Lt. Barno's view on general officer media competency is likely right on the mark as far as the armed forces public relations types would wish it to be. But I also think that he is mistaken if he is under the illusion that the public actually hangs with abated breath on the cogitations of generals.

My view is that the public is actually very skeptical, indeed, bored by the musing of generals largely because they are preprogramed and usually stick to the official transcript of uninformative and bullish remarks. We get more insightful and meaningful commentary from local TV news anchors blandly reading their teleprompters. The only time the public really pays any attention to generals (politicians too!) is when they mistakenly blurt out the truth or are unexpectedly frank about what’s on their minds.

1.) The role, we are often told, of army officers in dealing with the media is to get the government narrative out. They are to offer "helpful" and "constructive" comments. At what point do "helpful" stories cross the line into Psych Ops directed towards the US population. Moreover, isn't the official story often nothing more than an interested narrative meant to serve partisan, clique and institutional interests within the US government and certain economic sectors?

2.) The US Government has been shameless in its use of the military and former military commentators to push the official line, taking advantage of the public's faith in military commentators as impartial. One can only be bemused at the response when occasionally it backfires on them.

3.) The US will continue to refuse to admit to cultural and social realities in their field of operation. This is a weakness former imperial powers did not suffer from.

It might just be me, but I felt that Maj. Gen. Fuller's remarks about Karzai were so over-the-top, that it seemed that he didn't even care if he got fired.

Generally, I don’t mouth-off about general/flag officers using that oral opening in the front of their face, known in old barracks parlance as a pie hole, to utter immoderate/hot-headed remarks. However, this calls for a bit of a rant (yes, I know it’s not rant Friday, but we live in chaotic times, so bear with me).

I don’t particularly find it as astounding as I once might have, to hear such remarks as recently came out of Fuller’s mouth. After all, these past years have seen a subtle shift in foreign policy from the Department of State over to the Pentagon.

Hell, we regularly see the SecDef commenting on countries like Israel, Pakistan, etc. (Interestingly, I believe a certain recent past CENTCOM commented that Israel was the source of much of our problem in the ME, but didn’t receive much, if any, flack over it. Of course said CENTCOM was seen as indespensible and this recent general officer wasn't. . .no doubt?

Perhaps if we moved foreign policy completely back to State, and encouraged those in uniform at Defense to study the art of war (and a bit of geo-politics), the news media will go back to covering foreign policy where it belongs at State, and occasionally talk to generals and admirals on how operations are going, and why Air Force planes can't fly off aircraft carriers.

I am perplexed-I'm trying to understand what made General Fuller make those remarks, and failing. Any general officer is the equivalent of a PhD at earnestly espousing what he and those being espoused to know to be total untruths for the sake of political convenience. He's been doing it for probably a quarter of a century, and if he didn't like it and wasn't good at it, surely he would have chosen a different career field. So, WTF? Did someone spike his drink with PCP, causing him to enter a hallucinatory world where unicorns walk among us and telling the truth in public is acceptable behavior in the US military? Did he have some sort of massive neural event which suddenly made him care about his integrity more than his career or post-retirement prospects? A most disturbing event, and one LTG Barno is right to denounce.

This wasn't about a general's ability -- or lack of -- to interact with "The Media". It was a credibility fight: One guy decided to close a say-do gap rather than help preserve it. He emphasized the accuracy principle at the expense of the unified voice principle, which didn't support a comm strategy that emphasizes unity of voice over accuracy. Bad call? Maybe. But there's something to be said for candor.

Welcome to combat in the midst of a rapidly evolving communication environment. If a warrior ran into the guns knowing he probably wouldn't come back alive, we wouldn't call him oblivious or incompetent -- we'd memorialize him.

The righteous moralist in me would like to lift Fuller up as this guy who speaks truth to power. But let's say for the sake of argument that's what he intended to do. Let's go further and say the truth is really what he says it is. Does that still make his speaking out the right decision?

Not always.

Everyone who reads this post can think of instances where the military or U.S. government justifiably conceals the truth or actively misrepresents it. That's why the law allows Freedom of Information Act exemptions, among other things. I'm sure critics will be quick to point out the ban on PsyOps against Americans, but that's a false dichotomy.

Again, the law already allows the government to dissemble in certain circumstances. Call that PsyOps if you will. But it's legal.

After all, we have no problem with concealing technical specifications, operational plans and the like. Relationships between allies are an equally vital part of the military arsenal. Why should they not be concealed as well?

And just as we don't allow one general to unilaterally decide what technical specs and operational plans to make public, why should one general be able to unilaterally disclose friction between allies. That is clearly in the strategic/policy-making realm, thus meriting civilian direction.

There are clearly times to buck the chain of command — career and consequences be damned. But I don't think truth is the final arbiter of when that should be done. To me, the better metric would be consequences versus benefits. Did Fuller's comments advance American interests?

Hell, I don't know the answer to that. I'm just saying it's not all that easy to even determine if a courageous decision is the right one — much less follow through on that courageous decision.

This article seems to imply there is either something negligent in the training of generals or the selection of generals these days that is a new trend. A simple examination of American history reveals the phenomenon of a general officer putting one's foot into his or her mouth in front of a reporter goes back at least as far as McLellan during the Civil War. Have we already forgotten Patton, MacArthur, and Glossen as well? Shoot, let's throw then Secretary of State and retired General Al Haig on the list while we're at it. It's nothing new and certainly not a trend.

I'm a PAO. We usually get bashed pretty good here but this is what I think. I think he knew exactly what he was doing. My boss is a 1 Star and showed me the article. I told her that I'd read it and that I thought it had been done on purpose. I thought that maybe he had had enough of the game and this was a way out. I also told her that when everybody on our staff tells me they want cute photo's and scrapbooks....she needs to remember my job is to prepare her and them, for things like this.

Public Affairs is woefully abused in the US Army. My last boss got it and we had our unit in everything from Time to the BBC. My current unit wants wall decorations and pictures for newsletters. We're not trained enough on how to formulate talking points that don't make folks like Mr Ricks roll his eyes. The talking points and associated stories produced by ISAF aren't Psyop material but they're poor marketing attempts by undertrained and understaffed people.We only get better with experience and leadership that allows us to do our job. Its rare. I pray my last boss gets some stars so I can go back to doing my job.

PAO's are only important when trying to fix things like this interview. Our DCO thought that maybe he was voicing concerns that Gen Allen felt but could not articulate for obvious reasons. I don't think we could take a revolving door of 4 commanders in what 4 plus years. I'd like to hear what Tom thinks happened.

This episode shows an acute lack of judgement on MG Fuller's part. I am more concerned that the Army put him in this sensitive job. If you read his bio you find out he has not held an operational command since he was a company commander in 1987. He is an acquisition guy and has been in research and development positions ever since. Also, in 10 years of warefare he has managed to avoid deploying. This was his first deployment in theater and it was into a job that requires much cultural sensitivity and patience which he clearly did not have. I have seen better judgment (and more deployment time for that matter) from most captains in today's Army.

I have worked closely with Afghan forces and found them to be very brave and loyal. It can be very frustrating at times, but you learn to be patient and you don't talk out of school about your allies.

I found Fuller's candor and bluntness refreshing though his comments were intemperate and simplistic in nature. The fact that they came from someone so ill-suited to be in that position (Acquisition Corps), as LTG Barno (Ret.) alludes to, is a separate but worthy discussion altogether.

General Allen's response was predictable and disingenuous. 11 years on, we owe it to the nation and those in uniform to be more open, much more open, in regards to the tactical, operational and strategic realities and challenges we have dealt with for years. Diplomacy, behind the scenes discussions, empty threats and even paying off the Pakistanis to the tunes of billions aren't working any better now than they were years ago. There are some uncomfortable truths that need to be aired in public if we are ever going to resolve or at least manage them. Here are a couple: the Karzai Regime is as corrupt and as illegitimate as anything we attempted to prop up and legitimize in South Vietnam. I fear we lost our last "opportunity" when we watched him "steal" the election from Abdullah. Here is another: we are not only fighting an ISI proxy in the Taliban, but, in many cases we are fighting the Pakistani military on the ground. There is precedent in the Soviet-Afghan war of Pakistani military in local garb deeply involved in the fighting and logistics in Afghanistan. The same thing has been going on for years albeit on a more discrete scale. The current generation of Pakistani military officers from roughly colonel/O6 on down firmly views the US as the enemy and willingly supports the Taliban, Haqqani etc. This was in part an unintended consequence of roughly 10 years of frozen mil to mil engagement as they chased (successfully) nuclear weapons. Any cooperation they promise is lip service or limited and calculated in nature. They know the money will keep rolling in and we will eventually leave Afghanistan, and they will continue to posture themselves for that eventuality.
Regards.

Maybe MG Fuller reached his limit on the "rosy" view that we constantly try to present, while the reality is something different. At what point those your role as an American citizen take precedence over your role in uniform to follow the party line? I really can't say, but I'm not going to knock somebody else, without knowing all the facts.

Wow, it is truly unfortunate when a GO telling the truth is a fireable offense. As a junior officer who served in Iraq back in the early days of the war when it was not going well- yet some senior leaders insisted on pushing "good news stories" to audiences back home- I only wish more senior Army leaders had had the courage to call it like they saw it. LTG Barno is essentially suggesting that GOs put their career advancement ahead of their moral obligation to be honest. Sounds like he would prefer the "5 OClock Follies" press conferences of Vietnam all over again, where senior military leaders had lost all credibility.
The ultimate irony is that we fire MG Fuller for telling the truth, whereas the Karzai admin is riddled with crooks, many of whom the US has pushed for him to remove for years, and they still collect our US-subsidized paychecks!

General Patton used to mouth off all the time. He got away with it because he was pretty damn good at what he did, predominately killing Germans. But even he got a penultimate comeuppance - when he was relegated to modelling an Army commander in England pre D-Day versus being one. Then he went another step too far and finally got handed his ultimate/last assignment writing a history before his unfortunate death.

Maybe the lesson to learn here is that even Generals screw things up on occasion? i dunno. As politically unpalatable as the solution might have been, maybe - just maybe - Fuller should have had a trip to the woodshed and then be given a chance to fix his foot-in-mouth disease.

Yes, I know, we're talking bad about allies - while telling the truth. But this kinda tells guys like me that it's best to just keep one's mouth shut (which does nothing for the IO campaign). It also reaffirms the zero defect nature of things. Finally, it shows that it sucks when your boss ain't got your back, or throws you under the bus to save his skin, while bending if not breaking the truth in the process.

In the end, I am going to go all Kunino on this one and suggest there is another layer of competing STRATCOM going on. Fuller was the Bump and Allen was the Set, somewhere we need a playa to Spike that ball.

What a stupid opinion. One to be expected by a ring knocker who endorses maintaining the status quo and senior fellow of Center for Neo Con Central. We just need to remind ourselves of this General, who served under the worst administration in my country’s history that the best opinion is to keep your mouth shut, lest you be censored by the White House, i.e. Office of the Vice President of the United States. Yeh, that’s what we need these days in this war; more conformists like David, so insecure that the retired rank is still necessary to validate his credentials; lambasting a General who provides an honest assessment, which is so transparent, it could not clearly be his personal opinion. No, the American people are too stupid to conclude it’s a personal opinion; he must be the direct spokesman for SECDEF and POTUS. And there’s no one in the administration leadership backing up what everyone agrees is true in secret. You commanded in Afghanistan in 2003. Perhaps your byline should read Barno: Generals who can’t accomplish the mission should be demoted and then fired for good measure. You run your mouth off extensively on how to manage the media. But you look like a shitty operational commander because 8 years after your command, the warfighter is still dying in Afghanistan. You must sleep well at night. All people like you do; too busy managing your image instead of what matters. Make sure you get extra starch on your suits; it’s the only thing holding up your back.

Maj Jose M. Medina
Student, Command and General Staff College
U. S. Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Gordon, Georgia.

In the current operational environment, military leaders at all levels have the responsibility to deal effectively with the media. More than anything else, this should mean understanding and complying with Operational Security (OPSEC). However, dealing effectively with the media is much more encompassing than just safeguarding sensitive information and should include: (1) understanding the increasingly important role of the media in the battlefield, (2) building a soldier-reporter relationship, and (3) focusing on what I consider to be the ultimate intent - to inform the American public about the critical role the US military is playing as an instrument of the US Foreign Policy.

The role of the media in the battlefield has undeniably become a critical aspect of contemporary military operations. We have learned in recent years that warfare does not distance itself from the general population anymore. Therefore, it is critical that the military consider the impact that published information may have towards the attitudes and beliefs of the general population. In unconventional warfare, winning the trust and support from the general population must be considered a critical task during tactical operations. One critical fact to consider is that information can be manipulated via the media by the enemy forces to negatively affect the relations between the military and the local population. It is imperative that friendly forces counteract this negative Information Operation (I.O.) by conducting their own.

The importance of projecting the friendly forces’ intentions is critical not only locally, where operations are being conducted, but also back at home base. The general population needs to see that the military is being utilized positively and effectively; however, it is always a difficult task to project this image during the conduct of military operations. Current military operations, which predominantly are compose counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability and support (SASO) are extremely costly and lengthy. Moreover, the majority of citizens subordinate foreign interest to national interest. As a result there is much criticism about the amount of resources already spent by the US in foreign nations. For these reasons, it is imperative that not only policy makers but military commanders communicate effectively through the media. To make this possible, the Department of Defense has embedded reporters with deploying units. Embedded media provides a potentially effective tool for deploying units to project a positive image to the general population. Because the reporter is exposed to the operational planning and battlefield environment, he or she much more easily understands the decisions made by the commander. This, however, must be complemented by establishing a good soldier-reporter relationship. A commander who decides to avoid or ignore the embedded media subjects himself to inaccurate and/or negative press.

Negative publicity is especially harmful if the citizens do not fully understand the reasons for sending our armed forces to foreign countries. The reality is that many US citizens do not understand political science concepts like Responsibility to Protect or even why does the US has to have a Foreign Policy. Instead, citizens understand that there are bad people in the world, that there are poor countries with starving populations, and that every now and then a natural disaster occurs with devastating results. Therefore, US citizens need to be informed that the US Government is sending their military into harm’s way as a last resort to resolve matters of national security and that the calling justifies the loss of life of those members of the military who pay the ultimate sacrifice. The role of the commander is not only necessary but critical in the accomplishment of this task.

Disclaimer:
“The views expressed in this blog are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.”