One aspect that may have helped Field Marshal Slim in Burma was that his career was slow in developing, and it didn’t conform to the general English senior officer ranks. During the first several years of England's entry into the WW II, Slim was assigned to the backwater where he could afford to make mistakes, and learned from them.

As a former jungle bunny, I always appreciated the fact that Slim understood that his squads, platoons, and companies were his core elements in the jungle, and he capitalized on them by planning for short-term success with effective training programs, improved patrolling techniques, all of which gave his folks confidence that they could match the Japanese in the jungle environment. . .I believe he stated the jungle was neutral?

Slim never lost his strategic vision which was to defeat his enemy. . .nothing more. . .nothing else. . .and to do that, he had to do things right.

Of course ‘A Gentleman Ranker’ is absolutely correct in pointing out that building institutional excellence into a military system is not an exclusively German idea. Every now and then we must remind ourselves that the Germans managed to lose their two big wars of the twentieth century. Indeed, in the words of one of the most respected military/naval historians of the era H. P. Willmott, the Germans excellence was at the narrow spectrum of ‘fighting’ war not ‘waging’ war. In fact, in the case of the latter they were in a number of respects persistently incompetent to all free people's good fortune.

The military and naval traditions of Great Britain, America, Russia, France, and Japan, etc., all come from very different cultural and historical necessities. Consequently, the evolution of their systems and doctrine reflect the unique characteristics of each nation for better or worse. For instance what was effective for Britain’s operational doctrine and strategy in her naval heyday of the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries was quite different from what was needed in the highly industrialized maritime environment of the 20th century.

For the American military what was essentially a 19th century small domestic constabulary had to evolve in 1917 into a world-class military force literally overnight. The US had the same growing pains that plagued their British cousins as can being seen in the ludicrous tactical formations they employed in 1918. These were more like those used and discarded by the French in 1914-15 and the British in 1916-17 period. They at first rejected advice to use smaller formations with more devolved command and a focus on a more effective tactical model. After three years of auditing the war in Europe Pershing still discounted the effect of the machine gun and shrapnel on exposed infantry and his troops paid the price to provide he and his commanders with a learning curve. Such it is in all wars for all combatants.

The Japanese for all their early and dramatic success in the 2nd World War after all was said and done turned out to be a 19th century military whose only real tactical innovation was a cult of death. Their example leaves little to learn from.

The French whom for some reason many take endless delight in putting down as ‘surrender monkeys’ in fact became by 1918 the most tactically proficient of the three allied armies. Their learning curve being largely awash in blood forcing them into accepting the reality of modern firepower and limited manpower reserves. In fact, it was the French that began to experiment with new tactical techniques such as infiltration, flash barrages and limited objectives before the Germans. The failure of 1940 has to be considered in the light of their national holocaust twenty years earlier and a post-war political environment that was notoriously unstable. It was those conditions which largely reflected the human and morale sacrifice of 1914-1918.

We keep flipping back and forth between strategy and tactics. The Brits fought on the same side as Soviet Union and US so they won WW II. That does not prove any great flair for tactics. My Dad (who fought in Burma w Marauders and Mars Task Force alongside Slim) always said: "The British Lost Every Battle and Won the War!" and HE understood WHY they won.

Auftragstaktik really happens at the tactical level. I think it is Really a function of how good you are at COMBINED ARMS not just a function of tactical genius and initiative. The Brits had a whole bunch of organizations that were uncombined arms, British Tank Divs in Normandy had their tanks in one BDE (w one half track BN) and their Infantry in another Bde on trucks. That the kind of thing that slows down your planning, orders process, even your basic understanding of the other arms.

Burma (the Slim example) was largely an infantry fight, takes much less combined arms, plus the Japanese were a Russo-Japanese War Tech kind of force. Slim built confidence in his force by not allowing them to fail; he'd send a BDE to attack a Japanese Co, a BN to attack a PLT. What he did best was get past the Western Way of War, he got rid of many on the organic motor vehicles in his units and the fewer vehicles they had, the faster and farther they could go in the terrain. Some genius (Churchill?) described the US Army at Anzio as an Army of chauffeurs, they had about a gazillion vehicles and were going nowhere.

How much tactical or operational improv can occur on the modern battlefield shaped by U.S. forces and capabilities? Assuming there will ever be another recognizable modern battlefield with infantry, tanks, artillery, etc.

Will the inevitable advances in networked warfare foster independence at the company level? It doesn't seem like drones, Blue Force Trackers, combined arms assaults, CO helicopters, over-the-horizon death, just-in-time logistics, and real-time everything will or should foster mission initiative at the PLT and CO level.

One of the assumptions behind all of those gadgets is that TOC staff, commanders, AWACS crews, JSTARS crews, and drone pilots will have a better view and grip on things, right? I imagine a day when some S-3 will be able to tell a platoon leader to slow down by 3 KM so the echelon formation will look tighter and symmetrical on the HIDEF screen at the TOC. It''ll be like a video game. My favorites were the V4V series and Harpoon.

My sense is that the U.S. military has gone "all in" for networked, short, decisive, overwhelming, decpaitating attacks designed to minimize U.S. casualties and end the war, even before it's begun. Of course, the ability to do that sort of thing seems like a strategic asset/advantage that will scare off a whole range of threats or challengers.

Seems like contemporary small unit commanders are expected to hit their marks, and stay in their lanes. With so many nasty things planned out, which company commander will break with the uber-plan to secure the unguarded crossraods or bridge? What if that crossroads is about ready to get a cruise missile with bomblets or a MOAB? We're not quite at the point where cruise missiles will detect a friendly on target and disarm or switch to a secondary. Soon, but not yet.

Of course, the current wars aren't quite like this preferred war, but there's nothing saying counter-insurgency training and skills will persist once the U.S. is clear of IZ and AF. The fake villagers will be sent back to Dearborn, and the fake villages will be used for MOUT training and the training will go back to overwhelming a conventional foe.

I agree wholeheartedly that the U.S. will plan, staff and equip itself for conventional war. And U.S. planning will emphasize synchronization and sticking with the plan. Improvisers and free-thinkers need not apply.

Unconventional wars allow for big power adaptation since a quick, decisive win for the irregular enemy is not in the cards. Harder to adapt if the conventional enemy cripples your ability to fight (back).

I agree wholeheartedly that the U.S. will plan, staff and equip itself for conventional war. And U.S. planning will emphasize synchronization and sticking with the plan. Improvisers and free-thinkers need not apply.

Unconventional wars allow for big power adaptation since a quick, decisive win for the irregular enemy is not in the cards. Harder to adapt if the conventional enemy cripples your ability to fight (back).

...what to do about it all??

Training for new lieutenants entering the U.S. Army is not good enough to be able to rely on mission command. I've received four brand spankin new LTs over the past year, and I've seen many others in my battalion. Nothing against them personally, but they are under-trained. Very under-trained. I was too.

We were all trained great for setting up patrol bases and linear ambushes in the woods and swamps of west Georgia, but not trained to deal with ambiguous situations and to act on our own, within intent. I feel like its almost accident that I even discovered the concepts of mission command. It's been addressed at times during my career, but nothing more than skin-deep, and the training events seldom come close to helping learn it.

How can we develop REALISTIC training exercises for these young officers at their basic course to instill the mission command mindset?

I Agree in but reinstated after the stupidity of Leese was recognized. Many correspondents on thiis site seem to be unaware that WW2 (against Germany) was won on the eastern front with minimal contribution from the US.... Thanks !
Ar Condicionado Imoveis Acompanhantes Massagistas