Thursday, November 3, 2011 - 9:42 AM

By "An American Official"
Best Defense guest whistleblower
Regional Command-East has forgone efforts aimed at transition in favor of continuing kinetic warfare. In an order issued in late September, provincial reconstruction teams throughout the easternmost provinces of Afghanistan are facing dramatic cuts, upwards of 60 percent for some, by the end of the year. The effort is an attempt to meet President Barrack Obama's goal of cutting deployed military forces by perhaps 23,000.
While RC-E is making cuts across the board, other commands are trying to avoid fragmenting PRTs, which serve as the driving force behind transition. PRTs are comprised of military, Department of State, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and USAID experts who are highly specialized in combating sources of instability through empowering and mentoring civic leaders, constructing development projects, and educating public. They serve as a positive U.S. presence in a nation devastated by decades of war and strife.
As the U.S. tries to move toward a feasible "exit strategy," many PRTs are laying the foundations for U.S. consulates to house DoS, USAID, and USDA representatives for years to come. However, with cuts favoring the traditional warfighter in the East, PRTs will be forced to "do less with less," while still struggling to bring transition to war-torn areas of Afghanistan.
For the last five years, PRTs have suffered reduced freedom of movement and the ability to show US presence in a positive way. As a stepchild, PRTs now fall under the battle space owners, who could care less about the PRT mission as long as "bad guys" are still alive.
In Iraq, the success of PRTs was largely due to structuring them under the U.S. ambassador. However, in Afghanistan, PRTs are a "two-headed monster" with the civilian components reporting to the embassy and U.S. forces reporting to the brigade task force. "Infantry runs the Army," marginalizing the impact of PRTs and making them subordinate to a kinetic force.
PRTs fall under the same guidance as the warfighter, patrolling with heavy guns and strong military presence. However, just a few years ago, PRTs, who fought to remain separated from the battle space owners, drove pick-up trucks and could walk among the community. The idea was simple: "The more risk you take, the less you are at risk." Local people could see that the PRT was there to help, but that has long evaporated in favor of combat since the infamous surge. After all, battle space owners could not let PRTs be without their gross oversight, so they swallowed them under their commands.
By early next year, in specific areas of the East, PRTs will soon rely solely on battle space, kinetic warfighters to accomplish their mission. Throughout Afghanistan the public understands the distinction between PRT and "door kickers," but those once clear lines are being blurred. This blending may look to save taxpayer money and reduce redundancy, but that is dependent on mission priority. With a focus on kinetics, one can expect PRTs will be left thumbing a ride and often left in the dust. Additionally, the same people who attacked Taliban, destroyed buildings and perhaps incidentally killed civilians will now transport DoS, USAID, USDA, and uniformed PRT members to some of those same villages. Although protected by the might of highly skilled and trained warriors, perhaps the civilian counterparts will look like easy targets.
Since the surge of military forces in 2009, Afghan support
of U.S. presence in the country has dropped to near all-time lows. The drop
seemingly corresponds to increased combat operations; additionally, there has
been an increase in attacks against U.S. forces. This may be because there are
more troops on the ground, but it may also have to do with decreased trust in
what U.S. forces are doing in the region.
PRTs exist to strengthen trust, faith, and confidence in the Afghan and U.S.
governments, while kinetic warfare seems aimed at destabilizing Taliban forces
regardless of the cost. Although the cost is clear, new cuts jeopardize efforts
even more.
As U.S. efforts in Afghanistan aim to return troops, Department of State and other U.S. agencies will be left "holding down the fort." Without a strong PRT presence to remain by their side, they will instead be left "holding the bag."
"An American Official" may be the guy sitting to your right. Or may not be. You never really know, do you?
It's amazing that we still don't seem able to grasp that the end we seek is a political one, and that our military goals can't be separated from their political rationale. As the Chairman said, "War is bloody politics and politics is bloodless war." We do much, much better when we get move the fight to the bloodless war--as opposed to the bloody politics--as much as we can. Our lethal capabilities are resistible, as a perusal of the news over the past decade would show, but the force of our basic political ideas is pretty powerful, and we ought to be launching more of those and less lead.
This article is so off it is comical
State and USAID have never fully manned the PRTs, and are way out in front of DoD in pulling out their people. Count noses of PRT civilians and find out how many are DoD civilians, while the State FSOs all fight to stay in Kabul close to the seat of power.
Further, State is pulling their people out and consolidating into their consulates & regional offices well in advance of any military force reduction -- see Panjshir as an example.
The bottom line is that PRTs are closing because the Afghan government is pressuring NATO to eliminate parallel structures, and PRTs are a prime example -- spending money willy-nilly outside the formal government processes, with minimal linkage to either tactical stability initiatives (most of that is being done at the BCT and below) or to any long term sustainable development vision.
I appreciate that Afghanistan is not as "safe" for civilians and NGOs as it was in 2003. But at this point PRTs are supposed to be focused on building government capacity to manage their own budgetary processes, not trucking about the battlefield inspecting their feel good projects that primarily serve to enrich the contractors that build them, and the actors who enable them.
This is not to dismiss the positive role that PRTs play, but the article is written with the view that all this fighting stuff is interfering with the main effort, which is a breathtaking distortion of the reality in Afghanistan.
Some of "American Official" 's assertions are so wrong that they do not deserve a response. This may be one reason why PRTs, despite the assertions above, have not been wildly successful. And that Karzai, corrupt and terrible politician and person that he is, does not like them.
PRTs aren't "step-children." PRT are part of the family.
Granted, I've only seen a couple of RC-East up close and personal. Some were in more kinetic environments (like Laghman) than others (like Panjshir). And I'm familiar with the concept that conditions vary greatly there, province by province, valley by valley, village by village.
However, to effectively return to the under-resourced and stove-piped days (2006-2009?) of the battlespace owner/brigade combat team commander not being able to sync his units' "security" lines of effort with those of "governance" (often led by the blue-suiter PRT chief) and "development" (led by the PRT chief and/or joint Agribusiness Development Team) defies credulity.
PRTs aren't "step-children." PRT are part of the family.
Driving around in civilian vehicles and not wearing body armor is a technique, not a right. (It's also a technique that will get buddies killed, even in put-away-your-weapons Panjshir.) More importantly, it's not a strategy.
Then again, so is measuring success in numbers-of-doors-kicked.
Getting everyone on the same provincial-scale campaign plan was/is critical to whatever successes were to be gained under "clear, hold, and build."
If I have any regrets, it's that we came to that realization too late.
Soft power primacy, huh… Too bad your bureaucracy couldn’t come up with an industrial complex to shore up political clout. In the zero-sum game of budgetary politicking, State and its policies will always play second fiddle to Defense. I suggest you work to convince your local proconsul (aka BCT CDR) of your PRT’s efficacy. Otherwise, get really good at support to targeting.
A jargon-heavy article that appears to say something like " The military cuts are coming from provincial reconstruction teams because (1) destruction is a priority and (2) following on from (1) it makes better sense to cut numbers from non-combatants where possible to maintain the combatants. Curious, you'd suppose that the reasons for a drawdown of military forces would have nothing to do with electoral promises. Which is what this looks like.
One wonders, will the 'official' be paid back in his own COIN?
RBB did a great job of dispelling alot of the false assumptions presented by the - " American Official" may be the guy sitting to your right. Or may not be. You never really know, do you?
The condesending attitude towards BSOs is pretty sweet too; I wonder why he felt marginalized, other than not being allowed to travel in a Jinga truck in civilian cloths.
RAS- I think that your general premise of transitioning to the "bloodless political solution" is a good ideal to strive for, but completely unrealistic in Afghanistan. Afghanistan has never had a strong central government, Karzai is a terrible and unpopular leader which is compounded by the fact that he is stuck between a rock(PAK) and a hard place(US). Karzai appoints only political lackies for important posts, who garner no respect or power from their locals. Nothing about what PRTs are or aren't going to do is going to change this fact.
As long as Afghan government officials are profoundly and damagingly corrupt, neither PRT nor military efforts can succeed. It is that simple.
As long as there is a porous border with Pakistan and a supply of both foreign and Taliban fighters, our efforts are like pissing against the tide. It's that simple.
Finally, there are areas where only military action is appropriate. I'd be in favor of relocating hostile tribes from border areas to inhibit border crossings, but we aren't staying and the Afghan government will fail; so why bother. I know, we are waiting for peace negotiations - like Vietnam, right?
"In Iraq, the success of PRTs was largely due to structuring them under the U.S. ambassador."
What success in Iraq did we just casually refer to, American Official guy? Anywhere in Iraq you'd care to drive around in a pickup truck? Those State Dept Iraqi PRTs (which were mostly staffed with the same contractors who picked up and moved on to Afghanistan) are now "consulates" which will require some 5000 security contractors to protect against all that success you think you see.
State was never deeply invested in either game, sending reluctant mid-ranked clods like myself to fill SES berths to call it a "State-run PRT" while back filling with ex-military and the usual rag-tag bunch of carpet baggers now "succeeding" in Afghanistan.
Whenever anyone gets serious about reconstruction, give me a call, but let's be careful about declaring success.
Peter Van Buren
wemeantwell.com
The "official" makes very important distinctions between the civilian PRTs in Iraq (for the Civilian Surge" burst (under the Ambassador, and the "two heeded monster" institution that is primarily military dependent in Afghanistan.
In Iraq, there was a civilian, highly decentrailized task force deployed in many different circumstances and conditions (provinces, satellites, embedded teams) some with as few as a half dozen generalist civilians, while others had a hundred or more with a great deal of civilian specializations---all targeted on a decentralized basis toward a goal of rapid civilian transfer, in a country yearning to run itself (as evidenced by the SOFA and our later departure). In fact, there were many PRTs, and almost PRTs within PRTs, each with their own self-directing tasks, all primarily focused around linking Baghdad to provinces and provinces down to districts. To be sure, there were Embassy and DC projects, and project operators separately operating within the PRTs, but there was no big picture, and no big plan.
Some have suggested this was a CORD effort, but they profoundly misunderstand the differences. The military effort was essential, including much targeted strikes to control the Sunni fighters fleeing Baghdad into the hinterlands.
In Afghanistan, the lineage, authority and purpose is very different, as is the target audience., the purpose, the process, the staffing, the control, the many centralized and decentralized programs and controllers.
Bill Ardolino just wrote a great piece in Small Wars ( http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/coin-is-dead-long-live-coin) explaining many of the gaps and inconsistencies in the whole COIN/GovBox fiascos, and there have been many more articles explaining the profound broken linkages from Village to Kabul that offer no viable process to enhance fundamental gov effectiveness before drawdown.
This suggests that much of this is just window dressing and make-work efforts until Poof Day.
A serious civilian PRT parallel to Iraq simply does not exist in Afghanistan. The question now, of course, is whether that is all just too late.
Heard from the civilian folks to "Official's" right and left.
He is on point.
"Official" needs to realize the political cost of letting PRTs do their own thing--both operationally and tactically. Putting PRTs under BCT control is absolutely the right thing to do, as you now have a HQs that can coordinate the units whose focus is the Security line of operation with the PRT whose focus is governance. Both units focus on development can be better nested, as well--with the PRT usually covering down on the big dollar items that should be used to build capacity more than infrastructure, and the BSO focusing on small-dollar items to build influence.
The problem is getting a BCT commander who understands the important role the PRT plays for transition, and then giving them and the BN-level BSO alongside whom the PRT works very clear guidance on nesting their efforts. It seems to me that the BCT Commander may not know how to effectively implement his PRT and that he feels more comfortable with the kinetic units, so is more likely to back their short-term efforts (the east seems more kinetic, anyway, then the west, whjch is where I am).
Additionally, the BCT Commander has to be able to force the two units to work together, even when personality conflicts or inter-service rivalries get in the way.
On the tactical side of the house, it would be politically unacceptable to allow a PRT to drive around in lightly armored vehicles on most parts of the Afghan battlefield, when they fall under a conventional commander who must make the rest of his units operate with lower levels of risk tolerance. Think about the PRT going out and attracting a gunfight in their more-lightly armored vehicles, and then the BSO having to send a QRF each time. This isn't to say there aren't some parts of Afghanistan (and probably some parts of almost each Province) that are safe enough to travel around with a smaller signature, and in those places (again, probably not in the east) more blending should be allowed, given whatever the most recent comprehensive credible threat reporting is.
An alternative to ensuring security with more lightly armored vehicles would be easing the restriction on operating with the ANSF as escorts, particularly in places where we have or are about to transition security to ANSF control. This would show the Afghan people that we have confidence in their security forces, just as we preach that they should too. If commanders at higher levels aren't willing allow the ANSF to take a greater role in securing US/CF, then we are undermining our own IO campaign that CF is making strides in providing them with a government that can protect them.
If we are only going to pay lip-service to the ANSF, and force PRTs and other governance-developing facilitators to continue to use MRAPs and the like around the entire battlefield, then we really should examine why we are staying until 2014 and wasting tax-payers money to create an illusion.
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