Mr. Ricks: How does this new CT strategy cope wit the current COIN one? Are you favoring to abandon current COIN programs in behalf of CT? Isn't this approach the one that Biden favored and Petraeus didn't agree with? Please, I need further explanation, if possible.

Thanks

Short-term embrace, long-term divorce right?

But what will happen after we leave Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq all at once?

haven't we already settled on our critical interest in nuclear armed Pakistan's stability as the reason we continue raging war in Afghanistan? All those dead and injured American soldiers and Marines plus while we do spend a $billion a year on aid to Pakistan the burn rate in Afghanistan is currently about $12-14 billion a month.

So Tom, you’re saying that the ‘the always wrong’ Joe Biden is right after all? That the campaign in Af/Pak should be high yield small footprint intelligence centered special op’s counter-terror operation and not a full-fledged low-yield COIN invasion of a vast and complex country with a 140,000 troops at 2 billion bucks a week?

While I agree that Biden often suffers from acute diarrhea of the mouth his fundamental strategic view is much closer to being correct and that of the ‘big’ endless war military. The Pentagon’s ‘Vietnamization’ of the war has been wrong and will continue to be wrong which is hardly surprising.

What I am writing is not a comment on the merits of COIN vs. CT, as it seemed to be with Biden.

Rather, it is a recognition that if the cost of carrying out a COIN campaign in Afghanistan is continued extortion by Pakistan, it isn't worth it to me. So to regain our freedom of movement with Pakistan, I would like to reduce the size of the US presence in Afghanistan.

Not my ideal outcome, simply my attempt to grapple with the realities of Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2011.

Thanks,
Tom

The only problem with disengaging from Pakistan, or not investing is that if we don't other coutries like Russia, China, and Iran will gladly fill that void.

We keep talking about TTP in Afghanistan. What do you WANT this to look like when we get done? What do you EXPECT it to look like when we get done?

The problem with Afghanistan is that we didn't pick a place with very good material for our exercise in Nation Building. We couldn't have found a place more divided by tribe, ethnicity, or language.. No matter what we do there is probably a limit (a really really low limit) to how well we can reasonably expect Afghanistan to turn out.

Basically, the real ‘end state’ is that we save face. In Vietnam we were willing to take and give a lot of hurt in order to do that. Ironically, Af/Pak looks, feels and smells like Vietnamization redux.

Where are CT forces going to be based if there is a radical draw down in conventional forces in Afghanistan? They will require multiple safe, defended bases geographically distributed in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

I’m a little surprised that nobody wants to engage Tom’s actual question.
We have been paying blackmail to Pakistan of one sort or another for sixty years.

As is usual in blackmail situations, the payer gets nothing except a fresh demand for more money. Over the years the terms of the blackmail notes have changed, but the process has remained drearily similar.
It is possible that we are at one of those culminating points where we might be able to stop paying blackmail to Pakistan. Or at least begin to pay a lot less.
But, to do so would involve stopping the behavior that enables them to collect the big checks from us.

*****A substantially smaller footprint in Afghanistan (whether we pursue limited COIN, limited CT, or a limited combo) would free us from the Pak supply routes.

****A willingness to cede some autonomy to the Taliban in the South/Southeast would free us from having to pay Pakistan to pretend to engage the Taliban in the tribal areas.

Bioth of these would allow us to reduce the blackmail checks – perhaps not to eliminate them, because we still may find ourselves paying a bit of nuclear blackmail until we come up with a crisper solution to that aspect of the game.
So, what do the readers of this posting prefer:

**** continue paying blackmail to Pakistan because we can’t revise our Afghan strategy?
**** stop paying the full blackmail check to Pakistan by modifying our Afghan strategy?
**** Something different from the above that deals creatively with both the Pakistan conundrum and the endless war in Afghanistan?
**** Something really dramatic that gets rid of both the Nuclear and the Afghan blackmail routines?

I think Tom's challenge deserves more of a response than we have provided thus far.

Call up the Iranians, offer them the $4B/Year for MSR from Chabahar up Highway 95. Then you get that Las Vegas quickie divorce from Pakistan. The Buluchis ought to be able to make some money off this war, everyone else is.

We'd need to have enough sense to not fall in love with our marriage of convenience w Iran. We'd probably ruin it by deciding they weren't good "partners". If Quds Force blew up our soldiers w EFPs we'd get mad. When Iran backed Hezbollah or Hamas we'd get mad and take our toys and go home. In a word we'd try to act like we'd bought more than an MSR from them!?!?

When I first read Tom's post I thought to myself, well I wonder if General Petraeus is having a "LBJ moment" referring to the time shortly after the start of the Tet Offensive in Vietnam when LBJ lamented that since he had lost "Cronkite" he had lost the war.

Now that the pop centric Coin campaign in Afghanistan has "lost Ricks" what is next? Exum, Nagl, Kilcullen, et al at CNAS? :)

gian

Pakistani government has U. S. by the throat. US can NOT use its aid leverage to force Pakistan to stop supporting terrorist groups who kill US/NATO troops in Afghanistan day in and day out because US needs Pakistan’s help in ferrying supplies to those very US/NATO troops.

U. S. navy seal team collected treasure trove of information during their raid in Abottabad to kill Osama bin Laden. Currently CIA is going through that information to establish the connections that Osama had in Pakistan that allowed him to go undetected for more than seven years so close to the heart of Pakistani government and Army.

It is very possible that CIA will find undisputable connections between Pakistani Army/government/ISI and Osama.

That raises the serious possibility of conflagration between nuclear-armed U. S. and Pakistan unless of course U. S. government decides to shove Osama’s connections with Pakistani government under the rug. Afterall U. S. and its international buddies have poured more than 50 billion dollars in that terror center of the world called Pakistan over last ten years.

Well, well well, Mr. Ricks has thrown in the towel. The COINistas have failed in their attempt to mire the USA in a decades long COIN program in Afghanistan. This is very good news for our country.

Our brave President always knew better, and now he is working to get us out of Afghanistan. Vice President Biden has been vindicated, and has shown to be far more informed and wise than the COIN Mafia at CNAS.

... it's difficult to impose your will on an adversary who cares more about the fight than you do, and who isn't going to restrict himself to limited warfare.

COIN is about winning the middle 80% while destroying the extreme 10% in opposition - but it seems that much more than 10% of the AfPak population has taken an extreme position against us. We may be past the point of COIN - at some point insurgency becomes state enemy.

We have enemies both in Afghanistan and in Pakistan who proclaim they will never tolerate any form of stability we promote in their region. This opposition is likely to continue manifesting itself (including in these countries' elected governments) until the sentiments supporting it are crushed entirely. Wars are won by killing the enemy all the way to his capitulation, not by investing resources on the offensive but then letting up whenever the enemy withdraws to reconstitute on the defensive while paying lip service to 'cooperation.'

...and state. If the sovereign is not really sovereign over its territory and the state is more like a collection of tribal cabals, can we really consider it an ally or an enemy? Isn't Pakistan similar to a slum run by gangs with well paid leadership? So let's not pretend and deal with it as such depending upon our needs.

Is the airport parking lot in the picture the one at the old Stapleton Airport site in Denver?

I thought this section from Wright's piece was really interesting:

"Eliminating, or sharply reducing, military aid to Pakistan would have consequences, but they may not be the ones we fear. Diminishing the power of the military class would open up more room for civilian rule. Many Pakistanis are in favor of less U.S. aid; their slogan is “trade not aid.” In particular, Pakistani businessmen have long sought U.S. tax breaks for their textiles, which American manufacturers have resisted. Such a move would empower the civilian middle class. India would no doubt welcome a reduction in military aid to Pakistan, and the U.S. could use this as leverage to pressure India to allow the Kashmiris to vote on their future, which would very likely be a vote for independence. These two actions might do far more to enhance Pakistan’s stability, and to insure its friendship, than the billions of dollars that America now pays like a ransom."

I wonder if a strategy similar what you said of militarily disengaging (privately) over the long-term, coupled with an increased State mission, including a possible Trade agreement focused on promoting their economy, would be a possible way to go? It demonstrates a commitment to the Pakistani people and a desire to promote increased opportunity, but also makes clear we will not pay ransom to a government that harbors our enemies or allows them to flourish (even if unknowingly). Any continued military-aid would only be given, as you said, "for doing X, you get Y amount of money."

If they don't get the message then, maybe a containment strategy should be looked at, even if imposed privately and not publically.

Mighty Mouse is dead on.

Whoever occupies Afghanistan, for any reason, has failed World History 101. 2014 is a do-not-sell beyond date.

100,000-odd NATO troops in Afghanistan won't change the future of Afghanistan by one iota, once they've left. Proof positive of failed policy. If they stay put, they won't change the Pakistan/India showdown over Kashmir one little bit, except to serve as radioactive test dummies.

Like the movie cliche where the B-17 slowly noses down in flames just prior to bellying over and diving for the ground: "Get out! Get out! Jump!"