Mr. Ricks--

I think you need to react to things as they are, not as you wish them to be. Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies are messy at best, and don't usually end with a neat surrender ceremony on a battleship's deck. Certainly, violence in Malaysia continued for long after the British (and historians) decided that the war ended. Violence in the Philippines continued long after the end of the Phlilippine insurgency. But to try and assert--as you seem to be--that we are in the same situation as we were in 2005-2006 seems to be holding onto a conclusion long since obsoleted.

It’s rather amusing that TOTAL is trying to instruct Tom Ricks about the nature of insurgencies. My guess would be that Tom has forgotten more about this subject than TOTAL ever knew. However, TOTAL is right about one thing, this does not look like 2005-2006, it really looks more like Vietnam in 1970-1971.

Only pick fights that you can win.

The thing is no matter how many troops we put in Iraq, WE can't stop terrible things like these latest killings. Even at the height of our involvement, these incidents took place regularly. It only stops when the Iraqis want to stop it, and they at this time clearly do not want to stop. Their war is not over, no matter what we say or do. The demons we unleashed in 2003 when we destroyed civil society in Iraq and upset the balance of power among the tribes and religions is not settled yet. A lot more people are gonna die I am afraid, no matter what the US does with its troops.

After eight years and 4474 American deaths, we have become irrelevant.

Peter

http://www.wemeantwell.com

When you are at single digit national deathcounts, does that really signify anything?

In a country the size of Iraq, are 10 sectarian deaths a day destabilizing?

That is likely below the gang-related murder rate in the United States.

What is the marginal cost of driving that level of violence down?

What about Iraq looks like Viet Nam in 1970-1971? The perception that there is some degree equilibrium before a theoritical collapse once the US pulls out?

Not seeing it. Congress can't cut off Iraq's oil money, and Moqtada Sadr ain't Ho Chi Minh.

That pretty much sums up the whole OIF Star Cluster F**K. And sadly, the shitheads in Washington who came up with this brilliant war plan, never bled an ounce of blood, suffered the effects of a horrific wound or even heard a round fired in anger! And yet, the majority of uninformed nitwits in the Armed Forces continue to vote a straight Republican ticket in national elections! Go figure.

First, Joel's report and figures indicate that the political assassination level is declining. Whether like the ethnic cleansing, which declined as more of it was accomplished, the decline, plus the continuing disclosures, are good signs.

Second, I know that the increasingly limited reporting from Iraq seems to disproportionately focus on bombings, killings, which is not really surprising in one of the most heavily armed countries still in post-conflict mode, but look beyond the political theatre to basic trade, business, and foreign investment---all rising significantly (see news on the newly refurbished 5-star Al Rasheed (British construction, Swiss management). There is a very big difference between the economy and the political theatre.

I have not seen any data suggesting that Iraq, despite inevitable turmoil in the medium term, is actually at any serious risk of unravelling, despite, for example, the "Sky is falling" warnings about Kirkuk, the Oil Law, etc...

Reality is that these issues are really not make-or-break deals. KRG has its hands full juggling the three balls of Baghdad, Turkey and Iran, and really is not in a position to force anyone into a show down. Fortunately, they are well-led and, while always pursuing greater autonomy, are not likely to jeopardize all by over-pressuring opponents that would get the better of them.

Like a wobbly top, its is still upright and spinning.

From the Carter Doctrine on we've been digging ourselves deeper and deeper. Now the sands are shifting.

I see this in regional terms. It's time we got off and out. The "When" of this is unclear, but seems to me inevitable. The "How" is what troubles me.

Following Huckleberry's great line:

Careful and professional review of the recently released Wiki cables provides a sobering assessment of the underlying problems of one nation attempting to exercise authority over another through both an international, and local venue which it did not understand and could not control.

At the 10,000 foot scale, you have Ambassador Crocker and Krejeski's cables regarding the Disputed Territories (KRG/Kirkuk). Here, New York, more than anything was heavily involved as powerful competing neighbor countries pressured the entire issue to be dropped, handled completely their way, or resolved to address their particular local/national concerns. The pressure from New York (through the UN) was to remove the Special Representative and drop the entire issue. Israel, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait (and on) all trying to work the US levers for essentially Iraqi issues.

At ground level, there were many competing opinions, and, in large part, fundamental issues of property, political and civil/minority rights at stake involving real folks with genuine concerns. Like so many historically disputed areas, the answers would never be clear and completely settled even after a conclusion appeared to have been formally reached.

Wisely, Crocker sought to keep the issue on the table, but for Iraqi resolution (not based on the "neighbor" issues), but there were just too many local issues to resolve in a bubble of fast track national or international efforts. Only the Iraqis could resolve it, and only if and when it became essential to them to do so. Notice that Iraq has not blown up in the subsequent three years, and the neighbor issues remain.

Here, you have Iraq, with its own credible internal issues (all politics are local), with a foreign overseer/administrator/proxy so thoroughly engaged in, and influenced by, extraneous international pressures that, as Crocker correctly observed, could not be addressed through the proxy, but must be addressed by the actual residents.

Ultimately, the Tiger has to go into the forest and fend for itself. The rider risks everything by staying on top, and getting off.

I would argue that much of our continuing failures in civil post-conflict result from too many US folks, either explicitly or implicitly, riding a Tiger, and wondering why it is so hard.

We can't stay in this perch forever, and we have to carefully plan and prepare how to get off.