This is something we often talk about on this blog, it really made me feel good to see a Colonel write this, restored my faith. If we had more 06's like this we would be far ahead of where we are today in both Iraq and Afghanistan. A short, sweet and to the point article like this has a lot of weight when it comes from a serving Colonel, glad to read and it see that there are still a lot of good senior officers left, hope you make Flag.

really has his shit together.

I agree with Otter on the need for more like this.

This article, while concise and chock full o' goodness, saddens me. I'm 12 years in and I'm thinking such a shift in thinking among senior officers is a generational one, i.e. it will possibly be in place five or six years after I'm retired. Does anyone really think that prescriptive orders, over-reliance on SOPs, and management by PowerPoint(tm) will be phased out in the next crop of GOs? I guess I realized all of this before, but this short chunk of text really made me think how far we have to go.

How can we ever foster in our junior leaders, which by the way includes NCOs, that see or sense an opportunity in the pursuance of their commander's intent, to seize that opportunity rather than to dither, by referring it up to a higher level because they are made uncomfortable by a command climate fosterd by seniors, which Yingling layed out so elequently.

Ya know, there is nothing complex about combat. . .it's just damn hard is all! Since time memorial, no one has ever had a complete picture of what is going on, but I think LtGen Patton summed it up just about right when he said, " "a good plan, violently executed now, is better than a perfect plan next week."

Too many seem to be waiting for next week. . .maybe because by then. . .it will be over, and they will have in hindsight, a more complete picuture of the situation they were uncomfortable with, but now can forget about.

While I agree with some of what the good Colonel wrote, the assertion that SOPs exhist to protect senior officers is a tad off the mark. SOPs and detailed orders (e.g. a good annex D or detainee SOP) can provide the knowledge base for Soldiers who are not familier with said operation. The problem in today's military is that SOPs, orders, FMs, JPs, etc...are worthless unless they are read and understood.
Having some experience with detainee operations, a good detailed SOP was very useful to use to teach Soldiers who were thrown into the mission. The SOP was very useful when NCOs read it, understood it, and tought it to junior Soldiers. When he writes "I told them no to beat detainees, here on page 11." That is off the mark as well, no-one can ever use that as cover, but you take the knowledge in that SOP and teach and instill it into those troops, failing to that is what gets you in trouble, no matter how detailed the SOP or order is.
You have to have that base of knowledge before you can operate in the "Mission Command" environment.
From the top, it goes back to what you learn in ROTC, or PLDC/WLC...the last step in Troop Leading Precedures...anyone, anyone?
When the Colonel Yingling (BTW, anyone notice he is named after a beer, one of the best at that) gets back from the Zugspitz, he is free to offer up more thoughts.

When the Army started believing that a bulletin board full of policy letters would curb drunk driving etc., we took the first steps down the road to perdition.

SOPs are different (to a point). They are the playbook that ensures the team is all working in the same system. But they shouldn't dictate play calling -- or audibling when the opportunity presents itself.

BTW -- A LTC SHOULD keep a captain between himself and a problem -- not to insulate himself from the consequences -- but to address the myriad challenges at the lowest level possible. It is more efficient and more effective. Provided the junior leaders are empowered to solve the problems, and supported when things go bad.

War is not more complicated, but I would argue that there has never been a time in history when military leaders were under such daily public scrutiny over their day-to-day actions, and the consequences of military operations.

What is the average number of 15-6 investigations a battalion sized unit conducts (and is subjected to) during a year in Afghanistan or Iraq? 75?100?

This is not all internal military pressure. It is pressure to be responsive to public demands on information -- demands generated by politicians, the media, parents of Soldiers, human rights organizations, opposition groups of various stripes. You name it.

According to the Delta Commander present, the 10th Mountain staff would not alter their plan which was to insert Chinooks into an enemy trap because the division planning cycle would delay the operation a day or two. This was in the face of A1 American observation of dug-in Taliban weapons systems. The two companies and their lift got shot up and pinned down.

That is why MAJ Smith is dead wrong and COL Yingling is right. Rigidity and inflexibility lead to morbidity. In warfare, especially counter-guerrilla warfare, you have to be willing and able to spin on a dime. Late developing intel or unexpected contact requires a prompt, tailored reaction. In Staff College you got points for having the most "be prepareds" in your orders. BUT, your subordinate commanders must be mentally prepared for something really different. Pilots flying CAS can't be totally dependent upon carefully crafted mission orders. They may well be diverted en route to a unit in trouble with different terrain and a different type of human terrain. Similarly, a ground pounder may be going to a meeting in a village, but the commander knows that somewhere on the way in, or at the village, or on the way back - his unit or a portion thereof will be ambushed. His plan is a be prepared.

A Medal of Honor was awarded yesterday to an unexpected leader reacting to an unanticipated situation in an exceptional and amazing manner. Offhand, I'd say that higher could have had a QRF on standby for such situations and a contingency IDF plan, but not a contingency ground maneuver plan. That maneuver plan came from a Marine Corporal's instincts and his upbringing - not a school or OPORD.

There are times when a situation just calls for leadership and violence of action. How else to fight outnumbered and win?

SOPs are a baseline that are made for when you all attempting to sing off the same sheet and are intended for ideal circumstances, rarely do ideal circumstances happen in a fight.

long winded and misguided diatribe on command and control on the battlefield, Mr. Ricks proclaims him to be he's the next coming of Patton! But when P.F.C. [Proud F**king Civilian] Tom Lucier calls Major Smith's drivel "Long winded and verbose," Mr. Rick flags his comment as being "rude!" I guess RHIP on Mr. Rick's Blog too!

When Colonel Yingling criticizes Major Smith's........

"...you must be a pirate for the pirate's code to apply and you're not. And thirdly, the code is more what you'd call "guidelines" than actual rules."

In a conventional infantry unit, a patrol SOP might prescribe a soldier's basic load and patrol order. Of course, the amount of ammo, water, and food you carry is mission dependent - but at least you have a common frame of reference. You could view immediate action drills as SOPs or the procedure for calling-in IDF. You could view an SOP as the minimum you can count on - in some ways.

In SOG (I was not in SOG) there was a detailed SOP which included where vital items were to be carried on your person. In that way, if a man is hit, you know where his field dressing is, his extra ammo, his compass - etc. This is especially useful in units with vehicles. In an ambush, you know where each vehicle's extra ammo is stored or where the recovery tools are. Those are useful SOPs likely to survive contact.

What won't survive contact is an SOP which says, "When you encounter this, you do that." For example, the Malaysian Jungle Warfare School taught that when ambushed, you charge through it. In Special Forces, we practiced breaking contact and not charging through. Why? Well, these tactics were designed for units of different size and armament. So, SOPs aren't necessarily transferable. However, when you have a hang fire with a mortar, as far as I'm concerned, there is only one SOP on how to handle it. Of course, you'd execute a lot faster in combat than on a range and you wouldn't create a safety area. {;*))

I really get the impression that some concepts were arrived at to make staffs mentally comfortable without due regard for field execution.

Major Smith's long winded and misguided diatribe on command and control on the battlefield, Mr. Ricks proclaims him to be the next coming of Patton! But when P.F.C. [Proud F**king Civilian] Tom Lucier calls Major Smith's drivel "Long winded and verbose," Mr. Rick flags his comment as being "rude!" I guess RHIP on Mr. Rick's Blog too!

Mr. Ricks, please fix your blog's antiquated comments feature!

While I defer to others on the Col's main point, and applaud his outspoken record, I do urge all to take his mythic narrative with a grain of historical salt.

Guderian's officers had rehearsed mechanized war logistics for years in Alsace, Sudetenland, Austria. They had pause for a full reset after the month long live-fire exercise in Poland, where the Soviets shared in the victorious massacre. The rapid forward deployment of Wehrmacht air and anti-air assets, to defeat the RAF while advancing in column, that strikes me as a rolling staffwork masterpiece. By contrast, the unfocussed development of off-axis lines of advance in Russia bled the Wehrmacht, burned their oil without replacing it, planted the seeds of the first and final German defeats.

Union cavalry divisions (circa 1863) individually took 2 years to assemble and train, before they could surprise the undersupplied Stuart, where rebs were conserving rounds, rations and fodder behind the passes. Stuart's subsequent audacious raid into Maryland/Penn. put his commander at a disadvantage that cost him the high ground. Brig. Custer helped check Stuart on the 3rd day at Gettysburg with practiced dismount defensive tactics, and rapid loading cartridge rifles. Not the kind of reckless charge Custer threatened at Appomattox, or the feckless one he executed at the Greasy Grass.

No need to go to the Romans for efficient COIN leadership. Why not look at Grant's effective (and richly rewarded) use of artillery, in the reduction and 4th of July surrender of besieged Vicksburg? I've yet to hear a white Southerner thank Lincoln, Grant, Sherman or Sheridan for kicking their a__es so mercilessly.

Mythified history stories are good for rallying the cause. They can adapt to support authority or insurrection, confuse liberation and conquest. Try reading the Samson chapter (Judges 13-16) from the viewpoint of the CT/stability ops that our brigade staffs and line officers are likely to be tasked with today.

The reason for this difference of views is because we have underemployed staffs! We have divisions that no longer control their brigades and brigades that no longer have 3 or 4 battalions to order around. I know of one brigade commander who was jealous of one of his two deployed battalion commanders because that battalion combat team commander had his own AO with over 1200 troops and civilians under him and his own general officer counterparts in Iraq. The brigade staff had admin functions only.

In Afghanistan, who does the brigade command? Where is the division? Does brigade filter ISAF orders and policies? {Probably.) Do battalions require day to day brigade direction as they would in a conventional war with a front line? (Not.)

The Army's attempt to imitate the Marine Corps has resulted in some significant cultural gaps. The Army doesn't know how to deal with brigades separate and battalions separate - both with the clever acronym: BCT. Perhaps we should be beefing-up battalion staffs and company staffs. Company separate anyone - commanded by a Major?

Both sides of this debate have merit, obviously. I think everyone agrees mission command should be strived for, but many agree that the young officers are not trainined enough to execute properly..

So it comes down to asking how to better prepare them?

IOBC does not prepare young Infantry officers enough. It mainly trains them for Ranger School. Ranger School is a great leadership crucible and great for learning *some* tactics, but it is almost the antithesis of "mission command." (e.g. When I went through it, you would almost be 99% sure of failing a patrol if you wavered from the Ranger way of doing it....regardless of the outcome).

So.... how to train young combat arms officers better? A longer basic course is the first thing that comes to mind, but I'm sure that is just a the tip of the solution. How to train squad leaders better? (I think their NCO education schools are too short, but the Army needs them back in the fight, so its hard for Big Army to justify giving them longer school time, I think)

I don't have the answers, but I know that I was whoefully unprepared to take charge of a platoon in combat when I did. Thank god I had a squared away platoon sergeant and squad leaders and was able to learn on the job fast, but that is far from the ideal situation.

I know because I'm part "Frog" and a member of the Franco-Americaine Centre in Manchester, NH! And they can't draw flies to their French language classes.

All,

Glad my response sparked some thought!

COL Yingling was kind enough to dialogue with me offline about this before it ran. I have the utmost respect for him, and as I told him, we are really in violent agreement on most things.

First, one should not misconstrue what I was saying - I was not arguing for detailed control and mindless execution regardless of situations, more TPS coversheets, or taking initiative from subordinates. I was attempting to add a nuanced counter to those who allege that any controls imposed by higher headquarters are somehow misguided, and that mission command may not apply in all situations.

What I was responding to was not how we COMMAND, but how we plan, and adding that need for staff planning and sync increases and decreases based on numerous factors, which I alluded to in my response. Some of the prior writings were interpreting any planning and restrictions as unconscionable to the subordinate - hogwash. A well synced and wargamed plan allows commanders to see opportunity and respond appropriately within the commander's intent, and not miss opportunities because they are mired in operational details well trained staffs should handle or be prevented from exploiting an opportunity because no one wargamed and saw it coming.

In other words, "planning is essential, plans are useless" was my main argument. The less experienced the subordinate and staffs the more need for detailed planning - not command restriction beyond rhyme or reason. There is a difference.

I am absolutely bewildered how some of you, who have never served with, over, or under me, could draw such conclusions from a note that was articulating some nuance written hastily from the field. I wish I could engage more on this, but current commitments keep me a tad busy.

Best,
MAJ Niel Smith

I think it isn't productive to go so black and white on either side of this argument. We need SOPs that are well defined and well understood to instill "muscle memory"....and we also need leaders and soldiers that can react and utlize individual judgment.

I don't think this needs to be a binary set of choices. But I do think TJ Lucier a) sounds like the name of a bad cop show, and b) needs to never post here again.

closed minded simpleton. What's the matter, am I causing you to rethink your career choice? Or is it that you're just not "programmed to receive?" In either case, your nothing but an intolerant ignoramus! P.S. Better to keep your pie-hole shut than to open it and expose your stupidity to the world!

with not only the guy who posts spam selling running shoes and other junk, but also Mr. Lucier, who seems to have been off his meds for quite a long time. Tom, time to update your blog software, so that we can block non-contributors as well as track current posts more easily.

Responding just feeds into his energy.

Even if he had something to say, he lacks sufficient civility to be treated as a member of this discussion.

Best,
Tom

In my Constitutionally protected opinion, which in no way advocates overthrowing the current government, the sheer stupidity and incompetence of the general grade officers of the Armed Forces of the United States of America, has long since reached criminal proportions, and as far as I'm concerned, they should all be taken out, lined up against a wall and given their just due! Fact is, for the most part, our conventional ground forces couldn't fight their way out of a piss-soaked paper bag with a razor-sharp machete. Today's military has digressed to the point where it's basically nothing more than one giant, but highly ineffective social welfare organization that's parasitic and slowly sucking the lifeblood out of its host, the American Taxpaying Public. And we are sick and tired of getting zero bang for our tax dollars, while we continually get ripped-off by totally clueless general grade officers, greedy defense contractors and crooked politicians on the take. The U.S. Military, its current form, is completely broken, and nothing more or less than a criminal enterprise, replete with board-certified psychos, conmen, flimflam artists, extortionist and career criminals masquerading a "career" officers and SNCOs, who haven't been on the winning side of a war since August of 1945! Nice going, generals!

Since I am on the road I missed most of the discussion of Col. Yingling’s most excellent and insightful comments. Tom’s blog has a tendency to concentrate upon land operations, which is to be expected since that is usually our primary operational focus these days. But I will take a look at operations at sea.

One of the clearest examples of effective Auftragstaktik or ‘appreciating the commander’s intent’ was at sea by Adm. Nelson and his original ‘band of brothers’. In fact if I were asked to recommend the best example of Auftragstaktik my first choice would be to use naval rather than land engagements. Something like the Battle of the Nile at its best in execution and Savo Island at its worst.

If one studies both the battles of St. Vincent (1797, Nelson as subordinate) and the battle of annihilation at the Nile (1798, Nelson as commander) one would discover the essence of Col. Yingling’s ‘making ones own luck’ with supporting commanders using their own initiative to further exploit the tactical opportunity at hand.

These two battles like Hawke’s famous victory at Quiberon Bay in 1759 demonstrates even more clearly that most land engagements a numerically inferior force at a positional disadvantage in either gale like conditions or in poor visibility seizing the initiative to seek close action and decisive battle to its ultimate conclusion.

The key element in all these engagements (of which Trafalgar was the crown jewel) was not the evident mechanics of British superiority in gunnery, or seamanship, or signaling but the fact that all the commanders were on the same wave length in appreciating the missions objective and were capable of assuming command had Nelson fell (as he did at the Nile with a head wound) and pursuing his intent as if he were still in command.

Nelson believed that his most junior frigate commander should be mentally prepared to take the entirety of the fleet in hand if the responsibility fell on his shoulders. This was not so different from Guderian’s expectations of his subordinates in May of 1940.

Side note: Just about everyone who regularizes Tom’s site makes important contributions with their knowledge and experience but every now and then a crank materializes out of the atmosphere. I don’t now who TJ LUCIER is or what his problem is but his comments of late sound to me at least disorientated. Perhaps he can locate another venue to get off his chest whatever is bugging him?