Everyone is a leader or potential leader.

That is the way to approach it.

Walt

When everyone is a leader, then no one is. Perfect. We need fewer so-called leaders, and more indians with the smarts and the clout to act independently...then the so-called leaders can get out of the way and let the hard work get done.

The post totally misses the bigger picture. The larger issue is not how to conduct military operations better in Iraq or other places but the intellect and farsightedness of the very people conducting this hearing.

With its technological advances, the US has left the rest of the world quite a few years behind when it comes to military capability. As a result, the generals win battles far quicker than they used to. Wars, however, are won when policy matches the pace of military success. That is the bigger picture !! Both in Iraq and Afghanistan, the generals did win the battle pretty quickly and looked around to realize that the policy makers had not even started packing their bags for Baghdad and Kabul.

The pundits conducting the hearings should do some introspection on the policy aspect and the pace of its preparation. Did they ask the right question for the day after the military victory or on the overall startegy?

Unless the US closes the gap between the pace of military successes and the pace of its politics and policy making, we are likely to see similar disasters over and over again.

I doubt he's saying he was completely unaware of the Sunni-Shiite split in Iraq before 2003. I think everyone who followed the news, and heard some of the criticism and warnings in the media before the war, was aware of the two sects there and of the basic dynamic (Sunnis, though a minority, had ruled since the British era of the 1920s).

What he's probably saying is that, like almost everyone else, he underestimated how powerful that dynamic would be once Saddam was gone. And if you connect it to his discussion of the Einstein quote (55 minutes to define the problem, 5 minutes to solve it) you'll see that he means that he and other military and civilian leaders should have spent more time figuring out what the problem in Iraq was and would be with Saddam gone, and no jump straight to COA development for the invasion and Phase IV.

I can never remember which is which.

But I knew when we invaded in 2003 that it was a matter of defusing the two sects.

Walt

As a soldier, Dempsy's personal opinion as to the political/strategic desirability of the Iraq invasion is of no consequence (I say that as an soldier). That's your job, as a civilian.

Dempsey clearly states his personal opinion about the decision to invade/occupy Iraq: "it was my recommendation that we should take action to change the dynamic inside of Iraq and that the region itself would become more stable."

You didn't notice probably because it's always okay for military leaders to state their "personal opinion" as long as they're agreeing with the administration.

I suggest that the general had a duty to address such issues clearly -- and ducked it. The senators had a duty to encourage or compel him him to do it -- or else outright refuse to do it, and state his grounds.

Woodward, in his remarkable series of works of recent current history, has reported many conversations about the anguish provoked among senior military officers required to comply with a civilian demand that they plan the invasion of Iraq with what the officers believed and told their senior general was insufficient time to do a good job and while they were busy doing whatever it was they were doing in Afghanistan in 2002. Officers have opinions about such things, and their opinions are the people's business.

Nearly nine full years have passed, general Dempsey still seems uncertain or wishywashy about the whole attack-Iraq idea, and the senators were seriously delinquent in not establishing whether he could come up with something more concrete and valuable on such issues, and then deciding whether he was the right man for the job if they thought he showed that he couldn't.

Dempsey's words Mr Ricks quotes here seem to trouble a few BD readers. Their weakness and vagueness imply that the men offered the vitally important job the general is in line for don't need to prove their rightness for it: what really matters is some nod and wink in some back room, exchanged before these public advise and consent meetings.

Do presidential nominees for the CJCS appointment always get the job? Should they? How has this worked out in light of the performances of CJSCs who have held the position in recent times?

Because we've already seen what happens when we cut the cord or loosen the leash: Abu Ghraib, Haditha and the Afghanistan kill squad.
The Marines do indeed talk about empowering initiative among non-rates, the "strategic corporal" concept and all that. It's empty talk. How can they expect a man to make life and death decisions if he still has to ask permission to go to the bathroom, and isn't allowed to choose the color of his own socks, and gets punished for asking questions?
Comm tech will indeed foster an ever-more-micromanaged atmosphere. In my experience, no one lower than a company commander ever has real decision-making power, unless it's a platoon sergeant, making up rules and constructing his own little feudal fiefdom behind his nominal commander's back.

The religious aspects of Iraqi sectarianism are way overplayed by most American commentators (on both the right and left).

are the Kurds Shia or Sunni (or something else)? brownie points for knowing the answer without googling.

Marine Lance Corporals don't have to ask permission to go the bathroom, and as for the socks, they probably should all be the same color for Marines.

Marine enlisted men do (or used to) refer to themselves as 'non-rates', but that is a Navy term. If you weren't one you shouldn't use it.

Walt

Most of the Kurds in Iraq are Sunni. There may be some Shia as well as some other fringe sects as well as probably a few Kurdish Christians. But that doesn't mean they align themselves with the Sunni Arabs.

What rank is a squad leader? What about fire team leaders? Because I'm pretty sure that they make tactical decisions with potentially strategic consequences. The strategic corporal doesn't mean that we let junior leaders do whatever the fuck they want; it means that they need ROE, maybe some basic cultural context, and commander's intent drilled into them so that they can make timely decisions that contribute to mission accomplishment in a changing environment without being specifically tasked.

To me, it seems like you're conflating relative freedom to do what they want without anyone breathing too heavily down their neck (which Company Cmdrs certainly have more than plt cmdrs of cpls) with well-trained junior leadership who are capable of quality, independent decision-making.

To answer your question; the Kurds are Sunni, Shia, and something else (Yazidi, Christian, etc.). From a Macro Iraqi political position however, the decisive political affinity for the Kurds is the PUK and KDP. There are tribal and clan affiliations which support and reinforce these two political blocks. There is also sectarian strife with-in the Kurdish population, but from the outside looking in, the longstanding love, hate (mostly hate) relationship between the PUK and KDP must be understood and addressed to rationally craft an Iraq policy.

"when we took the lid off of that, I think we learned some things that -- and I'm not sure we could have learned them any other way"

Since even in 2005, most US commanders wouldn't bother to sit through a detailed terrain analysis briefing, because they were too busy going to other meetings to understand their AO. Even the commanders who knew what they didn't know (Dempsey, Chiarelli, Petrwus) where served by subordinate staffs and commanders who were so "busy" they couldn't be bothered to think about solutions in anything other than superficial terms.

So, by default, local commanders found the local sheiks and goodfellas to be easy to deal with and able to enforce things (with US backing and money)---dragging Iraq backward to sheik days of old, and away from more equitable and participatory governance.

Read the polls. Iraqis like democracy, just not the type we left behind.

At issue in Afghanistan and Iraq is that years of sanctions and strife had created an underlying black market and mafiosi that compounded the difficulty of rapid post-conflict stabilization.

To not mention the mafiosi and black marketeers is to miss the entirety of the relevant analysis in either country.

US actions in Iraq are more consistent with using the money gun to lay down suppressing fire while making a smart and timely withdrawal and a plausible claim of success/victory. When/if it all goes to hell, the State Department will be assigned the blame for losing Iraq.

I would add that Iraqis of even the most modest acumen understand quite well that the Americans don't care one whit about happens next. Post-American Iraq will just be another phase of Iraq's troubled history, and people will do what they have to do to get by and protect their families.

Don't disagree with most of that.

As one of those few sent by DoS to end the thing, that was a small mitigation for a vast and inexplicable engagement from CPA and beyond.

By 2008, there was nothing more that could be done but to get out of the Iraqi's way so they could get on with their lives.

Like the Kennedys, Iraqis have had a long and troubled history, but it has not been without bright spots and accomplishments for some, all at different times.

It is, however, their history to be made. And they are not without resources of many kinds.

Look at Chile, which, today, presses forward with major societal and scientific advances despite a long history of dictators and serious geological/geographic challenges. The future is not always set in stone.

Might be a year too early for McM to make MG? Also, I suspect there might be a little "hating on" McM due to his books, concusions, and prominence outside the military world.

Also, McMaster is a politically popular BG, so I wouldn't put it past Dempsey to think he's getting some cred by dropping that name.

Dempsey might be a well-read and well-spoken General, but he's also a political survivor, and not likely to achieve much in the way of change. I'm with Rubber Ducky: whittle it all down to a cadre with the latest in gadgets, capable reserve formations, and the ability to scale up with a draft. The AVF, massive defense spending, aggressive basing posture, and frequent interventions aound the world have achieved far less than the cost. Such a massive commitment to the military and intelligece, but we are less secure and our freedoms are being eroded in the name of security.

Maybe so. Although most of these names were on the same BG promotion list as McMaster:

http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=12069

And LaCamera, at least, is the year group after McMaster:

http://flagandgeneralofficersnetwork.org/promotions/USAGORosterMarch2011.pdf

Just seems a little incongruous to call a man your best brigadier general literally the day before you announce he's not being promoted.

...that P4 led the board that selected McM for BG mainly so McM would be selected for BG on his 3rd shot.

Agree to the incongruity, but it would not be the first time the military has not rewarded thinkers and critics.

I would add that McM appears to have done a couple of staff-type jobs since making BG: that JFCOM thing with future war and then ISAF staff? Are his prospects for MG dimisnished if he has not led a unit? I ask because the names I recognized (LeCamera and Smith) commaned AO's and ground units in Iraq while BG's. Can we expect to see McM getting an AO in AFG or an ADCOM before too long?

Types of jobs he would get was my concern; while one can set up a situation to get someone promoted, the bureaucracy does fight back and if players who a) don't like McMaster and/or b) are p***off because of how he did get his star, they have enough clout to keep sending McMaster to second string jobs. He then becomes a non-player for promotion to MG and that is key because if he did make MG, selections for 3 & 4 star jobs are "by name" as I understand it, and some of the snakes would have to come out from under their rocks to block him and that isn't the way they like to work.

Sizing budgets seems to be similar to forecasting wave heights. They appear similar to the previous ones observed.

So we have had every increasing budgets, I guess that if the height shifts downward it must be troubling....that is the essence of the General's testimony. But this General ran training and doctrine, aren't they the ones who set requirements upon which budgets are built? And annually review them and certify their necessity?

So maybe Dempsey had 55 minutes to think and said yes, this is what McCain wants to hear. Since Arizona does quite well on defense money to Scottsdale and points south to the Mexican border, that will give me some chips for my fellow WOOPOOs before I go purple..

But I really suspect that like most military planning, strategy, sustainment and acquisition leadership, Dempsey is racing from brief to hearings to submissions without stopping and questioning the unverifiable faith the services have for what they are developing. It is a dance like the one where Citibank was high kicking before the bubble blew. Defense budgets are driven by competing forces beyond the control of the military.

Just wish one or two of them had the courage to admit that the music is without a responsible DJ and resign in front of a committee..that would be general officer or flag level Medal of Honor work.

Jabs at COIN aside, you've hit the nail on the head. We had too much strategery and not enough strategy.

of why we're going to war"? It is called the Executive Branch. The President identifies why, articulates the reason(s) to Congress and the US people, and - most significantly for those of us following the generals leading - tells the Dept of War what to do. I see this as an essential responsibility of the Office of the President. And I would never criticize any sitting or past President, but I would suggest that some decisions could have used some improvement. Maybe a lot of improving....

I would bet, not having read the Army's history of the Afghan conflict/war/thing, that the campaign planners did not so much miss the bus re center-of-gravity analysis as that they did not have strategic objectives and goals that were clear and concise. That the political statements made in public substituted for commander's intent, in this case that would be the Commander in Chief. I have seen "...based on the President's statements during his speech at West Point on ..." used in lieu of actual guidance issued directly to the armed forces - guidance intended to guide and direct operations. We're guessing because we're forced to guess.

I very much agree with your (JG) take on Einstein's five minutes, I am still very unclear as to what we, coalition and/or US forces in Afghanistan, want to accomplish. Probably not the smartest thing for a mid-grade officer to articulate in public, but when I pose the question in private I do not get answers. I get vague responses that often parrot issued guidance that I did not find satisfactory. I see all of this going back to an assumption, on the part of the military, that what we were told to do is good enough and we can fill in any blanks as needed. Guidance? Objectives? Goals? Lots of "last 5 min" stuff, not a lot of 55 min stuff. Again: my take.

To the subject at hand then: how do we train the military for identify why we're going to war? Why should the military be mixed up in that response? Isn't that something that, while the military can contribute, should be done by the US civilian leaders? More to the point, what do we do when the civilians do not do their job?

No excuses...play like a champion

Iraq has many lesson for US, like don't war for no reason. There were no chemical weapons in that area but US administration killed thousands of innocent people as a result of this war and even thousands of military men also killed in this war. A bad experiment indeed for oil. greenhouses

I'm tracking. I do find it interesting that the general pack mentality of the military has led to a bunch of guys with absurd hard-ons for COIN who don't realize that it's just another tool to put in the tool belt. I just finished the Accidental Guerilla last night, and the point Kilcullen made, but which deserves a book in its own right, is that the decision to engage in a conflict that requires large scale counterinsurgency must be seated in a strategy that has identified that COIN is actually worth the effort.

As opposed to Iraq, where strategically, we were overthrowing the government, then establishing security, but never nation building, but then we needed to engage in nation building to establish security, but we still weren't nation building...when it would have been faster, easier, and less costly to go in with a nation-building agenda in the first place. Afghanistan suffers from similar strategic failures of a slightly different failure, but in both cases the root cause is a failure to make strategic decisions that are grounded in reality and likely consequences rather than political ideology.

You've spoken a from-the-heart analysis regarding the recent troubles as one who was in the middle of it all. The futility of so many aspects of these wars has taken a toll on those who did the most and honorably so. We've only demanded what is right for the warrior participants (and the Nation)--the best planning, truth in the mission, full support while in combat and in veteran status, and truth in purpose. And the demand that the civilian and military leadership be smart, honest, capable, and free of bullshit. When our own troops' lives are on the line, it can be nothing less.

... and this is how the next CJSC has equipped himself with current knowledge of the Middle East:

"I'm not sure it turned out that way [i.e., that a military invasion of Iraq would make the Middle East more stable]. I mean, it probably -- it is, but it didn't happen exactly as we intended it, and that's because I don't think we understood -- let me put it differently. I didn't understand the dynamic inside that country, particularly with regard to the various sects of Islam that fundamentally, on occasion, compete with each other for dominance in Islam, and so -- Shia, the Shia sect of Islam, the Sunni sect of Islam -- when we took the lid off of that, I think we learned some things that -- and I'm not sure we could have learned them any other way."

This boils down to, in July 2011, what the hell happened. The general no know, the senators no ask. Probably the general DOES know, but prudently thinks it none of the Senate's or the nation's darn business. Being smooth to the point of sounding ignorant trumps being clear. Is chilling the word?

...but I am assuming that at the onset of the Iraq War Dempsey was a 1 or 2 star at best. I don't believe it was his role to disavow our political leaders of their misguided ambition.

There were plenty of 4 and 3 stars that might have/should have. The one most significant one was Shinseki who told the truth (takes 150,000+ soldiers...) and he was rewarded by being turned into a lame duck for the last year of his term. Had he had the moral courage to display his displeasure by retiring early perhaps someone might have taken notice.

Notably, the guy who was identified to replace Shinseki saw the writing on the wall and would have none of it. That was of course Keane, who did far more in his retirement to fix Iraq than Shinseki did to prevent it. Moral courage. As GSP once said "Moral courage is the most valuable and usually the most absent characteristic in men."