Didn't have much to do besides sit there and earn his $5371 a month tax free ($64452 for a year deployment), plus BAH if he was married. I'm sure he would of switched places with the guys doing route clearance in Afghanistan in a second.

Seriously. I think being bored and useless for a year is a worse fate than doing route clearance in Afghanistan.
Best,
Tom

Perhaps I missed it in reading Major Stewart's comments, but did he volunteer for his assignment as an advisor?

I ask because among his comments he mentions concerns about where he'd be living; his safety precautions; and amusingly, would he need weekly shipments of soap.*

Of course, everyone says things are more complex these days, so forgive me for digressing back to simpler times, but my first concern as a field advisor was what my Vietnamese Marine counterpart thought about who this FNG was, and how well I’d do in my inevitable first battle, which I knew would set the tone on how he'd judge me.

*in a pinch: a bar of Ivory soap tied-off into a sock makes a great field expedient black jack. : o

Tyrtaios- he volunteered after hanging out in DC for 2.5 on Old Guard Staff. I thought the same thing about his key concerns; I always ask about the enemy in the areas, mission/OPTEMPO, partnered unit, equipment, COMMO, then personal living conditions and FOB security, though this might just be the difference in Branches(Insert ESIII comment about Marines and training all branch 1st as war fighters).

I don't want to sound like a jerk, but I don't have no sympathy for a MAJ coming off 2.5 years duty in DC being forced to stay(for up to 4 months straight) on a FOB with his AFN box, phone to the states, and internet to himself. At least his wife was able to endure 2-3 days w/o hearing from her husband.

You can do as much or as little as you want or with the risk you're willing to accept. Why not move out with the partnered unit and then return every few weeks to the FOB to send out reports. Send your daily reports up via cell phone. Why did they give 3x interpreters to one guy who wasn't even located with the guys he's mentoring; probably higher priority than our unit 100km north who had to make due with 3x terps for a whole In company(yes, less than 1 per plt when they rotate out on leave)

I'll be honest, I'm completely unimpressed by the MAJ's

This interview was an unusually candid account of what it's like to work liaison duty in Iraq. Stewart is basically telling on himself by saying that his time (BN Runner) and our money (JC333) were wasted with this assignment. That was his major theme for the interview; I don't think he was really looking for sympathy.

Reading it, I hear echoes of my liaison duty to the Iraqi police 2004-2005. I was the sole American liaison to two companies (approx. 400 men total) of Iraqi police for several months. I lived on the same camp as them and had the same personal security and resource concerns

The underlying fault with the job of training Iraqis to be police is that our version of police is different than than the Iraqis' version. Think of a state trooper from your state and the responsibility we grant them and the professionalism we expect from them. The Iraqi police have no concept of that. The police there are just another government branch where the leadership pockets as much cash as they can and the front line police try to do as little as possible and still get their piece. Any arrests, patrolling, or other police work done is incidental to that. Too many liaison officers show up thinking that the Iraqis just need some patrolling classes, some marksmanship training, and then they're ready. No, they need to learn stuff like civic duty and public service that simply do not exist there. All the patrolling classes we have won't stop the Iraqi police from shirking duty and stealing from the civilians in their sectors.

My first take on this was similar to Bn Runner: He could have moved off Echo and lived with the DBE. However, I think most of his readers do not understand how hard that is to do - especially alone. Stewart would have been totally dependant on the Iraqi police for his personal security and food/water. No way would I put myself in that position. The only levers an American advisor can use on his Iraqi police counterparts are money (cash, fuel, weapons, clothing, etc) and firepower support (CAS, arty, etc). Stewart knew that he had neither and that's why he didn't give up his personal safety. One guy can't do it alone and it's unfair to ask that of anyone.

Training the Iraqi police is an extremely hard job for multiple reasons. The main one comes with the title of 'MiTT' or 'liaison officer.' The existence of the MiTT gives the regular American commanders the impression that the training and oversight of the Iraqi forces in their area is someone else's problem. So sure, he had his three terps, his sat phone and internet. So what? He didn't have any lever to prompt the DBE leadership to do anything.

I agree with MAJ Stewart's main point: Don't throw a liaison officer out in the desert alone and expect that to be sufficient to establish a police force complete with traditional policing/leadership values, culture, and internal relationships which are alien to the local people.

I wonder if Tom posted this interview as it relates to our previous conversations on the terrible state of SGT MAJ/CSMs and the importance of initiative in today's leaders.

Is it the CSM's fault that they have a poorly defined position or it the CSM's fault that he doesn't find and focus on what's important and what will have the greatest benefit for his unit? Is it the Army's/CMD's fault that it provide the MAJ success on a silver platter or is it the MAJ's fault that he didn't adapt and overcome? I say the latter, esp for a MAJ.

On initiative; his commander told him to not send up complaints and to get the job done to the best of his ability. His commander didn't give him a 30 page FRAGO detailing everything he needed to do; from the sounds of it maybe he should have. Instead of watching TV, suffering the internet, and calling the States, maybe the MAJ should have focused on ways to adapt and overcome his limitations.

Here's a bet for you: Ask the MAJ if he was fluent in the local dialect by the middle/end of the deployment. I will bet a pay check that he wasn't fluent which would be a telling indicator of his focus and priorities.

In the interview, he said that he needed to be immersed in the language to really learn it. He had 3xterps(my blood pressure is rising again) who spoke excellent English so there's no way, if he has initiative and dicipline, that he would watch 4 hours of AFN rather than learn the local language(knowing that learning language would increase his effectiveness with his Iraqi counterparts and allow him to travel to any base and work with his counterparts without requirement(an additional requirement/coordination/mvmt/link-up) of a terp.

By the way, if I was an Iraqi leader and you came in a RIP telling me you weren't going to give me shit but you had a bunch of requirements for me and you were going to use your terps to spy on me, I'd be about as helpful as his partners were.

Additionally, the MAJ is fundamentally flawed in his thinking of security. Instead of worrying about how much IDF Echo takes and the IEDs along the route outside of his FOB, maybe he should have asked how many of his partnered unit's organic convoys were struck with IEDs or how often the partner unit's base 70k away took IDF. I bet he would have been signifigantly safer living at the partnered base(which prob took less if any IDF) and commuting back to Echo every once in a while to send up reports he's unable to pass over cellphone(if he's reporting on IA #'s, they'd be no requirement to use SIPR as I am sure the IA aren't talking LOG or #s on SIPR). Same goes for traveling; traveling in 1xUS armored vehicle in an IA convoy of different makes you less safe than riding in Iraqi vehicle.

You guys are really beating up on this poor major. At least he was honest.
Best,
Tom

reading this interview and I've stopped. *In this interview* he does not come across as a "Be all you can be." kinda guy. He didn't feel that he had to practice on the various radios because the others were familiar with them? Is that what he said? Do you like living? Might you run across a shot-up vehicle with a suite of radios you can't use on your 40 mile run?

I'm no good with languages so 25 to 30 hours is a waste of my time? My language aptitude isn't good either, but that makes me more motivated to master basic phrases. It is very unfortunate that they broke-up the team, but go and make nice-nice with some nearby US unit! Even a mess kit repair battalion could have helped him! Oh wait, they're contractors now.

You can always learn something. You can always offer your services to a nearby US unit. Do something! I see a future for him as a home entertainment installer.

read the piece for the factoids in evidence, as we did with 2003-6 happy talk about re-attrition of the last next 5,000 dead enders.

-Fuel is being syphoned off, the most mutable item in trade- for corruption, or the few IA/BDF mid-grades trying to use dope-deals to keep their units fed and housed on the porous Saudi border.
-The border defense vehicles in inventory are mostly hangar queens, drawing fuel rations.
-Iraqi general officers are likely as corrupt as in Baathist days.
-Echo FOB is a united nations/tower of babel, a coalition of rented former soviet block units doing security and base housekeeping duties, with all that implies.

There was more....

This guy had an ill-defined mission - so be it. But the other side of that coin is he could have defined it anyway he wanted to. As others stated 'initiative' didn't seem to be high on his list of things to do.

When in the defense, "constantly improve your position" is a maxim that will never go out of style. It appears he's never heard of this idea of had forgotten it. Sadly, I ain't all that great with language either, funny people over 30 or 40 don't assimilate those things that well by then (another good reason why all of our schools, like Europe, should be forcing bi-lingualism). But I can't help think that that guy had 4 hrs a day he could have been working Rosetta stone online instead of watching TV which is more than enough to make for a pretty good speaker in theater.

Plenty of wrong in the world, but let's not try to actively be part of the problem.

Yet another data point to say the United States Army really sucks; it cries out for radical reform. Costs a bleeding fortune but is hopelessly inept at its mission. Can't win wars. Can't even look out for its people. Sucks.

You knew the response to this article would be scathing. And speaking as someone that has done his share of route clearance, I would gladly sign up for the horrors this Major endured.

It should surprise nobody that the USG effort in Iraq was uneven in regard to thoughtful assignment, effectiveness, results, etc. The whole thing was an exercise in denial for 4 years, and then entered a new stage within things thrown together on the fly, sort of like building a new gold-plated 747 in mid-air with unlimited staff and money as the old 747 was burning and plummeting.

I stipulate that this officer could have shown more initiative and sticktuitiveness in working with his Iraqis. I recall meeting a Navy chaplain who was always on the prowl for ways to engage and help, and she ended up engaging and helping.

That being said, my take on the military and civilians at embassy and PRT's (Iraq version) is as follows:

1. There are going to be Carter Malkasians, Travis Patriqins and others who will make things happen. The people are not the norm, but it's amazing to meet them, and fall in behind their efforts. Much of the time, they accomplish their mission, or at least leave the place in better shape than they found it. I met one or two PRT leaders who would have convinced anyone to follow them to the Iranian border and back.

2. Related to this group are the people who do a lot of things, but not much of it makes sense to the mission or development/reconstruction. They might gain personal satisfaction from a lot Iraqi engagement and the like, but not much will persist after they leave. These are the people who push the projects and things the Iraqis did not ask for or need. I met a number of people who thought they could drop Swiss-level banking and German-level organization on the Iraqis without a hiccup or problem. It seemed like they were doing things that had lots of moving parts and multiple assumptions for their own reasons. These people were not drinking any tea before they rolled up their sleeves and added fodder to their resumes.

3. Most people want to help. They come with enthusiasm, and some experience and training, but they need someone to show them the way or lead them. If they have good bosses and a clear mission, then they make a difference. What the effort in Iraq lacked was enough experienced and competent leaders who could help all of these well-intentioned people with direction and guidance. Since leaders were stretched, or absent, these people who needed leadership were left to figure things out, or adjust expectations, or just hang out.

--- Added to all of this was the security situation that limited movement and engagement. I can remember lots of people at the Embassy and PRT's who talked about the crazy hours they were putting in, and claimed stunning amounts of OT. Maybe they were going to meetings and prepping slide decks, but most of them were meeting Iraqis no more that twice a week, so how much productive, mission-oriented work were they really doing? Many made the case that they were in Iraq and had to work, so they were going to be in the office and claim the time.

4. Lots of O-5's and O-6's and a few civilians were adept at going with the flow of things. They were in the office, they attended meetings, they did what they were told, and they let out the occasional "hooah!". Many of the military folks at the Embassy and the PRT's were members of these broken CA teams. They arrived in country ready to do a mission as a team, but then found out they were to be split among the PRT's and the Embassy and then confronted with all manner of civilians. I'd assumed that the sharp military people got Embassy jobs, but Tom's book suggests that the "shitbirds" were the ones detailed to higher headquarters. I remember an AF O-6 who looked pissed off most of the time as he led some redundant office, and he went on to be an officer relieved of a unit or base command. Many of these people were fun to hang out with, were always cheerful, and had internalized the reality that Embassy and HQ things happened in the fullness of time.

5. There were a few civilian people who were wholly unsuited for the work. Either they had dreadful interpersonal skills, or irrelevant experience, or they were ineffective, or they were malingerers and loafers. There was one PRT guy who always seemed to be at the Embassy for one reason or another. Some were identified and left early, while others kept a sufficiently low-profile and held on for years.

He is making too much money to really complain.

As a Field Grade Officer in the United States Army, he is expected to get out and contribute in some kind of way. Don't just sit back, take a paycheck, and then say you're too bored.

I don't know.. maybe I'm judging too hard, but this story just does not sound good to me.

I was stationed at FOB Echo after this Major, and I thought it was pretty depressing, but heck, I signed up for this stuff. At least the food was good!

I should clarify my above comment:

As someone getting paid almost $100k to sit around watching TV and basically not doing much of anything (and not risking any monetary liability in the process), his complaints fall on deaf ears.

I think Tom (unintentionally) didn't gave Maj Stewart a fair shake by including only one passage of a many paged interview. By the time Maj Stewart made that concluding statement, he made a fairly convincing case for how his spirit was systematically ripped apart. Some people thrive in that isolation but most people wither, especially with a seeming lack of support and vision. It might be a good leadership topic or lesson: How much can you expect from a man who operates nearly autonomously and isolated under a vague vision of operations? With all the talk of "force multipliers" (I hate that phrase), where was the Major's? Or after getting his team ripped apart, was he seriously expected to rebuild one himself amongst a mostly uninterested Iraqi coalition?

On the flip side, I pretty much did the same thing as the Major in Afghanistan. My responsibility was crew duty on aeromedical evac missions and I honestly didn't do anything extra. Sometimes we didn't have a mission assigned to us for a week. Sometimes we flew intratheater and intertheater missions back to back, on the move for as much as 60 hours straight.

All our efforts were in vain. When I first read "echo" my ears perked up. Could it be the same Echo in Diwaniyah? Yep. I was over at Camp Baker/Golf in 2004 and we had a team over in Diwaniyah. That was the year of the Shia rebellion. Once things quieted down we moved out of the city and took up residence at FOB Duke.

I agree with everyone regarding the comments about being concerned about living conditions first and then the tactical situation. That too brings back a lot of memories for me. After our deployment one of my fellow PLs was tasked with writing the unit history. I provided AARs and all the reports I filed regarding contact with the enemy. Her question to me...."Yeah but what was the chow like and how did you live?" Going in country wasn't much better. They laid out a map and said here is where you are going (someone else got to do the leader recon) and pointed to an area surrounded by urban development. My first question was "how many stories are those buildings?" All I got were blank stares. The lesson I learned from it all? Former Marines should never join non combat arms units in the Army Guard. And yes maybe avoid the Guard altogether.

There are still some interesting points in the interview such as Kuwait being the best place to training since there are so many restrictions at home. Our leaders should be highlighting this problem. Then again would the average civilian even understand why this is a problem?

Was the Major's quote: "I was only able to entice them to come and see me probably once every two to three weeks."

I start to doubt he understood his role as an advisor to a host nation during COIN operations. Its not for the Iraqis to come visit him and absorb his knowledge of the Old Guard. Isn't there an old saying "If the mountain wont go to Mohammad, Mohammad must go to the mountain"

The MAJ took the mentoring job for career advancement(he said he took the position to get to ILE and his choice of duty preference). So by his own admission, the deployment was an epic fail. Then he comes back from deployment nice and relaxed after watching TV, calling his wife every 2 days, surfing the web, and not leaving the FOB for 120 days at a time(to see his PARTNERED unit), but yet he's going to take that prime 82nd/Fort Carson/insert whatever prime duty you want from a junior MAJ who worked 18 hrs a day crushing himself to turn lemons into lemonade.

This goes back to Army's personnel management. When your branch manager comes down to talk to you about your next duty station at your PME course, past performance has no bearing on your preference sheet. A f*cking slug has just a good of chance of getting his first choice as a go-getter who made sacrifices be successful.

If you can over look your pride, why not be a slug; less work, same pay? Why smoke yourself turning lemons into lemonade when you can build a home theater, veg out, and be better rested for your next assignment.

The way out of IZ and AF is by mentoring and partnering. Bing West, in his new book, makes great points about what made unit great and successful at partnering with forces in AF. Partnering(serious partnering, not the check the box kind) is everyone's job; support, infantry, HQs, BSOs, MITT, OMLTs, etc. Anyone who has ever partnered with an IZ or AF unit can tell you that the most important thing you need to do is build a relationship with your partner unit.

Coming in during the RIP, telling the IZ unit you weren't giving them sh*t, you have no resources at your disposal, you're going back to your FOB of luxury and you want your partnered unit drive your self described dangerous route so you can quiz them is probably not going to make you successful.

We need to hold leaders accountable for failures and not just the wait until someone dies at the hands of previously identified shitty leaders and slap some wrists(look at the last chapter of the book Black Hearts; anyone who read that books could tell you a lot of the main leaders in that book needed to be immediately kicked out of the military and not sent to RTB to train future leaders and to be a XO/S3).

After reading SOAP MCTAVISH's comments from his IN Branch email in the "Flag Bloat" thread, I'm excited. Thank god only 20% of my peers are going to command a battalion. Some are great leaders among, some are good leaders, most are average, and a good portion are bad. If you're competitive and a performer, you're EXCITED to hear that your hard work will be rewarded. We should be happy our men will have a commander in the top 20% of his peers; they deserve specially selected leaders with a pattern of surpassing expectations.

to trade in order to get your partner's attention. If you don't have relevant experience like the American Civil Servants to whom he refers, then you had best have material aid to dangle. So I am honestly sympathetic to his plight. And, I do blame the Army for selecting him and sending him to that billet.

But, read this interview carefully (it is painful) and there are Freudian slips which reveal that he expected others (not just the Iraqis) to come to him. When you read of the great variety of units present at his location; surely you see opportunity. An "A" Team and a motor maintenance unit? I see opportunity. A good NCO would be trading and trafficking in favors left and right. Hell, use the "home theater" you've built and move the mess hall popcorn machine in!

The Poles might have had some out-of-the-box ideas. Some of the skilled US personnel might be bored as well. Maybe they would be willing to donate some of their time to help cultivate the Iraqis? We are taught and expected to try.

You cannot possibly hope to influence a counterpart's conduct until you win his trust. We are paid to take risks and we do not quit - unless ordered to do so.

None. Bn Runner and RCC are right--this guy is a slacker. Rather: he WAS a slacker during this assignment; for all I know, he could be a rock star in assignments that have less of a free-form and ambiguous nature. But he is a field-grade Army officer: he should be able to, and expected to, adapt.

Here's what I saw in the interview: No motivation. No imagination. No initiative. No ownership. Plenty of blame-shifting and shoulder-shrugging.

Sure, his higher-ups didn't exactly "set him up for success," but hey, things are tough all over. Sometimes the mission isn't spelled out for you in crayon, then read to you in one- and two-syllable words. The "suck it up" guidance from his boss had a pretty clear message between the lines: "You're a major; I shouldn't have to spell this out for you. You have a broad, vaguely-defined mission, with a small handful of specific requirements, and no supervision. Go make some goodness happen."

A lack of specifics and resources from your immediate boss doesn't excuse laziness. It means you look 2, 3, 4 levels higher, determine approximately where you fit into the bigger picture, and figure out your own damn mission.

Even without the luxury of idle weeks and months that this guy had, here's some workarounds (to get off the FOB and spend some time with his counterparts) I thought up just in the time it took to read the interview:
- Learn to submit an air mission request. Between 10th Mtn and MNC-I, there were helicopters that would have come to Echo, picked up him, his interpreters, & his ICE buddies, taken him wherever he needed to go, and back again. Sure, he wouldn't have gotten that kind of support every day--but once a week or two weeks, sure.
- He said his interpreters would drive their own cars out to his counterpart's HQ and relay back by phone. Why didn't he go with them? He and his ICE buddies dress in civvy clothes, take along a couple sat/cell phones, GPS, PLB, and personal weapons, and off they all go. Against the rules, sure; but clearly nobody gave a shit anyway, so why not? Do it until someone found out and made him stop.
- If those two methods weren't enough to get him out as often as he needed, fill in the gaps by hitching rides with other units like he did with the Poles and ODA. The impression I got is that his efforts to make those sorts of arrangements were halfhearted at best.

Last comment: his "banning of the phrase 'in sha' Allah'" on the training academy shows some pretty obtuse and willful cultural ignorance. That, and not learning any of the language despite unlimited access to 3 very high quality interpreters and "nothing else to do." He described his counterpart Iraqi G-4 as "useless" ... maybe he should have spent more time looking in the mirror.

During a comment thread in which we all piled on, I think Blackfoot's comments might be the most constructive.

We are probably a pretty tough crowd here, given that from what I can gather we are 100% combat veterans from OIF or OEF, and by merit of the fact we care enough to be trolling blogs this, we are basically self-selecting into a group of combat veterans that are more cerebral than most.

Given that fact, there were a ton of very thoughtful responses, but Blackfoot pretty much laid out a point by point "how to make your sucky and stagnant deployment mean something" checklist. Well done.

1. Movements for military and civilians were a big deal. If no US forces were at that Iraqi base, then air missions don't seem likely. Ground missions the same. I believe there were significant requirements for QRF and medevac/casevac when people went places. Likely some staff flunkies back at VB would have laughed at this guy's requests for extensive time out there.

2. As far as donning civvies goes, I doubt anyone was gonna go for that. There seemed to be pretty rigid rules that non-spec ops personnel were required to be in uniform. He could have done that, but it's fair to ask "Why bother?" Iraqi border cops don't care what three Americans are pushing anyway. They want stuff.

3. The MAJ's candor is appreciated and refreshing. So many people were under-utilized in Iraq, and it's not realistic to say that everyone who was shunted aside could make lemonade out of lemons. One of the constant refrains in my neighborhood was "stay in your lane", in part because people were fighting over busy work and meaningful work, but also because office responsibilities overlapped. Not likely that everyone is going to find or carve out a niche.

4. Perhaps the MAJ could have gotten on with some other unit at the FOB. I think he might have been there before the PRT arrived, so that was out. ECHO was not conducive to collaborative effort, and I'm pretty sure that the allied countries would not have stuck their necks out for him. The Poles were notorious for shooting first, and the then shooting some more, and the Romanians and Ukrainians .were pretty low-key when it came to the soft-skills.

A colleague in Diyala recounted a story about an Iraqi detective who explained that a rape investigation would go forward if the examining officer could stick in two fingers. How much can you really achieve in the face of that thinking? Give them their swag, and try to make sure they dime out the really bad people.

Like my screen name says I've been done the MiTT thing with an IA Brigade followed by a second tour in a Divsion ISF cell. So I can appreciate his frustrations and unfortunaltey I've seen too many teams give up in frustration.

That being said, I don't want to get into what MAJ Stewart could done better but rather provide some perspective. During my time in the USD-S ISF cell iI have been to FOB Echo numerous times and was familiar with the 5th DBE Region.

The first problem was that the BiTT team could only get to the Region HQs and one of the Brigades because everything else was outside of MEDEVAC range, the trip to the one Brigade HQs alone took something like six hours of driving one way if I remember correctly.

The second challenge was that the DBE itself are the least repsected of all of the Iraqi security forces, in fact the DBE shurta were paid less than the members IA/FP of the same rank.

Depsite the best efforts of the BiTT teams thoughout the Divsion AO it was hard for any of their ideas to gain traction beyond the region level due to lack of information sharing and overly centralized command and control that is endemic to the ISF. Most importantly however was the lack lack of will in the GOI.

In RVN, advisors of all types ate, slept, and fought alongside those they advised. The Marines took it to the extreme in going down to Popular Force level - village internal defense. Police advisors were AID personnel and came from police backgrounds in the US. MAAG advisors went down to battalion level. They all ate Vietnamese food and most slept in hammocks. In some units you gave advice and could call in CAS. In other units, you learned from the Vietnamese pros who had been fighting since at least 1945.

Not only has the wheel been reinvented, but the values and expectations have changed. It sounds like, at this stage in Iraq, we are barely going through the motions. I do realize that each nation and ethnic group offers different challenges and that bribery is a recognized way for many to supplement their inadequate salaries. My friend's experience with the Border Police on the Iranian frontier was completely different and was a positive one. One of their jobs was to protect some oil wells in his AO and they were a source of income for the province. They took that job seriously.

Apparently, we are just going through the motions and ought to get the hell out - and that includes contractors.

BTW, how do you get to stay for 2.5 years with the Old Guard? Was he recovering from wounds? Don't most folks redeploy more often than that?

Your comment on having advisors at the lowest level is true. In late 2008 when we began to move the battalion level teams to supplement the brigade MiTTs.

When I came back in 2010 the few battalion MiTTs that were left were shifted to the Brigade level and all the incoming STT were placed at the brigade/divsion/PDOP level.

The rational behind this move was the realization that tactically the battalions were Iraqi "good enough" but they still were unable to sustain or train themselves.

The heart of the Iraqi logistics system is at the brigade/divsion so the main effort was shifted to logistics and training management at the brigade and higher levels. I think given the dwindilng troop levels, resources and time this was the best we could do in order to make a difference.