I'm glad to see Ambassador Crocker chime in on this. He's right. The deal was the best deal at the time. The time may come for a different deal to be struck. Or the Iraqis can wait until things get worse, then ask for help. Either way, here are my Babylon BRAC Bingo card entries:

Victory/Liberty Base: 'Cause Baghdad is the center of the populous (see WWSD chapter of Tom's last book). Its got an airfield. Its fobbit friendly, for the poor souls stuck there instead of Afghanstan. Its Distinguished Visitor friendly. And finally, for as much as we put into it, we might as well get the most out of it.

Kirkuk: 'Cause the Kurds like us... sort of. If things go very badly, they will need our help. The Turkomen will also like having a somewhat honest broker around. We can also help the Kurds plink at their terrorist problems in Mosul and the north end of the triangle.

Al Asad or Ramadi: 'Cause the Sunni tolerate us and we'll need to give them a hand from time to time with their Al Qaeda problem. Not a big deal now, but some SOF guys, UAVs, and intel folks might disuade folks from coming back.

Nasiriyah: Cause the Shia don't like us. Basra would be better, but Maliki doesn't have the juice to alienate his political base by allowing us back in. Maliki does, however, need to remind the Sadrists who lost the Battle of Basra. Umm Qasar or Al Ammarah would work, but nobody wants us parked on the Iranian border or next to an oil terminal. Hillah might be a friendly neighboorhood, but just keeping the lights on somewhere in the south sends a message and we are kind of evenly upsetting everyone with our presence.

Those are my Bingo card selections. Don't forget, Tuesday is Kareoke night at the VFW.

Let's keep 50,000 American soldiers in Iraq forever, AND make sure they're based where they are most likely to get shot at, AND make sure every Iraqi political faction retains the flexibility to denounce the American presence in public while supporting it to American officials in private.

Strategic thinking at a high level, this is. The costs to the United States aren't part of it, which is OK since we have money to burn and always will. The exhausted American military so often discussed on this site is not really that exhausted, either. Plus, we're not talking about deploying people to a place where things could ever go wrong, and require them to engage in extended combat operations.

But most important is consistency. We do a lot of things in Pakistan at the behest of a government that can't acknowledge its involvement. Afghanistan too. This means we have to do the same in Iraq. Forever. Because to get along with all these people in that part of the world, we have to show that we respect their values, and the easiest way to do that is to accept their values. Ryan Crocker gets this, and it looks as if Tom Ricks does as well.

Tom - might want to consider Taji. Taji is centrally located (45 min north of Baghdad, 1.5 hours from Balad) and it's huge - more than enough room for tanks and brads (and associated support personnel), plus an aviation brigade. Last I heard, they were improving the runways to take large aircraft as well. Seems to meet your criteria. Oh, and Taji also has a pool, KFC, Pizza Hut and giant PX. And air-conditioned CHUs with complete w/internet! Who wouldn't want to stay there?

As for South, why not just stay in Kuwait? Rotate a (an? never could get that right) HBCT on the berm, tubes pointed north. Sounds good for Thunder Run v2.0

Tom:

I have nothing more to add or subtract from Ambassador Crocker's on-point comments.

Your issue is: Which bases?

Common practice for domestic base siting, and associated less than desirable uses, is to align the location with public support, and definitely not against substantive opposition.

Necessarily, a durable siting will never be achieved in the south, where domestic opposition would inevitably grow. The "Let's put a nuclear plant in Potomac, MD" crowd is a very small one indeed, and, similarly, a post-occupation siting in the south would be a continual lightning rod for local domestic opposition.

I completely understand US arguments for Liberty/Victory, but, when read from an Iraqi perspective, raises substantial threats of US dominion/interference in Iraq after December 2011.

Using the domestic siting rule, and the principle of staying small and unobtrusive, Balad is the logical choice of Speicher (already turned over) is not available. Centrality is great, surrounding communities (mostly Sunni) would focus on the economic benefits, and, while only a short jet hop from Baghdad, is out of sight/out of mind.

Balad, too, is very close to Taji, which will continue to be an important Iraqi base with which we would want strong relations.

The problem, however, with out of sight/out of mind is the continuing paradox. We can stay if we are small, but must go if we are too big or in your face. What, exactly, is our role and purpose post-December 2011?

Certainly, the US has an interest in some activity in Northern areas, but, Kurds, at present, are openly denouncing suggestions that they are undermining Iraqi sovereignty through base-siting negotiations with the US, and insisting that base siting is a national (Baghdad) issue.

Assuming some form of US non-military airport in this area, it is self-evident that it could be used as a staging for a US rapid deployment from Liberty or Balad, and that is the inherent problem for any national negotiations.

Having been mortared at all these locations, none is free from security issues, and any singular (or two) bases of a foreign country (us in Iraq) is problematic, especially under the already-limited SOFA relationship.

A lot of great US concepts and delusions came crashing down during the SOFA negotiations, and we do ourselves little benefit in arm-chair quarterbacking the result.

Amb. Crocker sweated blood to get what he could get from the SOFA deal. There is not a re-do scheduled, and, if there was, I believe the terms would erode further.

Just my two cents.

I should have included a facility in Kurdistan on my list, both as a way to keep adult supervision in place between the Arabs and the Kurds and to keep on eye on the most productive oil producing region in Iraq.

Southern Iraq is still Indian country, which requires a Fort Apache. The current bases down under are not isolated and thus far enough under the radar and defensible enough to fit our needs. Maybe work out of Kuwait and commute to next spring’s Shia uprisings?

Peter, wemeantwell.com

Iraq will and must sort out its issues without continued American military meddling and "s'mothering". The restored Republican Palace is a decent illustration for how GOI conducts its affairs, including what will happen when 2012 rolls around.

The Iraqis will insist that the Americans leave per the 2008 agreements. The Iraqis will struggle and neglect things and there might be violent flare ups. The Iraqis will seek assistance from any number of states or contractors for training and maintenance, with the contract going to the state or contractor that offers the best comissions to the facilitators.

I would also add that the easy BD speculation about basing options shows the almost total deficit of strategic thinking among American security pros and afficionados. Much easier to jump into problem-solving the proper basing footprint than it is to consider and debate the long-term effect of those bases and ongoing involvement.

Colin Powell used to say that the United States required only enough land to bury its dead. Now military commanders are noodling with ways to keep it all going a bit longer. I think BO gets it that the whole Iraq-thing just needs to be over. Please, please let the page be turned.

As usual, Mr. Ricks is out with the latest talking points right on time. Of course the gods of war want us to stay in Iraq. Is this a surprise? When this kind of stuff gets posted here, you can bet it is official. The question is, what kind of event will happen in Iraq to justify staying. Mr. Ricks might already know, but as one of the cool guys, he aint tellin. Maybe if one of his loyal followers asks nicely, he may throw us some crumbs.

As far as the gasoline bill goes, be thankful. Prices are really cheap. Besides, I'm sure the Pentagon would supply a credit card if asked for nicely.

For the record, I think any real US presence after 2011 is a bad idea. But, if pressed, by process of elimination I feel like Baghdad and Kurdistan are the only possible places you can leave any type of footprint.

Mosul is still extremely unstable and has more violence than anywhere else in the country, so Marez is out. But due to AQI's presence there, the US would probably want some sort of long-term influence. Kurdistan would provide this.

Baghdad (to include Balad or Taji) is obvious due to its central location and the huge infastructure we have built up there already. As previously stated, Balad/Taji is alot less intrustive, so who knows.

Nobody wants us in the South. I'm there now and its pretty much just a waiting game for us to get out before anything really starts kicking off. Tom's diagnosis may be a bit overly pessimistic, but let's just say things are definately not getting any better. Leaving guys here is just asking for bad things to happen, and I can tell you that we're not really doing all that much to counter any Iranian influence, the grand-strategic significance of which is probably overhyped anyway.

Again, any post-2011 presence aside from maybe some advisors/embassy security forces is too much in my book. Just my thoughts.

For the record, I think any real US presence after 2011 is a bad idea. But, if pressed, by process of elimination I feel like Baghdad and Kurdistan are the only possible places you can leave any type of footprint.

Mosul is still extremely unstable and has more violence than anywhere else in the country, so Marez is out. But due to AQI's presence there, the US would probably want some sort of long-term influence. Kurdistan would provide this.

Baghdad (to include Balad or Taji) is obvious due to its central location and the huge infastructure we have built up there already. As previously stated, Balad/Taji is alot less intrustive, so who knows.

Nobody wants us in the South. I'm there now and its pretty much just a waiting game for us to get out before anything really starts kicking off. Tom's diagnosis may be a bit overly pessimistic, but let's just say things are definately not getting any better. Leaving guys here is just asking for bad things to happen, and I can tell you that we're not really doing all that much to counter any Iranian influence, the grand-strategic significance of which is probably overhyped anyway.

Again, any post-2011 presence aside from maybe some advisors/embassy security forces is too much in my book. Just my thoughts.

I read this blog for entertainment. Mr. Ricks is assigned to dupe half wits who consider themselves informed -- that's his job -- just see who pays him at this corporate front PR unit..

So his sponsors back Obama, who won the election by promising that all US troops would be gone from Iraq a year ago, but extended that to this December. Meanwhile, Mr. Ricks pretends his blog followers are senile and wants to discuss which military bases should keep in our new colony, supposedly without any GIs.

The problem I see with staying in the south, be it Adder/Talil or anywhere else, is it invites a major potential political fight that we are then not operationally able to counter. The worst fight to pick is one you're not willing to commit enough resources to, to win. We're just setting ourselves up for failure. Besides the south is all longterm, political influence, which means State Department/PRTs, etc. If we really want to try to influence the south longterm, and/or counter Iranian influence, then possibly embassies in Najaf and Basrah would be the best plan (which I believe there has been public talk from the Iraqies about wanting that). SF and/or covert operations could then come in (likely from Kuwait into Basrah) if necessary with support from those areas without risking as much of a backlash, but the big issue is influencing the local political/economic factors which is primarily a State Department function. It also takes the "US occupier" meme out of the equation, at least in as flashy a way, that having troops will not counter, and allows Iran to be the primary "negative" external influence meme.

The question though, is what do we want to accomplish, and what are our longterm goals, and then does a troop presence help or hurt them? Having a troop presence in the north might help to be able to quell possible tensions between the Kurds/Sunni's, but I don't see that being applicable for the south.

Personally, the only SOFA plan with continuing US troops I could see Maliki agreeing to would be having US troops in the Kurdish region, which the Kurds would love to have anyway. It allows Maliki to effectively say that US troops are no longer in Iraq proper, while also making sure of US support longterm, and also to make sure that the Kurdish region does not actually secede, which they could not do with a US presence since we would not agree to it. VBC/Liberty is just too much still in the "occupier meme." Transfer all of the public face of VBC/Liberty to State, and then SOF/covert operations can still be carried out of there when necessary.