Tuesday, April 5, 2011 - 6:59 AM

Best Defense comment of the day comes from "Ironcapt" and should be filed under "dunno whether to laugh or cry":
I'll admit, at first, I shared Exum's concerns about the Boys from Benghazi being a little too close to the radical Islamist camp, with their track record of sending suicide bombers to Iraq. I think I may have overreacted. If these guys were hard core AQ types, they'd probably be winning more battles.
I wouldn’t be too hasty to make any pronouncements, satirical or otherwise, as to what al-Qa-idah in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is or isn’t up to, along with their proficiency at fighting head-to-head, as opposed to conducting prep-planned terrorist operations.
AQIM may very well be recruiting and acquiring weapons for future operations against what they suspect will eventually be a larger French and American foot print in Libya, or at the least, a destabilized country to operate out of.
Al-Qaeda may be very good at stirring up trouble, but they do not excel in any way in conventional warfare in the open desert. This is explicitly why they resort to such tactics as terrorism and irregular warfare in the mountains. I'm not agreeing or disagreeing about the influence such militant Islamist groups might have in the Libyan opposition, I haven't really paid much attention to the subject and so have no opinion. But saying that such groups aren't active in the rebel fighting force because they haven't been able to stand up to Ghadafi's tanks and artillery is poor reasoning.
But isn't that IronCapt's point? That al Qaeda is at least smart enough to know they're not good at conventional warfare in the open desert, so they seek other tactics better suited to their strengths? Whereas the Libyan rebels clearly are *not* smart enough to know (or have not learned the hard way enough yet) that taking on armor head-on in open country is a bad idea for guerrilla/insurgent groups?
Perhaps, that's not the impression I got from the statement however. The use of the word 'battle' makes me think IronCapt was talking along the lines of conventional warfare. Besides, it's still far too early to tell, AQ likes to think in terms of long term strategy, they're in it for the long haul as TYRTAIOS mentioned. I think we don't know much and just have to accept that fact for the time being; hopefully the spooks running around Libya now are getting a better handle on the overall picture.
Al-Qaeda may be very good at stirring up trouble, but they do not excel in any way in conventional warfare in the open desert. This is explicitly why they resort to such tactics as terrorism and irregular warfare in the mountains. I'm not agreeing or disagreeing about the influence such militant Islamist groups might have in the Libyan opposition, I haven't really paid much attention to the subject and so have no opinion. But saying that such groups aren't active in the rebel fighting force because they haven't been able to stand up to Ghadafi's tanks and artillery is poor reasoning.
Makes for a good soundbite, but...
Insurgencies seldom enjoy tactical success on the battlefield. I don't know how prevalent AGIM is in Eastern Libya, but I do know flip comments about their lack of tactical expertise in a conventional battlespace don't really mean a whole lot to an overall insurgent strategy. Muslim extremists like AQ or the Islamic Brotherhood have always been strongest as leverage organizations; inciting others to do their dirtywork while they wait for an opportunity to exploit a shaky situation.
This post should be filed under "Whistling past the graveyard."
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