Friday, October 14, 2011 - 7:45 AM
Joby Warrick, who used to sit next to me at the Washington Post, has a new book out on the guy who killed a bunch of CIA operatives in Afghanistan in December 2009. Here is a short interview I did with him about The Triple Agent.
Best Defense: There have been a ton of books on
intelligence and al Qaeda over the last several years. What makes yours
different? Why should a hard-working stiff (or one of the many readers of this
blog currently deployed to Afghanistan) pay to download it?
Joby Warrick: Triple Agent is a different kind of read because it is, at its
core, a pure narrative, the story of an intelligence operation that unfolds
over the course of a year and then goes badly wrong. There's a lot of "news" in
the book, including an account of drone warfare that is as detailed, in my
humble opinion, as any in the open-source arena. But the reader is pulled along
by a story that is populated by unforgettable -- but very real -- characters and
races to its tragic climax. For those who closely follow CT, this review by the Brookings Institute's Ben Wittes
wonderfully distills what the book seeks to achieve: a penetrating and
informative reconstruction of a flawed intelligence operation that, to use Ben's
words, "bristles with the energy of a thriller."
BD: Did your research make you more or less pessimistic
about the Afghan war?
JW: I became less pessimistic about the
prospects for defeating "core" al-Qaeda in the Af-Pak region. The CIA's drone
campaign is extraordinarily effective, and the agency is getting progressively
better at targeting senior leaders and disrupting their networks. On the other
hand, my view of the war itself has not changed substantially. After spending
time in the east and meeting with ordinary Afghans there, it's hard to imagine
how a future Afghan government will retain control of provinces such as Khost
or Paktia once U.S. forces are gone.
BD: What has been the unofficial reaction of CIA types to
the book?
JW: I've had wonderful response from
individual CIA officers, including some who served at Khost and were present on
the day of the bombing. Many said they appreciated the book's straight-ahead
approach in telling the story, and the fact that, while pointing out fatal
mistakes that led to the bombing, the book is respectful of ordinary men and
women who served at Khost and worked under extraordinarily challenging
circumstances.
BD: How do you think
the CIA should change?
JW: After the bombing, the CIA owned up
to what then-director Leon Panetta described as "systemic" failures that contributed
to the great loss of life on Dec. 30, 2009. A key failure was an insufficient
focus on counterintelligence, which is an even tougher challenge at a time when
the intelligence agencies and operatives are strained by multiple rotations and
a decade of warfare. There also were mistakes that uniquely reflect the
circumstances and individuals at Khost. The CIA has implemented numerous
reforms, but a challenge for the agency is how to ensure proper attention and
follow-through, given the relative lack of transparency and oversight.
BD: What is the one question you'd like
to answer about the book that nobody has asked you?
JW: Some of the events in the book have never been described elsewhere, and I've been surprised that few reviewers or interviewers have asked about them. One favorite: a description in the book of a dirty-bomb threat that emanated from Pakistan mid-2009 and raised alarms at the highest levels of the U.S. government. Information gleaned through SIGINT intercepts suggested strongly that the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) had acquired "nuclear" material-presumably radioactive sources useable in a dirty bomb--and were trying to decide what to do with it. Concerns over a possible dirty-bomb attack directly factored into the decision to take out TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud, who was killed in a drone strike on Aug. 5 of that year. No radioactive material was subsequently found, and to this day, no one knows what happened to it, or indeed, whether it ever existed.
Tom Ricks is going to be the medium for the financial downfall of this ignorant country boy by previewing all these interesting books. . .Oh wait, Amazon has “The Triple Agent” for chump change that even someone savaging Social Security and the DoD military retirement center can afford!
Anyway, I thought I’d move down from the back row of the peanut gallery and mention that the 2009 incident at our station in Khost certainly was a failure of insufficient focus on counterintelligence as mentioned in the review. . .And I don’t mean those having an intelligent idea had it countered either, which always struck me as the definition of military counterintelligence.
Further, once-upon-a-time, recruiting and running agents was easily a full time job and those who did so, had proven a depth of experience as a case officer that would provide the constant counterintelligence awareness that could have prevented this tragedy. . .But, in all fairness, whose idea was it to put an analyst in charge that had never run informants in the field for at least four or five years or so, before earning such a post?
I wonder if the book touches on the fact that a Jordanian Captain by the name of 'Ali bin Zayd was also killed, and it would be my bet he was the primary handler of al-Balawi who obviously fooled Jordan's Directorate of Military Intelligence and/or General Intelligence Directorate as well.
In closing, I have a general question: as fast as we are said to be killing Al-Qa’idah’s leadership and supernumeraries in the AfPak region, are we perhaps seeing a Pakistani Taliban taking their place, and also, does this go on forever?
Ultimate evidence of truth -- in part or whole?
That doesn't seem suggested by the author's pleased memory of how some CIA types have told him they think his book is great. This applause as readily suggests the opposite.
Whom those drone strikes are killing is the big mystery question of modern warfare. There used to be agreement that these killed innocent civilians alongside some bad guy or guys. Then it came out that those civilians were always being guesstimated too low. Now the fiction is that one drone strike equals one dead guy or more -- but no civilians at all. There seems no reason to believe that civilians are now magically spared from such events. They weren't, before.
But let's forget those civilians, as evidently Washington would like us to. An equivalent deep mystery is why Kandahar, a city of fewer than half a million, would have more than 990 separate insurgent leaders, all available to be killed there last year. That was the claimed tally of such leaders killed there in highly successful JSOC sweeps. This seems another dubious claim.
So what we have is the official position that every person killed by drone strikes is an insurgent, unless (after six months' investigation) a Marine. And the suggestion that among insurgent circles, the best way to be promoted to leadership is to have your bleeding corpse left behind by a nighttime JSOC strike. Unless, perhaps, you're a close relative of Mr Hamid Karzai.
All of this seems irrelevant to the central issue of all these killing: are they winning this pseudo war? The people claiming the truthful answer is yes are, let's recall, those making dubious claims about whom America is killing in Afghanistan and Pakistan these days.
This tragedy smells of ambition and too many cooks spoiling the broth. People should remember to have everything nailed down and triple-checked before telling anything to the White House. It's a bad scene when multiple people on the ground are overruled or second-guessed by bosses 1000's of miles away. Also, nailing any particular AQ boss does not seem to make much of a difference. Would be interesting to learn how his debacle influenced the Raid on Osama's compound. Balawi seems like he was in the category of the Underwear Bomber and Richard Reid: his AQ or TTP bosses knew he was good for one operation, so his life for all of those Agency personnel was a good trade, Thankfully, the CIA seems to have a deep bench.
An equivalent deep mystery is why Kandahar, a city of fewer than half a million, would have more than 990 separate insurgent leaders, all available to be killed there last year. That was the claimed tally of such leaders parenting guide killed there in highly successful JSOC sweeps. This seems another dubious claim.
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