This is an easy answer, there is a finite # of armed predators. Much smaller # of Ravens and Global Hawk. Every asset you put into Libya is something you pulled away from some place where we have troops engaged on ground. Americans will die because you took their eye in the sky away from them.

Tell me again how are we are injured if the French do something? I'm as Francophobic as the next "red blooded American" but I don't see it. Let the French excel.

Anderson acts like the French are bleeding to death (in Libya) like the were at Verdun or Dien Bien Phu. There is a difference between a stalmate and a battle of attrition.

I think this is likely to be more like the French in Mexico; Maximillian, Battle of Puebla, Camerone Day. Lots of glory to be had by all.

Anderson thinks that the French doing something stupid is supposed to goad America into doing something stupid? What was the REASON again?

That's been reported in the recent past, but needn't be true. The development, purchase and deployment of UAV systems are inherently less restrictive, potentially more responsive than manned aircraft inventories.

If the small number of UAV's being detached for Libyan ops must be removed from AfPak or other critical missions, then a few more foot dragging desk bound USAF generals need to be taken out and shot.

From what I'm reading, the Pakistanis are currently curtailing Predator/UAV strikes on their territory. Even with UAV flying stock being restricted by hidebound strategic AF practices, there should be some slack in available capacity.

But since Bearcat raises the specter of US soldiers bleeding out on Afghanistan's plains, what's being done about the growing rotary lift and CAS shortfall?

Drones in the sky over Libya to target pro-Kaddafi forces and possibly also in hopes of catching Kaddafi himself amongst them? That wouldn’t be regime change if we rained down death from above on Kaddafi, but more in line with Obama saying Kaddafi had to go. . .never saying the guy couldn’t go out with a bang.

However, how would we identify the crazy Colonel? The guy changes his headgear and uniforms as much as our own Army does. . .just an observation. . .nothing against the Army.

Incidentally, just as napalm was seen as rib-sticking good once upon a time, has anyone ever noticed the odd thing with drone strikes is that wedding parties are always on the target list? Probably only a coincidence, like cyclones going together with trailer parks, etc. My advice to all Libyan young people is put of your marriage plans off for awhile.

Incidentally, it appears the Obama administration has decided to pony-up more than just drones. The President's national security team has decided that anti-Kaddafi forces should get in on some logistics in the form of 25 million's worth of non-lethal aid for items like binoculars, radios, rolling stock, and medical supplies, etc.

I’m not sure providing anything that supports armed opposition can be categorized as non-lethal in the end, because if today’s good guys actually need binoculars, it will be one less item they have to spend their own money on allowing them to acquire something something they really want. . .wait-a-minute, I thought evolution over ions of time had developed zarkaa al-yamama in the traditional Bedouin Arab stock? That is to say, far-sightedness. . .what’s with binoculars anyway?

There is a piece of the geo-political picture that Anderson mentions, but didn’t delve into: the French classe moyenne, the middle class, are unhappy with the Muslim immigrant population, as well as illegal’s in general. Sarkozy is lagging behind in the polls, far behind Le Pen whose platform addresses the issue of immigration among other social issues.

The French and the Italians have had an understanding with Kaddafi that he would keep his thumb on N. African immigration, but has now threatened should he fall, Mediterranean Europe will be flooded with immagrants and refugees.

Sarkozy’s reelection could very well hinge on keeping not only Libyan immigrants on Libyan soil, but the remittance workers from Tunisia and Egypt that have been uprooted and now have no means of income. A stalemate of any length of time will only exacerbate the immigration to the shores of France, and Italy, and it is something in my view that Sarkozy cannot tolerate if he is to be reelected for a second term

In additional to what Anderson has laid-out, the French have battled Kaddafi before and probably have a good feel for his order of battle. Further, the French have airfield infrastructure that they have turned over to Chad, outside N’djamena, that might be made available to them. . .maybe. Additionally, Italy has acquired several modern Boeing aerial refueling tankers not too long ago, and surely would make them available to France should the need arise.

Keep in min le Francais are on a role militarily at the moment in the Cote d’Ivoire and have 1,700 troops that no longer have a mission now that they’ve removed Laurent Gbagbo, much to the delight of the U.S.

Having said the foregoing and knowing a bit more about current, and not so distant French intervention, in my view, Anderson's piece has merit and shouldn't be discounted out of hand.

Side bar comment: I agree with David Ignatius that using the Predator may be a bad idea for the very same reasons he's put forward.

I remember looking at the ISR charts for Sadr City in the spring of 2007. They were huge.

How could the ISR requirement for 47,000 Americans not in combat be the same as the ISR requirement for 150,000 troops in constant combat?

Best,
Tom

David Ignatius column makes prefect sense to me. His words, “My quick reaction, as a journalist who has chronicled the growing use of drones, is that this extension to the Libyan theater is a mistake. It brings a weapon that has become for many Muslims a symbol of the arrogance of U.S. power into a theater next door to the Egyptian and Tunisian revolutions, the most promising events in a generation. It projects American power in the most negative possible way.” are spot on and Gates must really feel under pressure to condone this unnecessary move.

Predators have become an all too easy ‘non-solution’ to messy problems that in the long run will be seen to have been counter-productive. The use of such machines in the eyes of Afghans and Pakistanis seems indiscriminate and that their lives seemingly have no value to the Americans. And that legacy of wanton killing often in error will live long after we have thrown in the towel and left.

These UAV’s also have certainly not changed the equation in Afghanistan or Pakistan where their use is rapidly undermining our influence in those countries. The Taliban don’t seem to be nearly as disrupted and demoralized as we bluster that they are and ISAF keeps advertising. This gleeful parading of Predator strikes reminds me very much of a time forty years ago when MACVN trumpeted meaningless ‘body counts’ as signs of victory which besides being largely fabricated merely further enraged the Vietnamese civil population. While the Predator has a unique military contribution to play in our arsenal it has become a panacea weapon of false hope in a bad war and will not save us from our own bad strategy.

President Obama made it clear that we employed limited force to establish a no fly zone to protect Libyan rebels from airstrikes. Mission accomplished.

So why deploy Predators Mr. Ricks? Are you suggesting that Obama is a liar, and that NATO's goal is the conquest of yet another oil rich Arab nation?

Egypt is the arab worlds center of gravity-the egyptian revolution needs to be americas primary focus of effort and resources especially diplomatic,mil to mil, NGO and intelligence. France and Britan can deal with Libya and the Magreb for now, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Council can work the Yemen,Bahrain problem- they are anyway despite any problems we may have with their tactics. Our military assets need to be focused on Afganistan and Pakistan where the Salafi active combat forces are homebased. Egypt however will determined whether their is a sea change in the arab worlds political world view and dynamic, lets not take our eye off the ball again!

Tom,
You bring up a good point that merits further discussion about the military establishment dragging their heels on the Libyan mission. I've noticed this assertion by you in at least one other post. Although those decisons take place stratospheres above my level, my take on it is that they (DOD, CIA,, etc..) are just trying to get it right. At least I hope that's the case. I don't think that I am naive. I have witnessed first hand the political intrigue (perhaps "political maneuvering" is a more appropriate term) that services can resort to in an effort to protect their interest. The Osprey, EFV, and JSF come to mind. I don't believe that this is the case in Libya though.
As you well know, poorly defined objectives lead to poorly planned and resourced campaigns which can lead to the sort of ambiguity that continues to haunt us in Afghanistan. The costs of ambiguity in military operations is usually some kid's blood. And yes, we have a ton of resources but we still can't afford to squander them feeling around in the dark for the right course of action. Especially when we are fighting multiple conflicts and still have to be prepared for anything else that might pop up (Haiti, Japan, N. Korea, etc....). Who would have anticpated Libya six months ago?
I've spent the better part of a year studying, through the lens of military history, when those connections between ends, ways, and means were clearly deliniated prior to a conflict beginning and when they were afterthoughts relative to when the shooting started. As you might imagine, the majority of conflicts (at least the ones that we studyat SAW) are of the latter variety and the costs associated with those are usually higher in terms of wasted lives and squandered political capital. At the risk of sounding like the newly converted, I am glad that someone in uniform is asking policy makers important questions about definitions, objectives, limitations and any other relevant items of importance to planning and executing military operations in support of national policy. I would much rather see that taking place at senior levels than see a succession of Yes men who dive in headfirst without really having a sense of what's under the surface because they are compelled to do so by a sense of duty. Obedience should be tempered with understanding, or least an attempt to do so. You are correct though that after all attempts have been made to understand intent, in the end it is obey or avoid the door hitting you in the rear on the way out.
That brings up a related topic whose details are probably better left for another post but.....I will say that the 26 field grade officers who are in school with me this year had varying takes on the article in JFQ earlier in the year about Officer dissent and the discussion that Richard Kohn's response generated on your blog. The majority opinion was that dissent in the form of resignation is not a viable alternative because someone else will just take up the cause before your seat gets cold. So you may just as well remain at the helm and try to mitigate bad policy as best as you can so that the effects on the average LCpl are as minimal as you can make them. I am still pondering whether this is just a well justified excuse for careerism or if there is genuine merit to this approach. I also wonder if an officer who decides to stay on in light of fundamental disagreements with the policy that he/she is being ordered to carry out can really carry it out to the best of their ability. I know in a perfect world profesionalism dictates that they do but I am also a realist and observe on a regular basis occasions where human nature heavily impacts an individual officer's concept of professionalism. The implimentation of DADT within the services comes to mind as the most recent, ongoing, example.
One final point. I do tend to believe that if you see voting with your feet as a non-viable option as a field grade then you probably haven't changed your mind much when you're wearing a star somewhere down the road. What would the political impact be of a Gen Petraus or a Gen Mattis resigning because of a disagreement over the disparity between what the military is being asked to do and the resources allocated to accomplish the mission?