Tom: Excellent comments.

In light of this and the D'Este piece, I continue to grapple with the substantial differences of, say, WWII and the Gulf War, with defined military objectives, and a decisively defeated enemy, and the nature of the Second Gulf War and Afghanistan, where winning the peace after engagements was the real issue (although, perhaps, not within the assignment of the prior general lauded for the initial war phase.

I leave it to the serious military historians, but, have any really solid pieces started to emerge yet on generals responsible for what was assigned in these later wars?

Much talk, to date, has focused on comparisons to, as examples, British Colonial occupation experience, but there, the focus was merely on securing trade and resource rights, not the full bore civilian conflict and post-conflict administration tasks (much of it performed under ongoing contest) of these later wars.

Post-conflict civilian administration in WWI was, in my opinion, a very different assignment.

“Schwarzkopf apparently gave no thought to the day after the war ended?” I am not cheer leading for the General, and I know retired LtGen. Trainor, and value anything he has to say, but perhaps that quoted sentence needs to be nuanced?

Although I was a bit south of Iraq on a special assignment at the time, I had heard through my sources that there was a subtle shift going down within the Arab coalition officer corps, along with our host population in the Saudi Kingdom. This may have been brought about or acerbated by the news media scenes of the carnage on the major road out of the Kuwait City, heading north into Iraq, dubbed the Highway of Death.

My bet would be that Schwarzkopf having accomplished his mission, the liberation of Kuwait, picked-up on the vibe that our Arab (primarily Sunni Muslim) partners were distinguishing between the accomplished military goal, and what they percieved as the further needless killing of Arab, and that any further military adventure would surely disintegrate regional Arab support and that of our hosts in Saudi Arabia. . . Anyway, just a thought?

Allied casualties were less than 400, versus over 20,000 enemy killed. Would that any general had such "failings" in any campaign.

His war plan was good, well-executed, and more importantly, overwhelmingly successful.

There were no failings on the part of General Schwartzkopf.

Tom doesn't describe what he's getting at, but if the so-called "failings" had to do with suppressed uprisings by the marsh Arabs and Shiites, who after the end of the Allied invasion were killed by surviving Iraqi forces, the consequences of those massacres can be laid at the feet of the political leaders who declined to do anything, not on the military commander on the ground who destroyed his enemy and conserved the precious lives of his troops.

I would also recommend re-reading "The Commanders" by Bob Woodward to look at the levels above Stormin Norman"

I would also recommend re-reading "The Commanders" by Bob Woodward to look at the levels above Stormin Norman"

... Russian peace negotiations with Hussein to remove any need at all for the Gulf war? The diplomat conducting these face-to-face negotiations later reported their course at length in TIME magazine in an article that so far as I know no official has ever contradicted. Among his more sensational claims: when he reported to Moscow that Hussein had agreed in detail to GHW Bush's demands for the evacuation of Kuwait, the Russian foreign ministry roused foreign correspondents from their beds for an 0300 press conference, so the US military would not unnecessarily attack; Bush, having got everything he had demanded from that first negotiation, said he wasn't satisfied and demanded even harsher restrictions on the Iraqi forces; he got them -- as another post-midnight press conference in Moscow made clear; and in Washington, the president said this was too late, he couldn't stop, presumably, General Schwartzkopf. A singularly weak-kneed commander in chief.

I share JPWREL's concern about the Highway of Death massacre. This was supposedly triggered by an armed attack by the retreating Iraqis on the American force in an impregnable position above them. One way to establish the truth of this claim would be to give the US casualty tally from that claimed sneaky assault. Sundry observers say there were no American casualties to tally.

Do Gordon and Trainor shed any light on this in their "inside story" of the war, or did they limit themselves as their title suggests, to the doings of the generals? And which generals? Just American ones, as the dustjacket suggests?

"Hey diddle diddle, straight up the middle" is forever etched into my brain.

Allowing the Iraqi's to use their helo's was also a big time mistake by Schwarzkopf.

Sun Tzus they were not. An Avalon Hill General could have beaten the Iraqis after six weeks of bombing.

And while I normally I stick to the 30,000 foot view, when it comes to Schwarzkopf, all I can say is this:

I want him put under oath and asked whether or not there was a "chemical attack at Jubail" on 19 Jan 1991 at 0300, and it there wasn't, then perhaps he could speculate as to why such an attack was recorded in his staff logs, and why so many Seabees and Marines that served there have subsequently developed similar illnesses.

Then they can ask him about the exact number and nature of attacks against US troops inside the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in months following the war's end.

The WH directed National Security Council should have been coordinating the national intel assessment re Israeli reactions to Scud attacks, and Saudi intentions for Saddam's continuing thru the 90's as a bulwark agin revolutionary Iran. The Bush family is famously well connected (thru Prince Bandar 'Bush') to Royal Family needs, and the Israelis have ways of getting their views aired along the Potomac.

CENTCOM is the fire department, not the building code office, nor the civil planning commission. While Gen. Schwarzkopf directed the war near the end of his 3 year CENTCOM command tour, it wasn't a policy position then nor do I beleive it is now.

Huckleberry raises some interesting questions about Iraqi 1991 chemwar attacks and weapons dumps being actively and rapidly buried, in the wars aftermath. What was Don Rumsfeld's 1985 Gulf War mission to Baghdad all about anyway? Mr. Cheney? Class? Anyone?

First, President Bush was having a medical problem just before and during the war. He was having "thyroid storms" and this produced mood swings. His mood was agressive when it was time to decide whether to go or not as his thyroid was not yet under control. Thereafter, it was soon brought under control and he became his passive self again. Colin Powell wanted to stop and HE may have received impetus from the publicity surrounding the "Highway of Death." [Those looters retreating from Kuwait City were not just poor conscripts. They were also the troops who tortured and executed Kuwatis during their occupation of Kuwait. Tough titty.]

Schwarzkopf, like so many Army conventional commanders was ignorant of Special Operations Forces strengths and weaknesses. In the beginning, he committed some recon elements without adequate rescue capabilities and an SAS unit was captured and killed and an SF Team was badly shot-up. Army SF did nothing different at the end of thew Vietnam War - period. SOG continued to pursue increasingly dangerous missions towards the end of our participation. That had nothing to do with the deployed teams. I agree that Schwarzkopf was probably oversold by the AF on their interdiction capabilities. After the Israelis threatened to deploy their SOF forces in the desert, Schwarzkopf deployed his SOF forces on the ground in the SCUD hunt. Finding the mobile launchers and their bases remained very difficult. Area defeats you.

After the Pennsylvania Army Reservists were killed in Saudi Arabia, Schwarzkopf was briefed on the behavior of the Patriot's software and its flaws in hitting the body of the SCUD and not the warhead.

The Franks'/Clancy book depicts a rather self-satisfied Schwarzkopf (without a plan) striding into the tent to accept the Iraqi generals' surrender and his naively giving them permission to continue to fly their helicopters.

The mission was accomplished, but some felt that the implied mission was to completely destroy the Republican Guard units. Those surviving units drove North like toothpaste out of a tube. Woulda, coulda, shoulda. They could have been destroyed by our armor or airpower. It wasn't done.

The Gulf War was a logistical tour de force. The Air Force ran an excellent air war coordination disparate service systems. SF did an excellent job in Kuwait City and in performing liaison with Arab units. Schwarzkopf was an aloof and quirky commander with demonstrable prejudices. How we end up with a Schwarzkopf or Franks in charge is another tribute to our personnel and political system. Do remember that Franks went to high school with Laura Bush - a big plus!

Come on, it was decided step by step and in Allied conferences which finally decided that only unconditional surrender was acceptable.

There were all sorts of incremental decisions which directly affected missions. AND, Supreme military commanders in consultation with heads of state determined the missions. So, civilians in the White House or 10 Downing Street, or the Kremlin did not write all-embracing mission statements (Stalin may have had the most direct command in the war on the Eastern Front.) Nor did they say "take Sicily." Rather, for example, after much debate it was decided to go for Italy after North Africa.

There weren't any WWII cry babies saying, "tell me exactly what you want me to do." Governments set priorities and strategic goals. And, in that war, it was necessary to focus domestic industry on those priorities and strategic goals. What do we do now? Well we emphasized MRAP production and let F-15s deteriorate.

I read "The General's War" years ago as a Lieutenant in Fort Hood in the late '90s. It kind of bummed me out for a few reasons. For one many of the kinds of operations Division and Corps Commander's lobbied for seemed elective in nature. 101st wanted to do an Air Assault, 1st ID wanted the breach, so on and so forth. It gave me the impression that the mission was secondary and that these Commanders just wanted to be the last guy to X sort of operation.

The other impression it made on me was that for all of our recon and intel gathering ability, we still had no idea how badly the Iraqi Army had been bludgeoned during the air campaign. Or did we, and it was just that Franks was horribly risk averse in closing with the enemy?

I think I spent four months of my four years in Fort Hood at the Battle Sim Center, listening to GO's bloviate in various ROC Drills. Once the electronic battle was over these guys would smoke cigars together in the parking lot acting like what they thought Grant acted like at Appomattox.

One very vivid memory I have of the Highway of Death was the smell - of perfume. I was a civilian advisor to the Kuwaitis who arrived in KC right after liberation. We were very curious to see the Highway because, among other things, we were documenting the extent of plundering and pillage that the Iraq Army had committed. Many of those vehicles were civilian vehicles that were stolen from their owners and driven helter skelter from Kuwait City. The enemy had been given ample warning to stand down (remember the thousands of prisoners who surrendered with leaflets in hand) and were legitimate military targets. Our two biggest failings were the delay in starting the left hook to trap the Republican Guard and at Safwan where General Schwarzkopf allowed the continued use of helicopters resulting in horrible acts of retribution against the Shia of southern Iraq. There was plenty of loot comingled with small arms and ammunition. I have a picture where I am holding a belt of 50 cal. Until the scrap metal owners of Kuwait had picked the place clean, this location was a tourist attraction. I also have pictures of Al Haig, Andrew Young, and Governor Shaeffer (D-MD) on site a couple of weeks after liberation.

Hindsight is usually 20-20! I intend to reread the book which is waiting for me in Ireland. I recently purchased Christopher Bellamy's book on the Gulf War that is on deck. I use the same term.

--At 3:32 a.m. on the same day, a very loud noise was heard throughout Al Jubail, and some service personnel reported seeing a fireball in the sky. ``Although some locations reported an initial positive test for nerve agent and blister agent, all subsequent tests were negative,'' the report stated. ``Two coalition aircraft have been identified as the most likely source for the loud noise.''

I remember that. It was two really loud booms that set off that Godawful Brit siren.

We were told it was two French Jaguars breaking the sound barrier.

Walt