Wednesday, November 9, 2011 - 10:41 AM
It is rare to see a careful strategic writer denounce a point of view so absolutely: "What is the strategic worldview of the air person? In effect, he or she sees the world as akin to a dartboard ... Needless to say, perhaps, such a view is nonsense. But, it has always lurked more or less explicitly in the belief structure of true believers in victory through air power." (P. 113)
Meanwhile, the Air Force practiced bombing Santa Claus.
That proponents of the decisive nature of airpower see the world as a dartboard probably has some element of truth to it. But, there is a strong cultural element to this attitude that really began to be formed in the 1920’s with air advocates such as Mitchell, Trenchard and Douhet. It was further amplified in the years preceding the Second World War as a hopeful means of avoiding the mobilization of vast armies and the resultant dreadful fighting and inevitable mass casualties of bitter memory in the First World War.
This attitude was particularly strong in the United States where a post World War One aversion to engaging in foreign wars was deeply embedded in the public consciousness. But at the same time there also existed here an industrial and technical capacity to build and deploy vast air armadas in place of vast armies and perhaps avoid the trauma of the trenches.
Since the advent of American industrialization and matched with her unique innovative capacity the country has always looked for ways to engage in war using technical and material means as a substitute for flesh and blood. This attitude is even more profound today than in past eras, particularly when the public is unsettled about the necessity and purpose of the wars we engage in.
This past decade’s casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan for all coalition partners involved have been a mere unremarkable battle on the Eastern Front in World War Two or a bad day on the Western Front in World War One. This is not entirely due to airpower but is perhaps the symbol of the major part of this transformative shift from human loss in war to material loss. If the great decisive promise of air power (ground based or sea based) has been oversold it still remains the crux of our deterrence and what does more to influence other nations than any other force could ever do.
There is some truth in tbe idea that past Airmen have seen warfare as a target list...bomb all the targets and win the war. However, it's not the Air Corps Tactical School or John Warden's Air Force any more.
Now that we're out of Iraq and on our way out of Afghanistan, the drums will start beating to try and save force structure in an Army that is now too big (again). Nobody will be sure why need X number of BCTs, but they'll fight for them anyway. They'll introduce scenarios for invading the Baltics or stabilizing Nigeria.
Most of the arguments will dodge JPWREL's points and show funny videos.
People fear US Air Power. It's cheaper than ground power.
Why don't we focus instead on what is the right mix of capabilities we'll need to protect America and America's interests in the future, and how can we do it within current fiscal constraints?
The Bureau of Airplanes That Don't Belong To Someone Else.
Air power will come in balance as a military instrument when the US Air Force ceases to exist. which, in my model, would occur by week's end.
Rubber Ducky, you and I agree about something again! Of course, in my model the Marines and Coast Guard would lose their independence too.
I know. Pigs fly. Hunter and RD agree. Who'd a thunk it?
Dunno about the USCG. Maybe.
USMC go away? Only if one can be convinced that the culture would carry over. Frankly, I'd rather see the US Army absorbed into the Marine Corps (though this also would be a bit scary) than the reverse.
FWIW, I'd also give sealift to the Army.
And create a new high-tech force for strategic deterrence, space, and cyberwarfare.
Your move...
This being the birthday of our proud Corps, I'll say that I'd rather see the US Army as a source for Park Rangers before I'd want it absorbed into the USMC.
Walt
What you got against Park Rangers?
USMC would be folded under USN
...so up to you what you do with them. I think we can have service branches with the same culutre they used to have, just less overhead as it relates to personnel admin, logistics, and acquisitions.
Army and AF rejoin.
Navy, Marines, Coast Guard join.
Everyone keeps their dress uniforms and traditions, but we all distill back down to one - maybe two - camouflage uniforms. 9Since that is a constant subject here in BD land)
Much money is saved.
We'll go crazy and call it a USDF (Defense Force) and we'll make a game attempt at actually following that notion.
Huzzah, Hooah, etc.
Happy Birthday Marine Corps. I love you like a brother, don't hate the playa, hate the game.
Minimize Uncertainty: Kill Them All
Although this topic won't get much attention, I use this Gray quote all of the time to introduce the concept of strategy.
The basic problem is one of risk acceptance in military strategy. Combatants are understandably risk averse. Combatants would like to minimize the chance that the other guy can kill him. The more you reduce the chance that the other guy can do something, (perhaps to you, perhaps to achieve his objective -- other than killing you and blowing up your stuff), the more you assert control over him. Total control, wherein the other guy is made irrelevant, is the objective.
Please forgive the vast generalization here, but most military strategy is about different ways to make the adversary irrelevant. It is tactics writ large. This is true of air strategy, land strategy, and naval strategy. It can be done through annihilation or maneuver, straight up the middle or a left hook. After all, airpower is simply 'flying artillery,' right?
The problem is that the other guy is most irrelevant when he is dead. Dead men pose no risks. But it is unlikely that (a) you can kill them all, (b) killing them all is too expensive, or (c) that killing them all achieves your political objective (outside of genocide, that is).
(c) is the big problem. Political objectives usually require the other guy to do something for you -- maybe order his men to surrender, maybe allow UN inspectors access, maybe change their foreign policy, and so on. Dead men can't do that for you. Only the adversary can -- if he is alive and has the ability to do things. He can decide to comply with your demands. And therein lies the rub: you need to accept some risk of betrayal, of defection, of defiance if you are going to achieve your political objectives.
Any strategy needs to do more than specify targets. It needs to specify how these targets affect the other guy's decisions. Maybe they cut off some options. Maybe they make some of his constituents mad and they demand that he do whatever you are demanding. In any event, this theory of causation -- from kinetic inputs to a political system to policy outputs from that political system -- needs to be specified. Some of the classical theorists did this, but most didn't. Douhet, for instance, actually did.
For more of this sort of thinking, see the work of that other eminent British strategist, Sir Lawrence Freedman, specifically his chapter in his book 'Strategic Coercion.'
This tired stereotype ignores things like, I dunno, managing various satellite constellations (GPS, comms, ISR, weather), the proponderance of airborne ISR platforms, airlift, CSAR, providing JTACs, airspace deconfliction, oh, how about all those in-lieu of deployments with airmen running military convoys so the Army can send soldiers to Kandahar instead to serve food in a redundant DFAC.
There's...
Space asset operations, management, and acquisition (with NRO), as you describe;
Space launch, range operations, and launch vehicle acquisition;
Cyber-warfare;
Special Ops and SAR;
Strategic deterrence, the useless second and third legs of the strategic triad (TRIDENT can reliably cover 100% of the targets required);
The CAS crowd and others who would actually support troops on the ground, this tiny tribe relegated to a corner of the hangar and ordered to never speak in public;
The fighter mafia: they run it all, bias the outfit towards ever-fancier air-superiority aircraft (with no known opponent), and relentlessly move the defense spending up along the Augustine Curve;
The corporate Air Force, managing all and sleeping around with every aerospace vendor on the planet;
And - finally -
The Strategic Bombing priesthood, acolytes of Douhet and his deeply flawed, never-proven thesis that aerial bombardment short-circuits the need for ground combat and wins 100% of all wars effortlessly.
The US Air Force is a dog's breakfast of missions, but hugely thankful for Douhet, who gives it all the gloss of theory and a deity to worship in the dark moments when someone asks what the hell the Air Force does.
One more Air Force, the one that...
...desecrates the remains of US Servicemembers (WAPO today: "The Dover Air Force Base mortuary for years disposed of portions of troops’ remains by cremating them and dumping the ashes in a Virginia landfill, a practice that officials have since abandoned in favor of burial at sea.")
All this being said about Air Power today I don't dispute, but I think the strategic bombing of Germany by the US Army Air Corps is the greatest triumph of American arms.
That oughta get this thread going.
Walt
The ball bearing factories and refineries kept producing, even with snow falling through the holes in the roof. Synthetic fuels were brought on line. Slave labor replaced lost workers. And the Russians pushed from the East, the rest of the Allies from the West, with victory coming from ground combat and the physical conquest of territory. Yes we (Brits and Yanks both, do not forget) beat the crap out of the Third Reich from the air, but it took boots on the ground to win.
To your point directly, it was as an arm of the US Army that this air victory was achieved. One finds many historical reasons that we then decided to calve off the US Air Force as a separate military Service; few are valid today.
Of course I am ready to defend the USAAC. Everything done by the 8th AF prior to 1/1/44 was prelude. The ball bearings raids in 1943 alarmed the Germans but did not cripple any segment of the war economy. On the other hand, the Germans began stripping all other fronts of fighter units to fight the USAAC even when the strike force consisted of less than 100 B-17’s ready for day to day operations.
The raids on Germany that the USAAC made between July and October, 1943 were like Pickett’s Charge every day. But they still went. They went even though the 8th AF leadership was indifferent to the need for long range escorts. After the 8th Bomber Command CO and 8th Fighter Command CO were relieved towards the end of 1943, things started to improve at once.
Operation ARGUMENT, attacks on German aircraft and engine factories, which began early in 1944, with a much larger force than was available in 1943, didn’t wreck that segment of the German economy either. But it did begin to attrit the GAF and did that decisively. The Germans had to fight. As we know, by 6/6/44, the Germans day fighter force had been badly damaged –and- forced to withdraw from France. This makes a big contrast with the RAF’s RODEO operations during 1941-42 over France, which the GAF largely ignored unless they had favorable tactical advantage. In fact, during these operations the GAF inflicted losses on the RAF of 4-1.
Against the USAAC, things didn’t go so hot.
The USAAC deprived the GAF of 2,000 aircraft in March, ‘44 and 2,000 more in April ’44. Recall that even though the USAAC had more fighters than the GAF, they had to cycle into action along the route of the bombers. The GAF could and did often have more fighters proximate to the bombers than the USAAC did. Yet the USAAC wrecked the German fighter force in just a couple of months. This even though the longer ranged P-51’s and P-38’s were a minority of the available USAAC fighters. That shows a very great triumph of American arms.
Also early in 1944, Spaatz began the Oil Plan. In two -days, May 28 and May 30, 1944, the 8th AF rededuced production of synthetic oil products by 50%.
April’s delivery of POL products to the GAF of 175K tons of aviation fuel was reduced by September to less than 1,000 tons. Delivery of POL to the German Army suffered a similar reduction. I think this makes a clear case for the bombing of Germany to be the greatest feat of American arms.
Walt
Actually, the strategic bombing of Japan probably was more decisively important than the joint RAF/USAAF bombing campaign against Germany. If you are looking for the key factor in the defeat of Germany think Red Army.
German arms production rose throughout the war until the late autumn of 1944. The post-war Strategic Bombing Survey discovered that the failure of either air force to settle on a decisive industry as they dispersed their efforts allowed the Germans to revamp and disperse their industry. By the time the bombing campaign began to generate decisive results the Russians were entering East Prussia and the Brits and American’s approaching the Rhine.
And most devastating of all, the losses inflicted on Japanese shipping and naval assets by the US submarine force. If you look in the Strategic Bombing Survey at the tables showing decline in imported war-essentail commodities and the sea-transport capacity needed to get them to the Home Islands, you'll sea that Japan was essentially strangled and out of business by April 1945. That was all the submarine force, BTW suffering a greater casualty rate than any other branch of service. What limited submarine success in the last days of the war was the utter lack of targets; they were all on the bottom.
Of course I thought about Japan.
But you didn't have:
1. An active and technologically advanced enemy fighter force which was simply crushed when our fighters were often outnumbered.
2. You didn't have Pickett's Charge ever day for a period of 6 months.
3. You didn't have often outstanding precision bombing done from 5 miles high while wearing electric blankets disguised as long underwear.
The gal for whom the 'Memphis Belle' was named flew in that A/C on some of the bond tours. She couldn't believe it flew at all, let alone over Germany. The guys that did all that accomplish a fantastic feat of arms.
The Marine Corps birthday is an odd day for me to going on -this- rant!
Blame Tom.
Walt
"German arms production rose throughout the war until the late autumn of 1944."
It sure did!
But there was no gas. One of the GAF pilots wrote later that they would just go and pick out a new ME-109 from among dozens on the factory flight line.
Most of them never were flown at all by the sumer of 1944.
Same thing with the tanks. The Germans had to -plan- on capturing US Army gasoline to prosecute the Ardennes Offensive.
Oil Plan starts in March- Germans desperate for fuel by June.
Walt
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