"It reminds me of something I once read about the British defense against the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain, that the real trick was not radar but the organization"

Cohen and Gooch, "Military Misfortunes:" 75-76

American and/versus British ASW, WW II

"...both the quantity and quality of American ASW equipment...were poor, but...these were not the most important failings. Two major needs went beyond technology...The first was operational intelligence...But analytic success...could not achieve anything in the absence of organizational efficiency"

Mahnken, "Uncovering Ways of War," 160

On prewar American intelligence gathering on the British air defense

"Even after the British goverment revealed the existence of its air defense system, military attaches focused on collecting data on weapons systems involved in air defense. They paid much less attention to the organizational arrangements that lay at the heart of the effectiveness of the British air defense system."

Tom writes: “It reminds me of something I once read about the British defense against the Luftwaffe during the Battle of Britain, that the real trick was not radar but the organization that was able to combine radar, radio and aircraft to get the right planes to the right places at the right times, and keep doing it for months.”

But it was almost brought to grief by the failure to include the essential function of pilot selection and training. While the centralized air defense control was both redundant and highly effective the RAF Training Command never got the word to bring the training facilities up to capacity. They were essentially training pilots at peacetime levels until it dawned upon the high command that pilot not aircraft shortages were undermining the whole system.

Thus, the establishment of the very sensible Commonwealth Air Training Scheme which relocated primary and advanced flight training to Canada and in which the Brits, South Africans, Canadians, Aussie’s and New Zealanders participated with no small number of American volunteers. This removed critical fuel and airspace issues besides being a central point of assembly.

This is a good example of how a non-operational factor almost fatally undermined a critical military operation underway namely the air defense of the UK against a pre-invasion air assault by the Luftwaffe. Everything in war is interrelated even if it is not the tip of the spear.

I'll be darned if that isn't General Weightman's son, Brian Weightman, in the picture..

Haven't read it in detail yet, though I intend to very shortly, but I was surprised (though I probably shouldn't have been) to see Stan McChrystal's name absent from the Executive Summary and the first page or so of the report. From all accounts his command of JSOC is what made this happen.

I've been really fascinated by JSOC's campaign during the Surge and its something I very much hope to study in detail in the form of a post-graduate (hopefully PhD) thesis, if I can. Thought I'm sure given the nature of SOCOM getting the right information will be difficult to say the least.

I have to recommend a great book on the topic Task Force Black by Mark Urban, it focuses on the SAS role in these missions as well as the rest of the war. Its a terrific read and I've yet to read a book written by a Brit thats more complimentary of American leadership and more critical of the British command during OIF, McChrystal and Michael Flynn in particular come out of it looking like geniuses. Originally the book wasn't released in the states, I suspect because it came out just after the Brits withdrawal they were more open to having they're SOF activities chronicled than US forces that are still in the AO.

Actually, he is not omitted, rather he is referred to as "General Smith." The one thing that confuses me is that they say that things went back to the way they were towards the end in Iraq, I'm confused because they still operate in Iraq, albeit scaled way back and General McChrystal implemented these teams again in Afghanistan.

They also say that conventional forces continued to fail to take full advantage of this method. What a terrible comment on the conventional officer corps. So much for COIN. BTW, this method of all-source fusion could be found in the Malaysian Emergency model.

There are still to many layers of approval and General McChrystal's excellent network centric model has the flaw that extra bandwidth is a two-way street (unless you have cable or DSL) and facilitates the trend toward micro management that was symbolized by the BN CDR in a helicopter overhead and now includes anybody all the way to Washington watching by satellite and drone.

The combination or "fusion" of all-source intelligence (NSA, CIA, FBI, SOF, etc.) with operational SOF units to identify and snatch/kill insurgent leaders and terrorists has nothing to do with the heroic exploits of of the Long Range Desert Groups or even with what the SAS did in the first Gulf War using similar vehicles in a reconnaissance mode. General McChrystal's achievement was to get these incestuous agencies to share info and intel with each other, with the operators, AND the operators to share what they find with the others - in the field.

It is the sharing and feedback that are unique. It is regrettable that it is so difficult to arm the operators with the best intelligence which in fact results in raids which produce hard evidence from the hands of the insurgents. This is not merely a commando operation. These raids happen 16 times a night in Afghanistan according to General Petraeus.

This is the methodology which should pervade our counter-terror operations regardless of location. It is my *impression* that everybody is still busy building stovepipe intelligence organizations, with and without too many contractors.

"A restatement of the bleeding obvious"

"--The single greatest variable of success was "access to the most senior decision makers..." Really?

"--Middle management at the home headquarters and agencies of team members proved to be an impediment to information sharing..." No sh!t! We're all shocked at this! Here we were thinking that large bureaucratic organizations (ISAF/IJC anyone?) were the most efficient means of winning a war/event/action/whatever and these folks throw this into the works. Wow.

Full disclosure: I have not read the whole report. And it is highly unlikely that I will... That being said, from the executive summary (you know, the only part that the executives will read...): "interagency teams....will disappear from America’s arsenal unless the knowledge base supporting the innovation can be secured." The "knowledge base" supporting this innovative method is command involvement. Get the commander in there making decisions.

Another very long statement of the obvious from NDU. Not to disparage the great folks at NDU, but did we really need 84 pages for this? Is commander involvement and understanding of the details really a strategic breakthrough? The US military does not need 84 pages of fluff telling us that working together, all agencies, often produces better results. We do not need someone saying this, we need to actually do it. Now if the authors had a sure-fire means of getting senior uniformed and civilian military leadership to actually work together more, now that would be something worth writing about.

My first guess for the secret weapon of the surge was American Dollars to pay off the Sunnis. Give most of them something to do besides fight the govt. $$$$ woke the Sunni awakening.

I am definitely OK w that, it was a British tradition on the NW Frontier, you might as well have them fighting for you as irregulars as against you as insurgents.

Here's a great quote from McChrystal out his recent article "It Takes a Network"... http://www.scoop.it/t/the-intelligence-war/p/27737382/it-takes-a-network-by-stanley-a-mcchrystal

"As we learned to build an effective network, we also learned that leading that network -- a diverse collection of organizations, personalities, and cultures -- is a daunting challenge in itself. That struggle remains a vital, untold chapter of the history of a global conflict that is still under way."

The small HVT teams were backed up by hundreds of analysts back in the States and elsewhere. The forward teams facilitated a "flat" network that allowed for unparalleled info sharing using modern IT. Understanding the ingredients that created this amazing unity of effort (we'll never achieve unity of command) starts with understanding the leadership that made it happen...both at the top and within the organizations themselves.

We need to see clearer guidance from the highest levels (Petraeus, Mattis) for the IC. Only effective and articulate leadership can break down these bureaucratic tendencies to stovepipe (especially in the days of Wikileaks). What are the priorities and expectations? What are the big problems beyond HVTs that we need to solve? McChrystal and Flynn are those kind of leaders...hope folks paid attention to what they were able to do.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but wasn't the success of the surge due to throwing ungodly amounts of money at Sunnis, like the Sons of Iraq, to get them to stop attacking?

In response to 9 Volt, yes, many ascribe the dramatic reduction in violence in 2007 to U.S. financial support to Sunni tribal leaders. The article makes the case, however, that the interagency teams used to target enemy clandestine networks were, along with several other variables, an indispensible ingredient of the success. Why is this important? From the authors’ point of view, it is important because:

-- the interagency teams enabled three innovations: networked-based targeting; fusion of intelligence and operations, and counterterrorist-counterinsurgency integration.

-- these innovations require unprecedented collaboration between diverse departments and agencies and between SOF and conventional forces.

We also think there are other reasons why the study is important. For those trying to run interagency teams, it is important to understand that:

-- their performance will constantly be challenged by the way different organizations with different mandates and cultures pursue different priorities and ways of doing business.

-- it is imperative to develop a sense of common purpose to override interference from parent organizations.

-- it is imperative to delegate authority for decision making to the teams.

-- smaller teams (8 to 15 people) that were collocated generally worked better than large ones and were able to generate greater cohesion and trust.

-- the best interagency team leaders knew they had to “ask, not task” and be ready to switch from type A to type B collaboration as needed.

For those running DoD it is important to understand:

-- how a small number of key leaders were able to pioneer radically different approaches—in some cases reversing standing policy—and thereby snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. Their example should be studied in great detail as an admirable example of leadership and resiliency.

-- why interagency organization was a necessary ingredient in the recipe for success, along with new technology and new operating concepts/strategy. This example of organizational innovation should be accepted as a best practice.

For those trying to run the national security system, it is important to understand that:

-- Organization matters in national security, and particularly interagency organization.

-- Interagency organization melds hard and soft power, which counters a common prejudice that national security matters ultimately are all a question of “hard power” and military power in particular. Our nation's best warriors understand and champion the importance of interagency collaboration that melded soft and hard power.

-- Moreover effective interagency collaboration requires more than just good leadership: Good leadership is essential, but not sufficient for high organizational performance. Team success also required organizational support, good decision making practices, learning ability and cultures that fostered trust.

-- Interagency teams are fragile in the current system and will disappear without support: Support required for teams arose in extreme circumstances and immediately began to atrophy after those circumstances passed. Agencies and departments resist interagency teams whenever possible. Thus there is little effort to institutionalize knowledge about interagency teams and their performance, and this lack of interest in interagency teams explains why in all likelihood the United States will fail to institutionalize this powerful new capability.

-- Interagency teams are efficient and a budget bargain: Interagency teams cost little to nothing and deliver great performance improvements. They are a national security bargain that should be seized upon, especially in an increasingly difficult fiscal environment.

Respectfully,
One of the authors