Boy, was he on the mark. Watching this Chairman wade into the political debate on DADT has been absolutely amazing to watch. Especially after watching GEN Pace get smacked for voicing his own personal opinion.

As with most "gee, this is a good idea right now" policies, the unintended consequences are amazing. I think Paul Yingling's article on going to an all-volunteer force made huge sense (and is a positive for today's military officers leading it) but the unintended consequence is a disconnected military that is easier to deploy over and over and over, with little notice by the unaffected American public. Betcha nobody thought of that 3rd order consequence when they wrote this law.

I guess this is why we write Army War college research papers...somebody has to make the criticism at some point OR we'll read it in the oral histories kept at AHEC (I hope we can, tom)

The Marines have no doctrine?

What about you know, amphibious assault?

And they went hook, line and sinker for maneuver warfare.

Army doctrine! Pshaw!

http://www.facebook.com/#!/DoctrineMan

Walt

Sullivan was not talking about jointness, he is talking about politics effecting military ability to provide the advice they need to their bosses. What we need to avoid is the politicians manipulating the mils upfront so they get the "advice" (testimony to congress while holding onto their testes) they wanted to get.

Re-read "Dereliction of Duty"; how did they get Navy to go along with something they thought was stupid ?(Indo-China). Wheel and deal on the CINCDOMs, threaten to make CINCPAC USAF until Navy caves in and goes along.

Rummie/politics is another example. Rumsfeld had this idea he was going to appoint a bunch of "Yes Men" who were in their late 50s, then extend the retirement age for Chiefs to about 72. That would ensure the dead hand of Rummie was on future Presidents and SECDEFs shoulders for the next 15 years. I heard CNO Vern Clark, express his opinion on that, he thought he was old enough already and didn't think he should be running Navy for next 15 years or so.

Three Bags Full, sir.

Just keep my name in the hat for CJSC.

I give Gen. Sullivan points for prescience after our experience with Gen. Myers and several other senior officers who rose in the Rumsfeld Pentagon. My question is whether -- outside of a greater willingness to be used publicly as props for officials of an incumbent administration -- chiefs of staff in the Goldwater-Nichols era delivered professional advice of lower quality than earlier occupants of the highest military posts.

Frankly, the performance of, say, the men who were Army Chiefs of Staff in the Vietnam period was unimpressive from the standpoint of the professional advice they offered. They seem to have been as easily intimidated and as deferential to misguided civilian leadership as the Chiefs under Rumsfeld were. I'm also not sure whether we should conclude that the Chiefs under Rumsfeld were typical of the post-GN era. How much really changed here between the 1960s and the 2000s, and how much of that change can be attributed to Goldwater-Nichols?

My impression of military culture and leadership up to about the O-6 level is that "the mission" is everything. What I saw in Iraq was very capable military people executing what the civilian authorities ordered, wanted, indicated, etc. There didn't seem to a whole lot of questioning, or doubting, or requests for review of policy. My sense was that military personnel might have thought that there was lots of stupid stuff getting done, but they were not in any position to raise doubts or criticism. Better to improvise, adapt, and overcome in achieving "the mission". Thoughtful and dissenting O-6's retire as O-6's unless they write a bunch of books, have a fan following, and have a supporter on the general officer promotion panel.

My sense is that O-7 and above do more things that skew toward the political, still focussing on "the mission", but also considering things like "good of the service", and bureaucratic infighting, and Congressional relations, and what not. Seems pretty clear that military leaders like the JCS limit their advice to non-policy or non-civilian authority things. New uniform? Sure they have opinions. Good idea to invade Iraq? That's what the Prez told me to do, and it's not my role to question that "legal" order.

Petraeus is interesting because he has a knack for the political side of things. Would seem that the fired and discredited generals were too much on the mission execution side of things. Maybe he is the best sort of general for wars like Iraq and Afghanistan....

Sure, the JCS doesn't have as large a role as it did in the past, so I guess it's fair to say we aren't "getting all we can" from it's members. But we've cut out a whole layer of bureaucracy between POTUS and those tasked with overseeing military policy carried out. Maybe we'd miss that layer in a big multi-theatre war, but the current system seems to work pretty well for carrying out imperial policy.

No disrespect intended to General Sullivan, but I suspect his opposition to GN came from being unhappy with having his job lose so much authority.