I think we spend just a bit too much time focusing on metrics and factors that are not driving events.

All this great Geopolitical stuff, and big toys are great entertainment, but the core reasons driving John's conclusions are more internal than big picture, and far more substantive than inherently unstable deals with China.

If Pakistan is the most dangerous country in the world, it cannot, at the same time be stable and secure.

The military picture is just one dimension, while the civilian ones (econ, political, demographic, cultural, physical) are the ever-growing tumor growing out the side of the military's stomach.

In 2009, WP credited my studies of Afghanistan's population figures for a major CIA downward estimate (from 33.4 m to 28m). It was actually about 24 tops by credible sources.

No offense but even if the 180m Pakistan figure is off by half, 90 million unstable Pakistanis facing serious civilian obstacles is not a pretty picture.

China and India, by comparison, make Pakistan a gnat.

It is bigger by many factors than either Iraq or Afghanistan, hugely complex, facing huge challenges, and with less and less options absent substantial gridlock, unresolved conflicts and bifurcations (future not a continuum of past patterns).

Unless somebody really has a clue about the big picture in Pakistan's future, quickie deals with China, instead of peace with its natural neighbors is a recipe for continued instability.

I'm with John, but for many reasons.

While the US seems to know very little factually about these various countries of interest, there is no doubt that India knows exactly where ever single Pakistani nuke/WMD capability is stored and located, and, wisely, has a strategy to disable them in the first two minutes of any engagement.

I would not lose any sleep about whether India would standby while Pakistan attacked it with nuclear weapons. Thus, the LET and Taliban strategies...

Other than India and Afghanistan (by irregulars), Pakistan poses no viable long-range threat to, as examples, Iran, China, Sri Lanka, Myanmar Baluchistan?

to mention that U.S. foreign policy is responsible for every problem Pakistan has, and if we only get ourselves right with the world, the world will experience an outbreak of peaceful co-existance not seen since, since...

Well, since never, but that matters not. Our military adventure next door is the root of all evil in that part of the world. Just ask the apologists who frequent this blog.

The US is allowing Pakistan to step on its throat. There is a very real difference here, it is the difference between the school bully hunting you down and taking your milk money vice you finding the bully and meekly handing the money over. Pakistan cannot be the hunting bully, they simply do not have the ability to force the US to do anything. The US, however, can easily capitulate to Pakistani demands, requests, and inferences. We, the US, are our own worst enemy in this regard.

And the solution is simple: stop giving stuff to Pakistan. Stop drone strikes. Stop foreign aid. Stop training their military in our schools. Stop letting Pakistani exchange students study in US schools. Most of all: stop running supplies for forces in Afghanistan through Pakistan. Is there a cost involved? Yep, and it is probably large. US forces in Afghanistan would probably have to reduce efforts for a while as things sorted themselves out. But so what?

The question we ought to ask is what will Pakistan do if the US funding stream stops dead. Is Pakistan willing to give up that money? This cannot be a diplomatic round-the-table discussion about some theoretical action. The US needs to do something, concrete action that shows that we will indeed take our toys out of their playground. My perspective says that Pakistan will run one of two, macro, ways but that both will end in essentially the same place. They will either stir the insurgent pot with the intent of showing the US that we cannot possibly operate in Afghanistan without tacit Pakistani support (supply movements), or they will crush the insurgents. If the US could stick with it I am betting that the US money that flows into Pakistan is more important to their political class than the ability to affect Afghanistan via Mullah Omar.

And the nukes? Just let Pakistan know in no uncertain terms that they will be held responsible for anything of theirs that gets out. We will not hunt the bomber, we will blow up those places that let the bomb loose.

Added bonus: we probably pull out of Afghanistan sooner this way too.

that the general governmental consensus in the US gov't is that we are using Pakistan. Using them to support our (unending) efforts in Afghanistan and for various other regional endeavors.

Seems to me that Pakistan sees itself as using the US. And, if this is the case, I think that they are right. We're getting our international diplomatic ass handed to us and we do not even recognize it happening. Guess we're too big and smart to be taken advantage of, at least until some nation convinces us that paying them a small boat load of money for them to harbor OBL for half a decade and foment insurgent actions across their western border... Wait just a sec here....this place is sounding a little familiar! No no no, can't be. Best go ignore reality again for a while. Maybe watch some slideshows, those are always restful.

The US does not need Pakistan as a logistical umbilical cord, the US wants Pakistan in that role. For several reasons I would imagine the least not being that it is easier to use Pakistani roads and ports than other locations to move supplies into Afghanistan. But there is a fundamental, and significant, difference between need and want and the fact that there is an apparent perception on the part of our leaders that the Pakistan LOC is necessary leads to too many secondary and tertiary effects that are not good for our (the US) mission here in Afghanistan, our standing regionally, and also our international position.

There is an obvious cost to foregoing the use of Pakistani roads and ports, monetarily and physically. If we shut off that line of communication we here in theater, no doubt, would see a lot less "stuff," at least initially. This has political costs for the politicians in the states as their constituents would start to agitate on behalf of friends and relatives in theater. Might be enough to cost an election. The short term costs then - political difficulties - are one of the reasons I believe that our politicians accept the long term costs - more insurgents killing more service members here. There are a whole host of other considerations and I know that pulling the plug on support to Pakistan is not a regional panacea for the US. But - and there always is one - does not our continued support to and of Pakistan tell them and the region that we're more than happy to give money and supplies to the country that harbored our number one bad guy for half a decade?

I would suggest that changing the perception that the US needs Pakistan is the first step to actually changing something significant on the ground here.

Amb. Crocker tells the story of positive negotiations with Iran immediately following the Afghan success.

The "Axis of Evil" speech came in the middle of negotiations, and blew it all up.

Still, if anyone could rekindle anything like that, he's on his way there, but he's equally familiar with Pakistan.

Again. That's the horse I put my money on for 2012. If real answers can be forged, he is a good welder.