For my current book project, I spent part of last weekend going over a list of 13,542 papers and group studies done at the Army War College since 1950. A lot of them were what you might expect, such as two from 1952: "The Soviet Railroad System" and "The Soviet Iron and Steel Industry." Some of them are downright scary, such as 1953's "A United States Program for the Post-World War III Peace."

And there are the hardy perennials, such as "Retention of Junior Officers" (1959), "Kashmir Dispute - Appropriate US Role" (1964), "Haiti: Another Abscess in the Caribbean" (1966) and "The Future of Stability Operations" (1970). With some updates in names and numbers, a clever but unethical student probably could re-submit any of those papers now.

Some of them just make you shake your head. In 1961, one officer studied "The Missile Killer Belt: The Ballistic Missile Defense of the Future." (You wanna talk about government spending? How many multi-billions of dollars has the Pentagon spent on ballistic missile defense over the last 40 years?) And speaking of throwing good billions after bad, there is 1963's hopeful "Pakistan: A United States Investment." Yep, I am sure it will pay off any decade now.

But there were some surprises to me, like how many papers were done on unconventional warfare in the 1950s, which military historians tend to depict as a decade when everyone was focused on nuclear warfare. And even some of that stuff on nuclear warfare looks interesting, such as 1958's "Critique of Kissinger's Strategic Force - Tactical Force Concept."

I also was surprised at how little written about the Korean War. It just seems never to have been foremost in the collective mind of the Army. Indeed, Vietnam seems to get almost as much attention in the mid-'50s, with papers such as Richard Stilwell's "The Indochina Contest," done in 1955, and another paper in 1958, "Military Strategy in Southeast Asia."

And then, 15 years later, this sorrowful topic: "Lesson from My Lai."

There are fads. Lots of papers about energy in the late 1970s. Then, "Contemporary Terrorism," written in 1982, marks the start of a new trend. After a long absence, the Civil War begins showing up again in the '80s, though in small numbers compared to the early years of the 20th century, when it dominated. In the 1970s, computers are an occasional curiosity in some papers. In the late 1980s, they begin showing up in large numbers, as in "The Application of Microprocessor Technology in Enhancing Combat Unit Effectiveness" (1987). In the '90s, the word was "digitization." Over the last decade it was "networks." The late '80s also saw a spate of papers on the military's role in "the war on drugs." The '90s are full of "revolutions" in various areas, such as "military engineering," in 1997.

The papers by future generals don't stand out particularly. One of the more interesting one appears to be Alexander Haig's "Military Intervention: A Case Study of Britain's Use of Force in the 1956 Suez Crisis," written in 1966. More typically, in 1985, there was Tommy R. Franks on "An Alternative Corps Concept for Winning the AirLand Battle."

In the papers written in the wake of 9/11, I had expected to see a torrent of papers on terrorism, Islamic extremism, the Soviet experience in Afghanistan and such. There were a few, but in general the papers for 2002 looked pretty much like previous years, featuring studies of "U.S. International Fresh Water Policy," "Vince Lombardi as a Strategic Leader, " and "Major General William S. Rosecrans and the Transformation of the Staff of the Army of the Cumberland: A Case Study." Plus, of course, a naval officer's 2007 contribution, "Algae: America's Pathway to Independence." You certainly can't accuse them of all running to the soccer ball. 

There are few illusions reflected in the titles from the post 9/11-era. From 2004, this paper, from an Army Reservist, intrigued me: "Operation Iraqi Freedom - An Unjust War." Two years later, an Army officer discussed, "Iraq: How We May Lose the War We Won."

Overall, the biggest hole, I would say, is a long-term tendency to study foreign strategic problems, but not to examine battles or wars that did not involve American forces. There are a few, and they generally seem to involve Germans, often the battle of Kursk. For example, I was surprised not to see a study of the Iran-Iraq War --though a small percentage of the papers are simply marked "CLASSIFIED," and that may where such papers are hidden.   

Also, there are some that I just plan to read for fun on my next research trip, such as, "1953: Creighton W. Abrams, 'Mobility and Firepower.'"

Anyway, this is just one of the gems up available at the U.S. Army Military History Institute in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The Army is mulling eliminating it, probably by putting it under the Army's Center of Military History. I think that is nuts. If anything, the Center of Military History should be made part of the Military History Institute, which has a broader mission, and connects the Army to the American public. Also, for researchers, Carlisle is a much cheaper place to go do a week of research than is the Washington, D.C. area. If you are researching on your own dime, and I think most military historians are, that matters.

purpleslog/Flickr

EXPLORE:HISTORY, MILITARY
 

TYRTAIOS

5:26 PM ET

April 29, 2011

Speaking of discovering holes

Speaking of discovering holes, and since this is TGIF, except for rifle squads in Afghanistan, a bit of trivia concerning the Battle of Kursk, a battle that involved about a 3:1 in manpower and 1-1/2:1 in armor favoring the Soviets (which the Germans were unaware of).

As the planning and preparations for Operation Zitadelle were begun by the Germans, much of what they were doing was observed almost to the smallest detail by Soviet air and ground reconnaissance, to include partisan operations in the German rear areas.

It would be at the Battle of Kursk that Russian commanders and their staff planners showed their grasp in the sophistication of all aspects of intelligence, deception, as well as the conduct of the attack, and defense (unfortunately, the Soviets would learn they still hadn’t figured a way to fix the problem of incurring appalling casualties).

One of the many highlights of the Battle of Kursk, and goes to the previous mention of deception by the Soviets, involved one last maneuver by the best and brightest, Field Marshall von Manstein, who launched an assault with XXXXVIII Panzer Corps along the Korosten to Kiev railway. Although initially successful, von Manstein had in actuality attacked what he thought to be four Soviet corps, but in reality turned out to be only a smaller deception force to mask the assembly of a more formidable Soviet force further to his south. This Soviet force then launched a surprise attack on von Mansteins’s degraded panzer corps and ripped a big hole (as in big ass gap) through it.

If von Manstein and other German field commanders hadn’t figured it out yet, the Battle of Kursk showed them they were now facing a very competent Red Army.

 

JPWREL

6:20 PM ET

April 29, 2011

TYRTAIOS above gives an

TYRTAIOS above gives an excellent review of Kursk with a soldier’s eye (excuse me a Marine’s eye). The Wehrmacht hadn’t ceased being tactically proficient but the Russians had gone to school over the past two years at the cost of unfathomable casualties and actually learned something. The German operational plan for Operation Zitadelle was severely handicapped by inadequate reconnaissance because the Luftwaffe had been badly damaged by Operation Blue/Stalingrad the previous summer compounded by the necessity of peeling away high quality units for the air defense of the Reich from USAAF and RAF bombing.

Consequently, offensive reconnaissance was very weak and incomplete and defensive preventive reconnaissance also weak having failed to control the airspace above the German assembly areas from the Red Air Forces own reconnaissance units. The very nature of Wehrmacht operational methodology and planning required intensive aerial reconnaissance and going forward until the end of the war the Luftwaffe was not in a position to provide it.

One continuing failure of the Red Army that would plague them until the end of the war was their inability to logistically sustain fighting units on the front line once their initial supply was exhausted. This was large because of a lack of logistical doctrine and transportation assets. Divisions even entire Fronts would be fought until exhausted; out of ammunition and fuel then whoever survived was rotated to the rear for rebuilding. A far cry from western logistical sustainment practices for front line formations. This meant that Soviet offensive would be terribly violent for a short period and then quickly tail off allowing more proficiently handled German forces to launch their famous counter-attacks with some measure of success.

An excellent source destruction and rebuilding of successive Soviet Army’s is covered in H. P. Willmott’s, ‘The Great Crusade’, John Erickson’s, ‘The Road to Berlin’, Max Hastings, ‘Armageddon’, and the new ‘Bloodlands – Europe Between Hitler and Stalin’, by Tim Snyder.

 

TYRTAIOS

6:48 PM ET

April 29, 2011

The myth of Prokhorovka?

The myth of Prokhorovka? Maybe not so much myth as the tactical key to success was always Prokhorovka, and I have a first hand account that says it was, as the fictional Sergeant Steiner says “Let me take you to where the Iron Crosses grow.“

More triva, but as the poster below points out, a good starting source to build upon: the German .88mm equipped Tigers were able to engage the Soviet 29th Tank Corps’ T-34s out further, and the Soviet commander once committed, launched a suicidal charge across opening rolling terrain to close the range, and in so doing, lost 400 of his 800 tanks alone (the mix of German self-propelled guns and tanks is counted, in recently released archives, as having been 320).

So, there probably were 1,200 tanks involved.

 

JPWREL

7:07 PM ET

April 29, 2011

Prokhorovka was more like a

Prokhorovka was more like a First World War battle but on tracks. Both sides made ferocious attacks and counter-attacks, suffered atrocious casualties and ended the battle essentially where they began it. However, the irreplaceable losses over stretched German front meaning that the strategic initiative would remain with the Red Army until it drove their tanks right up to the steps of the Chancellery in Berlin.

 

PHIL RIDDERHOF

5:33 PM ET

April 29, 2011

Military PME student papers

I have found student papers to be a great resource in looking at a veriety of topics. Even if i don't agree with, or am not impressed with specific writings, the authors have usually laid good groundwork in their bibliographies and footnotes for further research.
Both the Army Combined Arms Center at Leavenworth and the Marine Schools at Quantico have done good work in digitizing and placing on-line student papers. Not sure why the Army War College or Naval War College haven't (not sure about Air Force schools).

 

MAXWELLAWC

3:02 PM ET

April 30, 2011

Student research at Air University

While I am sure that Tom will be receiving the cream of the recent crop from John Sheldon, Air University has a number of data bases that they have tried to combine over the years. The main one today is "AURIMS" (the Air University Research Information Management System) at https://www.afresearch.org/skins/rims/home.aspx.

I find the idea of studying what our colonels have studied over the decades fascinating. Tom, if you control for service, MOS, year, future rank, and perhaps demographics, you could have a very interesting analysis -- and the basis for a good article in AF&S. I would also control for the annual topic list that each institution solicits from its service staff, the COCOMs, and elsewhere (maybe the faculty, maybe not, depending on which school) since at least for the past 7-10 years picking a topic from the list has been strongly encouraged if not necessarily required.

 

MAXWELLAWC

12:36 PM ET

May 3, 2011

New Parameters Cumulative Index

http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/ArticleIndex.cfm

This is new and covers 1971-2011. I just found some interesting articles and trends are easy to spot. This could be a nice comparison for the student papers -- what were line officers writing about, what did the editorial board of the Army's professional journal find interesting, and where are the overlaps & gaps.

 

HUNTER

6:48 PM ET

April 29, 2011

So how did you do this research, Tom?

Did you sort by type, era, topic? Do you have a comprehensive list?

I'd love to see it. The one thing critical thing I walked away with from my recent visit there was to start the paper early, like now, before you start.

I did a little searching and probably have a good choice for an adviser. I even did some searches (Mr. Ridderhoff I think much is online, but perhaps not open to the interwebs yet?), but I'd love to get ahold of your lists if you have them Tom.

 

TOM RICKS

6:55 PM ET

April 29, 2011

Got the list at USAMHI

I wept and begged.

I will try to e-mail it to you. Not sure it will go.

Best,
Tom

 

HUNTER

7:05 PM ET

April 29, 2011

Thanks Tom

Thanks Tom

 

HUNTER

7:14 PM ET

April 29, 2011

Works great, Thanks

Works great, Thanks

 

BEARCAT

7:36 PM ET

April 29, 2011

Speed Reader

When TR said: "I spent part of last weekend going over a list of 13,542 papers", I thought is sounded like a promotion board!?!?!? Then he broke out some of the stats.

We need some emoticons on here!! I usually keep the wink on all the time. We were busting on EricIII when his tongue was firmly in his cheek!?!?!?

 

PHIL RIDDERHOF

3:36 AM ET

April 30, 2011

research links

Here’s the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) at Ft Leavenworth where you can get US Army Command and Staff College, as well as School of Advanced Military Studies papers:

http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/contentdm/home.htm

Here’s the Marine Corps Gray Research Center Search page for USMC Amphibious Warfare School, Expeditionary Warfare School, Command and Staff College, School of Advanced Warfighting, and Marine Corps War College:

http://www.marines.mil/unit/tecom/mcu/grc/archives/Pages/default.aspx

(this is the archives page. Click the link for student papers)

Semper fi,
Phil

 

MAXWELLAWC

3:11 PM ET

April 30, 2011

Start Late, not Early

Starting a research project early is great but flawed advice. The most common topic is "that thing that ticked me off in my last job." That's a great way to start: you are interested in it, you have first hand knowledge, and you know what the answer is. Now you just need x,000 words on it!

But this approach leads to a dearth of strategic thought. Most War Colleges start off the year with a course on strategic thought. If the calendar permits, start after you've finished that course -- if you want to write on something that Tom Ricks (rather than your last boss) will find interesting.

 

HUNTER

10:55 AM ET

May 2, 2011

Thanks for the comment

Thanks for the comment. I've got a thesis, dissertation, and journal article under my belt at this point so I'm not overly worried about completing a requirement. More significantly, I might (I remain undecided) want to build on those previous efforts. Not necessarily because it will be easier (I admit it will) but because it is an area that I still genuinely want to better understand.

As for doing what pissed you off in your last job. E.g. My concern for suicidal soldiers as a Bn-level Cdr caused me to undertake a year long study (on my own time) which resulted in that journal article - and a lot of great conversation here. There's no shame in addressing an immediate need with which you are already familiar.

Also most research articles are based on the idea of "I wonder if..." or "What if..." and almost everyone starts with a preconceived notion of what the outcome will be (i.e. hypothesis). But no research effort I have ever done has ever come out as I expected/hoped it would. Fun and frustrating. But that's the journey.

I'll go in with eyes wide open, looking for new opportunities. But it always nice to have something in your back pocket. Thanks again.

 

TOM RICKS

8:12 PM ET

April 29, 2011

The heart of a book

Is good research. Lots of it.
Cheers,
Tom

 

GRANT

1:15 AM ET

April 30, 2011

It might be understandable

It might be understandable for soldiers to want to know what they're military did write or wrong but you apply this to American writing in general. We really don't write on politics or history/military history abroad to the same degree we do at home and even then we're still far more likely to write on Europe than any other continent/region.

 

HAL BARKER

6:00 PM ET

April 30, 2011

Korean War History Obstacles

Interesting point on Korean War history. CMH has a substantial series of After Action Reports and monographs, but no mandate to digitize these records. Same with Carlisle Barracks. Korean War records are scattered at many government locations. Researching the Korean War has formidable obstacles.

At the Korean War Project, we recently obtained a set of Marine Corps digital records in a proprietary format created in 1999 but almost unusable for research. We now have over 30,000 pages of those Marine records converted to PDF and will have them online next week. As part of this work, we discovered after the Marine Corps digitized the records, they sent the files to NARA. Through a bureaucratic error, the Marine records were reclassified and cannot be accessed by the public to this day, many years later.

Recently, DOD started a multi-million dollar research project to digitize Korean War Command Reports and Unit Histories. Over 100,000 pages of these records are digitized but have been declared off limits under FOIA under an arcane and unsupportable interpretation of the "Agency Records" case law. Many government agencies consider public records as private property, and use a FOIA denial to create a brick wall requiring a federal court battle to obtain simple public records available at NARA for a quarter a page.

On the good side, we recently obtained access to 30 boxes of Korean War Second Infantry Division records independently obtained in paper form by a veterans group. When these records are digitized, it will be the first time the most blooded Division from Korea will have records online for intense research free of charge.

Who would have thought DOD would deny access to digital Korean War records. This is one of the many reasons why Korea has often been called the Forgotten War.

Hal Barker
Founder - Korean War Veterans Memorial, Washington, D.C.
Korean War Project

 

CHRIS C.

2:55 AM ET

May 1, 2011

MDR vs. FOIA

Hal,

If you can specifically identify which classified document(s) you are looking for submit an MDR. Here's a helpful link:

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/foia/foia_guide/foia_guide_chapter4.pdf

 

GIANGENTILE

9:47 PM ET

April 30, 2011

your research

Tom said "the heart of a book is good research. Lots of it."

Well so much for your research on my squadron in your book The Gamble, which you made an about face from Fiasco, but still based on the same embed of the first week of February 2006.

I am still trying to figure that research switcheroo out.

gentile

 

TOM RICKS

10:08 PM ET

April 30, 2011

I did more research

New information emerged.

I spent a lot of time in Iraq in 2007 and 2008. Speaking of research, didn't see you there--yet you've held forth on that period. How is that?

Best,
Tom

 

GIANGENTILE

1:48 PM ET

May 2, 2011

what new evidence from 2006 do you have?

Are you serious Tom? Are you really pulling a "chickenhawk" card against me?

That is fantastic.

What new information came to you in 2007 about my unit's performance in 2006. Did you by chance do archival research in the files of MNF-I and looked at my unit's records and reports from 2006 that caused you to adjust your interpretation of my unit's performance? Be specific here and please answer my question with regard to new evidence of my unit in 2006. To be sure good historians do change their minds on things, but that is usually do to new primary evidence that has emerged. Again, what new evidence on my unit from 2006 did you acquire to change your assessment?

The bottom line Tom is that you cannot escape the fact that you had two very different conclusions about my unit but based on the same embed. In Fiasco we come out looking good--to be sure in the "gets it" crowd--but then in The Gamble we represent everything that was wrong with the pre surge army. I ask again what changed, at least based on different evidence of my unit that you had.

What really happened is this. You were with the Surge and felt to be part of the team at a time when i first started writing critically about coin and the Surge. My writings pissed you off and other members of the command, and I imagine you promised your friends when you were there that you would get back at me in your new book. Like I said you were part of the Surge team. And you did; problem though is that you used the performance of my unit (in which you twisted the facts) to get at the arguments that I was making. In this you were wrong to do. I would have been perfectly fine with you going after my arguments, taking them apart, whatever. But no, you used the performance of my unit by discrediting it to get at my arguments and this was wrong.

I am wondering when, if ever, you will correct for your mistakes.

gentile

 

HUNTER

3:52 PM ET

May 2, 2011

Juicy

Bing, bing, bing "Alex, What is the ancient art of Kanly?"

http://dune.wikia.com/wiki/Kanly

I make no comment on who is in the right here - I don't know - but I will be re-reading Fiasco and Gamble tonight to better understand the problem. May explain a certain amount of pungency in the conversation of the last few years though.

 

TOM RICKS

6:06 PM ET

May 2, 2011

Nah, not a chickenhawk allegation

I just don't think you know what you are talking about when you talk about Baghdad in 2008-08.

In early 2006, it looked like the tactics your units and others were using had changed. By late 2006 it was clear that they hadn't changed enough to make a difference. Baghdad was largely ethnically cleansed that year.

With regret,
Tom

 

MICHAELTURTON

11:59 PM ET

May 1, 2011

Thanks everyone

Very useful piece and comments.

Michael

 

TOM RICKS

6:07 PM ET

May 2, 2011

typo

in note above meant to type 2007-08
tom

 

Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.

Read More