Nothing really jumped out at me from Company Command 's 2008 selections, so now in our continuing celebration of this great website we go directly to my favorite for 2009, on why making a goal of bringing all your people home alive from a combat deployment is probably not a good idea:

It just seems to me that the 'zero-KIA philosophy' leads to apparent tactical successes that collectively can add up to a strategic failure. We all hope not to suffer casualties, yes, but a command emphasis on averting casualties seems misguided and, frankly, unattainable. - Erik Archer, 127th MP Co.

cc.army.mil

EXPLORE:MILITARY
 

ZATHRAS

11:08 AM ET

April 4, 2011

Quite a Dilemma

Doesn't this illustrate the central dilemma of counterinsurgency?

If you have a unit deployed for seven to fifteen months on behalf of a war effort designed to succeed (if it ever does) over a time frame many times that, that unit's command down to the platoon level is going to have an overpowering incentive to avoid casualties. Whether that incentive is consistent with counterinsurgency doctrine seems scarcely relevant to me; if you're going to ask someone to risk their lives and those of their soldiers, the reason has to be a little more accessible than "to increase acceptance of local government, if it ever shows up, and resistance to terrorism, as long as American troops are around, until Afghanistan can stand on its own at some indefinite future date."

I'm not saying it's impossible to get any unit to shed its determination to limit casualties on behalf of interim counterinsurgency objectives, or even that it's impossible to get many units to do this. Counterinsurgency depends for success on nearly all of our Army and Marine units doing this. Now, is it realistic to expect a force badly stressed after many years of combat deployments to conform to what the new doctrine requires, or not?

To be clearer than the truth, the point is not whether Erik Archer's view is correct in the abstract or even whether it would have been the right basis for command beginning in 2001 (in Afghanistan) or 2003 (in Iraq). It is rather whether we are wise to rest the entire Afghan war effort on the expectation Archer's view can be adopted by all Army, Marine and NATO units in Afghanistan today.

 

HUNTER

11:50 AM ET

April 4, 2011

Doesn't have anything to do with COIN

This problem exists in every possible military action, although it may be even more defined in the COIN environment.

The bottom line is and ever SHOULD be "Mission First, Soldier Always."

Feb 6, 1996 when I was guiding my mortar tracks into position on Checkpoint B1 on the Bosna river in Bosnia Herzegovina I marched through virgin snow - in a mine infested region. It wasn't particularly smart and it wasn't what I really wanted to be doing, but then POTUS Clinton said I needed to be there, so that's what I did. (BTW, Bosnia was a hella no casualties/zero defect environment for those in charge, but where the ruibber met the road we just did our jobs).

Long ago I remember (now retired) BG Jim Anderson tell the story of how he relieved a company commander for not following his guidance to go back onto that hilltop, which the NVA drove them off of, to retrieve their dead. I don't know which POTUS was in charge then, but it was clear what mission had to be done that day.

This is a timeless problem. But if a commander can't handle this dichotomy, then they best not be in command.

Back to Zathras point, there's a section in Petraeus' COIN manual on assuming risk, and how sometimes you need to risk more to be safer. It's good for COIN, but true of almost everything. L'audace, l'audace, toujours l'audace.

 

HUNTER

12:06 PM ET

April 4, 2011

Damn, just remembered...

... in Bosnia was our first taste of what we called "Force Protection above all things." You know what protects the force? not deploying them...or deploying them only when the cause is truly required and just.

Indeed, way back then in the Bosnia was when that dumb old bird Madeline Albright reportedly asked CJCS Powell...."what good is that wonderful military of ours if we never use it?[paraphrased]" That was a stupid statement back then, but it remains relevant.

Our military exists to kill things and break shit. Dennis Hopper in Speed says "a bomb wants to explode, otherwise it isn't a bomb."

If you can't go into a fight and recognize the possibility of casualties exists and be ready to accept that then you best just stay home.

I think every soldier we have lost is a personal and family tragedy but it bears remembering that in this entire clusterf^&k of a war(s) we still have lost only 7152 coalition soldiers. That's about the same as the number killed at Gettysburg in 3 days of fighting.

Again we can talk about the importance of the national strategy and our objectives or endstate. But eventually it comes time to pick up a gun and take action. If we can't afford a busted lip we best not start the swinging.

 

JPWREL

12:52 PM ET

April 4, 2011

I always take seriously

I always take seriously HUNTER’s thoughts on matters such as this. He has been there and has led his men in harms way and no amount of armchair reflection can match that experience. My only addition to his thoughtful comment is that the nature of the mission dictates the publics and thus the military’s acceptable parameters of risk. In some of our conflicts the imperative was so great and the mission perceived as so critical that losses were deemed acceptable even if equally regretted.

We did not engage the IJN at Midway with a view that force protection was the priority but rather with a determination to destroy the enemy foremost in our minds. Invading the lower Solomon’s on a shoestring was a very high-risk affair where heavy losses were expected and realized. However, we did these things because we believed in the imperative of what we were doing and that no matter how tragic those losses might be that victory was vital enough for us to accept such risks.

Vietnam, Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan are conflicts where we as Americans might like to succeed but remain unconvinced that these wars were and are critical to our vital interests and thus not worth much risk. The public and the military to a large extent see these wars as dubious adventures disconnected from their lives unless they have a son or father in the armed forces. The real question is, why shouldn’t the American public insist on ‘force protection’ when our public officials themselves think these wars so unimportant that they refuse to ask the American public for even a marginal sacrifice and to pay for them?

So yes, force protection has invaded our military culture in the way we conduct operations but for very understandable reasons. The public, the political class and the military in their hearts and minds remain unconvinced that the wars we are currently involved in are worth very much risk to life and limb. That attitude seems to me an eminently logical regardless of the posturing of those remaining war enthusiasts still beating their drums.

 

GOLD STAR FATHER

2:28 PM ET

April 4, 2011

Jaded

Even given my moniker, I hope that I am capable of objective comment on this subject. However, I do have subjective views stemming from my own uniformed experiences.
Hunter's body count analysis of the current "clusterf*$K wars" (appropriate description, I might add) vis-a-vis Gettysburg losses I believe is immaterial to this discussion. The fact that we "have only" X amount of modern losses to the recent escapades just doesn't matter in the current discussion of personnel loss acceptance and doctrine and how that doctrine evolved more as political protection than desired policy.
The nature of war, specifically offensive action has gravitated toward protection of the individual soldier. JWPREL rightly states that pressures from citizenry and the troops themselves (PFC Joe up through the mid ranks) demand more and better fighting and preservation equipment. I'm not so sure that this stems from empathy or contractual commerce with the Federal government. However, JWPREL states the "political class" demands this. Cynic Me thinks "not-so-much". I believe Madame Albright's famous quote says so much more regarding use of troops as if they were equipment and callous disregard for the use of troops in the higher emphasis of war as a means of a desired political end.
Troops are expensive. The military desires to retain personnel and get their money's worth. But the political class seemingly is not burdened by cost concerns. Troops are replaceable and merely the subject of cost analysis. The Fed keeps printing money and borrowing for spending daily. The political types concern themselves more with political outcomes vice personnel protection. However crazy was Rumsfled's retort: "You fight with the Army you have...", it was emblematic of really how little concern is given to Private Smuckatelli. The biggest offenders of the yellow magnetic ribbon mentality is the Federal government.
It is the individual military unit commanders that are pressured by the casualty doctrine (they love their troops) not the political class whose concern with casualties may only be in regard to re-election cycle survivability.

 

JPWREL

3:06 PM ET

April 4, 2011

GSF rings true

GSF, you make a smart distinction that I should have but failed to. I agree with your view that the political class pretty much views the use of their constituents sons and fathers serving in the ranks with a frame of reference based on their own political preservation not that of your son or mine. If they find their ability to raise both votes and campaign funds is impinged by being on the wrong side of an issue then they of course being the ‘leaders’ that they are they must rush to get in front of public opinion. However, at least elected officials have to demonstrate some sensitivity to the wishes of their voters and even more importantly their donors.

It is the non-elected and appointed officials of Washington that look at our men and women in arms as just another vehicle in the motor pool. Madeline Albright is only a more recent example of that part of Washington who being disconnected from the military thinks of it as a useful hammer to rescue their own policy initiatives. They have only one constituent and that is the President, and if he is confused and disorientated (often the case) then woe befall the cannon fodder.

 

HUNTER

4:16 PM ET

April 4, 2011

GSF

Your response was the one I worried about when I posted that last comment. My point is not to dismiss those casualties.

My point is that we the warfighters don't make the decision to go, we just do what we must. Patton said "I am an American soldier, I fight where I am told and I win where I fight." He also famously said he didn't vote as he deemed it a conflict of interest.

Our politicians don't do a good enough job of determining that grim calculus ahead of time as they move their pawns about. But my point in bringing up that grim number (current as today via icasualties.com) is that if we aren't willing to recognize that soldiers may die, and many of them at that, then we ought not be committing to the action. Thus my comment about split lips and coming out swinging.

Back on topic, all these matters should be transparent to the commander on the ground. His/her job is to complete the mission. By proxy you can't complete the mission by recklessly getting your soldiers killed, but you also can't do so if you are so risk averse as to accomplish nothing but drawing combat pay for a year by sitting on the FOB. Ultimately you do injustice to those who preceded you and those who will succeed you...and by failing in your mission, you also just bought yourself a return ticket to do it again in another year or two.

I, infamously, told my soldiers just that in the days before we got on the plane. I said something to the effect of.... "My goal is not to bring you all home alive, my goal is to accomplish the mission..[there was more in here]..If my goal was to bring you all home alive, then there would be no point in going, because I assure you you would be safer in Fort Living Room, watching the game and drinking a beer. I WANT to bring you all safely home, but that is not the goal. If we accomplish our mission there's a chance you won't have to go back again, or your kids won't have to go back again."

Never have harder or more important words left my mouth (I weighed those words for days before I gave that speech), but I had more than a few soldiers tell me they appreciated that I wasn't blowing smoke up their ass. I'm sure just as many cursed me under their breath.

 

ZATHRAS

11:54 PM ET

April 4, 2011

Guys, I appreciate the responses

Truly. They all, to greater or lesser degree, miss the point.

This subject has everything to do with counterinsurgency, because counterinsurgency is the war we're fighting now. Midway, Vietnam, Bosnia, the Spartans and the Battle of Wolf 359 don't enter into it at all. We can all grit our teeth and square our shoulders to inspirational words about doing the mission, but what we're asking company and platoon commanders in Afghanistan, in units with guys on their third and fourth deployments, to do is to be less risk-averse on behalf of a mission they can't define in under three paragraphs.

That, of course, is leaving completely to one side the question of whether that part of the mission involving standing up an Afghan government is likely to be successful even if every last American soldier and Marine in the country does everything right.

If the general sentiment here is that it is realistic to expect the American and NATO units deployed in Afghanistan now to conform to Erik Archer's wisdom across the board, that seems to imply a common sentiment as to how likely it is that Gen. Petraeus' campaign plan will be successful. I am doubtful, frankly. I was doubtful about this two years ago and am more so now. A tired army in its tenth year of the same war is going to be full of troops and officers whose eagerness to risk their lives for a cause they don't understand will be low. Again, the question: what does this tell us about Gen. Petraeus' chances for success in Afghanistan?

 

HUNTER

6:34 AM ET

April 5, 2011

Tired army

The military is indeed tired, but it is also composed completely of volunteers. And in ten years everyone of them has had one if not two or more opportunities to leave of their own accord. No one goes into the Guard thinking "Oh I'd like some college money, hope I won't get deployed" anymore. (That's a good thing)

Now we can spend lots of time talking about de facto drafts, and the economy and poor kids who ain't got better choices....but I just don't buy that. There's still a million choices better than surrendering your freedom and going off to fight an increasingly unpopular set of wars. These kids, God bless them, are doing it for some reason.

And its a bit of a fallacy about having to know the big picture...it certainly helps...but I've found if you can get Joe to commit his battalion mission statement to memory you're doing pretty damn good. (Good luck with that BTW). They care that they are helping town x in Douchebagistan, they care that their buddies are relying on them, they care that Bush or Obama signed them on for another hitch in a godforsaken land, but the reasons...notsomuch.

Many studies have concluded that “men in combat are usually motivated to fight not by ideology or hate or fear, but by group pressures and processes involving (1) regard for their comrades, (2) respect for their leaders, (3) concern for their own reputation with both, and (4) an urge to contribute to the success of the group” (p. 90). In post-Iraq War interviews, soldiers validated these thoughts with comments like: “In combat, just the fact that if I give up, I am not helping my buddies. That is number one” (Wong et al, 2003, p. 10).

See: Wong, L., Kolditz, T.A., Millen, R. A. & Potter, T. M. (2003, July). Why they fight: Combat motivation in the Iraq War. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute.

We back here are the ones that are supposed to make sure the big picture reasons are a) what we need b) reasonably attained. My original response targeted Bosnia because we didn't have a real clue going in there either. It was no different than a COIN fight or a conventional war. There was risk of dying, and there was unclear national goals. Admittedly they were better understood than this Libya thing, but you know we are still there? http://www.tfeagle.army.mil/default2.asp

BTW loved the reference to Wolf 359 - slipped past me the first time. I'll pull another geek card. Gimli said "Certainty of death, small chance of success... What are we waiting for?"

 

IRONCAPT

11:37 AM ET

April 4, 2011

The hard truth

Zero KIAs is what every officer and NCO in every tactical unit wants. But Cpt Archer is right, its not realistic. Risk aversion is bad. Some units take stupid risks and get away with it. Some units are too cautious, but have bad luck. War is unpredictable and dangerous.

All the "Zero KIA" sentiment does is make the survivor's guilt worse for the leaders (Corporal-Cpt) involved.

 

TYRTAIOS

1:32 PM ET

April 4, 2011

Force protection over primary mission?

The zero KIA mentality is a commander substituting force protection for the actual primary mission.

Is that the prevailing mindset? This is the second time I have heard this. I wonder if commanders are losing enthusiasm for what they see as no good outcome in the end, anyway?

 

STEVE C

3:41 PM ET

April 4, 2011

The flip side of the COIN, so to speak......

Someone has to assume risk in a war. In a military culture where force protection has become a primary goal there are really only two ways in which aversion to risk can be satisfied: don't go out looking for trouble or - if you do - be willing to rapidly escalate force to overwhelming levels.

Given the nature (guerrilla) of the two wars in which the troops are fighting and the environment (essentially civilian) in which the wars are being fought it is inevitable that the risk will be assumed (or imposed upon) the civilian population.

Here we have an inherent contradiction in the policies of the US and its partners in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. The wars cannot be won without either protecting or severely damaging the population (the latter part of the sentence still being the subject of some debate) and yet there is an unwillingness on the part of our societies and our soldiers to assume the risks necessary to win the wars. The strategy within which the use of force is contained is fatally flawed.

I can only conclude that the lives of those 7152 coalition soldiers - and those yet to die - are wasted.

 

GOLD STAR FATHER

5:28 PM ET

April 4, 2011

Wasted

I, for one, reluctantly agree. Today's icasualties.org count is 7153. The last addition being a female Norwegian Colonel who lost her life in the Burning Koran Riots.
The bizarreness of waste is going to new levels. Mr. Karzi and Goofball Florida pastor are very strange bedfellows in an increasingly maddingly stupid farse.

 

JPWREL

5:58 PM ET

April 4, 2011

Ring a bell when we win so we know

Steve C, yours are interesting thoughts. You state, “The wars cannot be won without either protecting or severely damaging the population (the latter part of the sentence still being the subject of some debate) and yet there is an unwillingness on the part of our societies and our soldiers to assume the risks necessary to win the wars.”

One of the key problems we have with morally ambiguous wars of choice entered into with a rather impulsive indeed, thoughtless manner is defining what in fact victory looks like so we can recognize it when we see it. Surrender ceremonies on the USS Missouri are one kind of victory for one kind of war but I have yet to find anyone who can tell me what a realistic and achievable victory scenario looks like for instance in Afghanistan?

 

STEVE C

6:32 PM ET

April 4, 2011

I sympathize....

You're not alone in your search for that evasive explanation.

Specifically to the part of my previous post that you quoted, I do believe that there is a way to significantly reduce violence (in Afghanistan) but I'm not sure our own cultures are adequate to the task. "Take that hill!" is a seemingly reasonable order to follow - and to give - but "Don't, under any circumstances, harm the population!" is not.

As so often here on BD, the question becomes "What is the strategy?" but that question belongs in the political sphere, not the military.

If that question were answered, would our societies and our armies be more willing to sacrifice by severely restricting the use of force?

 

CAVANTRY_RECON

7:01 PM ET

April 4, 2011

Don't make promises to your troops you can't keep

This discussion reminds me of one of my Platoon Sergeants who told the guys we would bring everyone home safe. I cringed when he said it, but at the time was still a young LT and didn't know what to say. I also didn't want to contradict him on it in front of our soldiers.

Both of us had moved to other positions by the time the platoon took casualties, but what he said to those guys who either came back in a casket or with horrendous wounds still bothers me to this day.

On another note, I'll have to plagiarize Hunter's pre-deployment speech to the troops on the next trip over!

 

JTINSC

9:23 PM ET

April 4, 2011

"Who wants to be the last to die...

here in this nasty hellhole that no one cares about," was a burning question in the late 60s and early 70s in, you guessed it, Vietnam.

Hey, I made it through more than one tour. Lots of guys I knew did, too. Some guys I knew didn't make it. Somewhere around 58K ultimately didn't make it. And none of it mattered. Not one bit. The world continued to turn, the invasion of California never happened and the Viet Commies turned out to be the capitalists they wanted to be once they settled their internal differences. Meanwhile, we lost 58K and they lost 2M. Wasn't that special? You guys are at, what? 7153 on our side? Shit, you've barely begun. That's why so many of you are so sanguine about needless deaths. You haven't seen enough of them. That's why the politicos can keep this going: not enough death.

I'm just wondering when it is that the troops are going to seriously start asking that burning question about who will be the last. Hunter, all officer types understand your first post—the one with the mission first, people always horseshit—but your second post is nearer the sweet spot: exactly when is it that our politicians will ever truly give a rat's ass for the fine people they send out to be killed in fools' errands? And I will tell you when: Never. And if the politicians don't care, neither will the great unwashed American public.

I draw U.S. Army retired pay. I don't regret it, but I wouldn't do it again. The more one gains in rank and seniority, the more difficult it becomes to salute and put a happy face on the reality that is our war loving American political process. And I won't encourage any young person to join today's military. Not to serve politicians representing a nation that specializes in wasting its most dedicated and loyal citizens. Hunter and his serving brethren have no choice; I do, and I choose not to support any of these futile overseas adventures.

Maybe we'll run out of money soon. That'll be force protection at its finest.

 

HUNTER

7:03 AM ET

April 5, 2011

Nice comment

But I would add that you are letting the 'unwashed American public' off too easily. I don't want to be accused of elevating the great civil-military divide. I won't talk about Sheepdogs (I prefer Wolfhounds), Sheep and Wolves - though I do like that analogy.

I will just say that 1) we get the politicans we deserve. The American public bases decisions on name recognition and soundbites. Terrible.

2) we don't make citizenship cost anything beyond taxes (I'm not calling for Starship Troopers, but maybe a test equivalent of that required of a naturalized citizen wouldn't be too much to ask). Morons voting for morons, most of the time.

3) we are a fickle lot. There was plenty of 'kill em all' jingoism on Sept 12, 2001 but that dissolved quickly when American Idol announced their latest Top 12. (Remarkable that that show has lasted almost as long as the GWOT, sigh). We're consumed with athletes and actors - bread and circuses.

4) aside from places like this board there aren't many deep conversations going on around this country. There's certainly not enough to get a tipping point to demand change. Those with 'skin in the fight' (hate the term but its appropriate) care, but not many beyond that small circle. (Sorry still don't want a draft though).

5) the military is the People's Army. We're bought and paid for by their tax dollars, lots of them, would be best if they knew what they were paying for. Regardless, we act on their behalf. Bosnia, Sinai, Somalia, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya too...we act with the implicit approval of the American people.

Scary huh?

Finally, as I remarked in the "Tried Army" post above everyone has a choice to serve. I have a choice. I have long past any Service Obligation (SO). Indeed I am about to sign on for another one. I don't have to go to school, but I want to. I know in my SO, I risk deploying again. Mrs. Hunter knows it too. But I am not yet eligible for retirement, but damn close. I could get to the retirement sooner if I avoided the school. Cost-benefit and risk analysis tells me taking the school and the SO is worth it to me. Admittedly, I don't think I'll last much beyond that SO. Like the Army, I am tired and I owe my family much.

But the damn shame of it is I love the Army and its soldiers too much. What can I say, I am a fool too. Unlike JTSINC I would do it all again. It's still an honorable profession.

 

GOLD STAR FATHER

7:42 AM ET

April 5, 2011

Cultural Norms

We have made much talk of the civil-military divide. Hunter has highlighted the disparity with the apathetic indulgence typlified by "American Idol". But, JTINSC gives an honest synopsis with "...but I wouldn't do it again".
Us Ole Farts have this 'luxury' of highsight, an actual self-analysis of our experiences. I suspect JTINSC could come up with good memories of his AcDuty times, but its his honest total label that is interesting. My BS circuit breaker popped so many times in the 7+ years of my mil career, that I just couldn't reset it. I look back on some experiences that I cherish, but so much remains the same that it boggles my mind. 30 years ago this May, I was flying off the coast of Libya, baiting Mr. Khadaffi. Here we are again.
Hunter, you are at that final transitional point. You have made your choice, with all you know and have experienced, to go on for more. But....are you secretly hybernating from a decadent society? You state what you do is honorable. No argument there from me. But is it escapism from government and culture gone mad?
JTINSC: The body count doesn't mean squat in a measure of national fool's play.

 

GOLD STAR FATHER

7:56 AM ET

April 5, 2011

Need mo' Java

Make that 30 years ago this August we tootled around the Gulf of Sidra, essentially creating a Libyan NFZ past the 12 mile off-coast mark. As in, who the hell does that tin-horn think he is? I'm convinced that Khadaffi was baited enough to send his agents out covertly to pay-back the USA: German nightclub, Lockerbie, exportation of eager suicide bomber youth to any place one could find "American boots on the ground". We reap what we sow.
When I mention the escapism to the military Hunter, I speak not just of you, but those American youth who seem to be in well sufficient numbers to fill the ranks post 9/11.

 

HUNTER

11:02 AM ET

April 5, 2011

Can't escape

The government and culture is everywhere. Short of New Zealand where can one go?

I'm a special head case, I grew up in this Army. 5 people in the immediate family and only Mom didn't wear a uniform - and she did as much for the cause as anyone. If you think I got it bad, think about her! Cold War Germany, Vietnam, Korea (postwar) (x2), Desert Storm, Bosnia (x2), 9-11 Pentagon (yes really), Sinai, Iraqi Freedom. All on our various resumes.

But my point is I made a decision to leave at 7 + years like you GSF (and for some of the same reasons), but then I tried the RC and found a whole new world, more in need of talent than the active force. I've enjoyed it, but that life can suck the wind from your sails. I haven't had it near as bad as some of my AC peers who are on their 5-6 trip, but it is a different kind of suck.

In answer to your question, sure I am hiding out. It's comfortable here and I know much more often that when dealing with people you can (mostly) expect a genuine answer. the work is meaningful - back on topic - guys know even for a short while they are making a difference.

But most of all I worry that I won't know what to do with myself when it is over. My Dad retired after 30 years, and never worked again (not really). Just sort of withered away (ultimately killed by Agent Orange factors - yes really). My brother said he was going to get out since 1984, ended up retiring in 2007 - with 27 years. Had a job but now he doesn't. Not even looking, although he will soon.

They seemed happy, but that ain't me. Got to be moving. Hope I am doing good, that's the criteria, when you know when to stop. Lots of people in RC not doing enough, just holding down a seat. Lots are gone, but still some remain. All part of that culture we are talking about. Gimme something, for nothing.

 

ERIC_STRATTONIII

8:20 PM ET

April 5, 2011

I think a lot of you guys are a bit off on what the problem is

The Zero KIA is a hang over from terrible leadership and the Zero Defect mentality, it is not part of COIN nor is it part of anything I have ever read, been taught or seen taught except in respect to an Officer being more concerned about his career over the mission.
I have seen officers force Soldiers to wear the shoulder and arm body armor in the Iraq heat and thus making the soldiers less mobile and less active all in the name of Force Pro, ie; CYA and your career. I have even seen Army grunts wear the face shields in the bloody summer in Iraq, so a terrible O does not shock me.
Now, limiting EKIAs are a goal but again I have not seen ANYONE on the SOF side at least, express that not having EKIAs were a mission focus.
I think a lot of what the Co. Commander is talking about is poor leadership and nothing more and it all goes back to what we often talk about on here in so far as leadership in the Military above the field grade level.

 

JTINSC

10:27 PM ET

April 5, 2011

America's Army

Hunter, many years ago, I read a sociological piece that addressed the problems of welfare, poverty and crime. It turned out that paying for welfare is the price of admission in a wealthy society. What this means is that those who can afford to pay are buying off the criminal elements and keeping their neighborhoods safe.

The military and the endless wars fit seamlessly into the whole welfare racket. Hunter, like it or not, there is no such thing as "America's Army." You're just a guy, doing a job that most Americans don't give much of a damn about. The way it works in the 21st Century is that educated citizens, i.e., the ones who pay the freight, have a compact with the government: "we'll pay for some of it—you can borrow the rest—but don't expect us to actually do much for you. We don't really pay a lot of attention to your wars, but we do expect you to win, whatever that means."

Today's Americans understand that paying for endless war being conducted by other peoples' kids is, right along with welfare, part of the price of admission. The wars have become part of the background noise.

Hunter, I've got a kid probably about your age. My kid grew up with a father who went to war and who did the Cold War thing. My kid understands that whole Cold War existential thing and does not think old dad was wrong in his career choice. However, my kid, who's got a couple of graduate degrees, pays the taxes and is the future of this nation, does not understand at all what you, Hunter, and lots of others, get so fired up about in your current wars. My kid does not think you are doing a thing to secure the United States. My kid thinks you are wasting your time. My kid is more than willing to pay for national security—part of the social compact—but does not understand why you are doing what you so like to do.

Hunter, I don't think you're "America's Army," but, then, I wasn't either. The last "America's Army" was in WW2. Hasn't been one since. But you shouldn't care about my opinions. I'm old. You should care about my kid's opinions. My kid and my kid's peers are not impressed with you and all of your exploits. They think you're spinning your wheels. They think you're led by foolish generals and venal politicians. They see no reason why you do what you do. I think you should be very concerned about this new generation. Members of the older generations have shown themselves to be so crooked and untrustworthy that younger folks won't ever again trust government. This includes the military.

 

ERIC_STRATTONIII

10:59 PM ET

April 5, 2011

JTINSC

I have not heard that much 60's retread BS in a long time, thanks! Very retro. Your kid? What does he do that is so important that somehow he does not have to be involved according the to you? Your entire "They think you're spinning your wheels. They think you're led by foolish generals and venal politicians. They see no reason why you do what you do. I think you should be very concerned about this new generation. Members of the older generations have shown themselves to be so crooked and untrustworthy that younger folks won't ever again trust government. This includes the military." is like reading some Vietnam protestor who is stuck in the 60's and will whine about the "injustice of the wars!" but who is really just a scared kid who wants to live in the US but not have to do anything for it except "protest" and stomp their feet like a child.
Yeah, the military is all part of some odd conspiracy and your kid, who is obviously well informed, shoud not trust it, I mean, with all the conections you seem to have to it then it would only stand to reason right?
(sarcasm is dripping in case you are a little off on the theme of that post)

Look, no one cares what your kid thinks, more than likely he is just another academic who lives in a fish bowl like most of my Professors when I went to school. As for the military, we are still doing ok last I checked as far as approval by the rest of the USA so feel free to wave your fist at "The man" but at the end of the day did you ever do anything but pay your taxes and maybe vote? Ever do a few years in the Peace Corps? Another NGO? Americorps? Anything that put yourself on the line that took you out of your comfort zone for more than a few days and more like a year or more? I know you did not do time in the Military from past posts, so what exactly have you done besides whine?

 

ERIC_STRATTONIII

11:03 PM ET

April 5, 2011

Actually

I am sorry, perhaps I am mistaken, maybe you are just a frustrated warrior who laments what is going on but at least offer something up. Either way, man, you are off.

 

JTINSC

11:38 PM ET

April 5, 2011

Actually, Eric, you don't have to be sorry

You're entitled to your opinion. And you've caught me out. I'm just an old guy who always paid his taxes, but did not ever work for the Peace Corps or an NGO or ever get out of my comfort zone.

I am, however, a retired Regular Army officer who served on active duty from the 60s to the 80s, first as an RA NCO, then as a reserve officer on active duty, and then as an RA officer. If you look at my years of service, you might get a clue as to where I might have served. I have a Good Conduct Medal among others.

I presume you know what "regular army officer" means.

 

ERIC_STRATTONIII

6:38 AM ET

April 6, 2011

I may be entitled to my opinion but

I should have not been so caustic, just struck a nerve a bit and was reading while drinking, not as bad a DUI but Reading Under the influence and then Commenting Under the Influence do not make for a reasoned post all the time ;) I Still do not understand where your view is coming from and positive it does not match the actual sentiment of the American street, ie; "It won't play in Peoria".

 

HUNTER

10:21 AM ET

April 6, 2011

ESIII & JTINSC

ESIII please don't drink and write, you get belligerent enough when you are sober. I totally got what JTINSC was trying to say. Indeed he said much of what I said in my numbered bullet comment above it. So while JTSINC has some tough words, they are true enough to be bad-tasting but necessary medicine.

His kid is important. Doesn't matter what he does, or what he has done. He's a citizen and therefore something of a customer. If he doesn't know what we do, and doesn't beleive in it, then we have a bit of an onus to explain it. His kid pays taxes just like JTINSC and you and I.

It would be nice if we could meet in the middle on this. Maybe JTINSC's kid could take an interest in current affairs or just visit a base (assuming it isn't locked down like many are these days). But somehow I don't think that will happen.

I've said often, on this forum, that the DoD should have long ago bought a hour on primetime on whatever the 4th place network is and run Iraq/Afghanistan war footage. Every Sunday night you could watch another Restrepo like documentary. You could see what your soldiers are doing, good and bad, in far off lands. Complete honesty and transparency goes along way. Show what happened at Abu Ghraib and explain what happened to those who perpetrated it. Show what we've done to prevent it from happening again. I've also often said "Nothing is so powerful as to completely fuck something up and then take total responsibility for it." People are so wholly surprised by it.

JTINSC is right, much as it pains us, we aren't America's Army. If we were America would care more about us. We can continue to build walls, but in the end we risk becoming the mercenaries they think we are.

 

ERIC_STRATTONIII

6:24 PM ET

April 6, 2011

Do not agree Hunter or GSF

Hunter,
His kid is not a "cusotmer", he is a citizen nothing more, you can't say we should listen to him in one sentence because he is a customer and then in another that the Citizens do not care about the Military, it does not connect, why would I listen to someone who does not care in your view? Either the kid has something to offer or I do not care and neither should you. Also, while I respect J's service his post was total 60's retread BS, nothing more. My God, I could take his post out and plant it in any paper in the late 60's or early 70's it was so cliche. I am glad J served and I will take his opinion on board but wish he would offer up more than the view that his kid and the generation he is from won't trust the gov't or the military, not really doing much. Why exactly won't his kid trust the military? Why exactly won't his kid trust the govt? What does he offer for ideas and solutions? Also, Hunter, let's be real, this thread is about poor leadership and how it relates to COIN and in the military as a whole and yet I keep hearing from a lot of former and current Officers who with the possible exception of yourself do not offer much in the way of ideas or solutions. Let's not act like J or GSF or many on here are waxing poetic and saying deep and meaningful things that offer real solutions or that many will even try to change things if they could. I do not see that many people post ideas to solve problems with the Officer Corps, the Training of our troops or much at all except "bring back the Draft!" "pull out now" etc...etc...Heck, even on this topic of COIN and an Officer saying he is to not get any KIA, a lot of folks have no idea what they are talking about. It is frustrating because many are very academic in their approach or simply parrot what they read in a newspaper or blog article but they are not very realistic and really not very well informed about what is going on.
As for being beligerent, Hunter, usually I am ok if someone has something reasoned to say or want's to argue a point and stay on track with that but usually what goes on is the threat gets taken down another path or perhaps a person can not focus on one topic long enough to actually argue it ;)

 

GOLD STAR FATHER

7:33 AM ET

April 6, 2011

The American Street

Its a very wide boulevard Eric. With many yazoo roads. JTINSC expresses that you need to hear the youth, what they say here in the USA, and abroad, I might add. We are a very belligerent country. Some of us older guys and much of the youth is tired of the status quo casus belli. This isn't "60's BS", its decades of asking the same questions over and over.
You need to listen closer to the Peoria voices.

 

RBB

2:29 PM ET

April 6, 2011

talking to Soldiers about casualties

The hardest in this war is explaining to you Soldiers why PFC XXXX had to die an a "stupid" patrol to YYYYYY that was unimportant.

Every day is not D-Day. There are not a lot of hills or beaches that "have" to be taken -- it is not a linear progression that leads to Berlin and home.

As I talked to our troops about what we were doing, and particularly after one of our platoons lost guys, I told them that there is probably not single patrol I would send guys on if I knew in advance that someone was going to get killed.

There are almost no missions in Afghanistan worth the life of a single Soldier. But we have a mission to do, and we will do it. You can't let the risk paralyze you -- anymore than you would lock yourself in your house because there is a risk of dying in a car crash.

You tell Soldiers what the unit is doing to manage the risk, and that if any Soldier or leader thinks they don't have what they need to do to get it done with an acceptable level of risk -- then say so. If you can't get ISR and it is critical to the mission, then you don't go that day...and wait til you get it. Do something else, and run that op when the conditions are right. If you talk to Soldiers, they'll tell you when they think something is stupid. Sometimes they are right -- sometimes they just need to hear the context.

Leaders have to have the stones to speak up, and that is a command climate issue. If you've been a leader in this war long enough, you have sent a unit on a mission you knew was dangerous, and someone got killed doing it. That is something you carry for the rest of your life. But it is part of being a Soldier.

I don't know that all of the politicians get it. But some of them do.

 

TIERCE

2:20 PM ET

April 6, 2011

Dealing with this in OEF...

...right now. I'm a PL in the IA ARNG, 2/34 IBCT. I've heard from multiple sources that the BDE CDR has made it very clear that "zero KIA" is his primary goal for the last 3 months of the deployment. So instead of occupying a patrol base, living with the people, actually PARTNERING with the ANSF (which requires living side by side), an entire Squadron has been ordered to drive circles around BAF to "protect" it (when we get less rockets in a month than any base I was on in Iraq took on an average day).

This is not a like WW1, with officers ordering their men to the slaughter. Everyone at the company-level and below wants to be out there doing the mission we were ostensibly sent here to do, and we've actually had guys sent home for attempted suicide because it's so depressing to be restricted to a force protection mission when the Afghans are asking for us to come and live with them and fight to protect them. I wonder if this is more of an issue with the ARNG, because commanders have to go back to their states and communities and are afraid of being blamed for taking risks. Ultimately, I think it also comes back to the increasingly pervasive trend towards micro-managing, because if the CO, the PLs, and the NCOs all want to take the fight to the enemy, their views deserve some respect as the "guys on the ground".

I'm probably out of line just posting this here, but it really touched a nerve.

 

HUNTER

8:11 PM ET

April 6, 2011

Great posts from RBB & Tierce

Sorry to hear that. Wouldn't expect that from that COL. I knew him awhile back, but I imagine he's probably seen quite a few guys killed since then. That can weigh on a guy.

I bet its the same with any unit. Guard or otherwise. Active duty guys all live on one post, Guard guys live all over. I've never lived within 50 miles of my units.

Regardless, good luck and come home safe Red Bull.

 

Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.

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