took 16-18 years to make a battalion commander and 20-24 years to make a battalion commander. The process they referred to was one of experience in challenging conditions developing commanders for the next level of the organization they are in.

I really think it is wrong to let infantry officers command cavalry squadrons/regiments. But, that would never have happened. Likewise I can only think of one occasion of an infantry officer commanding a tank battalion. But, somehow our Army has decided it good for armor officers to command Stryker Infantry battalions and brigades. I can only believe it is a numbers issue with LTCs and Colonels and not the best solution for the units and their Soldiers. The senior leaders of the Army have different problems to manage than do the battalion and brigade commanders. Think that is how they decided to manage this one.

But, guarantee it will be successful and not overturned. We are not very good as an institution in admitting we have made a mistake and going back.