Tuesday, May 10, 2011 - 10:44 AM

No one is ever right all the time, especially on problems as vexing as U.S. relations with Pakistan. That's why I try to run guest columns that disagree with me. Here's a take on Pakistan somewhat different from my view offered yesterday.
By Col. Tom Lynch, U.S.
Army (ret.)
Best Defense bureau
of responsible opposing viewpoints
This is truly America's most troubled relationship with an erstwhile ally since the Soviet Union in World War II, but an important one to manage soberly and realistically.
Realism requires us to grudgingly understand that Pakistan continues to operate from a paradigm where it demands equality with India, blames India for all of its perils, leverages "irregular warfare groups" (that are predominantly Islamic radicals) and nuclear weapons in a quixotic effort to level the security playing field with New Delhi, and ascribes nefarious motives to any country that doesn't consistently help it score points against India in the region and internationally. It also requires us to acknowledge that designating Pakistan as enemy remains a course fraught with peril and outcomes far worse than we've seen to this point.
In this context, our policy approach toward Pakistan since 2008/09 is wrongly branded as failure. Instead it has course-corrected a failed policy from 2001-07 of just feeding Musharraf money and trusting that he was committed to ending support for regional and international terrorists. Our efforts since late 2008 have been expensive, but far from failed. We've built a CT intel and strike network of depth and complexity in Afghanistan that has enabled many of our drone strikes and an extensive mapping of terrorist and militant ops there and in much of Pakistan. Capitalizing on Pakistani civilian differences with their mil-intel complex, and on PakMIL-ISI embarrassments over the entrails from the failed May 2010 Times Square terrorist bombing episode (and others), we've built an independent network of intelligence operatives within Pakistan.
The results are shown in the bin Laden raid, in drone strike successes against many senior international terror figures (a truth that Pakistan ISI obfuscation cannot alter), and in many other areas that we are not yet allowed to see in the unclassified world. Indeed, we've now got a set of processes and frameworks that enable us a window into Pakistan that can be game-changing -- but not if Pakistan's military-intelligence leadership won't make the decision to change.
Now is the time to press PakMIL-ISI hard on its duplicity, on their need for a new narrative of Pakistan moving forward, and on our demands for cooperation in two immediate priorities: (1) Kill/capture Ayman al-Zawahiri and (2) Mounting pressure on the Afghan Taliban leadership to make it hard for them to regenerate losses suffered & suffering in Afghanistan. We won't give these priorities a chance if we take this moment of greatest leverage as an excuse to just walk away. This won't be an easy sell on Capitol Hill, but it is a vital one.
Col. Tom Lynch (U.S. Army, ret.) was special assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 2008 to 2010. He is now the National Defense University's distinguished research fellow for Near East and South Asia.
Look, I'm just a reader -- no relevant policy experience, no credentials, but this line from Col. Lynch's post struck me as quite possibly wrong:
"Now is the time to press Pak MIL-ISI hard on its duplicity, on their need for a new narrative of Pakistan moving forward, and on our demands for cooperation in two immediate priorities: (1) Kill/capture Ayman al-Zawahiri and (2) Mounting pressure on the Afghan Taliban leadership to make it hard for them to regenerate losses suffered & suffering in Afghanistan."
Pakistan has three hole cards: its nuclear deterrent, which it will never give up or stop relying on, and two items related to the war: support for the Taliban and keeping al-Qaeda figures in its pocket. The killing of Bin laden both exposed he latter and also, perhaps paradoxically, made the last two even more valuable. To ask them to essentially give up their ability to string out the Afghan war and keep us guessing about senior al-Qaeda people is to ask them to atone for being caught hosting Bin Laden by shriving themselves of their bad ways. Well, I don't see Pakistan as a shriving kind of society. I think, since 1947, they are a dig-in-their-heels and stare down the outsiders kind of society. They got pretty clearly linked to the Mumbai attacks and didn't do a thing to change their ways.
The logic of Lynch and others seems to be that the facade of cooperation on the hunt for Bin laden was important to Pakistan, so the loss of it will cause them to bargain harder for our approval. I think it more likely they never really cared about the facade -- as long as they have a shred of deniability, they'll shrug, maybe fire a few scapegoats, and go on. What is important is having assets -- they probably saw Bin Laden as one, to be traded or used at some future point, and probably still see Zawahiri as another. They almost certainly see the Taliban as another -- a useful and powerful tool to keep themselves in the game in Afghanistan. To surrender those two assets would be unilateral disarmament. I think if anything they'll be inclined to double down and increase thinly-disguised support for the Taliban precisely because they calculate America won't call their bluff. (just as they're apparently increasing their nuke stockpile in the face of any realistic utility for more bombs -- see http://krepon.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/3113/pakistans-nuclear-requirements ).
Again with the missing Grand Strategy
I like a lot of what Col. Lynch has to say, but like others I am troubled by the conclusion. The two "immediate priorities" he lists are valid, and duly labeled immediate, i.e. short term.
What I still see missing is some sense of a Grand Strategy (not Col. Lynch's fault, obviously). If this is truly an inflection point useful for changing Pakistan's direction, then where would we like them to go?
And I still don't see Pakistan fundamentally changing its orientation unless India is on board. What are we doing about that?
The issue I have with Lynch’s view is that it’s sounds more like a short term "policy" contingent upon however long we are in Afghanistan directed toward counter-terrorism as opposed to a long term "strategic" framework involving the bigger picture that includes Pakistan's place in the overall global fight against terrorism.
Short on actionable recommendations
>Indeed, we've now got a set of processes and frameworks that enable us a window into Pakistan that can be game-changing -- but not if Pakistan's military-intelligence leadership won't make the decision to change. Now is the time to press PakMIL-ISI hard on its duplicity, ...
Col. Lynch does not suggest any actionable items to make this change happen. My take is that cutting aid immediately is the best approach to force them to change. Money is a huge motivator for the Pak military and political leadership, especially since much of it is siphoned off - nothing like personal greed to make things happen.
If that does not change them, follow it up with declaring them as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, and treat them like Iran and North Korea, the table they should be sitting at anyway.
You would be absolutely right, Charlie, in saying that money is a huge motivator for Pakistan's Military and the ISI. However, you must be cautious and bear in mind that money is also the only incentive for those same forces to proportion aid (military and intelligence - do not forget that Pakistani Intelligence was to some extent useful in finding Osama) to US services in the region. Cutting off aid - despite how much of it is allocated to bribes - could be potentially devastating for US operations, leaving them stranded in a country that is amongst the most unstable in the world. It would have to be a very gradually approached process, if it is at all an option.
Pakistani government has U. S. by the throat
Now that Osama bin Laden has been found to be being sheltered so close to the heart of Pakistani government, foreign policy establishment in U. S. is in the full swing to once again rescue Pakistan from getting a black eye over it.
It does NOT matter to these Pakistani apologists that Islamabad has been caught with their pants down umpteen times.
Pakistan has been able to get away with all the crimes against U. S. and still come out smelling roses because
Pakistani government has U. S. by the throat. US can NOT use its aid leverage to force Pakistan to stop supporting terrorist groups who kill US/NATO troops in Afghanistan day in and day out because US needs Pakistan’s help in ferrying supplies to those very US/NATO troops.
Furthermore Pakistan has spread a biggest malarkey with U. S. connivance that ’nuclear weapons are in danger of falling in the hands of Islamic fundamentalists if Pakistani government collapses’.
How can Pakistan be in danger of falling to the Islamic fundamentalists if Pakistani Army and ISI are SPONSORING those very Islamic fundamentalists led by Osama bin Laden, Haqqani, Mullah Omar and Hafiz Saeed as reported by ambassador Patterson?
Previous US ambassador Anne Patterson to Pakistan, wrote in a secret review in 2009 that ‘Pakistan's Army and ISI are covertly SPONSORING four militant groups - Haqqani‘s HQN, Mullah Omar‘s QST, Al Qaeda and LeT - and will not abandon them for any amount of US money‘, as diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks show.
No matter how Hillary Clinton spins it, ambassador Patterson had NO reason to mislead her own State Department and U. S. government.
US just keeps deliberately ignoring Taliban’s Pakistani connections in fueling and sustaining Afghan insurgency as reported by Matt Waldman in ‘The sun in the sky‘ on 6/13/2010, corroborated by WikiLeaks leaks on 7/25/2010 and then further corroborated by Chris Alexander, Canadian ambassador to Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005 and Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan from 2005 until 2009 in his article on 7/30/2010 titled ‘The huge scale of Pakistan‘s complicity‘.
Let us see if U. S. once again allows Pakistan to get away with a whitewash and a wink and a nod with few more billions in aid to boot after finding out that Osama bin Laden was sheltered so close to the heart of Pakistani government.
I'll bet you and exclamation point and a question mark that we will let the corrupt military/feudal elite get away with it and in one month things will be back to normal and ADM Mullen will be back to drinking tea with Kayani sahib. Sad for us, fatal for a lot of Afghans and Pakistanis.
The trial for the ISI sponsored terrorist starts in Chicago on Monday. Do you think there is a chance that will change things?
Wow, did I just see Tom Ricks on CNN say that...
He's happy to see America help India secure Pakistan's nuclear weapons if the Pakistanis don't cooperate?
If Iraq was a bad idea, this is a massive brain hemorrhage-vegetable state stupidity.
I did too. Personally, I don't think India has any interest in 'securing' Pakistan's nukes; it's just convenient for Ricks to put them on the forefront of a policy he'd like to see the United States adopt.
Appalling.
Tom is beating the drums here, but I don't really understand where he thinks his "end game" is. Does he think that Afghanistan is more important to our security interests than Pakistan? In other words, in order to pursue our war on the Taliban in Afghanistan (a war which many of us think is unnecessary, unwinnable and a dead-end), does Tom want us to in effect sever our relationship with, and lose whatever influence we had over, one of the largest Muslim countries in the world, one with nuclear weapons? We know that Pakistan's biggest regional fear is India (not the Taliban or AQ), and so we cozy up to India and bless their unauthorized nuclear weapons program -- and then we try to browbeat Pakistan into helping us defeat the one force in Afghanistan that they think is a counterweight against growing Indian influence in that country? Someone please tell me how this foreign policy stance is workable.
Not only that, Rick's comment smacks of irrational exuberance...
Yeah, the SEALs did a bang up job with Bin Laden, made the Pakistanis look the fool, but what makes Ricks think that India is capable of doing likewise, and against nothing less than Pakistan's nuclear weapons facilities ?
Doesn't anyone remember what a massively incompetent job the Indians did in 2008 Mumbai ?
I used a word search to confirm that no form of 'pashtun' was used in Col. Lynch's essay on resetting US policy, in their region, where they once ruled.
I take issue with Col. Lynch's opening salvo, that Pakistan seeks/requires equality with India. My reading leads me to believe that's like saying that Carl Rove is seeking equality for his ambitions. If equality is a step in the direction of winning, then equality is desired, but not the end-state.
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan ('land of the pure') self defines as a moslem land. The ruling elites dispossessed in 1949 feel that their kind of Moslems were the rightful heirs to rule India, and seek redress on every level. The political religion of Mohammed holds that non-moslems ruling over moslems is just wrong, a temporary condition, inshallah. Islamabad wants to rule Kashmir, Bangladesh, and more.
I say this without overt Beckish prejudice or hatred, or carrying water for New Delhi. The Indians for their part are ruled by Nehru's Hindu party, which has hijacked Ghandi's name to become a nuclear security state. They include a substantial faction that feels they should have 'finished' the islamists in '49, or after the Bangladesh partition, before the subcontinent war became nuclear-ized, a sub-set of global nuclear strategic competition.
I'm the son of a Baptist sect which derives from a judaic tradition that holds much the same view; that we are 'the chosen', and that after much suffering we will be restored to power by the almighty. What goes round comes round.
irony; communist politics & Indian religious tolerance?
but amen to getting along.
Most religions are in favor of tolerance, as long as they're in the minority. As you know Don, the christian minorities tend to and immigrate, in Iraq, Palestine, Egyptian troubles. Here in San Diego county we have a burgeoning Iraqi/arab christian population that's been building for decades. Ironically, my neocon congressman's family (Issa) was lebanese .
I used to work for the grandson of an India missionary who had an ali baba sword over the desk. Grandpa had been marked for killing with that sword by one zealot faction, when he loaned the mission car to the 'other'. Neither side could tolerate the other to have a powerful ally providing use of a motorcar.
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