Many leaders do not understand what their own goals are for the unit. Therefore, they almost always are unable to articulate clearly what actions their subordinates should take to accomplish the goal which they themselves cannot define. If a leader can do the first two, accountability, is not a high hurdle.

Back in the 70's, when I was a corporal, every Marine NCO had to buy the Handbook for Marine NCO's written by Col. Robert Debs Heinl.

Of course there was a chapter on Leadership and a discussion of the 11 principles and 14 traits.

Col. Heinl, as I recall, wrote somewhat wistfully (at least I saw it that way) that there had formerly been only one of each:

"Know your stuff."

"Be a man."

I still have the 1980 edition.

Walt

He really was a common man in his habits. When informed I'd be in charge of his retirement party at Fort Monroe, I asked him what he wanted, knowing his wife was very, very formal. He said he wanted a country-Western night. I engaged Carolina Charlie and the Heavy Cowboys, and it was a great success.

The strength and genius of the man was putting doctrine, training and acquisition under one umbrella. Without belaboring the point, the Army stopped acquiring interesting gadgets unless a requirement was identified and agreed upon, in support of doctrine. And nothing was acquired without detailed understanding of training required--who would do it, how much it would cost, and how to test skills.

He didn't like a beard I grew on a Canadian wilderness trip, but it wasn't as bad as when his dog treed my cat and my young son turned the hose on General DePuy. We never talked about that.

good advice to ROTC grads as it was written for. Good for Platoon Leaders, and even to a point Company Commanders. I would argue that command in combat requires a bit more as you get to the Division level and higher. Many times it is about persuasion of allies and partners (think Eisenhower) or getting other government agencies to buy off on your strategy. Ask someone who commanded MND-B, how to get the Iraqi ministries to do what you need them to do, and what that takes.
I would also add that leadership can also apply to the staffs, ask anyone leading an OPT, it requires peer level leadership, and demanding that other G or J codes do what you tell them does not cut it...the power of the best plan or idea is what gets it done.
Again, fine points by William DePuy, but I think this thread could get some great comments on command in combat, more than those three points.

the second half of the war from 68 to 72 was fought in the same way; there was no change to the operational framework. Just go to the archives and pick up a brigade's command post log from 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, and 72, and you will see what i mean. It never shifted from search and destroy.

gian

"there are only three steps to perform, easy to state and not difficult to accomplish."

These may indeed be easy to state, but I seriously question how "not difficult" they are "to accomplish."

Steps 2 and 3 are pretty easy to do, but there's that all-encompassing - not at all easy - step 1 hurdle to get over, now isn't there?

I'm reminded of the old joke about the special repairman who comes in to the factory to repair a critical piece of machinery. He looks at the machine and after five minutes pulls out some chalk and draw a big x on one component of the machine and says "replace that part and it will work again."

He draws up a bill and hands it off to the factory owner. The owner say "$10,000!!! You only looked at the machine for five minutes? I'm gonna need an itemized bill!"

The repairman takes the bill back scribbles a few more words on it and hands it back to the factory owner. The bill reads 1. Chalk to mark the X = $1.00 2. Knowing where to put the X = $9999.00.

Commanders can only provide the "First, a leader of troops in war must decide in each tactical situation, or, for that matter, each administrative situation, exactly what he wants to do with his unit..." if they've been properly trained, resourced, and provided appropriate guidance, and have an adequate amount of situational awareness and understanding.

Unfortunately in a war setting you almost never have that perfect alignment of planets. So something gives and "exactly what he wants to do with his unit" - if you get that far - might not match the tactical situation.

DePuy was a smart guy and I am betting that he offered a lot more context than this forlorn quote. As it stands this dismisses a very difficult task.

As for steps 2 and 3. G.S. Patton said it better "don't tell [your soldiers] how to do something, tell them what you want done and they will surprise you with their ingenuity." Insisting that they do things exactly as you told them to - as DePuy suggests - often does more harm than good.

"Second, he must tell his men precisely what it is he wants them to doand in most cases it is best to tell them in the language of the street, not the language of the field manual."

But Patton is endlessly criticized for this, including on this blog. In fact, the Army, in both the first Persian Gulf War and the Iraq War invasion, used Patton's philosophy of maneuver warfare to great effect. "Grab em by the nose and kick em in the pants" ring a bell? Sounds like Dupuy studied Patton.