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Posted By Thomas E. Ricks
Friday, April 1, 2011 - 7:24 AM
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I have been feeling a bit frustrated with the military's inflexible attitude toward Libya: "Hell no, we won't go without an end state." Here Capt. Crispin Burke tries to sort through the issue of how the military might better address the problem. Btw, young Burke just made the major's list but politely declines to put one of those tacky "(P)"s after his rank.
By Capt. Crispin Burke, U.S. Army
Best Defense Office of Wicked Problems Analysis
Tom writes, regarding ambiguity:
For the last 10 years, our generals have talked about the need to become adaptable, to live with ambiguity. Well, this is it. The international consensus changes every day, so our operations need to change with it. Such is the nature of war, as Clausewitz reminds us.
Well, sort of. We do need to deal with complexity, uncertainty, and so-called "wicked problems". But we do that through critical thinking, research, and analysis. We don't embrace uncertainty; we reduce it. We reduce it not through arrogance, oversimplification, or pithy mathematical formulas -- but through careful reflection, and thorough understanding.
Traditionally, the military has valued an engineering approach to problem-solving. Formulaic methods, such as the Military Decision-Making Process, focus on well-structured, tactical problems. While an MDMP-formulated plan might be complicated, it's by no means complex. For most tactical problems, there is generally one established solution. The mission, purpose, key tasks, and end state spelled out in an order from a higher headquarters.
Most importantly, the environment is relatively free from outside influence.
Using similar methods, the German General Staff, under the direction of Alfred von Schlieffen and Helmuth von Moltke the Younger, meticulously planned the opening stages of the First World War. The vaunted Schlieffen Plan, much like its French counterpart, Plan XVII, was meticulous.
Yet, the Schlieffen Plan failed when subjected to the messy complexity inherent at the strategic level. The plan's underlying assumptions -- a mere six-week offensive in France, followed by a sudden re-direction towards the Eastern Front -- would prove to be untenable. France was able to halt the Germans at the Marne, and the Russians were able to swiftly mobilize their army, trapping Germany in a two-front war.
And who could have predicted the most peculiar "Black Swan" of August 1914: two German capital ships would escape across the Mediterranean to Constantinople, helping to bring the Ottoman Empire into the War on the side of the Central Powers. (It's no understatement that the improbable string of events associated with the "Flight of the Goeben and Bresnau" are still being felt today, in the fragmented nation-states left after the Ottoman Empire's collapse.)
End-states, clearly-defined objectives, and mission statements are important, don't get me wrong. But problems arise when we apply this methodology to strategy. The world is far too complex for an engineering approach to strategy.
Fortunately, US Army Training and Doctrine Command's General Martin Dempsey is one of many Army leaders who understands the importance of mastering complexity and ambiguity. In a recent article for Armed Forces Journal, General Dempsey wrote:
The recent addition of design into our doctrine and into our education curriculum is another important step in changing how we develop strategic leaders. Design highlights the importance of framing and understanding both the operational environment and the problem to be solved before trying to solve it. It teaches the value of questioning assumptions and reframing the problem as events unfold and changes occur. Design is an important component in adapting our curriculum to educate leaders how to frame and reframe complex, ill-structured problems. It's intended to encourage leaders to think "outside the lines" of existing paradigms. It's also about valuing intellectual curiosity.
Much of the debate over Libya has focused on the end-state, exit strategy, and objectives. Few, however, have taken a step back and defined the Libyan problem itself. There are never operations orders for strategic problems. Thus, planners are rarely blessed with well-defined objectives. So rather than identifying the mission, per se, civil and military leaders might start by identifying the problem.
After identifying the problem (or problems), commanders and their staffs decide what problems are worth solving, how to efficiently solve them, and how to minimize unintended consequences. After putting together a tentative -- and flexible -- plan, commanders can then observe and react to unforeseen circumstances.
That doesn't mean we should foster more uncertainty by "shooting from the hip". Rather, a Design approach allows commanders to understand the consequences of their actions, and to better anticipate the environment's reaction. Of course, there's uncertainty. But through careful analysis, questioning, and case studies, commanders and their staffs can minimize the proverbial "fog of war."
So, for the moment, let's stop babbling about mission objectives, end states, and withdrawal plans. Instead, let's focus on the more immediate: the problems in Libya, their underlying causes. Next, we need to understand how solving one problem affects other problems? For example, what does action or inaction in Libya mean for regional stability? For the Arab Spring movement? For NATO? These questions are often glossed over in commentary on Libya, and they're debates worth having.
Most importantly, though, we need to ask ourselves: what problems we should attempt to solve in Libya, and how do we best minimize unforeseen consequences?
Captain Crispin J. Burke is a US Army officer who has served in Fort Bragg, Honduras, Fort Drum, and Germany. He is a contributor to Small Wars Journal, and runs his own blog, Wings Over Iraq.
I wish I could avoid being the curmudgeonly type who doesn't want to accept the new shiny object the military has to offer. But the Design kick seems to me one of two things 1) repackaging of old wine in new skins 2) so much gobbledygook that NO ONE UNDERSTANDS.
But regardless if you're a Design acolyte or not, even if you think understanding the problem is more important than having a desired endstate or exit strategy - I don't think we've formulated enough of either to set conditions for us to be comfortable with this military action in Libya...like one can be comfortable with any military action. Oh well.
As for minimizing the fog of war, never happens. You may reduce it but minimize is an extremely dangerous word. The fog never lifts, it just burns off in one area and reforms elsewhere.
Me, I am an 85% good solution is better than the perfect solution a week late (apologies to G.S.P.) kind a guy. But this whole affair reeks of desperation and poor preparation. To echo another illustrious thinker /sarcasm/ this one has too many known unknowns and unknown unknowns.
What I woudn't give for a little - wait for it - 'fingerspitzengefuhl'
I'm reminded of the bit from The Guns of August about the younger Von Moltke, the guardian of the Schieffen Plan, telling his political leaders that once the plan was begun, its timelines were so rigid and precise that they must be followed to their ultimate conclusion. Essentially, the generals told the politicians that if they didn't decide to go to war right now, they would lose. And the generals on the other side were telling their politicians the same thing, so two great dumb masses of men blundered into each other to a bloody end without their leaders taking the opportunity to think things through.
Yes, plans and end states are important, but plans often crash into reality and grown ups have to make hard decisions. I've warmed to the idea of the Libyan war. It may have stopped a massacre (which isn't the same as genocide, but is still wrong). It also put Arab leaders on notice that we won't abide any more Hama Massacres (as Koppel mentioned on sunday) or Srebrenicas. This is a good thing.
If you want clear endstates, become an accountant. If you want moral clarity, work at a children's hospital. The military does what the military is supposed to do, follow orders and make the best of messy situations.
IRONCAPT, Barbara Tuchman’s ‘Guns of August’ while superbly written is a bit dated and contains some flaws which have been corrected in later writings by more specialized academic World War One historians. Tuchman was a popular historical writer without familiarity to the wealth of documents and academic studies made available in the 1960’s and onward. The central idea that she postulates that Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, and Britain all rather unwittingly stumbled into a war has been pretty much disproved notably by Fritz Fischer, and later Herrmann, Fromkin, Zara Steiner & Neilson, Joll, Martel and comprehensively by Hew Strachan.
Helmuth von Moltke championed war against Russia of which a decisive campaign against France was a preliminary necessity by German General Staff logic. The Austrians while not enthusiast about fighting Russia were keen on a campaign against Serbia but had to take a position on the front against Russia in order to satisfy their German ally.
Russia’s hands are not clean in this affair but France was generally an innocent victim and of course Britain eventually felt compelled to support France in order to prevent not so much the defeat of France but the occupation of the Belgian coast by a German Army. Of course this a all a super simplification but among the Austrians/Germans there was more commission than omission as the German historian Fritz Fischer discovered fifty years ago and has been more thoroughly collaborated with exhaustive studies since that time.
I'll check out your reading recommendations (and add them to the pile). The point I was trying to make with the "great dumb masses of men" comment was that war plans need not be so ridgid. I'm not enough of a history scholar to comment on Tuchman's analysis, but the writing was fantastic. From what I recall of the book and the bit on pre-WWI doctrine from the Makers of Modern Strategy, quite a few officers on both sides knew that barbed wire, machine guns and artillery would make the next war a bloody mess... but they marched onto the trains anyway.
IRONCAPT, yours is a very good observation ‘quite a few officers on both sides knew that barbed wire, machine guns and artillery would make the next war a bloody mess... but they marched onto the trains anyway.’
Unfortunately, for the armies of that era that knowledge (or pre-war suspicion) was more fully appreciated by junior officers at the tactical level than older senior officers whose tactical knowledge was derived from familiarity with weapons systems and tactics of the latter part of the 19th century.
Interestingly, the British Army the smallest of the lot was the most skilled in fire and movement, concealment and its general overall standard of training. Its equipment was excellent with the exception of a critical shortage (almost absence) of indirect fire field howitzers, which were to become the most decisive weapon of the early clashes of 1914 even more so than the machine gun. Unfortunately, the campaign from Mons to First Ypres literally blew away over ninety-percent of that fine little army of pre-war regulars ‘the old contemptibles’.
IronCapt: I've been trying to find the passage in "The Guns of August" when Moltke was literally screaming at yet another change to the pre-ordained plan. It's a classic not-so-great moment in military planning.
"Your Majesty! It cannot be done. The deployment of millions cannot be improvised. If Your Majesty insists on leading the entire army to the East it will not be an army ready for battle but a disorganized mob of armed men with no arrangements for supply."
The All Highest pointed out vMoltke the Elder would have responded differently.
"Wounded me deeply, I never pretended to be the equal of the old Field Marshal. At that moment, I thought my heart would break."
"Crushed" vMoltke memoir'd, he returned to General Staff HQ and "burst into bitter tears of abject despair. I threw my pen on the table and refused to sign."
"That was my first experience of the war. I never recovered from the shock of this incident. Something in me broke and I was never the same thereafter."
Guns of August, "August 1: Berlin"
To be fair, 'Gloomy Gus' seemed to recover enough to handle Prittwitz's desire to flee behind the Vistula before Tannenburg "This is the result of leaving that fat idiot in charge of 8th Army" and agreed to the new combat team of vHindenburg and Ludendorf
Napoleon Bonaparte said, “that many of the decisions faced by the commander resemble mathematical problems worthy of the gifts of an Isaac Newton or Leonhard Euler.”
I also understand that neither Newton nor Euler would have been making any military decisions given their backgrounds, but as a military planner, my commander-in-chief expects me to rely on my judgment rooted in intuition, common sense, and experience? The latter of experience my boss will view as the most important, since the results to be brought about by military action will most likely defy the odds of chance, and I should be able to narrow those odds down more favorably for him through my experience.
So Captain Burke, you're saying the military should get on with it? Ok, just so we understand each other, you may tell the public that Kaddafi has to go although we aren’t going to do it by military means - just don't tell me that privately. . allez d'accord?
Incidentally, a simplistic quickie comment on von Schlieffen's Plan: Moltke weakended the German right flank. I believe Alfred von Schlieffen reiterated prior to retirement, ""remember to keep the right flank strong."
The ‘Schlieffen's Plan’ was never really a formal plan of operations but merely a memorandum to be update and revised as circumstances changed. The original ‘memorandum’ was written when both France and Russia were weaker particularly in field artillery. The dramatic rebound in Russian military strength after the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese fiasco (for Russia) and the new French 3 years conscription plan and the expansion of railroads for both countries forced modifications to Schlieffen’s original concept.
Likely, reinforcing the right wing of the German advance would not have helped the Germans that much more since the German Army was a considerably heavier army in 1914 than in 1905 when Schlieffen put his thoughts to writing. The road net at the railhead terminuses in Belgium and northern France could not support the size of the force and logistic train that Schlieffen originally worked with. Perhaps of more immediate impact on the German’s was their horrible, indeed, inept command, communications and control procedures. Also, the reduction of the German force by two Corps to reinforce East Prussia during the Battle for the Marne. These two Corps weakened the immediate German battle line but arrived too late to be of assistance in East Prussia.
I thought that simplistic statement might bring someone forward with a bit more detail for the readership, and what better person to do so than who I had in mind: you JPWREL! Please take that as a compliment.
I might also point-out that the plan was predicated on way too much centralized control, didn't address England's entry into the war, and certainly underestimated logistics, always logistics.
Back to the subject: I am reminded that Clausewitz tell us,” Although our intellect always longs for clarity and certainty, our nature often finds uncertainty fascinating.”
Perhaps our generals are not fascinated enough? : )
vSchlieffen Plan was very much an operational plan as best understood. Also consider - if vMoltke had not fell for the "Cossacken Komen" panic of well born Junker ladies pleading to the Kaiserin about family estates being spoiled by the naughty Russians - those two Korps pulled from West Front would have a made a significant diff at Marne - or even vKluck's Turn.
Also in Dreadnaught and Castles of Steel RK Massie has great sources to indicate nearly a division's worth of men were sucked up by Kriegs Marine's attendent vessels and they would have made vSchlieffen's plan succeed - most likely.
Sounds Like Something I just Read from 1999
To piggy-back on Hunter's comment of repackaging, this Design Approach reads a lot like Chapter 4 from "Out-of-the-Box Leadership: Transforming the 21st Century Army and Other Top-Performing Organizations" and the Creative Action Based Decision-Making Approach. Either way, when you make decision making models rediculously complex they lose value...no one understands them.
Great! Since MDMP was rapidly adopted, this should be easy!
If I had confidence that all of our UCC and JTF planning staffs could consistently and rapidly apply "Design" to frame their planning efforts, I'd probably agree more with this article.
Given that the majority of our planners, and those who support the planners, are very used to planning done in the typical cookie-cutter MDMP, even if you're right about the potential use of Design to limit our reliance on a well articulated national interest, it still doesn't help us out in the near term.
Said a different way: Yes, if our planners better framed the problems before starting planning, they might be able to plan without having to depend on statements of national interest. Unfortunately, the majority of our UCC's and JTF's still expect to have some level of strategic oversight/guidance to help them go through the MDMP.
I think the current foreign policy and military whinging on about the lack of national interest/strategic intent/adult leadership reflects the fact that they weren't getting enough input to effectively plan their operation. I don't think anyone expects perfectly articulated, unambiguous strategic objectives, but it really helps the planning process if one knows whether it's more important to prevent civilian casualties, or to limit damage to infrastructure, to prevent creation of a "failed state" (hate that phrase, but you know what I mean), or to limit the spread of radicalization.
Prioritizing those sorts of high-level goals really help ease the planning process. We've all done planning in a vacuum, and know what it's like to get stuck in a revolving Mission Analysis phase. If a lot of folks were complaining about the lack of national strategy, then maybe that means they just wanted more data, not perfect data.
So here's hoping we one day get to the point where all of our UCC's can plan using Design, or whatever other method they find to help deal with complex, chaotic situations, in a consistent fashion that limits the need for adult supervision. But we aren't there yet, which means that loud requests for more strategic guidance probably should be listened and responded to.
Here's an even better formulation:
Paraphrased, when using abbreviated planning techniques (and I have to assume this was as abbreviated as they come) the commander's contributions are critical.
Developed further from this webpage, *** emphasis is mine: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_95-12_upch3.htm
"When using the abbreviated technique, the commander's guidance is very similar to the guidance he provides his staff when using the deliberate technique. He issues his guidance to the staff upon approving the restated mission. However, when using the abbreviated technique, ***his guidance must be more specific and directive in nature.*** The elements of the commander's guidance presented in the previous chapter is still applicable, but ***the commander's guidance must be more detailed and directive in a time-constrained environment.*** He must specifically tell his staff what COAs he wants developed. He should include tentative task organization and scheme of maneuver. He must also determine which enemy SITEMPs he wants the COAs war-gamed against and what branch plans he wants incorporated within each COA. The staff will probably not have time to conduct a detailed wargame session with numerous friendly and enemy COAs. By providing this type of guidance, the commander has slightly limited his staff's flexibility and initiative in effort to save time. This technique will result in providing the staff more time to synchronize the COA during the wargame session. "
Now the MDMP probably isn't the first thing on the POTUS's mind. But regardless of decision-making methodology, he best know what he wants and how he intends to get there. Commander's intent....which, guess what...includes endstate.
JTFs and COCOMs do not use MDMP, they use the JOPP. Small difference, but significant enough.
Some COCOMs are good at framing the problem, figuring out what needs to be done, and in some cases will draft the EXORD for the Joint Staff to pass back down, other COCOMs will sit and wait for an EXORD in the mind frame of "We don't do anything until we are told."
Sometimes you have to figure out what the Strategic Guidance will be based on documents that are already out there, NSS, NMS, speaches, etc...
Getting wrapped around semantics
I believe when we talk about problem solving versus objectives and guidance we are discussing essentially the same things. You can't solve a problem (planning) unless you know what the problem is (objectives and guidance). And yet we seem to still be suffering some sort of temporary insanity that says we don't need no stinkin objectives. Folks, do you gather a bunch of wood, nails and tools and expect to build something with it when nobody has told you what it is you are supposed to be building? Would you expect a staff of smart action officers build you an OPLAN without explaining to them what the plan is supposed to do? Yet here we are, throwing a bunch of assets at an ill-defined problem and expecting the supposed flexibility of the operational planners to be good enough to make this (whatever "this" is) work out in the end. I know, I always get myself into trouble when I start relying on common sense, but sometimes I just can't help myself.
Well, let me clarify. When I said "let's forget about mission objectives", I made sure to tack on "for the time being".
The Design metaphor is often likened to an explorer in the 17th Century trying to reach the Pacific Ocean. The Ocean is the objective, of course, and it's important to spell that out. But if you don't know where you are--haven't defined the problem--you can't really tell where you're going.
Identifying the problem defines your objectives. Design in a nutshell. The hardest part of design, near as I can tell and I am certainly not an expert, is getting someone in charge to actually identify the problem, or set of, that they want solved. And this Mr. Ricks is what many of your commentators, that I have seen here and many in the military have been talking about when they ask for some strategic objectives re Libya. Tell us what problem you want solved, we will tell you what is costs.
When avoiding stating the problem is mandated by political perceptions (the perceptions of the politicians that is) then you will not get solutions. The US has not really stated what problem it is trying to solve, or support solving. There have been many statements working their way around explicitly stating our intent but nothing really concrete.
So how do you support this whole 'design' concept when it just demands that which you claim is unnecessary? Instead of asking our politicians what the US' intent is, why not ask what problem we're working to solve? I predict that the answers will remain the same.
Back in the early yars of my Civil Engineering studies our algebra teacher got us to have nightmares with this part of problem resolution: Is there any solution at all? That man translated it into "Looking for black cats in a dark room" and the first step to solve the problem would be figuring out how to turn the room lights on and check if there was any black cat at all.
From time to time I still have nightmares in which I haven't passed that algebra course.
Tom, you have continually avoided the military's predominant complaint, which is Obama's lack of articulated purpose. This complaint is not a function of a particular planning model. Let's take the Design approach: what, exactly, was the problem with Libya? Was it Quaddafi's rule? Was it the murder of civilians? Was it the threat to European oil interests? Which problem(s) did we set out to fix? Did we fix it? Will we?
The true source of discontent is not that Obama doesn't have a crystal ball (even though the President himself evidently committed--rigidly, simplistically--to a war of "days, not weeks" even before the first shot was fired). We understand that combat develops beyond our powers of foresight, and we do not need lectures on the fog of war. But ambiguity amidst war is no excuse for lack of a policy objective at its outset, particularly because the latter amplifies the former. Therein lies our dissatisfaction. Call it mission, task and purpose, a problem in need of solving--whatever your approach, you must be able to articulate why you go to war. This administration has not done so coherently.
As a military reader, Tom, I'm frustrated because I expect thoughtful, dispassionate analysis. On this issue, I feel that your desire to see Obama proven right has you off slaying the endstate strawman instead.
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