Thursday, September 8, 2011 - 7:32 AM
That's the article I'd like to read by everyone who predicted a stalemate or quagmire in which the United States eventually would have to insert ground troops. (For those of you too hurried to click through to all them links, I am calling out the following members of the diverse quagmire/stalemate coalition: Dov Zakheim, Andrew Sullivan, Alexander Cockburn, Anne Applebaum, Richard Norton-Taylor, Melanie Clarke, the German government, the editorial page of the Wall Street Journal, the Xinhua news service, and the Beirut Daily Star.)
Who wants to go first?
Meanwhile, from Fareed Zakaria, here is one of the best summaries I have seen of the meaning of the Libyan war:
The Libyan intervention offers a new model for the West. It was a humanitarian mission with strategic interests as well -- support for the Arab Spring and the new aspirations of the people of the Middle East. It was also a new model in that it involved an America that insisted on legitimacy and burden sharing, that allowed the locals to own their revolution. That means, however, that it is in the hands of the Libyans. They can avoid the mistakes of Iraq, which makes the challenge before them even more daunting. But it is a challenge they have eagerly sought and one for which they will find help from friends around the world.
No ground troops and only a little air support with those NATO guys (but that’s us too). Although we did help to topple an evil dictator, we also incentivized weapons of mass destruction and again showed that our values and interests remain aloof. I don’t think you can say this is over yet - I hope this turns Libya into some sort of responsible state but I’d say it’s still too early to tell. Read some Crane Brinton, father of revolutionary studies, there is more to come...
I suppose its like some politicians say, the process of running a successful contested election makes us better elected officials.
US Independence from Britain required a serious, grim, challenge, over a number of grueling years, with, at best, nominal support from France.
Our nation was forged as much by Valley Forge as by that long and bitter civil war that arguably resolved the outstanding conflicts left over from the independence fight. With that background, forging a nation with some level of endurance is often a grim and reductive process requiring serious shared sacrifices, blood, treasure, and scary compromises---and some serious winning and losing across a society.
My read of events is that immediately upon success, questions have begun to arise as to the "rebel" leadership, and especially those who were against the rebellion before they were for it.
If, in fact, Q's support was only thin, with many of his staff, aides and supposed supporters ready to turncoat in an instant, why was external aid so necessary? Are the turncoats really committed to the rebellion, or just to continuing to hold the reigns?
My objection to NATO's heavy involvement is, to a great extent, the risk that it pre-empted many of the historical processes that have forged successful nations in the past (Germany from Bismarck to Brandt?).
Maybe the inception of modern warfare, tools and social media negate the relevance of the past, but, somehow, as Egypt seems to suggest, they have not.
Another version: the price of freedom is both eternal vigilance, and shared pains, investments, risks, and compromises toward an agreed goal; if it comes too easy, it might go the same way.
Our recent history is that popular press coverage has, sometimes, not accurately predicted the end result.
Beyond this, the US intervention evidently has raised hopes in other proto-revolutionary movements that kindly, heavily armed Americans microwave ratings will arrive soon to help remove their tyrants. Syrian revolutionaries seem at the head of this line.
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