I did this last year, but we can learn about military affairs from Warren Buffett every year. The military is not a business, and should not be run like one. But still, the defense establishment could learn a lot from a person as wise as Buffett.

If I could, I would ban all those business fad management books I see senior officers reading and instead make them study the annual reports from Buffett's company, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. You may not know Berkshire Hathaway, but if you buy insurance from Geico, drink Coca-Cola, eat See's Candies, read the Buffalo News, use goods transported by the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railroad, or wear Fruit of the Loom underwear, then products and services of companies owned in part or whole by Berkshire are touching your life.

For example, the U.S. military, and especially the Army, have been plagued by micromanagement since the mid-1950s, so long that no one now in the Army has much experience in any other way to run it. I see generals constantly scurrying endlessly to meetings where they often sit in the dark while subordinates read aloud to them bedtime stories (AKA Powerpoint briefings). Well, there is another way, and it is laid out by Buffett in his annual report for 2010:

At Berkshire, managers can focus on running their businesses: They are not subjected to meetings at headquarters nor financing worries nor Wall Street harassment. They simply get a letter from me every two years…and call me when they wish. And their wishes do differ: There are managers to whom I have not talked in the last year, while there is one with whom I talk almost daily. Our trust is in people rather than process. A "hire well, manage little" code suits both them and me.

Berkshire's CEOs come in many forms. Some have MBAs; others never finished college. Some use budgets and are by-the-book types; others operate by the seat of their pants. Our team resembles a baseball squad composed of all-stars having vastly different batting styles. Changes in our line-up are seldom required.

(p. 7)

Imagine a military run like that, that trusted people rather than process, a military where the Army chief of staff could boast that XVIII Airborne Corps is run so well that he has kept the commanding general in place for several years, and hasn't seen him in two years or even talked to him in one. But, the chief of staff would continue, he does talk to the Army commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan daily, in part because they need his help, and in part because he isn't distracted by checking on the XVIII Airborne Corps. My view: People who spend most of their days in regularly scheduled meetings too much probably are wasting their time and others'.

Also, because Buffett keeps successful people in place, staffs and subordinate managers are not constantly in turmoil and adjusting. Instead of constantly adapting to new bossses, they can focus on the tasks at hand. And the boss can leave them alone because he knows how to tell when they need help and when they don't.

Wikimedia Commons

 

LESTER_GALULA

3:30 PM ET

June 10, 2011

Meetings

I've come to the ocnclusion that regularly scheduled meetings originate because someone is consistently making mistakes, failing to meet deadlines, claiming that they didn't get the word that was passed to everybody else, or claiming that they aren't being supported. A meeting is the easiest (and least effective) way to address these issues, and they continue because people get in the habit of meetings as a (weak) leadership tool and don't want to look like they aren't doing due dilligence to set people up for success. I've yet to see a meeting that accomplished something that couldn't be done with a few emails/phone calls/in person conversations, though.

 

KILGORE_NOBIZ

4:16 PM ET

June 10, 2011

Theory

I have this theory that has never been wrong in 19 years of service. My theory is that an organization's efficiency is inversely proportional to the number and length of meetings it conducts. If I were to assume command of a unit the first thing I'd do after meeting my senior NCOs is to look at the battle rhythm and see how many meetings occur and how long they are and immediately cut it in half.

 

TYRTAIOS

4:27 PM ET

June 10, 2011

I don’t think Buffet as head

I don’t think Buffet as head of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. makes his decisions by spinning the bottle with three schemes of maneuver designed by his staff in anyway, shape or form. I further sense that Buffet sets goals by allowing his staff to own his vision of those goals if that makes sense?

However, I wonder if the reason he may hold down meetings with his staff is because he knows they're mining inside information, each within their own petit sous-quartier, as a "noted counter-insurgent" you may know might say, and prudence and propriety also dictate better the devil you don’t know in the details. . .a luxury not always available in the military. . .although one shouldn’t have a meeting just for the sake of holding court with their princes (and knaves).

 

ZATHRAS

10:01 PM ET

June 10, 2011

Meetings of the Third Kind

I hate these. I value meetings of two kinds: the kind in which something important is learned, and the kind in which something important is decided.

Meetings that "keep everyone posted" make a record: they are time blocks on everyone's schedule, they can be reported to others as activity. They allow weak, passive leaders an easy way to report to superiors what their subordinates are working on. They're just agony to sit through. And, they happen on a regular schedule for one reason as often as not -- because they've always been done that way. I've had to attend hundreds of weekly check-in meetings during my career; back in the 1980's, I couldn't even work on answering e-mails while they were going on around me. I hate them more than mayonnaise.

 

HUNTER

10:17 PM ET

June 10, 2011

Battle rhythm

Battle rhythm is a notoriously stupid name for a meeting schedule, which has nothing to do with battle and very little to do with rhythm. Thus why I banned the term. I also banned Deployment Manning Document (DMD) as a stupid alternative to an MTOE which is what we all start with anyway. We called it a LOP (list o' people).

 

DRIFTER83

2:39 PM ET

June 13, 2011

Meetings

20 years after the fact i still remember the meeting
Weekly Bn ops meeting, focus was to decide the day to deploy for gunnery etc at Graf. As Bn S3 NCO I needed the date. After 2 hours meeting of the BC and all the company commanders they ajourned without the date.
Pissed me off. I confirmed transportation and range availablity information and the following week another Bn ops meeting, I told them the date. Some weren't happy but I didn't care and the BC backed me.

As Bn S3 NCO I also found that trying to have weekly meetings with the company Ops NCOs didn't work, everyone was just too busy. Me going to them worked much much better

 

BEARCAT

3:53 PM ET

June 10, 2011

Meetings

There is no reason to have recurring meetings about the same stuff w about the same agenda. I have no problem having a meeting as exception to plan problem solve. Don't invite your dumb or dysfunctional guys to meeting.

Warren Buffet is just a good "chooser" he knows how to pick winners. He may not be a management genius, he didn't build all those companies he bought all those companies. He is also smart enough to stick with his core competencies, he said he didn't understand derivatives so he stayed away. Meanwhile all these other geniuses got into derivatives, credit default swaps, mortgage backed securities and various ponzi schemes.

I recommend we acquire: Royal Marines, Israeli Air Force, and Hanjin Corp.

 

JIM GOURLEY

3:59 PM ET

June 10, 2011

Tom Ricks -- Master of Irony

So, in the same day we have posts on this blog about a President who thought 75% of American Generals were idiots, a Brigade Commander who lied about a tryst with the wife of a man who risked his life to help US forces in Iraq, and the idea that we should micromanage our leaders less?

I love this blog.

Really and truly I do, but I can't get over the juxtaposition. Meanwhile, the cover of Stars and Stripes punctuates the issue with two disturbingly tragic stories, "One Army, Two Failures." I think in sum these illustrate the problem with a Buffett model military.

Buffett has an advantage 90% of the armed forces don't have-- he hires who he wants, when he wants. He also fires at his leisure. The benchmark for success is widening the profit margins. You either hack it or you don't. It's big boy rules.

Now, there are sectors of the military that can and do operate according to such laws. By and large, they're the spec ops community. Again, they have the advantage of being selective. They emphasize quality over quantity. They would rather go without people than take substandard people. In short, they don't compromise.

The conventional force, by contrast, operates wholly on a basis of compromise. Whenever it falls short on numbers, it lowers standards. We've discussed this already in regards to physical standards, but it doesn't stop there. Drug histories, criminal records, education level-- it's all negotiable. That can be corrected by good NCOs. The only problem is that we've kept up the input of pathetic soldiers for so long that they're starting to become pathetic NCOs and diluting the leadership pool.

You see this explicitly in the enlistment process, but while it's more difficult to see on the officer side doesn't mean it's any less prevalent. The Officer Evaluation Report system in any and every branch is broken. It's to the point where mediocrity is the standard and failure is acceptable. It is impossible to give an officer a bad review anymore, because there are so many other non-performers among his/her peers and superiors that it can't be justified. The question has been asked here why more O-5s and O-6s haven't been fired in the Army. It's also been asked why only one or two Generals have been let go. I think the second question is the answer to the first one. There's nowhere for the buck to stop. Everyone is passing it.

I only see the micromanagement as a manifestation of a culture that promotes checking the block as the path to success. You can't call a guy a piece of crap anymore without 18 counseling statements detailing every objective metric by which he failed. The military in these times of COIN loves to masturbate to such concepts of "ill defined problems" and "brilliant counterintuitive thinking." We think you have to be Sun Tzu or Obi-Wan Kenobi to come up with anything good. The consequence is that if you didn't have a successful command tour then it's not your fault-- obviously you were placed in a difficult situation and did the best you could in an extremely "dynamic environment." But so long as you kept your inventories straight, built three schools in the province to which you were assigned, killed x-number of insurgents and recovered y-number of weapons caches, you can call your deployment and command stint a flaming success. By contrast, you can be kicking ass out there, but you can still lose your career over an EO complaint if you ruffle the wrong feathers. I submit the case of LTC Jenio on that point. The military has come to a point where it can find thirty ways to say a battle is going swimmingly while still losing it.

We use all those numbers to cover for the fact that the enemy still dominates your AOR. All these battalions and brigades keep rotating into regions time and again. Every time they figure out a way to talk about all the great things they accomplished, and every time they finish another year the situation has improved very little.

Business is as much a dynamic environment as combat, but that doesn't change that there's still a bottom line and that it has to be met. The military has largely distanced itself from that reality. Fear of accountability has created a system where micromanagement and useless statistics are valued more than actual results. Every time the American public asks its military if it's winning the war in Afghanistan, we get charts and graphics that are meant to confuse us with information. If they can create the perception that the COIN fight is this vast internecine problem that no common civilian can understand, we can't hold them accountable.

And so we wind up counting the increase in drone strikes since last year... because that's going to tell us something. That's what I think the ultimate irony is-- we micromanage and focus on data so much more in order to escape responsibility.

 

PEN DRAGON

4:05 PM ET

June 10, 2011

I quickly tired of the

I quickly tired of the mandatory 'education' classes we enlisted grunts had to sit through every month. But at some point I had to concede that I saw the point of whoever required them. Because even though every single Friday afternoon featured an hour-long lecture about the evils of drunk driving, my battalion racked up three DUIs a month, like clockwork.
The point is not that more micromanagement would have helped, or that the amount we got was useful. It is that a very, very significant percentage of military people (college-educated senior officers not excluded) are so hopelessly stupid that they simply cannot be trusted to get themselves from here to the head and back.
Buffett (and all private-sector leaders) has an advantage the military lacks: he can choose his people much more carefully, and if he regrets a choice, he can fire people. No such option really exists in the military; sure, a Navy O-6 gets relieved of command every other week, but those guys don't actually leave the payroll until their current contract is up. And that's for high-levle officers. Short of a dishonorable discharge (which can only be incurred by unmistakably criminal behavior, not mere incompetence), there is no mechanism for removing enlisted people from the service; the best you can do is assign them an unimportant job and hope they don't try to reenlist.

 

CAPTAIN NOVAL

5:27 PM ET

June 10, 2011

Getting rid of enlisted people

Pen Dragon, I don't know your background, but in the Army if we had a problem soldier, we could get rid of them comparatively easily by riding them hard, chaptering them out, and in the case of NCOs, giving them low marks on their evaluation reports.

Less than getting rid of them, I found that the harder part of leadership is taking the low-performers and turning them into adequate and excellent performers. Motivating people to get better is hard to do when one is "all stick, no carrot."

 

FG42

4:24 PM ET

June 10, 2011

A while back, showing my

A while back, showing my service bias, I was thinking and asking myself, "Why can't the Army get its act together, like the Marines do? What's with all these problems in the Army?" Then I realized something. The Army is necessarily (similar to the communist countries' lingo) a "People's Army." It represents society as a whole, and consequently it has soldiers (officers and enlisted) who are a cross-section of the community at large, for better or for worse. Or, another analogy: the Army is like a college football team. You can recruit a star QB or running back, but most of your team will be whoever turned out for that season...and they won't all be all-star players. But as coach you gotta deal with whom you've got. I think an organization as big as the Army is always going to have people-problems, and it necessarily must manage closely downward. Warren Buffet's management model sounds like something for an SF or SAS unit, not for the Big Army.

 

TOM RICKS

4:29 PM ET

June 10, 2011

Precisely the point, JG!

When you can't fire failures, you have to micromanage them. And when everyone constantly rotates, and shuffles failures along, you start treating everyone like a potential failure.

In sum: The U.S. military, and especially the Army, has lost the tradition of rewarding success and punishing failure. To do so is to create a military that may naturally gravitate toward stalemate.

Best,
Tom

 

JIM GOURLEY

5:15 PM ET

June 10, 2011

An interesting sub-point...

I fully concur, but found one detail you wrote interesting-- why "especially the Army?" Why isn't this as bad in the Marines?

 

LESTER_GALULA

6:25 PM ET

June 10, 2011

Holding People to Standards

Two Page 11s equals a pattern of misconduct that justifies administrative separation (in conjunction with a few informal written counselings). So if you have someone who doesn't put effort in at PT, write an informal written counselings every time, and when he fails the PFT, a Page 11 is justified. If he fails a room inspection, write an informal counseling. If his uniform looks like trash, write a counseling. If he makes a mistake due to his own negligence, write a counseling. Then, when he makes any other mistake, a Page 11 has been justified by papertrail. A single Page 11 can prevent a Marine from reenlisting. We invest more into training officers, then have a competitive career designation (meaning the Marine Corps will let you continue to be an active duty officer) process, which goes to boards. Promotion to Capt goes to boards as well. We've also implemented a culture that doesn't inflate Pros/Cons or fitreps. The description for a ranking of B (the lowest non-failing ranking) on a fitrep is basically, "performs his duties competently, always accomplishes the mission, proactively finds solutions, meets the expectations of the Marine Corps." The description for a ranking of D (low middle of the options) is "significantly exceeds expectations for rank and billet, proactively identifies problems and improves procedures, improves higher and lateral units. A force multiplier." The criteria for a particular ranking is written above that ranking on every category of evaluation. On my last fitrep I got an even mix of Bs and Cs and was recommended for promotion ahead of peers and greater responsibility.

I'm not saying there aren't turds in the punchbowl, just that we have processes in place to try and scoop as many of them out as possible.

 

BURRCDR

10:01 PM ET

June 10, 2011

Where do all these standards come from?

I've seen the application of the strategy endorsed by Lester and the net effect is a unit on-edge and not in the good way. When you put people in fear for their own well-being, their focus becomes self-preservation, not achieving great things. The trouble with claiming standards as the basis for taking action is that we have so many staffers from 4-star commands on down creating standards that if you look hard enough, you're going to find something that didn't get done. My experience in the navy has been that we have more standards and requirements than are achievable with the personnel assigned. In the face of this setup for failure, is it any surprise how many people are looking for the exits?

 

STEVE_M

10:24 PM ET

June 10, 2011

On disciplinary actions

Interesting point on writing up disciplinary actions, LG. I've had peers who were poor troops in their jobs but stars in military fringes (room inspections, uniform). I've had peers who were excellent in their jobs but slobs in military fringes. Do you punish them both equally? The standard "If I can't trust you to get a haircut, then I can't trust you to do this task" is engrained in most NCOs. But do you punish the troop who barely gets the job done and the troop who gets the job done best (with some slightly shaggy hair) equally if you're trying to keep the best? Somebody would likely cry out, "unfair." Is your response, "Too bad?"

 

LESTER_GALULA

10:27 PM ET

June 10, 2011

Or

They just do shit right so that they don't have to worry about adverse counselings. Also, do they not teach you how to prioritize in the Navy?

 

LESTER_GALULA

10:39 PM ET

June 10, 2011

@Steve_M

An adverse informal counseling isn't really a punishment so much as it is an opportunity to mentor someone while simultaneously starting a paper trail in case you need to administratively separate them. And building a paper trail never takes the place of leadership, so if their work performance sucks, they need to be taught and mentored and supervised until it improves. If a Marine doesn't meet grooming standards, tell them to get a haircut or shave or whatever. If they can't field day their room, give them an adverse informal counseling and then make them remediate with supervision.

My rule of thumb is that informal counseling is for when people make mistakes and Page 11s are for patterns of misconduct or severe mistakes. Neither of them replace leadership.

 

BLUELIGHT

5:47 AM ET

June 11, 2011

I agree LG

Point of clarification, two page 11s doesn't necessarely get you administratively seperated, its gets you processed for administrative seperation. Big difference. I never moved forward until I had three (offense dependent) to increase my chances of success and to make sure the kid was getting a fair shake.
So, the Ragman goes to the board with two-three page 11s, and depending on the composition of the board, they decide to keep him, effectively overriding the COs written desire to seperate him. That you used to really frost my ass when they did that to me. A technique to consider as you assume greater responsibility; when the board decides to retain, do not send that Marine back to the unit that wanted him seperated. Assign him to the senior man on the board instead. Make him live with his decision. I got better board results that way...s/f.

 

STEVE_M

9:02 PM ET

June 11, 2011

@Lester

Ok, I get your methodology now.

 

JPWREL

4:30 PM ET

June 10, 2011

Auftragstaktik – Mission

Auftragstaktik – Mission tactics and scope for junior officer initiative. Simplified mission orders giving latitude for execution depending on tactical circumstances.
"The concept of Auftragstaktik or "mission tactics" … made it the responsibility of each German officer and NCO … to do without question or doubt whatever the situation required, as he personally saw it. Omission and inactivity were considered worse than a wrong choice of expedient. Even disobedience of orders was not inconsistent with this philosophy."

Yes, I know this is largely about tactics and operations, however, the concept is still useful even for the peacetime administration of an airborne corps or Marine rifle company. Select the best people make their training extremely demanding, quickly cull the non-performers and give the rest room to operate and even a make a mistake or two. This is called ‘institutionalizing excellence’ which was the central motive device of the German General Staff. Reward superlative performance not seniority, encourage out of the box thinking, and constantly groom talented subordinates for higher command. As shocking as it may be to some American senior officers even the U. S. military is capable of learning something meaningful from other corporate or military institutions with a track records of excellence.

While some including myself my hesitate to use the German’s of 1866 – 1945 as an example to emulate it would be a worthwhile enterprise if we extract the right lessons from their experience. They proved to be the twentieth century’s professional standard of excellence when it came to purely military matters but wholly deficient when it came to taking bearings from their moral compasses’. At the smaller art of planning and fighting war they were peerless but at the larger art of waging war they were deficient across the board.

If any people have a reason to shy away from anything German it is the Israelis. However, in the fifties and sixties it was to the German General Staff system and their tactical and operational methodologies that the Israelis turned to in order to help them glean ideas in order to incorporate a tradition of excellence into their own military. The result of that study and partial emulation was an Israeli version of ‘Auftragstaktik’ and the stunning victories of the Six Day War and the Yom Kippur War.

 

STORMY

4:46 PM ET

June 10, 2011

Ditching Micromanagement Possible, but Not Likely

Mr. Ricks,

As an Air Force captain, I would LOVE to see less micromanagement from above. I've had a squadron commander who let me run my geographically-separated detachment with little interference because he had faith in my abilities. On the other hand, his follow-on replacement was the polar opposite and needed to know how I intended to spend each minute of the day. Personally, I gained significantly more leadership experience under the former.

But in this age of tweets and Facebook status messages that circle the world in seconds, it becomes very difficult to be truly hands off. What if a major incident occurs and the first line of leadership fails? This is where I believe the origin of micromanagement lies. If senior leadership is blindsided, they are considered aloof, inept and murmurs of "dereliction of duty" creep in. Most individuals who have reached that level in the military haven't gotten there by letting things play out and not being involved themselves.

Can military leaders be hands off? Yes. But the bottom line is that it takes a leader who is bold, trusts his/her subordinates, and has a bit of luck on his/her side to avoid a major incident.

 

BEARCAT

5:08 PM ET

June 10, 2011

Shrink the Army

You could effectively shrink the Army by going to a Regimental system where you couldn't pass your problems on to another unit. If you want to promote Joe Blow instead of running him out of the Army you'll be stuck w Joe forever. Everybody in Regt knows everybody else.

Same thing for general staff. The Prussian/German Armies were huge but the general staff was not huge, they were pre-tested, hand picked by the CoS, rigorously educated for 2 years, screened again, then assigned to the great staff and supervised and mentored by chief, screened again. The idea was not to see how many people you could churn through the general staff the idea was to see how much quality you could get on staff. Everybody on General Staff knows everybody else.

 

NEWBIE

6:00 PM ET

June 10, 2011

NATIONAL GUARD

Believe it or not, Buffett served as a private in the National Guard per his bio SNOWBALL.

 

OTHER RANKS

6:10 PM ET

June 10, 2011

Surprised no one has pointed

Surprised no one has pointed out yet that Buffet's hands off management technique means he doesn't set the culture for those companies. Micromanagement can exist at the lower and mid levels or higher at Berkshire owned companies along with any number of management quirks as long as the CEO's deliver results. A more direct comparison would be the relationship between the President and the service chiefs/combantant commanders.

Finally, the recent insider trading scandal involving David Sokol, once a rising star in the Buffet empire, shows that even Berkshire-Hathaway isn't immune to bad apples.

 

TOM RICKS

6:43 PM ET

June 10, 2011

Marines

Jim,
I think part of the answer is that Marines, being inside the Navy Department, are still linked to nautical tradition, and the Navy clearly has maintained the tradition of relief better than the Army has.

But I suspect that is only part of the answer. I would like to know what others think: Is the Marine Corps approach to relief of officers for cause different from the Army, and if so, why?

Thanks,
Tom

 

JIM GOURLEY

7:19 PM ET

June 10, 2011

A matter for investigation?

Tom,

If what you say is true, I'd hazard that the Marines choose not to promote about three times as many Lieutenants to Captain as the Navy has fired O-5s and O-6s. As has already been mentioned, it's not like the Marines don't have turds in the punch bowl. So if they're not having to relieve as many Battalion commanders, the chaff has got to be getting separated from the wheat somewhere earlier along the line.

Wow, another statistic. Talk about irony.

 

TYRTAIOS

7:51 PM ET

June 10, 2011

Marines vs Army

When the Continental Army was molded by the likes of Friedrich von Steuben, the die was cast for today's Army culture. It would have been better to have gone with the American Indian method of mentoring and if the mentored didn't live up to expectation, another was looked toward to lead. I think the Marine Corps best exemplifies that.

Maybe the aforesaid is more of an attention gainer than a truism? However, it’s pretty obvious that relief comes from those that either have a series of problems or major incident, or flat-out break the rules. This is where I feel the Corps differs from the Army in that although not always, the Marine officer is given a great deal of independence but is ultimately held responsible for everything that happens.

In the Army, responsibility seems to be shared down the chain-of-command, and I would cite examples such as Abu Ghraib, and perhaps Wanat where the final lessons learned scapegoated a young now deceased lieutenant as ultimately to blame.

 

HOKIEFAN

8:34 PM ET

June 10, 2011

Size plays a role

Let's not forget that the sheer size of the Army necessitates greater leniency when meeting quotas. It would be great if O-4 promotion rates could drop below ninety-something percent. But as long as slots need to be filled it ain't gonna happen.

Meanwhile the Navy and Air Force have had rounds of force cutting with which to select the best.

 

KILGORE_NOBIZ

8:41 PM ET

June 10, 2011

Joint Comparisons

I'm just an Air Force wheenie, but I have as much joint experience as anyone in any of the services at this point in their careers. I've had supervision from every branch and have a pretty good idea how each operates. The Army is easily the most insecure when it comes to allowing subordinates freedom of action. Marines, Navy, and Air Force are similar, but it obviously varies by personality.

Why? My take is the Marines are notoriously undermanned, underfunded, and underresourced. They have to adhere to the concept of centralized command/decentralized execution because they simply do not have the resources available to succeed through over-managing a process. They give their officers and NCOs the freedom to go outside the lines because there are just too few lines to go by. The Marine mentality is just gitter done and I love working with them.

Conversely the Air Force does the centralized command/decentralized execution because we have found great strength in granting autonomy to individual pilots/operators. You cannot successfully execute an air campaign if each element/aircraft has to await their next set of orders. You build an ATO that levies general guidance and allow the units to follow their own chosen tactics. Things move too fast in the air to follow a rigid command structure.

I believe the Navy is quite similar to the AF. Ships and fleets need freedom of movement and execution, thus they grant ship commanders extensive leeway to operate as they see fit on a relatively quick timeline.

One would think the Army would benefit by giving individual units the same sort of flexibility, but for some reason I am unable to divine, they do not. The worst micro-managers I have had for bosses were Army. When I was an element commander my Army O-6 installation commander thought I was a total loser because I didn't report every single thing, nor consult with him on every single decision I made at the end of each day. I had another Army O-6 supervisor who would chew me out every time I so much as talked with another O-6 without asking her permission first, even to answer simple yes-no questions.

In the AF leaders don't want to be bothered by such triviality. It is considered good leadership if you can solve problems without help from "the boss". Seems to me that in the Army, not bothering "the boss" is a sign to them that you are sherking your duties. It's terribly insecure and inefficient. I believe the Army would benefit greatly from more decentralized execution like the other services, but for some reason they feel like the entire chain needs to be consulted to make a decision. I've spoken with my peers in the Army and most of them agree with me. Why continue this way? I have no idea.

 

LESTER_GALULA

9:09 PM ET

June 10, 2011

Tradition of Relief?

The only COs that I've heard of getting relieved were relieved for DUI and shoplifting. I've heard of a tendency to fire SupOs, CommOs, staff officers, and occasionally an XO, but that's typically for incompetence. So I don't know if there's necessarily a tradition of relief. I'd attribute the difference between the USMC and the Army to the following;

1) Greater emphasis on training junior leaders. Sgts and Cpls are the key to success, good SNCOs and Lts are the key to making NCOs successful. I think that the Marines Corps institutionally brings a higher leadership product to the table at the lowest level, which leads to much higher quality leadership throughout because of effective mentoring and the wisdom of experience.

2) Clear-cut, Marine-proofed policies with well-defined standards. PT, body composition, performance evaluation, maintenance, safety, etc. All of these things have standards that are clear, no nonsense, with defined consequences that makes it easy for Sgts and Cpls to carry them out without getting into too much trouble, and frees officers to ensure the standards are being maintained rather than wasting their time by trying to personally carry out the activities necessary to meet the standards. This keeps low level activities from biting a CO in the ass.

3) A more competitive promotion process. Like Mr. Gourley said, this weeds a lot of the chaff out at the company grade level, and most of the remaining chaff doesn't make it past Major. This is true even more so for the combat arms than combat service support.

4) A personnel policy that does a better job of identifying people who are worth retaining as LtCols because of their knowledge and experience, but aren't necessarily a great fit for command. There are a lot of LtCols filling staff positions in Quantico, DC, and elsewhere who are a force multiplier because of what's in their head but are poorly suited to command.

5) Higher quality staff officers. For reasons 1, 3, and 4. Success is always built on quality subordinates.

6) The refusal to promote people to meet quotas. Hokiefan talked about the need to fill O-4 slots. We fill them with Capts, and bump 1stLts to company commands. And expect everyone to perform just as well as if they were the rank that the billet rated (which they usually do). I personally know a 2ndLt who left MOS school and immediately filled a Major's billet training Afghan police (he was also a logistics officer). This is related to reason 1.

7) A culture of accountability that emphasizes integrity. There's a lot of forgiveness to be found in the Marine Corps if you own up to your mistakes. If you try to keep them secret, you will be crushed. This keeps mistakes and misbehavior from spiraling out of control by encouraging people to identify mistakes, tell somebody about them, and quickly fix them.

 

JIM GOURLEY

8:54 AM ET

June 12, 2011

What I get from Kilgore then is...

That massive funding and personnel cuts would be good for the Army? I think it was GEN Odierno who recently said we'd have to get used to "doing less with less instead of more with less." Maybe that viewpoint is the product of years of living within the micromanagement culture. I wonder if the Marines don't look at that viewpoint with disdain, as they've been making it work for a century.

The Army would perhaps be better served to borrow the USMC's leadership paradigm instead of its uniforms. That whole fracas between the soldier program office General and the USMC Sergeant Major is ridiculous to the nth-degree, by the way. Like two sisters arguing over whose closet the outfit belonged in.

 

WHISKEYPAPA

1:43 PM ET

June 13, 2011

If I Recall Correctly...

Five of the eighteen battalion commanders on Desert Storm were relieved. And the CO of one of the reserve regiments, the 24th Marines was relieved after everyone got back. He had a shitload of congrints on him, including one from me.

When I was in 3/6, (1983-84) my company commander was relieved, and the guy who relieved him was also relieved.

Walt

 

WHISKEYPAPA

1:56 PM ET

June 13, 2011

Gene Duncan

Gene Duncan (recently passed away) wrote the wonderful "Green Side Out" and "Brown Side Out" books (and others).

Speaking to your point about promoting people into billets at low ranks and expecting them to perform, I recall reading in one of his books that it was a lot more fun to be XO of First Tank Batallion as a major than when he previously held the billet as a first lieutenant. Of course the company commanders were mostly captains.

Walt

 

PEN DRAGON

9:38 PM ET

June 10, 2011

Freedom of action

Another substantial advantage Buffett has is autonomy. He stayed out of derivatives because he didn't understand them; how many military officers have successfully ducked Afghanistan because they don't understand COIN/CT? If Buffett doesn't like the odds of something, he can decline involvement and that's fine because he's his own boss. Officers have bosses, who usually have a very limited or politically tainted understanding of the orders they give, and so they are often forced into situations that they prefer to avoid.

 

TOM RICKS

1:02 PM ET

June 12, 2011

good point

He is not in the position of trying to make chicken salad out of chicken shit, as it were.
Best,
Tom

 

DOUG KRUGMAN

11:56 PM ET

June 10, 2011

Traditions of relief

I'm a Marine entering a period of field grade staff purgatory/recharging after three years of infantry company command. Some of the comments about Marine Corps leadership above require clarification.

Although the Marine Corps never reached the near all-inclusive field grade promotion rates or accelerated promotion timelines the Army has had for officers over the past decade, the percentage of Lieutenants invited to continue in service after their initial commitments rose from somewhere around 50% in the mid-90s to about 90% in 2005 before the becoming an open invitation to stay for several years to meeting increased end strength requirements. The program, once called augmentation and now career designation, is becoming more selective again with about 65-70% of Lieutenants being selected to remain on active duty this year.

As for separations for poor performing Marines, technically two "Page 11" entries is sufficient grounds for an administrative separation which must be approved at the General Officer level. In practice, I do not recall seeing any separations endorsed and approved without at least one battalion level non-judicial punishment, and had at least one rejected by an O-6 despite a summary court-martial and a few lesser offenses.

I have seen a fair share of enlisted and officers (below the CO level) relieved over the past few years, but I have also chosen to and watched other leaders choose to keep marginal performers and outright failures in place, with or without bad paper. The small size of the Marine Corps sometimes makes it difficult for our manpower system to produce external replacements on short notice, especially in low-density high-demand specialties and at higher pay grades. If the in-unit replacement didn't have the potential to do any better than incumbent, no one moved. I relieved three SNCOs but kept a fourth despite his repeated failures because none of his immediate subordinates could have done a better job. The First Sergeant and I understood that platoon commander had to lead and manage the platoon differently than most of his peers and the platoon performed well.

That brings me to my final point, which is adaptive leadership. "Infantry in Battle" though written before World War II contains an example about a commander who treated each of his three subordinate commanders very differently based on their personalities. In some cases decentralized execution is entirely appropriate (it is my preferred approach), but when dealing with junior personnel in unfamiliar situations, meetings and a more regimented schedule can produce better results. I've learned that in some cases what I consider "death by powerpoint" staff meetings are necessary to synchronize action and help develop personnel even if they try the patience of a few.

 

GOLD STAR FATHER

3:41 AM ET

June 11, 2011

Thanks Doug

Although I am removed 30 years from your experience, it is good to see that the USMC still traces the standards necessary to preserve the core dependence on personnel to achieve the mission. Although not perfect and certainly not friendly, those that strive to attain positions, either Offficer or NCO/SNCO, must abide by Marine Corps standards, institutionally higher than other services. I say this in regard to the (whole) Marine Corps whose most basic function is still support to support th noncom rifleman in the mud in a 2-way live fire scenario.
It is a non-forgiving system that must be in place to retain the edge that the Corps reserves for itself and the system, yea, the heritage and expectations, expects. This is not trash-talk upon the other services. For the Marine Corps to function on, what 9% of DOD budget?, the mission is paramount based on max output to assests available. People are the main assest of the Marine Corps and people are the weapons systems that must function the best with the least failures.
Sometimes this eats people up; it is bound to. But those that excel are those that take to heart the principles that are taught to each Marine from the first second entering MarineLand and apply them for (too) many years--careers that end at E5 or O3, or on to SgtMajor/Flag.
Mirco-management has no place in the Corps' system of training nor combat participation. It can't. Far too much is demanded in far too less time alloted for any type requirement to seek approval for bold needed action.
In my lifetime, I have gone from the Marine Corps not having a seat on JCS to Marines fully involved in national defense commands at the highest levels. I've seen micromanagers that demoralized those under them and Marine unit commanders that stated don't do shit unless you deem its necessary (concentrate on the mission at hand)--anyone screaming at you, turn them over to me. Paperwork/reports/reporting are the death of any unit. Action is what produces results.
Damn, if I could only get away from paper in my job now like I used to when my primary MOS called me elsewhere... SF

 

HEADHUNTERSIX

1:26 AM ET

June 12, 2011

So fitting...

My weekly "battle rhythm" as follows..Monday meetings where we report what we're working on. It lasts about an hour and ahalf. From there Tuesday through Friday I have a meeting every afternoon. I've briefed the same info for the last month at each meeting on each subject. The Wednesday meeting has nothing to do with me, my soldiers or my jobs. I just sit there. We started both a military ball and change of command IPR 2 months out. Nobody can be trusted to actually do anything unless it goes through one person. These meetings last hours. This is all for a 250 man unit. We're deploying back overseas within the year....we've wasted more time on social functions then actual training. At times I hold info back so I have something to brief because "no change" is not allowed. People are actually ridiculed. I tried to change my slide packet so it was streamlined and was told I was not being a team player. Its a continual pain ex.....

 

HUNTER

3:17 AM ET

June 12, 2011

I don't mean to make you feel bad

But I don't think I held a single meeting for our family Spur Ride, our SQDN ball, or the SQDN change of command and we did all three within the last 4 weeks of my command. As Guardsmen we simply haven't got time for all that. All three events were first class and I was genuinely pleased.

I will cop to talking to my OIC about these events frequently during the run up. He and I assigned action officers, gave intent, and ultimately got results. Sure there were things we could have done better, but that's what the AAR is for.

C'mon over to the darkside, we have cookies.

 

AR FA MI

1:12 PM ET

June 13, 2011

Meeting, Smeeting

I won't bore everyone with our BN Battle Rhythm but it seems HEADHUNTERSIX might be in my unit. HAHAHA!

According to the leadership on a certain military post where gold "might be", the overall theme is if you came into the Army prior to September 11, 2001 you are awesome and know what the Army is supposed to be. If you came in after 9/11/2001 you are a Millenial and you have no idea what you are doing and you are lazy.

Now to the fun part, as a JO who happens to be older than 2 of 3 FGOs, they really love when I ask how my "generation" of Officers/NCOs/Soldiers got this way. I explain to them that we didn't all get together at MEPS and decide we are going to fundamentally change the Army. I believe it is called mentoring and training to "standard" that was overlooked after 2001. It's a lot of fun and I suggest you try it. I didn't want to leave the BN CSM out but he was sleeping during Command and Staff so I put him on Comms Blackout.

Oh, HUNTER, I love cookies. Do you have Peanut Butter?

 

AZTEC

8:03 PM ET

June 12, 2011

My Takeaway

"Hire well; manage little"

Harumph!

 

HEADHUNTERSIX

1:52 PM ET

June 13, 2011

I think we might be.....

AR...we might not be in the same unit but I think we're on the same Post.

In my last unit I stopped doing the "just cause" stuff. If we had a meeting I made sure that it had some correlation to my job/support of the unit. I guess because I was surrounded by folks who felt the same way, I could do that. Oddly enough the job got done and my section and soldiers did a great job for the unit. My boss trusted his people to do their jobs. My mistake at my current unit was acting in the same manner. People here walk around scared to make any decisions unless we've had 30 IPR's and 200 slides on any given subject. I wouldn't mind but we're not a combat arms unit but purely admin.

I guess it will be very interesting to see how we evolve as an Army as we've had 10 years of junior leaders at all levels making quick decisions on very important matters in combat. Well atleast we're getting rid of the beret on a day to day basis!!!!

 

AR FA MI

7:49 PM ET

June 13, 2011

Are You Sure?

Are you sure you aren't in my unit? HAHAHA!

I think most JO's have come to expect everything spoon fed to them so they don't even try anymore. What I have found to be happening is leaders miss and/or blow off suspenses because they just assume the higher HQ will do it for them.

I agree with you that this transition is going to be a unique time that I am sure some of the older military members could shed light on from their past experience. All we know is war/COIN but we have no idea how to truly create a training plan for the garrison environment. Let the fun commence.

 

DRIFTER83

3:23 PM ET

June 13, 2011

Keeping it between the fence posts

Level 1- I tell you where to go, what road to take and exactly how to go down the road, you nod your head, say, "Yes Sergeant" and I take you along the line the line on the road
Level 2- I tell you where to go and what road you're taking, with your input we discuss how you're getting there, and you go down the road while I continously make sure you're following the right road
Level 3 - I tell you where you need to go, you tell me what road your taking and how your getting there, we discuss it, you go while calling in at check points .
Level 4, (I call it the fence post level, I think Hunter once used the term too) I tell you the final destination, or better you tell me, I make sure you have the tools and keeps the bosses off you, I check periodicly to make sure you are keeping it between the fence post, or ditches, along the highway and the job gets done.

Trust and experience on both ends counts enormously to have a leadership relationship at the fence post level but its a beautiful place to be.

 

AR FA MI

7:37 PM ET

June 13, 2011

Management 101

DRIFTER, that there is basic management levels. Otherwise known as what you learn on the second day of Business Management class. The first day is the syllabus overview. HAHAHA! I guess some people skipped that class.

 

RUBBER DUCKY

11:30 AM ET

June 14, 2011

Yet another set of comments on My Favorite Army...

...without the word 'reform' ever appearing. Ditto 'overhaul.'

William Blake said this: "He who thinks but acts not breeds pestilence.'"

 

PVCBLINDS

2:25 PM ET

June 21, 2011

This is so very tue and i

This is so very tue and i quote;
For example, the U.S. military, and especially the Army, have been plagued by micromanagement since the mid-1950s, so long that no one now in the Army has much experience in any other way to run it. I see generals constantly scurrying endlessly to meetings where they often sit in the dark while subordinates read aloud to them bedtime stories

 

Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.

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