...I am pretty comfortable with a very rote procedure that is triple checked and drilled to perfection by humans lest we have a screw up of global proportions. I guess that is the cost of doing business in something that is really a zero defect affair. As I joked once with a launch officer acquaintance, I hope you guys NEVER get a combat patch.

Sad about all the derived procedural things in that organization, though.

...have jobs for which they are overqualified? Tradition? Intertia? Legal reasons?

A higher level enlisted person does not have the expereience and authorities to turn the launch key? Same for watching a console that monitors satellite status. AF space ops sounds a lot like Arab militaries.

I'm thinking a thoughtful and well managedmilitary personnel system might look different from the curtrent military personnel system, at least for many types of work.

If the U.S. military gets into a real war -- with real losses and setbacks and the need to attack or defend -- inspired and effective leadership will come into view. The price in blood and treasure will be high, just as it always is.

From reading both this article and its source piece, I think that this is also a situation where the ability of soldiers and leaders to think for themselves will vary greatly within each branch of the military, and not just differ between military branches.

I was a paratrooper from 1992 until 1996. In my experience, our leadership and soldiers were quite adaptable and often improvisational. This ability stemmed from our role in military action - ever see the chaos of a drop zone at 2 AM? The disorder of Normandy after the Allied airdrops? Our culture made it a necessity that individuals be self-organizing and individually thinking.

However, the same cannot be said for all unit types. I found that armor units in particular were limited in much the same way as the above mentioned Air Force Missile Officers described above. They were far more tied to doctrine and directions than we ever were.

Of course there are going to be more checklists in the Air Force and less flexibility - not only is the method of warfare dependent on multi-million, or billion dollar equipment, but the equipment is also extremely complex, and has the ability to go horribly wrong if mismanaged.

Maneuvering a platoon of men on the ground to attack a town, while a considerable responsibility, is going to add a lot more flexibility than operating ICBMs that have the potential to instigate or end WWIII.

I could not imagine a place where "independent subordinate initiative" would be less welcome than with the people manning the strategic nuclear arms. Dr. Strangelove was exactly about a general who showed too much "initiative". The military is too big and too complex for one idea to be universally applicable.

I also feel tempted to ask Dr. Ricks if you would have fired the ICBMs, presumably knowing that the US would be unlikely to be around to benefit from your counterattack. I assume you would have and pass no judgment on that; otherwise the deterrence would have been a bluff.

As many have noted, it depends on the mission and in the case of launching nukes you want a checklist orientation. But there are other parts of the Air Force out there. In the olden days when Strategic Air Command was around it too was a very checklist oriented culture for the same reason. Checklists for SAC were referred to as your paper/plastic brains.
But there's a lot of free thinking out there with both the airlifters and with tactical air. Airlifters end up a long way from home and not always the best connectivity for micromanagers use to butt in. And on the tactical side it becomes a matter of mission commanders being responsible for getting the job done.

The best summation of this is from the Air Operations Center philosophy of "Centralized Command, Decentralized Execution". i.e. the taskings were handed out to the operational units along with the constraints necessary to get the whole plan to tie together, but it was up to the operational unit to get the job done as they saw fit.

One very good example of this are the counter air/air defense units on alert. The klaxon goes off and a flight of jets gets launched against an incoming target. Sure, there is a ground controller, but with a call of "Judy" the flight lead in the air can tell the controller to stop transmitting, the flight lead now has control. Given general orders on what to do, e.g. identify the incoming target and destroy if it is an enemy, the flight lead then leads the rest of the mission execution.

One thing working in favor of the Air Force is that the forces to be used are relatively small so a huge amount of control isn't necessary to get them all moving in the right direction.

But for launching nukes? Yeah, checklist city.

Dear A. Checklist Monkey,

Your service, the USAF, has had it share of bumps, just as its counterparts have, over many decades of service to this country. Overall in its history, the AF has performed its share of the nuclear mission or Triad. The officers selected to man the crew positions that you have held are required to have incredible discipline--part of which is to stay focused and alert because our nation's survival might depend on it.

Rather than select a blog that in recent months has attacked the service to the delight of a great many, non-joint, non air-minded readers about the frustrations you feel from a possible breakdown of your own endurance for such a mission, it might well be more productive and less denegrading for your colleagues if you stepped away from this mission and possibly the AF.

I believe 'OWG' was very kind, and knowing, in his remarks to you about the size and scope of the Service that you have yet to appreciate. It is unfortunate as Airmen and their leaders work very hard to see the mission through, in an imposing resource climate, that you provide a patently false window into that of the AF Field Grade Officer.

Your service, in the silo is much appreciated by this American and almost all Americans--thank you for keeping watch. Please consider your next steps in providing those you lead inspiration and motivation. Toss the chips, don your uniform, and be proud to serve our great country.

Major Harold Hering anyone?

Pretty good comments overall...the Major is pointing out the basic difference in philosophy between the two old parts of the Air Force...checklist oriented Strategic Air Command and seat-of-the-pants oriented Tactical Air Command. Both parts probably built legitimate cultures...one for nuclear weapons and billion dollar satellites, the other for flexible tactical missions that were never the same. Sounds like Major Monkey might have been more psychologically prepared for the TAC side.

He wasn't able to post this from his work computer, so I am doing it for him.
Best,
Tom
--

I wanted to offer quick comments/replies in case you were curious about answers to the questions some people were posting.

- I guess I didn’t make it 100% clear, but I actually do feel that ICBM ops is one of those areas (like a doctor’s diagnosis) where 100% accuracy should be the standard. I received more than one counseling session for not getting 100% on my monthly training exams, despite never actually failing an exam in 5 years. Less than 90% is failing, by the way.

- Actually pulling alert out in the field, sitting underground waiting to turn keys was the EASIEST part of being a missileer. It was everything outside of the capsule that made life miserable (the micromanagement and inflexibility of everything else).

- One commenter asked why there are not enlisted personnel on missile crews. Back in the Titan and Atlas ICBM days, there actually were enlisted personnel on missile crews. Although they are like a needle in a haystack nowadays, you can still find on occasion an E-9 or E-10 wearing a Missile Operations badge. Because of the types of components used in current ICBM systems, components that have been legally designated ‘officer-only’ components, enlisted personnel are NOT LEGALLY ALLOWED to be on missile crews. If you want that changed, write your congressperson.

- One commenter asked why (sarcastically?) anyone would join the Air Force. Everyone has a different reason, of course. If you want to fly F-16’s, your career options are limited. I tried the pilot route, but it didn’t work out for me. Space Ops was my #2 choice.

Thanks again Sir!

- A. Checklist Monkey

One thing became apparent to me late in my previous military career, and that is whether Air Force, Army, Navy/Marine Corps, an organization's doctrine is what is put forward as correct behavior. . .the right way to do things; having been put together through a collection of ideas, beliefs, perceptions, and even prejudices.

However, the culture of one's service is based on much more than doctrine. It is a collection of both formal and informal ways of doing things, passed down from-generation-to-generation, and is manifested in the way the promotion policies of that service work, its social mores, and, in effect, the world view through the eyes of that service.

Toujours Fidele

"sitting on nuke alert eating potato chips and watching TV in my wife-beater t-shirt and sweat pants" is not quite the same as sitting in the back of a MRAP in 70 lbs of gear, in 120 degree heat, on a known IED route. Just as the decisions made in a village shura or an isolated firefight, do not have the world-changing, strategic consequences of an ICBM launch. It is comforting that there are so many layers between us and potential armageddon. No doubt BG Jack D. Ripper enjoyed the dynamic, flash decisionmaking offered by "Plan R", but ICBM and satellite warfare are strategic in nature, and necessarily must endure a long, scrutinizing process. It is at the tactical and operational levels that are most in need of controlled violence of action, carried out by intelligent, educated, and dynamic individuals unrestrained by yards and yards of red tape.

Here's how I think Auftragstaktik *should* apply to ICBM ops:
The mission order for an ICBM crew is to do what is required to deter nuclear war.
That means that the maintenance and operation of the control center and missile must be perfect and, yes, by the book, by the checklist. That said, as the systems get older, and they are getting older and certain to continue getting older, the 30-years of checklist refinement will leave gaps and opportunities for improvement in response to degrading conditions. ICBM crews need to have the training and awareness to identify these gaps and the confidence that when they report emerging problems they will be addressed.
Ultimately, having a man in the loop between the missile and its launch is about Auftragstaktik. Deterrence requires a crew ready, willing, and able to launch a missile when they receive an authenticated order. Humanity requires a human being capable of recognizing a situation where there are anomalies that put doubts in the commander's head. Will this action deter nuclear war?
Does my willingness to launch a missile under this peculiar, non-checklist, situation deter war? Recognizing potential communication breakdowns, sabotage, or system failures is why we have a man in the loop. That's Auftragstaktik, in the peculiar situation of running a missile silo.

Rather than select a blog that in recent months has attacked the service to the delight of a great many, non-joint, non air-minded readers about the frustrations you feel homeideas from a possible breakdown of your own endurance for such a mission, it might well be more productive and less denigrating for your colleagues if you stepped away from this mission and possibly the AF.