This fifth column on Auftragstaktik
is in fact our third from Germany, which is fitting.
I think I disagree with the argument
offered below, because I think Moltke codified the theory but that it was
entirely possible to have mission command before he did that. I suspect what
you need is competent, cohesive units with profound trust running both ways in
the chain of command. But I still think this column is worth reading, if you
are trying to understand this important subject.
By Stefan Schilling
Best Defense department of Auftragstaktik
affairs
I believe both Maj.
Smith's and Col. Yingling's
arguments to be both true and false. It becomes apparent when reading both
articles that both do debate Auftragstaktik,
but do so from different perspectives and lack a common understanding of what
is meant by the phrase "mission command."
Paul Yingling certainly is right in claiming that mission command works better
with senior officers who possess traits such as courage and intelligence. Yet,
I bet pretty much every organization works better when intelligence is
involved.
While his claims that Scipio and Hannibal have applied Auftragstaktik simply
because they were courageous and intelligent does neglect the fact that Auftragstaktik
is based on a vast and deep understanding of theory. He is also wrong about
Guderian's officers. As Col. Yingling has argued, "these officers succeed
because they had the intelligence to see the battlefield clearly, and the
courage to act on their convictions." As Clausewitz has taught us, no
officer or leader has the intelligence or the ability to see anything in war
clearly, not in our current wars and not in the times of Moltke or Scharnhorst.
But what set the officers of Guderian apart from Scipio's, Patton's and Hanibal's
was their ability, installed by rigorous education and training, to accept the
friction of war and use it to their advantage by exploiting the enemy's weak
points when they became apparent. This is what mission command is about.
Most of the historical figures Paul Yingling cites were undoubtedly great commanders with a deep insight into the friction and intricacies of war, and were certainly not afraid of bureaucracies or higher echelons. Yet
they did not necessarily command in a mission command style just because they
were courageous and able to exploit weaknesses. Auftragstaktik is
not about one great commander, but about ensuring that every commander has the
ability to trust in every junior officers to perform in his intent and exploit
chances when they present themselves.
As Eitan Shamir has so vividly shown in his book Transforming
Command
- The Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S., British and Israeli Armies,
militaries tend, when confronted with new cultures, to look to their past in an
attempt to proof that the "new" is actually a well-known tradition of
their respective forces. In the British army this was attempted by identifying
the command styles of Oliver Cromwell, Wellington and the Duke of Marlborough
as mission command. The narrative in the U.S., according to Shamir, is that
commanders such as Sheridan or Patton are identified as having commanded in
such a way. In the Israeli case, he argues, the Palmach have been the tradition
with which to prove that mission command has been a long-lasting tradition
within the IDF. However, in each of the cases we might talk about courageous
and intelligent commanders, but they were not backed up by the tenets of mission command. For example, while the early IDF as well as the Palmach
had a great tradition of practicing and exploiting the enemy's weaknesses, they
were utterly opposed to general staffs and leadership education, which
subsequently lead to a gradual disappearance of mission command.
Yet, Auftragstaktik's
major tenet is (and its lack is what I believe Maj. Smith is rightly lamenting)
the ability of every junior officer to be able to understand his immediate
superior officer's job and if need be to command in place of that superior.
This has the advantage and the consequence that every junior officer
understands perfectly - and performs according to - the intent of his superior
officers. (Not according to his will but his intent.) This is, I believe, the
core of mission command. Moltke, the father and implementer of mission command, has set
up the Kriegsakademie to teach and educate junior officers to do exactly
this, by consistent war gaming and simulating. War games, as Maj. Smith has
remarked, have the ability to put everyone on the same page and assure that no
system is left out. However, in order to assure this, officers need experience.
This was assured in Prussia by sending the graduates of the Kriegsakademie
to spent six months in a branch other than their own, and then on to serve on
the general staff for a one-year trial period. Guderian's officers were not
only courageous but were also made aware by having been educated in mission
command in the style of Moltke's Kriegsakademie. As such, they
undoubtedly did have their share of education, training and hands on experience
in general staffs before assuming command that Col. Yingling claims not to be
necessary.
If, however, promotions are made as Maj. Smith has pointed out, in a hurricane of personnel moves, without either the education or the hands-on expertise in staff, this experience is certainly missing from the force and the
education process and the trial period assured that every officer has the
common knowledge base, and a common language and understanding of issues. Maj.
Smith thus is not wrong about Auftragstaktik as Paul Yingling claims,
but points out the central tenet of Auftragstaktik as well as the
dangers when mission command is applied without the education it necessitates.
However, our discussions seem to show several problems consistent in many
militaries and certainly the U.S. Army.
1. mission
command is not universally understood, and many different versions of its
meaning seem to be floating around.
2. The
U.S. Army has not implemented mission command as it should be otherwise this
discussion would not arise.
3. Well-meant
programs such as ARFORGEN are not well suited to prepare officers for their
capabilities on the ground.
4. Modern
battleground tools such as drones, BFT's and so on are only increasing the
ability of senior commanders to micromanage, but not their ability to apply
mission command.
It is needless to say that suspected
disability of junior officers might serve
as an excuse for poor command, these difficulties do force commanders
often enough to rely on "Befehlstaktik,"simply
because they cannot trust in their junior officers' ability to understand and
execute in their intent.
To change this, Col. Yingling is certainly right in saying that: "Senior
officers who wish to exercise mission command shouldn't wait for favorable conditions; they should create them." But this also involves creating the educational system for junior officers to train, practice
and gain experience in order to come up with unique and desirable ideas.
Stefan Schilling is an academic
assistant at the Department for International
Relations and Foreign Policy of the University of Heidelberg, Germany. He has
earned a M.A. in Political Science from the University of Heidelberg and is
currently working on a doctoral thesis on U.S. military organization and
innovation.
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