By Maj. Douglas Pryer, US Army
Best Defense guest columnist

It is increasingly clear that the most significant military outcome of the Information Revolution has been the magnification of the importance of war's moral dimension. Or, to put this more simply, moral judgment and this judgment's effects on the fighting spirit of nations and warriors matter today more than ever.

That moral considerations are the most important ones in war is nothing new. Great military theorists have long emphasized their primacy in war.

To Sun Tzu, those "who excel in war first cultivate their own humanity and justice and maintain their laws and institutions." By doing so, warriors "make their governments invincible." In On War, Clausewitz described war in its pure, idealized form as one in which violence is applied without restraint. But he also understood that actually waging war in such a manner is impossible: social conditions, political limitations, and other sources of moral "friction" all serve to temper war's violence. It is by understanding such practical constraints that "real wars" -- wars as they must actually be fought and strategized -- are won.

More recently, Colonel John R. Boyd declared that grand strategy needs to have "a moral design." The "name of the game" in warfare, he stated, is to "preserve or build-up our moral authority while compromising that of our adversaries in order to pump-up our resolve, drain-away adversaries' resolve, and attract them as well as others to our cause and way of life."

What is new, however, is the exponentially-increasing importance of moral considerations.

In today's wired world, the moral judgments of communities cohere with far greater consistency and power than they did historically. Within the community of nations, for example, the Law of Armed Conflict and the Just War Tradition in which this law is embedded are now widely accepted. For a nation to ignore this fact is for it to risk, not just pariah status, but also economic sanctions and the indictment of its leaders by international criminal courts.

But such moral flattening at the global level does not mean that the idiosyncratic values of smaller communities do not matter. Paradoxically, perhaps, they matter more than ever. Witness the rising strength of the "Arab Street"-of one ethnic community's collective moral judgment-as put on display during the Arab Spring. Or, witness our own country's long struggle against a media-empowered jihadist movement, al Qaeda, and two largely ethnic insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan: like Hercules in his battle against the multi-headed hydra, the more heads of the beast that America has physically severed, the larger and more dangerous the monster has grown.

This is not to say that the U.S. government and our military are not taking war's moral dimension seriously. We are. The 2006 U.S. Army and Marine counterinsurgency manual was well-grounded in moral ideas-ideas that helped engineer a much more successful approach in Iraq. New recruits now receive extensive instruction on the Law of War. In 2008, the Army stood up the Center for the Army Profession and Ethic to "reinforce the Profession of Arms, Army Ethic, and culture." And "culture training," which is really just moral awareness training regarding the locals on a given battlefield, has received much more attention in both the Army and Marines.  

But unsupported by any substantial shift in resources or foreign policy, such measures are proving inadequate. Most shamefully, the moral "hits" our troops generate in Iraq and Afghanistan -- as demonstrated by the 2010 "murder for fun" tragedy -- just keep on coming.

The resistance of military procurement processes to moral ideas is one reason for the U.S.'s long string of moral defeats in Iraq and Afghanistan. To effect better outcomes from today's conflicts, the U.S. government must first spend less on "hard power" (missiles, fighters, submarines, and robots) and more on "soft power" (diplomacy, economics, and information). Also, when the U.S. government strays far from using the American military for its Constitutionally-ordained purpose of defending the republic (a purpose attracting the long-term approbation of nearly all Americans), it must attempt extraordinary, costly, and sometimes impossible measures to sustain at home a sense of moral legitimacy and the will to fight.

Truly, operating with moral awareness at all command levels -- to include the national command level -- requires a whole of government approach.

But there are certainly steps our military alone can take to display greater moral awareness and help America achieve better outcomes from its foreign conflicts. In general, our military needs to spend less on kinetic-focused intranet and more on ensuring we are communicating the right message via the internet and our actions to key communities -- Americans at home, the international community, and influential ethnic, political, religious, and social communities on our battlegrounds.

Specifically, steps our military must take include the following:

(1) In the quixotic quest to give U.S. troops "information dominance" on the battlefield, the American GI has slowly assumed a sci-fi, cyborg-like appearance. One might as well expect a Star Wars village of Ewoks to embrace Imperial Storm troopers as expect the village elders of third-world countries to welcome hardware-encumbered American soldiers surrounded by small land robots and flying R2D2s. Our troops certainly need the best armor they can receive as they move about on today's IED-strewn battlefields. But rather than spend billions on extensive communications systems and remote-controlled robots, we would be wiser to rely instead on more robust culture and ethics training, human intelligence collection, and intelligence analysis.

(2) U.S. military regulations and doctrine are a babble of discordant voices on the subject of the American profession of arms. DoD and joint regulations differ on the core values of service members, and each service has its own unique set of values and definitions. Worse, scriptures like the Army's Soldier Creed and Warrior Ethos actually promote such amoral qualities as blind obedience to authority, devotion to technical competence and kinetic action, and a win-at-any-cost attitude. Also, even though our counterinsurgency manual declares boldly that if we lose "moral legitimacy," we "lose the war," this crucial idea is largely ignored in other DoD, joint, and service manuals. We do not need more doctrine about the American profession of arms-quite the contrary. What we need is doctrine that is clearer, more ethical, better taught and understood, and more consistent across all of the services.

(3) Ethics training in most line units has changed little in recent years. In the Army, it usually consists of an annual or pre-deployment PowerPoint lecture delivered by a lawyer or chaplain. This training needs to be command business. As one executive officer for a cavalry squadron put it: "I guess I'm a simple guy, but from my combat experience, having a battalion commander talk to every soldier about coming home with their honor intact worked." Furthermore, operations officers-not lawyers or chaplains-need to be this training's primary staff proponent, and these officers need to be resourced so they can integrate moral considerations into training at all levels. For example, troops need to practice the principles of discrimination and restraint on all live-fire exercises, to include tank tables and weapons qualification ranges.

(4) We are by far the most classified military generation in U.S. history. Our default setting for keeping documents classified is decades rather than months or a couple years. Nearly all of the computers and networks supporting combat operations are classified systems, and almost everyone using these systems routinely classifies the traffic they generate-even when there is no reason for secrecy. This lack of transparency is a shame, for U.S. service members conduct themselves much better on the battlefield than many people realize. However, without sweeping and expensive changes to how the U.S. military manages information, we will continue to struggle to convince the world that the civilian deaths we cause are mistakes or that an atrocity committed by a service member is an aberration.

(5) Staff planning models should be updated to reflect the importance of maintaining a moral advantage over the enemy. Field Manual 3-0, Operations, does have a useful discussion on the importance of moral concerns to determining a side's "center of gravity," but the importance of maintaining a moral advantage over the enemy is less clear and largely missed in this doctrine. Additionally, when staffs assess possible courses of action, evaluation criteria should focus on such moral questions as: Which course of action (COA) should best promote the legitimacy of the host nation government? Which COA should result in fewer U.S.-inflicted civilian deaths and injuries and less property destruction? Similarly, the "measures of effectiveness" for a strategy, campaign, or mission order should reflect the same moral questions: Has the legitimacy of the host nation government actually increased? Have U.S. forces inflicted fewer civilian deaths and injuries and less property destruction? And so on.

(6) Once a leader or soldier is commissioned or enlisted, his professional military education rarely touches upon the subject of ethics. The vast majority of military schools-even those lasting a year-do not require more than a few hours of ethics-related instruction. Even at West Point, where ethics education probably surpasses that of any other military institution, the curriculum is relegated to the second-year of college, and cadets largely overwrite those principles and forget about them in the final two years of study. Philosophy in general is remembered as an amusing afterthought for most cadets by the time they graduate. Considering the moral nature of our military defeats in recent years (Abu Ghraib, Gitmo, Haditha, Mahmudiya, etc.) as well as the sometimes close relationship between PTSD and the unresolved ethical questions of PTSD's sufferers, we must clearly do a far better job of providing ethical guidance and a mechanism for building inner spiritual armor to service members before sending them to combat.

Napoleon once observed that "morale is to the physical as three is to one." (High and low morale is inseparably intertwined with moral judgment. Indeed, there is very little difference between having a sense of moral purpose and possessing the will to fight.) Today, thanks to the Information Revolution, it is no overstatement to say that the moral is to the physical as ten is to one, and this relative importance promises only to grow. Whichever side maintains the moral advantage in a 21st-century conflict (that is, best declares and wages war in accordance with the ethical expectations of the communities upon which it depends for victory) has the best chance of ultimately "winning."

The 2006 counterinsurgency manual was the first of several strong steps our military has taken to ensure leaders and troops operate with moral awareness at all command levels. But these steps are not nearly strong enough. We must do much more if we are to earn better outcomes from our armed conflicts abroad-and at a much more acceptable cost in blood and American treasure.

Major Douglas A. Pryer is the winner of several military writing awards and the author of The Fight for the High Ground: The U.S. Army and Interrogation during Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003 - April 2004. This guest blog is Major Pryer's work and does not reflect the opinions/policies of the U.S. Army or perhaps even those of Albert Pujols. Specifically, it derives from three essays: "Controlling the Beast Within: The Key to Success on 21st-Century Battlefields" and "Steering America's Warship toward Real Communication (and Success) in the 21st Century," which won the 2010 and 2011 General William E. DePuy writing competitions respectively; and "War is a Moral Force: Designing a More Viable Strategy for the Information Age," which was co-written by Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Peter Fromm and Major Kevin Cutright and which will be presented by Fromm and Cutright at the 2011 U.S. Army Command and General Staff Ethics Symposium at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, on Nov. 7-10.

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OMPHALOS

12:06 PM ET

October 20, 2011

This is your brain...

This is your brain on war....

Ho hum.

I'll start paying attention when I see texts like _Fighting the War of Ideas Like a Real War_ on more big-chief-muckety-mucks' reading lists. But I'm not holding my breath.

And while we're doling out assignments... Howsa 'bout every congressman and woman (hell, why not every citizen?) having as mandatory viewing the video Michael Yon (NOT shilling for the guy, BTW) posted to his blog the other day.

http://www.michaelyon-online.com/watch-your-step.htm
Don't adjust your volume. Things get busy at about the 00:50 mark...

 

GOLD STAR FATHER

12:07 PM ET

October 20, 2011

Fine and dandy

However the moral stance during urban combat (OEF/OIF) might very well break down when survival and mission accomplishment trump moral coded ROE.
An ROE that protects civilians to the detriment of troops in contact produces casualties far more than generally accepted or desired. Move this moral code down to house clearing; if a grenade into a room precedes troops going through the fatal funnel, the survival rate of the troops is far greater. Who is really at fault if civilians are killed/injured from that grenade, the attacking force or the insurgents who use civilians as shields? Insurgeants who know the ROE as well as we do scoff at the moralities of Western troops in the recent troubles in the sandbox. Their propaganda beats our moral code in the courts of world opinion fueled by media.

Morality works in the macro, not the micro.

 

TTC

12:32 PM ET

October 20, 2011

Haditha

This kind of thinking results in incidents like Haditha -- a lot of civilians dead, and no closer to ending the war or accomplishing our mission.

 

JPWREL

12:48 PM ET

October 20, 2011

GSF, very well said. Ground

GSF, very well said.

Ground troops must deal with the moral ambiguities of combat. The trade off between mission success and force protection will always be a fine line that cannot be easily judged from an armchair.

However, the question that comes into my mind is what is the moral stricture that governs a Hellfire missile launched by a Predator that may kill the intended target but also destroys innocent life? The Predator is merely a robot at one end of a cyber network thus the risk to its safety one would assume is not a relevant variable in the equation of mission success vs. innocent lives destroyed?

 

ERIC_STRATTONIII

1:35 PM ET

October 20, 2011

@GSF

GSF, really well said and your thoughts are based on what actually happens in a high threat environment in the middle of combat at the small unit level.

TTC, you want to cough up the dough to train and equip every Marine and Soldier in Hostage Rescue CQC then you can talk about what they should have done, while your at it, you might want to look back as near as Korea and WWII when American Soldiers often did the same thing during urban combat such as throwing grenades in rooms before entering to clear them. If you know civilians are there and can spare them, by all means do whatever you can but there comes a point when it is just not always realistic in a combat situation.

 

TTC

3:53 PM ET

October 20, 2011

Iraq like WWII?

Yes, and we also firebombed cities and destroyed every church steeple between Normandy and the Elbe.

The enemy-based approach to Iraq, and the emphasis on force protection, explains why the first half of the Iraq war was an abject failure. Some guy named Ricks wrote a book on it I think.

 

PICKYOURBATTLES.NET

4:34 PM ET

October 20, 2011

This is more important than you think

GSF, I need to read this article a couple more times. I admit that, but I'm responding anyway. Tired after working all night and I don't have the energy, so I'll apologize later and take my lumps as required. Couple things in this article kind of rubbed me wrong, but I love the fact that somebody is talking about ethics and morality and what the American people think. Even if it has this political "will of the people" dimension, ie factoring in the will of America like it's a AAA emplacement in enemy territory, just another factor that must be analyzed on this chess board we call war. I understand it, but that brings me to my response to you.

This isn't just a philosophical, in the weeds, nicety that doesn't apply on the ground when bullets are flying. I wish it were, but it's not. The ethical and moral mistakes that are being made by us today are so huge, so far removed from the trenches, that they eclipse the human pyramid pictures in Iraq and even the killing sprees by so called rogue units. They are so basic, and so important, that this topic absolutely needs to be discussed in great detail, in my view. I'm glad Mr. Ricks posted this, it's the most relevant post I've seen here.

If we win American hearts and minds, and win those of our enemies too, but we politically and legally and "spiritually" sacrifice ourselves to do so, have we won? What if the WE of before is no longer the victorious WE of now? The ethical and moral questions we face today are not the hippie musings you might find on a liberal college campus. They're real. They are the rule of law and our American political processes.

Put another way, if our politicians and Generals had a magical device that allowed them to lose the war(s) against our enemies, at the expense of a recorded American loss OR to win the war(s) against our enemies, in exchange for a Soviet win, what should they choose? Is it worth remaining the United States and losing, instead of bargaining with the devil and winning as a country that can't honestly be defined as the America we were handed by generations before? That's the question. Who are WE, and how valuable is strategy to win, if it sacrifices that? Those are moral and ethical questions not far removed from legal questions.

I'm not a smart man, but in college I majored in religion and I minored in philosophy. Beyond that, I have done things I don't like in combat operations, on several occasions. I can justify them, and I can sleep at night just fine. I drew a line ethically. I felt my line was pretty far forward, and I never thought I'd be asked to cross it... But the issues we face with ethics and morality today are not so easily wiped away with "fog and friction" and troops in contact. That kind of language has its place, but it can't be used to excuse the kind of unethical and immoral and un-American action that is being taken today in the name of winning wars. It's an important issue.

In my opinion, and I'm tired, so I'm going to bed.

 

ERIC_STRATTONIII

8:09 PM ET

October 20, 2011

@TTC

"Yes, and we also firebombed cities and destroyed every church steeple between Normandy and the Elbe."- firebombing whole cities is hardly the micro level and I am pretty sure I was specific in my example that we are talking about small units or ground troops.

"The enemy-based approach to Iraq, and the emphasis on force protection, explains why the first half of the Iraq war was an abject failure. Some guy named Ricks wrote a book on it I think"- Yeah, I think the Military with the help of a guy name Kilcullen wrote one too and going after and killing insurgents is part of it but you have to do your best to protect the populations as well, doing this on a large scale and would be what is called the macro level.

What GSF is talking about, please correct me if I am wrong GSF, is that in small unit actions in an urban environment morality is not that clear cut. For example, if a platoon or squad is getting effective Small Arms Fire (SAF) from a building to include Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) they most likely will not get Close Air Support (CAS) or Indirect Fire (IDF) to hit that building, a Strategic (Macro) moral choice to show the locals we are doing our best (Not always the best call though) to spare civilians. Those same troops will have to clear that building and they will or at least should clear that building by throwing in a grenade first, if civilians are inside, while that is tragic, it is hardly an immoral choice made by the people assaulting that building. The immoral choice was made by the insurgents, not the troops and is better than either a slew of our troops being killed or more buildings that surround the one being used by the insurgents from being flattened by an air or artillery strike. It also, at times,might be the moral choice to use a large strike on that building, it just not that clear cut . It is the difference between what sounds good on a Post Grad Paper or in a Military Professional Magazine or on a blog and what is the reality in the field.

 

JPWREL

8:24 PM ET

October 20, 2011

ERIC, good response right on

ERIC, good response right on the money.

 

GOLD STAR FATHER

9:12 PM ET

October 20, 2011

Of Apples and Oranges

@TTC and Pick; Thank you for my freedom to respond. Welcome home.
I say none of that with any sarcasm. I mean it. You did what you were ordered to do. I did it too.
Haditha. Shit, is that a standard? From my view point, the full truth is not out yet and won't be until/if SSgt Wuterich's trial hapens. I will not go all Murtha on the situation and I haven't read the investigation reports, but on face value--it doesn't look good. Be as that may, it is not what I was originally speaking of. Murder does happen in a combat zone and Major Pryer speaks of that in his piece above. Haditha and the ROE's that have existed are two distinct things. Apples and Oranges
@Pick speaks of this dilemma and very rightly talks of the moral problem of troops in contact. My original post was just my affirmation, and I believe that Maj P speaks of the same, of the morality of waging war. I took it to the lowest level- rounds flying. JPWREL dives into the periphery of morality too-what do we do at the trigger pull moment? Who can justify all this?
I'll (just have to) throw in a personal perspective. (ESIII show me some slack.) This is the time of the year that I remember my own flesh and blood's KIA. I lost him as I originally wrote: going through the door; I believe, after much investigation and analysis, the ROE was flawed. If a grenade was used first, I just might be busting chops with a guy who loved the Bills as I follow the Giants. Now I speak to empty air, still expecting a call back. I'm left to ponder "morality".
Point is that I do believe that the morality, as Major Pryor outlines (although I get lost in the weeds with the 1 through 6 approach) was not done at the National level. Therefore, what happens next--the obvious: subordinate units are ordered into combat and they do what they do. I did not agree with a combat action against Iraq, but I did (eventually) agree that my obligated son must go. We do what we are trained and ordered to do. The borderline of legitimacy and morality was breached (in my opinion) but I put my first born on the plane and praised his responsibility and cryed for his participation in a foolish adventure. We both held up our right hands and repeated the words.
So now what? He, like a lot of you, traveled to an active AO. WTF? Who advocated an ROE that would tie his hands? If you send the troops into "harm's way" dammit fight to win and perform a mission, then get the hell out.
BS to the waivering, the rules change the 5 pages of Bremmer Stupids, the "Oh yeah, we need a surge". If you (America) is going to do this, you have must have gone through the machinations of legal, political, moral obligations that you must do and decided that invasion and occupation of another country is the way forward, and then dammit, let your troops win. You (Executive and Legislative branches) authorized this...so do it.
Therein lies the rub. The die was cast but now we are held back because the planning was flawed, the politics dictate the tactics, and we don't know what to do when Americans are hung from bridges other than knee jerk reactions.
I know the ramifications of a shit sandwich first hand. I just don't believe that Federal level decision makers do. We are now obligated to pull all troops out of Iraq by 12/31. F me but I'm not going to pop champagne for that. It will be unnoticed by virtually all in this country, an oblivious population who never really gave a shit about it all while it was happening. I suspect that AFG operations will just the same melt away in the Nation's conciousness too.
Argument over morality at this point is just more fodder for service schools to debate. Most of us out in the hinterlands won't care or believe that anything will come of it.
To ESIII and others participating in what you do in AFG: I'm sorry, East Podunk Iowa doesn't care. Doesn't know where Afghanistan is on the map and many don't know youa are there. Please just come home.
@Pick, this isn't what I intended to write for I am tired too. Not just because it is late on the east coast, I'm tired of attempts at justifying, analyzing, rehashing morality in regard to the events of the last decade in the morning and afternoon too.
Sorry Tyrtaios, RVN SF and others, but "It don't mean nothin'".

 

GOLD STAR FATHER

9:19 PM ET

October 20, 2011

Confession

Tom, I busted Rule 19. Happens occasionally.

 

HUNTER

7:48 AM ET

October 21, 2011

GSF

Terrible story you shared, but glad you shared it.

But now I must say I still think your premise is slightly flawed. Tis true many of these moral decisions should have been made before and weren't. That's the macro problem. But as long as our troops are in contact this discussion should continue. That's the micro problem.

I (and I think I can speak for Pryer) believe that our morality is sacrosanct, not dependent on the whims of the foe we are engaged in. There's really only one standard of behavior. We may argue over small thin line points. But I think the crucial elements of this notion are 1) We serve at the behest and in service to the American people, we represent their interests - even when they remain disinterested, sigh 2) We act in the way that we believe is appropriate, see the Soldier Rules, a too late innovation for this war that isn't as highly publicized as it should, we do this knowing that our enemy won't necessarily reciprocate 3) we do these things first because they are right, second because they facilitate battlefield success, utility, and third because to do otherwise puts our soldiers at risk for psychological/mental damage that exceeds that of the just your everyday shitty day in combat. This is what led me to stand in front of my 600 and say - almost direct quote - "I don't want you to come home physically well, but mentally broken because you did something you shouldn't have." (You, GSF, know well my concerns as they relate to PTSD and suicide)

There's the absolutist argument and the consequentialist argument. But morality which sways with the time or place doesn't seem to be a morality to me at all.

Kudos to Pryer for bringing this up, but let me say as someone in the schoolhouse right now this is a big subject. The Army is talking about this, not as much as I might like but they are talking...and I am writing.

 

ERIC_STRATTONIII

4:18 PM ET

October 24, 2011

@Hunter

What exactly are you advocating in regard to morals, ethics and ROEs?

 

GOLD STAR FATHER

5:20 PM ET

October 24, 2011

Actually,

an extremely good question and probably one that Hunter needs to raise at NWC level. Pull that morality issue down to the ROE level and leader's responsibility to perform the mission and protect the troop concurrently. I suspect that you are already debating that one, and ESIII and others have legit input into this academic calculus.
It goes further into the issue of well, lengthening the war. Has morality (with nasty politics and dumb-sit decisions) caused this F'in thing to extend a full decade? This goes beyond predictions, political cycles and (GSMother hates this one) basic common sense.

 

ERIC_STRATTONIII

5:43 PM ET

October 24, 2011

@GSF

I hope they are taking input from guys on the ground GSF and think your basic premise in your earlier post, as I understand it, is correct. Unfortunately I often see 05's, 06's and almost always GOs forget basic "ground truths" and often make their choices with good intentions couple with grand ideas but rarely realistic goals and even more rarely with tactical level input. In other words, they (the senior officer corps) often do not think how their strategy will really effect the "boots on the ground". I doubt that the Army (or any other branch) has now magically gotten realistic in their approach to morals, ethics and ROEs.

 

ORCUSPAY

12:28 PM ET

October 20, 2011

Transparency

Nice to hear someone in the Army arguing for greater transparency.

 

HUCKLEBERRY

12:35 PM ET

October 20, 2011

Just War

"In today's wired world, the moral judgments of communities cohere with far greater consistency and power than they did historically. Within the community of nations, for example, the Law of Armed Conflict and the Just War Tradition in which this law is embedded are now widely accepted. "

Do we mean St. Augustin's formulation of the Just War, or latter-day academics pontifications on the subject?

As I recall, the refined Roman Catholic view of Augustin's formulation goes something like this:

War must be declared by a legitimate authority.
War must be a last result.
The Objective of the War must be greater than the expected damage it will cost.
No means may be employed that are, in themselves, immoral.

By this reckoning, the Iraq invasion was, from the beginning, a violation of the first three criteria. In execution, it eventually came to violate the fourth (in its treatment of POWs).

What does the soldier, when faced with such clear violations, do? Should the officer corps have resigned en masse before the war? What are the moral implications of participation in an Unjust war? How is a soldier to decide when the apparently legal authority (John Woo) contradicts the moral (Just War)?

I think this notion, that there is a greater moral coherence with regard to anything in "todays wired world," is utterly wrong, in warfare and everything else. Before the advent of this technology, it was far easier to arrange a moral coherence, both through state-control of information flows and by the simple absence of widespread means of communication. From what I have viewed on the internet, I don't see any moral coherence at all.

While certain aspects of Just War tradition (immoral means such as using chemical weaponry or shooting civilians) are widely accepted, these have little or nothing to do with internet technology, the former having preceded the latter by decades, and everything to do with the experiences of total war in the mid-Twentieth century.

Finally, all this talk of "outcomes" hurts my ears. Is this what we are our after these days, instead of victory? Is it possible to have focused morals when pursuing something as apparently unfocused as outcomes? I don't think this is a matter of mere semantics. I would suggest that if we start after "better outcomes" there is no way we can use Just War criteria to evaluate whether or not we ought to starting out at all.

 

JPWREL

1:10 PM ET

October 20, 2011

Whether it is St. Augustine

Whether it is St. Augustine or St. Thomas Aquinas, theories of ‘Just War’ formulated under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church makes one wonder about the motive for such a philosophical effort? Perhaps the reason may lie in the desire of the ancient Church to construct a moral basis in order to excuse its tendency to wage war by fire and blade upon those who did not accept its ecclesiastical suzerainty? Wars fought in God’s name could hardly be immoral.

 

HUCKLEBERRY

1:23 PM ET

October 20, 2011

Actually

Augustin's motive, so far as we know, was to provide a justification for Christian participation in the defense of the late Roman empire against the Goths.

What Aquinas was thinking I do not know, but some suggest that he was concerned more with war among Christian kingdoms - pretty common in 13th century Europe - than between Christians and their enemies.

 

STEVE C

11:39 PM ET

October 20, 2011

Morality......

....is something of a red herring in this discussion - one to which Maj Pryer alludes in his 5th point.

Framing an argument around a moral equivalence with the "insurgent" is a refusal to face some realities: his (the guerilla) struggle is legitimized by a response he can extract from the counterinsurgent - in this case, the occupying force. This is a practical consideration on his part, not an issue of morality or ethics. He is not launching his attack from within the population in order to provide himself with protection but to hold out a seemingly irresistable opportunity for his opponent to respond in a way that is self-defeating to his mission. Oblige him at your peril because the available data suggests that you, not he, will pay the price in opprobrium and injury to a much sought after legitimacy.

The view of the population (the battlefield of modern war) will not be that they were being abused by the guerilla (whose fundamental aims they possibly share) but that a well trained and equipped foreign force held their own lives to a higher value than their own and that the foreign soldiers were more than willing to transfer the risk of death or injury to the civillians than accept it for themselves.

To ES III's comments: Are those really the only options - CAS or house clearing? What about refusing battle? Isn't that a reasonable alternative? Spin out the possible consequences of each course of action and see which one has the best likelihood of tactically supporting the strategic goal. This may not be the favored option of the warrior but that, again, is missing the point.

The modern theater of war, into which the United States has chosen to thrust its military - but refuses to stomach the price of success - will not be forgiving of forcing the local citizenry to shoulder the cost.

 

HUCKLEBERRY

3:18 AM ET

October 21, 2011

Red Herring

I don't understand this. How can morality be a red herring? The author uses "moral" in his title and ten more times in the essay.

I like what this piece is trying to do, just not how it is doing it.

It is not that there exists a greater moral coherence in a wired world, but that there exists a greater opportunity to view moral hypocrisy in warfare, over and over, courtesy of Youtube.

This is bad enough. Such discrepancies between intention and action can become iconic - regardless of context. I am thinking here about the famous shot of that suspected VC being summarily executed during the Tet offensive. Or that little napalmed girl running down the road four years later.

But what is far, far worse is when moral hypocrises are perpetrated by those who were ordered to war using the language of messianic moralism and divine sanction.

The messy gap between the means and ends of war is real and will never be closed - I don't think there is much argument there. But consistently holding the moral high ground has been rendered pretty much impossible by the camera phone. It makes no difference whether the ends and means of the campaign is licit according to one side's notion of it (be it based on Augustine or John Yoo) - there will be a gap, and it will be messy - especially when it is edited into a video and set to hip hop.

 

ERIC_STRATTONIII

5:40 AM ET

October 21, 2011

Yes Steve C.

Refusing to engage? Really? I hope you will think about where that leads, especially in a counter-insurgency campaign and how that would then influence the insurgents Tactics, Techniques and Procedures. What would you do in the insurgents shoes if in order to shoot at the counter-insurgent forces and avoid any consequences for those actions you could just terrorize the local populace and hit your enemy by engaging from occupied homes? Wouldn't that then become your Standard Operating Procedure? Again, some of the views I see posted or even written as guests are just not practical and often avoid reality.

 

STEVE C

8:21 AM ET

October 21, 2011

@Eric

"Wouldn't that then become your Standard Operating Procedure?"

According to some - including you - that's already the case, along with the assumption that he does so out of cowardice and in order to avoid the consequences of his actions even when it has been demonstrated time and again that the tactic does not work to that effect.

First of all, in all the time I have spent among Iraqis and Afghans, I haven't once heard a complaint that insurgents were using them as human shields. Really, not once in years of day to day contact. What I did hear them complain of was the escalation of force, particularly by US troops. It doesn't matter whether or not that complaint is justified, it just exists. And that perception of guilt becomes the reality you must deal with. Or fail.

I am not saying that your underlying assumptions are wrong - though I haven't seen them particularly well tested either and I've heard the same arguments from both sides in a number of conflicts.

Let's alter one assumption for a moment and see how it changes the game. Let's say that the insurgent or, more likely, his commander, is a wily bastard who sites himself within the community, not in order to save his own ass but to draw a violent response from the counterinsurgent. He may also have pre-planned his exit route. If he's done his reading (and you really should assume that he has) then he will know that to elicit a reaction that favors force protection over mission success, is another step - for him - on the road to victory.

Your overall analysis is skewed toward self-preservation (and I'm sympathetic to that) but that doesn't get you where you need to go. I think I've said it before here but it's worth repeating my mangling of a Rummy quote: You go to war with the enemy you have, not the one you wished you had.

 

ERIC_STRATTONIII

10:17 AM ET

October 21, 2011

@Steve C.

No Steve, it has not become an SOP, nor did I say it was, it happens but it is not an actual SOP by the insurgents. This debate was about the morality of conflict and how as nice as what the guest writer put up on this blog is it just does not jive with reality, to include your opinion about not engaging. The situation I used is an example and disengaging the enemy is not really an option in that case, you will have to come back and clear them out eventually if you want to secure that village and the safest and least civilian casualty causing way to do that is via ground troops. You claim the assumption is that the insurgent leader is doing this out of cowardice when he occupies the building? No one said that, it is a practical but yet immoral choice, not cowardice.

"First of all, in all the time I have spent among Iraqis and Afghans, I haven't once heard a complaint that insurgents were using them as human shields. Really, not once in years of day to day contact."- I almost cracked up at this comment. In my multiple deployments to the same place, we did not really ask that question nor did we hear about it either, usually it was about how they had no "taliban", no "al queda" but wanted medical and vet aid. Odd huh that they would say that? No taliban or AQ but yet IEDs all around, strange. We still none the less provided medical and vet aid and worked on getting them roads and involved if we could and then oddly again, there was indeed taliban in the area. Strange huh?

"Let's alter one assumption for a moment and see how it changes the game. Let's say that the insurgent or, more likely, his commander, is a wily bastard who sites himself within the community, not in order to save his own ass but to draw a violent response from the counterinsurgent. He may also have pre-planned his exit route. If he's done his reading (and you really should assume that he has) then he will know that to elicit a reaction that favors force protection over mission success, is another step - for him - on the road to victory."- Really? I never would have thought of that MOTO. ;) Also, he is in the community, eventually you will have to go in and get him, maybe you can go at night? Ooops...nope, can't do that unless you have really good cause, it might insult the home owner, but let's say you do so to minmize casualties on both sides. You start with a tactical call out and when that fails you are back to using small arms and men to clear him out of a home there, a home which by the way is set up like a fort. Next hypothetical please.

"Your overall analysis is skewed toward self-preservation (and I'm sympathetic to that) but that doesn't get you where you need to go. I think I've said it before here but it's worth repeating my mangling of a Rummy quote: You go to war with the enemy you have, not the one you wished you had."- One, yes, it is but it is also geared towards the big picture. If you really think that dis-engaging from the enemy every time in a situation like that will somehow lead you to "where you need to go" I can only hope you were not leading men in combat. Using troops on the ground, providing support and protection for the villagers and minimizing civilian casualties as best as possible go to getting us where we "need to go" and our information operations campaign is getting better at getting the word out. As for the Rummy quote, these guys and their tactics are nothing new, to quote another poster "read history".

"I am not saying that your underlying assumptions are wrong - though I haven't seen them particularly well tested either and I've heard the same arguments from both sides in a number of conflicts."-I have seen them tested, we are doing pretty well at the tactical level, which is what this mini-debate has been about, it also goes to the helping at the stategic level by using ground forces vice air units when clearing villages but those villages have to be cleared none the less.

Last point, what we are talking about here mostly relates to small units in a COIN environment, it becomes even less clear cut when doing straight urban assault in a place like the second battle of Falujah for example. Again, your view sounds great on paper, does not cut it when you are on a two way range.

 

BEARCAT

1:31 PM ET

October 20, 2011

Read History

"High and low morale is inseparably intertwined with moral judgment. Indeed, there is very little difference between having a sense of moral purpose and possessing the will to fight"

This sound like "Trial By Combat". There is a lot of history that show this is not the case. The bad guys would never win if this were actually true.

 

HUNTER

3:42 PM ET

October 20, 2011

Damn you Pryer

You took my freaking Sun Tzu epigraph. Seriously, stop writing for awhile.

(Just kidding, but c'mon)

 

HUNTER

3:59 PM ET

October 20, 2011

OK

Just about all the rest of the stuff too ; ) (I just sent you my first draft Doug, look for it on AKO).

 

IBARVETERAN

5:07 PM ET

October 20, 2011

Pin the tail on the insurgent

Seems like Afghanistan figured this out. I love the fact that the UN and news media now insert context into their reporting of the crisis-du-jour an admission and recognition that the vast majority of civilian casualties are caused by the Taliban.

That is not happening by accident, and is the "compromising [moral underpinnings] of our adversaries" from the Boyd quote that must be done concurrently with getting our own house as straight as combat's realities and unit training/discipline permit.

 

J.D

8:09 AM ET

October 21, 2011

hard sciences vs soft sciences

all of our services love to deal with hard science "stuff" (weapons systems, technology, platforms, etc) and thusly spend the majority of resources (time and $$) on this stuff....

soft science stuff (leader development, real mentoring, counseling, behavioral issues, moral/ethical development, etc) is just too damn hard....

oh well....

 

SOCAL55

11:54 AM ET

October 21, 2011

There are wars, WWII, and then there are wars, Iraq, Vietnam

Does the moral situation change when one is part of an invading and occupying force Should there be any kind of moral restraint on the actions of the occupying force?, Invading and occupying Iraq was purely our choice and outside of a few Iraqi expats who profited hugely I don't think that the average Iraqi would thank us for destroying their country.

We had clear practical and moral reasons for invading Afghanistan but what we are doing there now, 10 years latter, seems to have moved far afield from our original aims and cannot be so easily justified beyond a vague notion that whatever the cost we don't want to lose.

One can always justify their actions as ultimately moral but that is also relative. I'm sure that the Taliban within their own cultural context think that they are the good guys as did the Nazis.

 

DELTA22

12:52 AM ET

October 22, 2011

a

'The "name of the game" in warfare, he stated, is to "preserve or build-up our moral authority while compromising that of our adversaries in order to pump-up our resolve, drain-away adversaries' resolve, and attract them as well as others to our cause and way of life." '

You know, you have to wonder if this thought ever crossed the mind of Dick Cheney.

 

PYORTR

8:31 AM ET

October 26, 2011

Cooking the narrative

Today, the United States has to take stronger steps to ensure our leaders and soldiers possess the professional education, training, and principles they need to become moral exemplars on the battlefield. The more we blind ourselves to moral realities in combat (and out of the understandable desire for self-preservation, refuse to face that it is in fact a moral sphere), the worse off we will be in the long run. The first three years in Iraq proved this universal to us in spades. What that experience told us was that we need to better define how to achieve and assess “legitimacy” as it applies to direct military action in support of a sound strategy. Legitimacy means fully incorporating a tradition that is internationally authoritative and centuries-wise, that of genuinely just wars (and not wars with a cooked narrative). To argue over what "just war" is -- according to this or that theorist -- misses the point, which is that moral understanding is increasing in solidarity because of technology. This is a practical issue for those who think morality in combat is a hopeless dream of idealists. We have to understand that means connect to ends in a world where everyone has a cell phone camera. Every shooter has to know that his actions will be judged, and that judgment will have a price paid for by his buddies or fellow soldiers down the road. Too often, U.S. military professionals view moral considerations as an extraneous hindrance to war’s conduct or they misapprehend the real moral object. We need to get better focussed on actions. Check out the book "Lethal Warriors: When the New Band of Brothers Came Home."

 

ERIC_STRATTONIII

9:01 PM ET

October 26, 2011

No one views morals and ethics that way

What we do not expect is for people who are not shooting or being shot at to think we are cops, should wait till we are shot at before returning fire or many of the other classics people ignorant of reality cry about-"he shot him in the back!" , "the guy was already wounded, why did they shoot him again?!", "Why did they shoot him so many times?!", etc...etc...none based on actual combat realities, how humans react or perform in combat, the laws of land warfare yet still so many naive views that are taken seriously. Those type of public opinion "morals" based on TV, the movies or whatever silly media source the ideas may come from are what most in the military consider a hinderance.

 

PYORTR

8:42 AM ET

October 28, 2011

@ERIC_STRATTONIII

I can't figure out what you are saying. My own point is that, for example, if a shooter decides to waste a bunch of folks on mere suspicion, I think we have a serious moral problem. After that extreme example, things get trickier, but the example serves to make my point that right and wrong do exist. No one is trying to shackle the shooter here. No one is arguing for moral sainthood or perfect control in combat. The issue is to work harder so that shooters are put in positions where killing has a greater chance of being "right," and once there, shooters should approach their tasks with as much nobility as they can muster. I think the vast majority already do that. Still, we should prepare them for that situation as best we can. Because . . . in the modern world, this issue has developed important strategic ramifications. If you are saying there is no such thing as "right," except in the movies or some other "silly" place, well, then I guess we cannot have a conversation.

 

ERIC_STRATTONIII

12:42 PM ET

October 29, 2011

@Poytr

You did not say that "My own point is that, for example, if a shooter decides to waste a bunch of folks on mere suspicion, I think we have a serious moral problem. After that extreme example, things get trickier, but the example serves to make my point that right and wrong do exist." or use that as an example in prior posts and I have seen people over and over again, to include those in the military advocate for a use of force more akin to policing in the US than in a combat zone. Usually those people who advocate such things have never been in combat and more often than not have not even been in the military. So while you may think that "No one is trying to shackle the shooter here. No one is arguing for moral sainthood or perfect control in combat.", far too often they are and our leaders, GOs and many others gear ROEs more towards perception than reality, more towards the news than what works and will keep our guys alive. Recall the uproar over the shooting of the wounded Iraqi in Fallujah that was caught on camera? The guy was wounded already but an SOP was to lure our guys in and detonate and IED or other explosive device, on camera it looks clear cut and I am sure many folks, to include those who have served would consider that a bad shooting if they did not know all the facts. Heck look at some of the things people on here have posted in regard to ROEs and moral concepts and still explain to me how I should not shudder at the thought of those same types of people having control over my ROEs? That is my problem with non-line folks making those types of calls and far to often the ideals of morals on the battlefield surpass the reality of what needs to be done on the battlefield in order to stay alive and win. As I have repeatedly said, a lot of this stuff sounds great on paper, in articles, on blogs, etc...but it often does not cut it when you are charged with taking a building down that has both civilians and insurgents in it waiting.

As another moral choice hypothetical for you, if killing large amounts of civilians meant you could actually save both up to 500k of your own troops and perhaps as many as 3 million of the civilians but you had to wipe out two whole cities to do so, would you do it? Think about that for a second, it is the deliberate killing of hundreds of thousands of civilians but in the big picture you save more of your own people and possibly end a war, would you still do it? All of these moral ideals that people have and talk about on here come off as very black and white when that is just not the case always, even at the macro level.

If you want to say we shouldn't just kill people for no reason, say that, NO ONE will disagree with that concept. If you want to say that we should avoid civilian casualties as much as tactically feasible, NO ONE will disagree with that concept either.

Here is what should dictate your actions in a moral sense-

The Situation as it presents itself-a hostage rescue? a total war? COIN? assaulting a position? defending a position? etc...
The Goal of the mission, battle or war
The Enemy and their style of fighting (Yeah folks, it effects it, see the above note on the Fallujah example)
The Men you have-don't expect an Army Convoy Troop to perform or act like a Marine Rifleman for example.

All these things have influence on the choices that are made in the heat of the moment, as they should.

 

PYORTR

9:15 AM ET

November 1, 2011

@ERIC

We're talking past each other. I get your point--really do. What I am saying is we need to get better about incorporating the sense that morality has an impact on strategy--I'm agreeing with Pryer on this point. It may sound like some black and white prescription, as you say, but that is not the issue.

My point is that if we do not have the moral conversation that right and wrong exist on the battlefield and that we should strenuously strive for the right, it is too easy to slide in the other direction. Not only that, but if we do not have the conversation at the troop level, there where it is really needed, and we allow ourselves to get sloppy, we're being stupid from a practical standpoint. Technology has made individual restraint a strategic issue.

From my perspective, I do not think Hiroshima-style arguments about utility are useful here. Those kinds of consequentialist trade-offs are all too hypothetical--as was the real attack on Hiroshima. The idea in 1945 was this: "If we don't do X, then we will do Y. If we do Y, we think it will be morally much worse than X."
At least that was the post-hoc justification. We don't really know what the decision making process was. We do know that Admiral Leahy objected and after the fact said it was counterproductive. I think his view is instructive for such hypotheticals.

The real moral question for the kind of situation you propose is this: "If we do not do X, then the enemy will do Y. Morally, Y is much worse. We have certain proof that this is the case." That kind of situation, predicting and chosing between the lesser of two evils forced on us, is I think a red herring here--not what Pryer is talking about (or me).

I'm talking about getting better at defining how to achieve and assess “legitimacy” as it applies to direct military action in support of a sound (i.e., moral) strategy.

 

ERIC_STRATTONIII

9:24 PM ET

November 1, 2011

@PYORTR

Here is the thing, if you do not think we have this conversation ad nauseum about morality on the battlefield from the squad to the division you are not staying informed. The unfortunate part is that it comes off like just another platitude, something the military is unfortunately getting far too comfortable with. Look, the average kid is going to do the right thing and the fact that we have had so few incidents in such a long conflict in both theaters is testament to that. Our guys have acted with so much restraint I am amazed every day, instead though a few dozen incidents tend to take the front page verse the many times that those same troops have risked their lives for the civilian population. We get morality at the micro level and the macro level but don't expect us to drink the Kool Aid and throw our lives away as some do.

Basically I am calling bullshit on the whole post by the guest writer Pryer, this is not something that we have not been talking about for decades and acting like it's not is simply bullshit. I get tired of a few guys who write a paper on something we have talked about forever and act as though it is the great "new idea". It's a good thing to talk about, don't get me wrong but this is something we have been at for a while. Alas many officers love to re-invent the wheel and act like they are bringing fire to the neanderthal. Also, if you do not think that the senior officers, 06 and up and people who advice from the DoS and in DC do not look at a lot of these things in black and white terms then you are again not staying informed. Keep in mind that the majority have never shot a round in anger and some come back as combat vets simply because they got shelled on their camps or perhaps had an IED go off by them, not the same as an ambush, assault or foot patrol, I assure you having been through all of those. They pay attention to some of the crap that comes out of these schools and do not always pick the best programs to go with and try.

I am not attempting to insult you, most folks outside the combat arms do not get the amount of Laws of Land Warfare, ROEs, Use of Force and how these effect our strategy or how often we get this training. Everything now is about the Information Operations Campaign (IO) and it is stressed to the hilt how our morality and actions effect our strategy, nothing new.

Lastly, the bombings of Japan are applicable to this whole topic, look at the other posters, read the tones and understand that many are in positions of authority and then think about how they view morality in war. Think about how today that same choice would be viewed compared to then? We are talking about the strategic level of morality and how that morality effects us and our war effort from the squad up to the division, from the patrol to the fleet, micro to the macro....etc....

As a side note, yeah, we actually do know what they were thinking, a lot has come out since the end of the war, even more recently. Admiral Leahy would be more immoral for thinking that at the time in my opinion. I wonder how Leahy would feel once the invasion had begun and at least 500k had died? An estimated 3 million Japanese? Great that he would have felt better about himself for not using the A-Bomb but that would be small comfort to the American families who lost loved ones.

 

PYORTR

11:07 AM ET

November 2, 2011

@Eric

You said--"Here is the thing, if you do not think we have this conversation ad nauseum about morality on the battlefield from the squad to the division you are not staying informed. The unfortunate part is that it comes off like just another platitude, something the military is unfortunately getting far too comfortable with."

That's a great point and the largest part of the "problem"--hell, it sounds like that IS the problem. My contention in support of Pryer is that the converstaion needs to be more authentic, less platitudenous, and that it is a leader problem, not a troop problem, to get it better in an age where technology makes small mistakes (or crimes as the case may be) carry strategic ramifications. I have absolute sympathy for and with the shooters; I was a 60-gunner in 1-75 back in the 70s. I always have that perspective in mind, even now as a civilian, and I do not think the decision maker on the trigger should be second-guessed. The onus is on commanders to keep the discussion going and keep it relevant. The day we stop talking about it is the day regression starts. I'm not for more restrictive ROEs necessarily, but I do think command climate has a lot to do with sloppiness in sloughing off risk to noncombatants. I have no doubt the vast majority of our soldiers are doing well--the point is to minimize error (or crime as the case may be) for the sake of strategic effectiveness. That's why I think the conversation needs to be continuous and needs to be more effective.

Not sure about Leahy--I think he advocated not invading, that it was not necessary, that a blockade would force surrender (and if I'm not mistaken he was not for "unconditional surrender"). As it turned out MacArthur bascially settled for a conditional surrender to keep the peace, anyway, which probably turned out to be exactly the right move, even if distasteful. At any rate, I don't think having the end justify the means is a good strategy (which is the level of focus where I think this discussion is most relevant). There is a lot of mythology out there about the bombings of Japanese cities that caters to angst in the narrative of justification.

Means connect to ends, and even if a shooter does not have time to sort that out mentally in combat, planners and strategists do have time--they have an obligation to plan for the best moral outcomes so the shooters have the best chance of doing their part.

 

ERIC_STRATTONIII

3:29 PM ET

November 2, 2011

@PYORTR

I think that is a pretty fair view with this comment-"That's a great point and the largest part of the "problem"--hell, it sounds like that IS the problem." Pryer however to me is re-inventing the wheel. The incidents that have happened are so few in number that they do not merit a review of the ROEs and are not really effecting the locals view, at least in Afghanistan. Discipline and sloppy leadership are to blame in some incidents but in cases like the Stryker Brigade, I do not believe anything would have prevented that except keeping Sgt. Gibbs out of the military, he is a sociopath. The big moral lapse strategy wise was the use of CAS via planes or UAVs, that was something that the locals were not pleased about and was killing us on the information campaign, now we have over corrected but at least if need be we can still use organic weapons. I do think you are forgetting the rule of unintended consequnces though when it comes to ROEs and what you want. You may not want more restrictive ROEs "necessarily" but that is what always happens, kind of like Congress when they pass a new law that "will help everyone feel (pick your favorite) safer, more free, more competitive, etc..." but they forget about all the other laws piled on from the past, he cumlative effect and how things actually work in the street. Anyway, we are getting into details and those darn shiny objects are getting my attention again....

Morality is something that has never been dropped in the military conversation, we are all still Americans and that is part of who we are and we want to be seen as the good guys. I can't remember who posted the line on this blog about not understanding Americans because one minute we are killing people and the next handing out candy, then someone else commented on that as an apt description of us. Even in WWII war crimes happened but again, just like today, most American's acted with great restraint and morality. Now, how they treated Japanese troops or the SS, well....that is another story.

 

ERIC_STRATTONIII

3:34 PM ET

November 2, 2011

Last point

real quick final point, we are a moral people with a pretty good sense of right and wrong, morality is never ignored or put on the back burner in the military circles I have seen. I do not agree with Hunter on many of his views for the guys on the ground but he makes a good point on getting the guys home with an intact mental state too, morality comes into play with that and it something that the overwhelming majority of troops think about.

 

Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.

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