The program should be judged against other programs at the same age. How proficient were we in amphibious warfare in 1943? Tarawa went flawlessly, did it? From what I've seen, much of the criticism seems to boil down to - "It hasn't won the war yet, so it's a failure."

It's beginning to sound
Like boobs on the ground.

Oops.

The idea seemed pretty solid, but this sounds like growing pains. It is a little scary that after all this time, commanders don't see the value in guys who speak the language going out to talk to people (in civies, or maybe just wearing less body armor) especially in lower risk areas. Weren't there some books written about getting off the big bases and doing such things by the guys at the little think tank that could?

I've got a buddy in the program and he's enjoying it. I introduced him to an Afghan friend of mine and they chatted in Dari for a while. I was then shocked that he had never heard of Ahmad Rashid and hadn't ready any Afghan history before he finished his language course, so I gave him a prioritized reading list before he left.

He wasn't totally fluent in Dari in the 4 months he had at DLI, but he was light years ahead of most of the folks we sent to Iraq. And allowing an officer to get those 4 months away for training was tough. I think they are going the right way, but, like FETS and HTTs, it varies with the person, the area, and the commanders on the ground.

The problem is that many APHs get assigned to staff positions in Kabul or at RC HQs, when they are more useful at the local governance and development level. They need to be assigned to District Centers with USAID reps near forward units or associated with TF HQs that they can rely on for convoy support outside the wire. Why isn't this happening already? Because there is no CIV-MIL coordination in Afghanistan, or more precisely, there is no Central CIV-MIL coordination in Afghanistan because there is no CMOC at ISAF or IJC. So no one is optimizing military support for governance and development down to the district level, and instead APHs settle into the most convenient positions in Kabul staffs or ministries or PRTs, which function more as Provincial capital RTs, not RTs for whole provinces.

Current governance and development efforts are far too centralized. APHs are most useful for CIV-MIL governance and development activities. So consequently, their employment is far too centralized. This would not be a big problem if Afghanistan was an urbanized society, but it's not. 74% of the Afghan population lives in rural areas. Our governance and development efforts need to emphasize local governance development down to the village level, with a focus on the district centers.

The elephant in the room is security though. And there aren't enough troops to effectively secure all the municipalities and all the district centers, including the rural districts. So ISAF is forced to prioritize until security improves and the ANSF grow large enough to handle the municipalities. An ISAF CMOC would help optimize / prioritize, but for the meantime APHs need to be patient. As security conditions improve (if they improve) their roles should become more relevant.

shows we are making a good start in Afghanistan. 10 years from now ISAF leadership will hopefully be able to point to some solid progress in the battle against Taliban influence.

"Col. Jess Playitsafe isn't going to win the war by letting some of his people mix with the population, but he might hurt his career if one of them is killed or, even worse, kidnapped."

COL Playitsafe is probably less worried about his career than putting an entire regional command through the 90+ day spin-ex that stems from a DUSTWUN.

Any Soldier getting captured will completely unhinge operations for weeks, if not months, generate a ton of distracting operations, and invariably get a number of searchers killed. Nevermind the stuff that won't get done as all the ISR pools into one area trying to find a needle in a haystack.

Not a defense of AF-PAK Hands -- but it is tiresome to see all of the gratuitous shots at the military -- where genuine concerns are always painted as self-serving and career oriented.

The way to fix AF-Pak hands is to get them out of NTM-A and Camp Eggers and ISAF, and put them at the RC, BCT and below where they can actually interact with Afghans. They don't have to have an apartment in Kabul to do that.

I'm in the program, and undoubtedly I was in that group of 80 that Mr. Ricks cites at the opening of the article.

A couple problems that I see:

- They want the functionality of an Army Foreign Area Officer (FAO) without furnishing a similar level of training. A FAO goes through 6-18 months of language training (depends on the difficulty); about a year in the country of the target language using it in practical daily settings as well as political/military contexts; and then a year to 18 months in a graduate program focused on POL-MIL security issues of the region for which he/she is training to be an expert.

The Dari & Pashto courses at DLI in Monterey are probably about 12 months long. AfPak Hands are supposed to be in positions where they are advising Afghan government officials; yet they only get 4 months of language training. I'm glad that some AfPak Hands have made lemonade with the lemons that they have been given, but it's hard to call the program successful when you have a performance expectation that is incongruent with the baseline training you have provided.

- Dr. H raises an interesting point about moving APHs to district centers to do CIV-MIL work. It sounds like the ideal candidate for that type of work is someone with a civil affairs background. Unfortunately, there aren't enough of those to go around. In any case, I don't think the vision of the program was to have all or most APHs working at DCs, and putting a non-CA guy in a civ-mil job might not achieve the desired result.

Furthermore, when they pulled the first cohort into the program, it was pretty much a blank check in terms of what ranks and specialties they were able to bring on board. They selected mainly field-grade officers from across the services with a wide variety of skill sets and backgrounds. Unfortunately, they didn't match the talent that they had acquired with in-theater billets (irrespective of Dari or Pashto skills after the 4 months of training).

Had they started with a smaller, more focused group for a pilot program, they might have been better able to work out some of the kinks and mismatches that they are still experiencing.

- I think the broad range of skill sets acquired stems from the fact that they canvassed commanders in-theater about whether or not they would have any use for an AfPak Hand. Well, what commander is going to turn down an extra (and "free") worker who also happens to be a Dari or Pashto speaker? I would bet that a number of APHs in the "80" were victims of this sales pitch.

Lastly, if this program were the number one priority, why isn't it getting the resources and attention commensurate with a number one priority? It's not a weapons or vehicle program that requires a lengthy acquisition process. I think that conceptually the program is a great idea. However, the implementation (again, from my perspective) hasn't been so great. I still think people have a hard time articulating what it is an AfPak Hand is supposed to do. "Be able to talk to Afghans" and "build relationships" are not purposes or end states. They're just tools in the toolkit for accomplishing the mission. Because there hasn't been a sufficient articulation of the purpose of an AfPak Hand, their employment in-theater remains fuzzy.

Another group of "specialists..." I'm assigned to a staff in Kabul and I have to say that each time I meet another self-selecting group of specialists who tell me they're too important to do the work that 99% of the rest of us are doing, I wonder just what is it they do...

My opinion, we don't need APH -we just need common sense military officers and NCOs with a basic understanding of culture and the most basic language skills.

I don't need more "you wouldn't undertand - you're not an APH" Please!

"...we just need common sense military officers and NCOs with a basic understanding of culture and the most basic language skills"

This is what the APH program should be delivering. Nobody comes out of 4 months of language training with better than basic fluency - and they should have an understanding of culture. Thus far, as an APH, I have done the same as I would at any assignment - whatever needs to get done (including cleaning, furniture moving, and all the jobs that I have often had ranking officers "tell me they're too important to do.") There has been some mention above of the need for some butt-kicking - IMO, if an AH is refusing to assist in a necessary function then they need their butt kicked. There isn't anybody too good or too important in most offices, but there sure are people who think they are - I saw plenty of times in Baghdad that COs were able to fee up time for water-moving details but a few O-3s and 4s were "too busy" to assist. I think there are some people with the inclination to believe in their own "specialness" - it is unfortunate when participation in a program becomes a justification for that, in their own mind. But that doesn't make the program flawed.

It's sad that anyone believes that what the Chairman thinks about a personnel program is relevant. The fact that it draws on all services reflects its "jointness." But that's about it. If staff officers and commanders can basically ignore what General Petraeus orders, who gives a fig about what the Chairman in Washington wants?

Part of the problem with this program lies in these very comments. It's sad that a staff officer on one of the bloated, rank-heavy Kabul staffs is concerned about someone who might not be available to move desks. Why is an Afghan Hand even on such a staff? Someone's looking for an Afghan Hand endstate? Why would you place them under the command of someone who has no clue what their mission is? How can someone know the specific mission when it is Afghans who should define their roles by what they want to achieve?

Another person thinks that Civil Affairs trained officers and NCOs are better suited to the undefined job while our staff officer thinks that any officer or NCO could do the (undefined) job. Meanwhile, an AH (See Dr. K, I can baffle with acronyms too) assures us that he will type, move desks, or do whatever it takes to satisfy his peers whom he was not sent to support. I wonder who the rater is for these folks? That usually determines all.

And yes, I agree that it is more inconvenient to search for a kidnapped soldier than it is to put one in a body bag. Heck, can't you be creative and pretend that they were killed? I could go on, but it's embarrassing. Better to refight Tarawa.

Speaking about the Army only, it has been demonstrated that anything special is resented and, if possible, crippled. The other services only embraced special operations forces when they saw money in it (Marines excepted.)

If someone wanted to make an AH program work, they would adequately train them and assign them with or in special units. Those units could be advisory, training,AID, PRTs, SF detachments, Marines, or CA/Psyops units. There they would be embraced as an extra "hand" in a common endeavor. Of course, if they were poorly trained, they might be regarded as a liability.

The fact that these folks only receive 4 months language training is a testament to the actual commitment of the services to the program and the profound influence of the Chairman.

It's sad that anyone believes that what the Chairman thinks about a personnel program is relevant. The fact that it draws on all services reflects its "jointness." But that's about it. If staff officers and commanders can basically ignore what General Petraeus orders, who gives a fig about what the Chairman in Washington wants?

Part of the problem with this program lies in these very comments. It's sad that a staff officer on one of the bloated, rank-heavy Kabul staffs is concerned about someone who might not be available to move desks. Why is an Afghan Hand even on such a staff? Someone's looking for an Afghan Hand endstate? Why would you place them under the command of someone who has no clue what their mission is? How can someone know the specific mission when it is Afghans who should define their roles by what they want to achieve?

Another person thinks that Civil Affairs trained officers and NCOs are better suited to the undefined job while our staff officer thinks that any officer or NCO could do the (undefined) job. Meanwhile, an AH (See Dr. K, I can baffle with acronyms too) assures us that he will type, move desks, or do whatever it takes to satisfy his peers whom he was not sent to support. I wonder who the rater is for these folks? That usually determines all.

And yes, I agree that it is more inconvenient to search for a kidnapped soldier than it is to put one in a body bag. Heck, can't you be creative and pretend that they were killed? I could go on, but it's embarrassing. Better to refight Tarawa.

Speaking about the Army only, it has been demonstrated that anything special is resented and, if possible, crippled. The other services only embraced special operations forces when they saw money in it (Marines excepted.)

If someone wanted to make an AH program work, they would adequately train them and assign them with or in special units. Those units could be advisory, training,AID, PRTs, SF detachments, Marines, or CA/Psyops units. There they would be embraced as an extra "hand" in a common endeavor. Of course, if they were poorly trained, they might be regarded as a liability.

The fact that these folks only receive 4 months language training is a testament to the actual commitment of the services to the program and the profound influence of the Chairman.

I agree that four months of language training was relatively short, but it surely didn't feel that way being in class, TDY away from my family prior to a year long deployment. After the tour is complete, most of us have to pack up and move the family for an 18 month job of engaging in Afghan related issues in the greater DC area (weekly training and 3 more months of language training), and finally another tour in the same billet. (BTW most were unaware of the length of the program or deployment schedule when solicited by HRC to fill this high priority job)

Billets: the quote about not being a manning solution for deficiencies on the JMD.. yeah right. Some are doing plenty of Afpak awesomeness, but many are not.. simply doing staff jobs that could've been adequately filled with a WIAS tasker or filled by one of the bloated staffs at NTMA, IJC or ISAF. The layers of "authority" here astounds me. There are alot of people here who are charged with getting in business that they have no need to be in. RC-E, NTMA, RSC-E, IJC, CJTF..

I completely agree with idea of using us in the BCT, but DLI has mobile language trainers that go to the FORSCOM installations and teach Pashto and Dari, 16 weeks of language at home station w/o the APH designation. It is convenient, as someone mentioned above, to have an APH on the staff because we do have a special skill set that can be used to create atmosphere of trust and allegiance from a local populace (also the "free help" concept is totally embraced here)

APH's doing FET's or VSOPS is the ideal way to utilize our skills IMO. There is no need for us to work w/ the ANA/AUP/ABP because in theory they are already on the "team".

The comment about moving desks is a leadership issue or personality issue and is not indicative of any one of us feeling a special sense of entitlement... arrogance comes in all forms and MOS'... Self selecting.. huh? Most were voluntold about this program (I was not one of those Soldiers), not a single person that I have know in this program sees themself as any better or worse than any other person here supporting the mission. We have a skill set and wish for it to be used in the manner to which we were told it was going to be used. How would you like to go to 4 months of training that was very difficult, only to be assigned to a job that neglects the 4 months of hard work and training?

Khoda Hafez.. Hala, man boyad nana chost berawam batareke gushna astam.

GREGGD did not say "...Afghan Hands are primarily not volunteers" - he said there definitely are "voluntold" personnel. Speaking for my experience, I am a volunteer, as are a majority of the personnel I deployed with. There is considerable difference among the services on this - with AF, Navy and Marines seeming to rely entirely (or nearly so) on volunteers whereas the Army seems to have an over reliance on the "voluntold."

When I said I will do what needs to be done, I did not mean "assures us that he will type, move desks, or do whatever it takes to satisfy his peers whom he was not sent to support" - I actually meant what I said. I am sure that when he was in Vietnam RVN SF VET did not refuse to move ammunition or whatever else his SF unit needed done at the time because he was "too important." I don't care about impressing my peers (of which there is only one on the base I am at) nor the ranking officers and civilian here. I do care about supporting the mission and the people who are here executing the mission. I do what needs to get done because of personal integrity - and the fact that I find it safer to look in the mirror when I do shave.

INTELGAL makes a good point about area studies being overlooked - although I think a demonstrated ability to learn about other cultures may be almost as useful. Either way, we need more people who view Afghans neither as "Americans in funny clothes speaking 'foreign'" nor as "Incomprehensible foreigners who are probably all ripping us off and/or wanting to kill us." Neither approach is correct, nor are they helpful. The language training is good, but not a substitute (as others have remarked) for a conceptual understanding of Afghans and Afghan culture. Those are actually far harder to impart than a command of the language.

WAZEEFAHMAN NEYST calls it right when he says "...arrogance comes in all forms and MOS'.." That arrogance is what leads to an attitude of "My mission here is..." instead of "My part in the US and/or ISAF mission is...." When you remember you're part of a larger mission it is easier to realize that sometimes those "demeaning" jobs need to get done.

I do agree that the vast majority of Hands would be best employed at posts outside Kabul. Happily, I am currently waiting for transportation to such an assignment.

Khodah Hafez.

I am not going to defend the program. We all know that there are a boat load of programs, cells, agencies, whatever, etc, floating around Afghanistan right now. What makes this one different? At the moment, not much. As RVN SF VET said:

It's sad that anyone believes that what the Chairman thinks about a personnel program is relevant. ... If staff officers and commanders can basically ignore what General Petraeus orders, who gives a fig about what the Chairman in Washington wants?

This is the true issue. GFIs at high level are just that. If the commander actually wants something more than to articulate his/her good idea then command attention and influence need to remain with that idea. Fire and forget does not work well, especially when you're bucking the bureaucracy that has been building (here) for a decade. When your subordinates cannot or will not best employ the new tool you just brought to the fight then what good have you done?

Afghan Hands is no different, in essence, than many other programs that started in some staff meeting chaired by someone with stars on their collar. "Go do good stuff" is pretty crappy guidance, especially when whomever you are working for does not agree on the definition of "good" that you're working with.

Hala mulakat daram, ama barae ein mulakat zabon Dari zeorat nadaram. Bitchin'.

"about 15 have asked to extend their tours" Sshhh...don't tell the AME but I'm one of the 15 who extended and you know why? Because after wasting a year here in this program partnering with GIRoA at the strategic level, I finally worked myself into a real job that actually will have a strategic affect....and it's got nothing at all to do with the APH program or 'partnering' with a host-nation who doesn't want any more partnering. I've said it before and I'll say it again: no amount of cultural sensitivity, tourist-level language ability, headscarves, or 'seeing things through Afghan eyes' will make any damn bit of difference now. GIRoA doesn't care about any of that anyway and they never did.

The APH program would have made sense in 2003 with 2000 of us versus 2011 with 200 of us. Now, there's no time, no commitment, and still no strategy (either in this program or the larger war effort, but that's another story). Again, it's just another example of 'throw $$ and people at a problem and maybe it will help.' As it is now, well over a year into the program and with the local commands still largely unsure on why we're here, what we can do, and what effects we can help to achieve for them, the clock is ticking and the end of 2014 is just around the corner. We know we're leaving, the Afghans do as well, and the only game in town now is figuring out Transition and hoping for a decent interval.

some smart and articulate folks. Only 200? So the first problem is employment and the second is training. For some perspective, here is something I've copied from a random website of an Army Vietnam veteran"

"Preparation for Vietnam included MATA Sector/Unit training at Ft. Bragg, NC, then “School of the Americas” in Panama, after which I went to Ft Bliss for Vietnamese language training and then Vietnam. "

I don't remember the exact meaning of the acronym, but MATA was the course for military assistance advisors deploying to RVN. Perhaps because Vietnam began as an advisory mission, extensive training was an early premise of the program. Especially in the early years, getting to RVN as an advisor was a sought after, prestigious assignment. Your 201 was reviewed by Westmoreland for his approval prior to assignment. Kinda different now. In 1965, there were around 15,200 Army personnel in-country (prior to the arrival of US and allied combat units) of whom, around 2100 were unit advisors in the field.

It seems that there is such a stigma to the Vietnam experience that we eschew even the worthwhile things that worked. I admire the fact that the USMC continues to place small numbers of courageous officers and NCOs down at the small unit level in the ANA.

We have clearly lost our way and the AH (screw Pakistan) Program gives us insight into how we can waste some of our best in thankless assignments. I admire the tenacity of the AH contributors here who are trying to make the best out of a poorly articulated and implemented program.

Khodah Hafez
[I was able to confirm that this is not the name of the lovely woman on NBC TV in the morning.]

I am also being told now that a surprising number of people in the program are not very good--either sluggards or James Bond-wannabes. Plus some very good officers.

I have no idea if this is accurate, but if we are assessing the program, we also should get a sense of who is in it.

Best,
Tom

After reading the feedback from the folks actually in the field on this program, I'm even more pessimistic about the Big Army's ability ever to do "hearts and minds" stuff. The high-level intent and guidance just aren't being accepted by a significant proportion of the troops on the ground, ranging from those commanders who have their own ideas about the proper strategy, to the NCO and junior officers who ignore McChrystal's guidelines on use of air power, right down to the grunt whose idea of war is the simplistic "just kill the gooks." Maybe the only troops we have who can "nation-build" anywhere are the SF and CA people who are trained for that dedicated mission, but there aren't enough of them. Maybe the US is just not cut out for the long, limited, slow-bleed war; we can only succeed in an all-out, all-hands affair like WW2.

Tom, only you can judge your sources. I don't credit the characterizations. Is a sluggard an AH who wants to associate with Afghans and not move desks? Is a James Bond type one who wants to adopt some articles of local clothing? If you don't understand the nebulous mission, how do you judge people tasked to perform that mission?

There are only 200 of these folks currently deployed. We've been lucky to get feedback from 5 plus your guest, Air Force Lt. Col. Cheryl Garner. For a pick-up game, that's pretty good. Each one of these folks appears to be intelligent and committed to doing a good job - with the tools and circumstances provided. That's what we are supposed to do in the Armed Forces.

There certainly could be a dud or a very unhappy voluntold out there, but I suspect that the folks providing the pushback are the problem. Sadly, I suspect that it does not matter owing to the past civilian mismanagement of the war (Bush era) in cooperation with the early conventional commanders who have made it impossible to succeed in a time-frame acceptable to the American people. Our hope for extraction lies in the on and off negotiations between nutso Karzai and the Taliban. As another person has pointed-out, the time for AH was immediately after the success of the Northern Alliance when the nascent leaders of a new Afghanistan were emerging. We do not remember context nor do we learn. In the future, any idea associated with Afghanistan will be anathema to future planners.

Our principal task remains unaddressed. We still need to wipe out al-Qa'ida hiding in Pakistan by any means necessary. And we need to kill those harboring them. Then, on to other cells, wherever they are without regard for national sovereignty.

either did the Ruskie Suvorov: "large staffs - small victories"

all the above comments make it seem obvious that a bloated staff fighting a war with no clear objective is a recipe for ineffectiveness..

I think the HANDS program is a noble effort to bring some continuity to the Afg war, but I predict its potential impact will be snuffed out due to massive staffs and a U.S. govt that doesn't even know what victory will look like.

As I read the comments and also listen to what's going on where, it starts to look to me like the problem may be that too many Hands are senior officers that have to either be assigned to a Staff in Kabul or be in charge somewhere. Neither is conducive to interacting with Afghans (as a general a rule - a few Kabul jobs and PRT CO positions may be exceptions). It does seem that CA/SOIC personnel are spending at least half their time interacting with Afghans (except where the Hand has learned a language inappropriate for the assignment - another issue, and it is being worked).

I do think that strong consideration should be given to recruiting (and vetting) volunteers from the Reserve components of all the services. In most cases, Reserve personnel are older and with far broader experience than their Active component equal-rank counterparts. Greater age alone will be a benefit in dealing with Afghans - adding even moderate language and cultural knowledge is likely to make some real connections.

Recruiters and screeners do need to have clear guidance on the academic, practical and military experience/skills needed and also some idea of personality traits that are likely to be helpful.

Far broader experience... What? We AD component dudes/dudettes PCS every 3-4 years to places all of over the globe and have different styles leadership thrust upon us every 1-2 years... This does not happen at near the same frequency as the Guard/Reserve components..
Now, if you meant that a person is a Lawyer by day, but a Signal officer on drill.. yes that is much more diverse but has nothing to do with expanding a person's cultural awareness which is imperative for any Officer or NCO to be successful here in AFG (AH or not)

Age thing, maybe.. but the focus IMO shouldn't be on the old but the up and coming 20 and 30 somethings who are the future.. Yes we must interact w/ the older people because of the Afghan culture..

I don't care where they draw the APH population from as long as the individual cares and tries their best to learn and advance their skills.

Also, to be clear, I am in no way shape or form intending to denigrate the RC/NG personnel serving. I disagree with the notion that a RC/NG person is better suited for this job.. it boils down to a personals will and inititave not component.

[ADAPTED FROM ONE SERVICE'S MESSAGE.]

I do not see a clear mission or concept in here:

1. BACKGROUND. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (CJCS) HAS DIRECTED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE APH PROGRAM. THE APH PROGRAM SUPPORTS OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) KEY JOINT MANNING REQUIREMENTS. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE APH PROGRAM IS TO IDENTIFY, SELECT, TRAIN, AND MANAGE A COHORT OF EXPERTS TO BRING GREATER UNITY AND COHESION TO THE FIGHT IN AFGHANISTAN. AFPAK HANDS WILL BE PLACED IN POSITIONS OF STRATEGIC INFLUENCE TO ENSURE PROGRESS TOWARDS ACHIEVING U.S. GOVERNMENT OBJECTIVES IN THE AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN REGION. THE END-STATE IS A PROGRAM THAT WILL SUPPORT CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF THE STRATEGY WHILE PRESERVING THE MEMBER'S CAREER PROGRESSION. USCENTCOM AND USFOR-A ARE IN THE PROCESS OF IDENTIFYING APH POSITIONS WITH THE GOAL OF ESTABLISHING A DEDICATED COHORT OF APPROXIMATELY 600 MEMBERS -- OFFICER, SENIOR ENLISTED, AND CIVILIANS FROM ALL SERVICES. AFPAK HANDS WILL BE DRAWN FROM A MIX OF MOS'S AND PAY GRADES, AND WILL BE SPECIALLY SELECTED TO CAPITALIZE ON, OR FURTHER DEVELOP, PROFICIENCIES IN COUNTER-INSURGENCY (COIN) DOCTRINE, REGIONAL LANGUAGES, AND CULTURE. EACH HAND WILL HAVE A MATCHED COUNTERPART, AND WILL ROTATE BETWEEN A CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES (CONUS) HOME BASE AND POSITIONS IN THEATER THAT DIRECTLY INFLUENCE U.S. GOVERNMENT STRATEGY IN THE REGION. THE PROGRAM IS DESIGNED SO PERSONNEL WILL BE IN DIRECT SUPPORT OF JOINT REQUIREMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN. DEPLOYED TOUR LENGTH IS 12 MONTHS BOOTS-ON-GROUND POST APH TRAINING.
2. SITUATION. CJSC HAS DIRECTED THE IMPLEMENTATION OF APH TO BEGIN IN TWO PHASES. THE FIRST IS COMMENCING 19 OCT 2009 AND HAS ALREADY BEEN SOURCED. THE SECOND INCREMENT IS TO COMMENCE 2 NOVEMBER AND WILL BE TASKED ACCORDINGLY. THE IMMEDIACY OF THE REQUIREMENT TO SELECT PERSONNEL FOR PHASE TWO WILL RESULT IN UTILIZING OF NON-STANDARD TASKINGS TO COMMANDS PRIMARILY IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION (NCR).
3. MISSION. NO LATER THAN 13 OCTOBER SERVICES WILL IDENTIFY AND SOURCE OFFICERS FOR ASSIGNMENT TO LANGUAGE TRAINING TO COMMENCE 2 NOVEMBER IN SUPPORT OF THE APH INITIATIVE.
4. EXECUTION. SERVICES WILL IDENTIFY PERSONNEL TO BE IMMEDIATELY REASSIGNED TO THE APH PROGRAM. AS THE PROGRAM CONTINUES TO DEVELOP, ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND MODIFICATIONS WILL BE PROVIDED. SELECTED COMMANDS IN MOST CASES WILL ALREADY HAVE OVERSTAFFED PERSONNEL, CURRENT MOVERS, OR BE BACKFILLED DURING THE SUMMER OF 2010.

That's who is supposed to have oversight on the program. And while it's not the primary task of either of those two GOs, it's still in their portfolio and they are responsible for it. As was observed at the beginning and in a number of times in the comments: if this were really the number one priority, I would think these GOs would have "fixing APH" as the first item on the their to-do lists.

To add support to Staff Guy's discourse, Army HRC simply matched vaguely suitable personnel to vacant slots in the program. It gets worse in-country when someone who has no idea what your career specialty entails puts you in a slot that some other ill-informed person decided was suitable for your MOS. Example: I have seen a couple of billets on the books for Army Middle East/North Africa FAOs. Why on Earth would someone think that a job in Afghanistan would be best filled by a ME/NA expert?

Because most APHs are field-grade officers, many of them have niche specialties and skill sets that could be effectively employed in-theater if they were given the right job. Unfortunately, the number of people managing the program in Kabul aren't numerous or knowledgable enough to know what that effective employment might be.