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Posted By Thomas E. Ricks
Monday, March 7, 2011 - 7:21 AM
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One of the nice things in life is to have friends smarter than yourself. Over the weekend I had a long discussion with several of them about Libya, and came away persuaded that we need to do something in Libya, though probably not imposing a no-fly zone.
I think President Obama needs to sit down his defense secretary and the Joint Chiefs of Staff today and look each of them in the eye and then say this:
Don't tell me what I can't do in Libya. Tell me what you can do. Give me a list of options. And give them to me within 24 hours, because push may be coming to shove, and I don't want to see Qaddafi prevail. As Michael Singh warns, 'inaction also has its consequences.' Because why? Because we don't want to the lesson to Arab autocrats to be that all you need to do is shoot up the rebels and the West will turn tail. Also, Qaddafi may be regretting giving up his WMDs right now. We don't want the lesson for other bad actors to be that he should have held on to them.
To help the president nudge the JCS in the ensuing discussion, here are the options he should ask to be put on his desk:
1. Best option: Give the Libyan rebels the aid they need to win. This may be no more than some secure communications gear and a couple of thousand rocket-propelled grenades to deter Qaddafi's tanks and SUVs. (This may be already happening in some form.) Can we start flying discreet charter flights of stuff into some airports in the east? This needs to be ready to go ASAP -- like yesterday.
2. More aggressive, riskier option: It is not in the interests of the United States, or the Libyan people, to see Qaddafi put down the rebels. So if Option 1 doesn't work, what more do we need to do? I think here we want to think about direct action: Using Special Operations troops to corner and then capture or (if he insists) kill Col. Qaddafi. You do need tactical air on tap for this, both to finish off Qaddafi if he holes up and also to cover the extraction helicopters. This needs to be ready to kick off in 72 hours.
3. Third: And yeah, sure, let's look at what a no-fly zone would look like. This is my least favorite option, because it is a half measure -- which by definition is an act that is enough to get us involved but by itself is not enough to promise to determine the outcome. Still, is there any way to do it quickly and with less risk? I've heard things like stating "you fly, you die," and not conducting extensive air strikes, just popping whoever flies. I am doubtful of this. Sen. Kerry's simplistic "cratering" of runways is a non-starter -- it is very easy to quickly fill in holes. Imposition of an American-led no-fly zone effectively would be a promise to the Libyan people, and it should not be an empty promise that allows Qaddafi to get aircraft in the air even occasionally to bomb rebellious cities. But it might be worthwhile to throw up a no-fly zone if only as a cover for Option 2, because it would have the effect of throwing sand in Qaddafi's eyes. So the NFZ also needs to be ready to go in 72 hours.
MARCO LONGARI/AFP/Getty Images
Ok I'm not a Libya expert (and if you've read anything else I've posted on this blog, you'll know I'm not an expert at anything) so I have two questions:
1. Arming the rebels: doesn't this bring back unpleasant memories of arming Osama and the Mujahideen?
2. No-fly zone: Why can't the Europeans do something about this? Weren't the French, Italians and Russians the ones selling Gaddafi so many billion Euros worth of weapons?
I feel like we're stretched pretty thin these days...money and people-wise. Libya seems like the perfect opportunity for serious mission-creep and frankly, I've had enough adventures in that part of the world to last a lifetime. Someone enlighten me, please.
to insurge or counterinsurge, that is the question
@Don.. haha. well said. Keep up the good posts!
An insurgency isnt an inherently bad thing. It is simply a way of overthrowing or changing a government. The American revolution was an Insurgency. Vietnam was an Insurgency. Our initial role in Afghanistan was AS insurgents. And in Iraq we fought a counterinsurgency.
So, to sum up. These are simply words. Words with definitions. Our policy, and the targets of the insurgents determine weather something is "right" or wrong. From what I can see, we have been nothing but consistent.
Tom, Did You Forget About the UN Arms Embargo on Libya?
Or are you advocating ignoring those pesky international rules in order to "do the right thing"?
And I am with Soap; turning over MANPADs to rebel groups is generally not a good idea, especially if you are also drawing up plans to fly in their airspace.
to answer your questions. Despite what your articles say, we are, in fact NOT close allies AT ALL with Libya, and Mumar. We would love nothing more than to get rid of him and deal with someone who is a bit more rational. So, "close allies"? Really?
also, I do not think that we should intervene in Libya. We have NO REASON to do so. we currently get less then half of one percent of our oil form Libya, and we have no other real interests there. So I agree, there is no reason worth intervening.
What I was taking an issue with initially was that you were implying somehow that Insurgency was a universally bad thing. It isn't. My only point was that the U.S. can act as an Insurgent and or as a counter insurgent in varied situations and it has no bearing on what is "right" or 'wrong". it is simply a strategy. there is no irony, hypocrisy, or (insert negative term) involved. We are only executing a strategy.
But one does have to consider the "Pandora's Box" angle, as well. If you become an active participant by 1) arming/supplying, 2) striking at Gadaffi directly, or 3) enacting a no-fly, is the United States alone and/or with UN approval and/or along with EU powers prepared to see the action through if these efforts lead to Gadaffi's supporters, with or without Gadaffi in power or alive, fighting on against anti-Gadaffi Libyans and, possibly, foreign forces now involved on one side of the fight? Are the US and EU powers prepared to stand in the middle of a battle for Libya between the governing class and those with a vested interest in it remaining in control and all other Libyans if things escalated to this extent? If the Obama administration doesn't have an answer to that question then it shouldn't get involved at all.
Most commentators on the situation in Libya suffer from a serious knowledge deficit as to the situation on the ground there and how it got to the state it is now. That emphatically includes me. It's what happens when a regime has wielded absolute power for over 40 years.
I make this point by way of observing that recommendations for American or Western action with respect to Libya assume that relatively modest steps are needed to tip the balance in the rebels' direction. This assumption certainly draws more on what we saw happen in Tunisia and Egypt than what we know is the case in Libya.
And the assumption may be correct, but we need to consider what happens if it isn't. If, for example, Qadhafi isn't strong enough to crush the rebellion against him, and his opposition isn't strong enough to oust him and suppress his supporters. I do not have better sources of information than anyone else, but what I'm seeing leads me to think we ought to consider a protracted, violent stalemate in Libya as a strong possibility.
If that is what we're looking at, and the relatively low-cost steps suggested by Tom Ricks here are not enough to boost the Libyan opposition to victory over Qadhafi, what then? I don't have an answer to that question right now; all I can do is suggest we ought to be asking it.
One more thing: if military action with respect to the Libyan situation is being considered -- including the steps Ricks suggests here -- Congress needs to be consulted by the administration in a public, formal way. This will not guarantee success; nothing can do that. It will put Congress in the role intended by the Founders with respect to the initiation of hostilities with another government, something that isn't very important to Libyans, but is for us.
This might be one of those times where we assess if deploying US troops to Libya has second and third order effects, of which further damage our reputation in the middle east and the muslim world. is it a better option to support and coach our European allies to take a more dominant role, or even better yet those states within the region who are more directly effected.
To launch an invasion - will be percieved as another foreign infidel incursion, and if we are to overtly secure the oil fields - we play into the reputation we are about oil in the middle east.
I for one am curious about the ongoings in the NSC - and advice being given an options on the table - to include those not involving the military. Good time for SecState to shine and leverage (or arm twist) our European friends to take lead here - or are we out of schlitz because the Afghan commitment by same countries has depleted any chance of support.
No disrespect intended here, but the idea of a European-led response to the Libyan situation is a chimera. Europe didn't even want to confront Milosevic in the midst of a genocidal war on Bosnian civilians without American leadership; Europeans will do nothing more than apply economic sanctions on the Qadhafi regime unless they are following the Americans.
Here is a better option; fly in some MANPAD’s and let the Libyan rebels construct their own no-fly zone. Along with the MANPADS supply some Javelin anti-tank missiles and again let the rebels counter the loyalist armor. They don’t need Navy SEAL’s to do a snatch job on Qaddafi. By helping them to beat his more dangerous forces they can deal with this character at their leisure. In the long run it is better for everybody is the Libyan’s win their own war. The western allies should concentrate on the above two items and humanitarian assistance.
No, do not fly in some MANPAD's. But if you must, make sure they're Russian SA-7's that are less effective but will get the job done, but no more.
The last time we did something like you suggested, some of them ended-up in Iran being fired at a Navy A-6 in 1987.
Hey, here's another idea: you may laugh and scoff, and think the old man's steering cable broke and I've gone left rudder. But this is where an Iowa Class battle ship comes into play, with her 16 inch naval rifles fore and aft. Had we parked one of those bad oscars off Tripoli early-on, the crazy colonel would have filled his boot with piss - these warships we've got today are simply wonderfu, but don't intimidate the wogs.
Of course we ain't got none of these anymore, but like me, we're not short on ideas.
OK, fine I defer to TYRTAIOS better idea and more ‘politically suitable’ choice of anti-air and anti-tank hardware. How about the SA-7’s and AT-14’s to even the playing field for the opposition? Those two items (we can get the AT-14’s from the Turks) preclude the need for western intervention beyond crucial humanitarian assistance particularly medical and food. One way to really turn the opponents to Qaddafi against us is if they finally win to is allowing them to starve.
Kill the regime command/control, and the evil brain will die
Tom talks about providing radios and anti-armor rockets to the rebel maneuver elements. Yeah, that's important, and every revolution needs some of that.
But CC is even more important to the armed regime's ability to direct and concentrate its forces. The USN is pretty good at sigint, and US satellite assets give us wide-angle recordings of Libyan EM traffic. (Every spark-ignited vehicle is a noisy RF emitter, which is one reason why the US went to diesels.)
I'm guessing that Gadaffy's radio-telephone net is vulnerable, and CCC nodes could be shut down with an EMP device during the fireworks, with minimal direct casualties or collatoral. Our friends over in the E. Med probably have figured out an effective EMP device using local/salvage hardware supplies.
There is always unintended collatoral, and EMP would damage pacemakers, hospital gear, ambulances and friendly forces in near proximity, and innocents impacted.
It's important to remember that civil wars divide up according to who you know, with good and bad people on both sides, for good and bad reasons, with good and bad consequences. Mostly bad for civilians in the conflict zone.
I just glanced at my monkeypod sculptured caricature of a guy with his head up his rectum. . .hold that thought on the battle wagon scenario I tossed-out.
But here is an idea to keep in mind: what ever we do, who ever we end up supporting, Libya is a country of numerous tribes and sub-clans that would make an Iraqi’s or Afghan’s head spin. My point is, whomever we support may alienate another in the long run - but hey, a short term fix is what's needed, we'll worry about the long term tomorrow!
With the clear risks involved with creating a no-fly zone and with a questionable need for its implementation, there's another option for how the US can provide assistance--by sending food.
Every time I hear about Libya and the rebels I can't help but think of Star Wars, but unless sending in the Millennium Falcon is an option, providing a steady supply of food and medical resources (bandages, sterile tools, medicine) would enable us to help Libya's anti-Gaddafi forces without directly involving ourselves in the conflict. If we wanted to go a step further, I would caution against providing arms and instead provide communication equipment (radios, GPS, etc.) that could be crucial in organizing and coordinating rebel forces spread throughout the country. Sending ships with supplies to Benghazi should not be too difficult and will likely encounter no resistance from Gaddafi forces.
Lastly, if we do want to step up with pseudo-military assistance, I would avoid sending arms that could eventually come back to haunt us (think Afghanistan and the Soviets) and instead send in pick-up trucks. Fords or GMs should do the trick; why not help out our car industry in the process. A classic weapon in desert warfare, the Technical has been successfully used for decades in Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia and its flatbed back, ideal for mounting machine guns or ferrying troops, high maneuverability and low-cost make it a boon for any under-funded fighting group. Libya's conventional forces have intimate experience being on the losing of a conflict with Chadian forces using these vehicles in the Great Toyota War in the 80s.
Adapted from
http://highchairanalyst.blogspot.com/2011/03/how-us-might-be-able-to-help.html
"Idle Hands Are The Devil's Tools"
These guys you talked with, are they getting a little bored?
As I mentioned elsewhere, "Idle Hands Are The Devil's Tools." More pointedly, when you have nothing to do you are more likely to get into trouble, by looking for things to do that you shouldn’t!
Ah rat spit! Ok I'm always a player, let's do something, for the sake of doing something, even though we don't know where it all ends.
However, we've waited this long, can we wait a few more days and see how the Sa'uds handle the supposed planned Shi'a protests around Al-Qatif and Hasa in the eastern providence? If they crush it militarily, won't we look the hypocritical idiots standing idly by, well carping about Omar Qaddafi?
I'd check in with someone in the UK and get the full scoop on what happened with the 'diplomatic team' that went in to help the rebels. Seems they weren't welcomed. The Special Operations concept fails because, unlike the northern alliance or montagnards, we have no idea who we ought to deal with in there or what region they occupy. Sending in an ODA or even a Ranger Batt would play out like the guys in "Office Space" trying to figure out how to launder money.
I'm assuming the SAS guys weren't stupid, either. They met up with someone who was fighting against Qaddafi and found out people in Libya really do mean it when they tell us to stay out. You can't ignore that there's a strong tendency among the people there to do it themselves even if it means a cost of an additional 10,000 lives. Nor can you dispute that, on certain levels, there's a real intrinsic value to that additional cost.
I don't care what Libya's ambassador says. It's very possible that the guy commanding forces in Zawiya today was the commander of a falafel stand there two weeks ago. How does the former know what the latter wants? I also think the WMD argument is shallow. Do we really think that putting the smackdown on Qaddafi is going to make people like Chavez, Ahmadinejad or Castro think twice? These are crazy people. If rational thought was a consideration, we wouldn't be having discussions like this in the first place.
This is like when your girlfriend in college catches you two-timing on her and the two girls start fighting. Trying to intervene isn't going to stop them from fighting, and intervening is only going to get you a black eye. That said, I think the military already got a middle eastern menage a trois going on. If we want to add Libya to the mix, we're going to have to make Charlie Sheen defense secretary. He's the only guy I know who could be #winning in all three places at the same time.
He's also the only guy doing enough drugs to think deploying ordnance to the ground from F-18s is a solution.
Commander of the falafel stand FTW.
It sounds like we don't have a lot of focus in this campaign planning. I recommend we bring Gen Dugan back from retirement so at least we hit the Colonel where it hurts. Targeting mistresses is probably more achievable than targeting "heavy weapons" (most of which can be carried around in you ave 3d world sedan. The big stuff can be carried in the ave Bongo Truck or ambulance.
The salient feature on the SAS story
The salient feature on the SAS story is that it is being talked about, and how it is being talked about. That part is both interesting and true.
It could be that a mission got outted (those pesky sat links and cell-phone cameras, gossip at light-speed becomes news), and so s damage control move could be to shape the story, pre-empt it, make them 'arrested', and the Benghazi rebel leadership 'angry' at there presence. Half-truths are wonderfully useful in IO. Misdirect attention to the safety of our heroes.
On the face of it, the story says a Brit messenger was on his way to Benghazi, and is now there at a central HQ, with no casualties to his security/communication team. The SAS shooters may or may not actually be locked up at a rebel HQ, but someone wants someone (not necessarily me) to think they are.
When you say that they will be like the guys in office space, are you saying they would have to pull out a dictionary an look up the meaning of "Special Operations"? Or would they just ask for the help of a magazine salesman who knocks on the door?...he may know someone who can do the job.
What're they going to do? Just walk into eastern Libya saing "take us to your leader?"
That's a great way to wind up with a dozen magazines you don't want.
jim gourley: Well said.
And if I sound like an idiot to some...
Let's see if Watson could get this on final Jeopardy. What do Saddam Hussein, Pablo Escobar, Idi Amin, and Ahmadinejad all have in common?
They started out as falafel stand commanders. Point being, be wary of going in there and helping some guy with a busload of revolutionaries overthrow the Colonel. The cure might be worse than the disease. Furthermore, when we say we'll get involved "on one side," we do that American thing and assume the world works like a football game when actually it plays like Chinese checkers. I think that's why they don't want anyone in there. The game is bigger than just "get rid of Qaddafi" and we keep it from being played out in a fair and just manner when we throw our shoulder behind one faction.
If we're not smart enough to sort things out in Khorengal, Pech or Arghandab, we've no business jumping into a goat rodeo called Libya.
Arab/moslem ability to self-organize a village posse
Gree, JG. The Arab/moslem ability to rapidly self-organize a village posse is something that we maybe haven't learned yet. If a local posse isn't sufficient to gain redress, Old Mo (or one-eyed Omar) falls back, and returns with an army on camel or hilux.
Us can-do Hatfields and McCoys should respect and even admire that Lexington Green characteristic in another culture, even when we find ourselves in the Redcoat role.
There's a very good reason why cops hate responding to domestic violence calls. Almost inevitably the officer winds up fighting the person he came to rescue. QED.
Mmmmmmmmmm. Falafel.
There's a very good reason why cops hate responding to domestic violence calls. Almost inevitably the officer winds up fighting the person he came to rescue. QED.
Mmmmmmmmmm. Falafel.
Cratering runways has some virtues
Having served as a plans officer in the Pentagon - although I did retire in 1995 - I posted a consideration of the military problem of cratering Libya's runways almost a week ago. I do not think it would be difficult. It's true that repairing craters is fairly easy, but there are two simple solutions: (1) Just crater them again and/or (2) park Predators high above them that can launch disincentives at the repair crews.
See:
http://senseofevents.blogspot.com/2011/03/john-kerry-agrees-with-me-on-libya.html
However, that the mission may not be difficult does not mean it is advisable. Bombing Libya, even as comparatively "gently" as merely cratering its bases' runways, is also unambiguously an act of war, period, but if that is all we do we have taken only halfway measures. And if there is anything the last 10 years should have taught us, it's that halfway measures must be avoided.
If it really is in our national interest to get Qaddafi gone, then let's get him gone. It doesn't mean sending in the Marines (who are already over-committed already), We can furnish effective arms to the rebels, send SOF teams to give organization assistance and training on the ground - this is exactly what SF A-Teams are trained and designed to do, and so is the SAS - provide intelligence and battlefield information to the rebels, etc.
But no matter what we do, we'd best understand that it commits us absolutely to Qaddafi's downfall, and we are not willing from the beginning to go that far, then cease work now.
Of the 1.4 million barrels of oil per day exported by Libya in 2010, the U.S. bought about 71,000 barrels, 5%. China bought about 11%. Around 14% went to "other, and ALL the rest--70%--went to NATO countries in western Europe.
Why, exactly, are we thinking about putting ourselves in yet another thankless game to make good Europe's shortfall in military spending? We should think about joining the fray only after Europe's finest have tried and failed to secure the means to their own fucking lifestyle.
Its. Not. Our. Fight.
I agree with your point, but there's an issue of morality here. Do we want a Gaddafi to come through unscathed over a mountain of skulls? Do we want a rwandian scenario for Libya ? Tom's point is very valid: Do we want to send the message that an all-out repression will be accepted by the world?
That said, I agree with GSF that it is _their_ fight. I think sending any kind of troops would be a grave mistake. The least we can do, however, is to make sure the fight is as fair as possible. If fairness is even possible during civil war.
Look to your own question for the answer. Do we want a Rwanda in Libya? It didn't bother us that there was a Rwanda in Rwanda, or a Sudan in Sudan.
Additional bonus to us for not getting involved on this one-- let the Brits and French see how it feels to be the leader of a coalition of the not-so-willing. They're already going to NATO with their plans, and the two together have enough forces to deal with Qaddafi. Let someone else foot the bill this time.
And if they DON'T have the requisite capabilities to pull it off, well, maybe that serves as a good object lesson to them about the direction they're taking their forces. Downing Street just rolled out their first-ever defense review at the end of last year, and the direction they indicated was to draw down forces and rely on MI5 and MI6 to stop threats on the approach to the UK. Their recent actions indicate they may not be able to practice what they preach. Let the truth be told.
Well you see Eric, although we import less than 20 percent of our oil from the region as a whole, and a pittance from Libya, the percentage is irrelevant. All that matters is how much is available on the market on any given day, or the perception that there may be a disruption in the flow, by those countries in Europe that are the main consumers of the region's crude. They may then compete with us to buy oil from our traditional sources, or broker to lock-in futures as a hedge.
Understanding you know that, the real reason, and only reason we reestablished diplomatic relations with Libya again, under Bush, was so our oil companies could reestablish their previous claims. As an example: in 2005, I recall Occidental bid 9 out of the 15 blocks available, which made them at that time, and maybe still so, the largest holder of oil and gas acreage in Libya.
But of course very little light sweet crude is exported by Oxy (or Exxon) to the U.S. market - my bet is the pitch is in by big oil to do something.
Because the global economy is not a zero-sum proposition, because a deeper Eurozone recession will drag us under with them, and because Americans are now paying an average of $3.47 a gallon for gasoline (about 25 to 30 cents of which has been caused by the Libyan Civil War). That is just the short-term economic dimension.
That said, I agree with you: the Europeans, having a greater stake, should take the lead. But I have serious doubts about all of this. And some questions.
Who are these folks we are supporting in Libya? What do we know about them? Who leads them? What do they want? I damnsure don't know, and when I don't know anything, I tend not to do anything (except post on BD) until I know more.
We are engaged in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf. We have had two long-time allies fall in a matter of months. There are cultural and demographic changes going on across the globe - changes that we did not cause and cannot control or even probably affect in any meaningful way. We have to get over ourselves - and get back to that wise notion of non-interference in the affairs of other sovereign peoples.
And since no one knows what is going to happen: hadn't we better keep some troops ready, just in case we need to secure the oil fields of Saudi Arabia? I mean, the House of Saud is pretty much the whole shooting match, as far as most of our foreign policy and the entire global economy is concerned, right?
"What’s the point of you saving this superb military for, Colin (Powell), if we can't use it?"
Listening to the current debate about whether we will (can) participate in the Libyan Revolution brings to my mind the strange phenomenon that the USA recently (last 20 years) tends to project military force quite easily, while choking on any attempt to diplomatically solve conflict first and patiently.
Our military is quite adapt at flying in humanitarian supplies. We are also quite adapt at jumping into tar pits. Both actions are controlled by civilian authority. It is not a lack of will, political or otherwise, to hold in reserve--deep reserve--our military force and do the hard work of negotiation. Its hard, it can be humiliating, and it could be unsuccessful. But it must be done before rattling sabers.
Its so damn ironic that when Madeline Albright uttered the above quote, she was Secretary of State. Can our country default to diplomacy first and foremost before we talk of lobbing cruise missiles, implementing no-fly zones,and sending in A-Teams?
Foggy Bottom hawks vs Puzzle Palace owls
Follow the money, GSF.
DoState can afford to put Pentagon fleets, funds, troops and commander reputations at risk, and stands to win the internal turf war if the military 'gets it wrong.'
Madame Albright is still hoping the WMD will show up and justify the Clinton policy team support for the occupation of Iraq. Old George Schulz was 4-square behind launching airstrikes under Reagan, while Weinberger was forever advocating a diplomatic offensive. JFK/LBJ's cabinet diplomats were VN hawks- the WH tapes prove that MacNamara wanted the striped suits to hold back the dominoes while his advisors withdrew in '64. Even Powell discovered that it's State's job to sell the same old intervention product, whether the salesman believes his own pitch, or not.
Mom's big threat was ever 'wait til your father gets home...'
Where are the Arabs-Any international effort has to have Arab backing and Arab ideas. Amr Moussa needs to be the key here.
N
"Don't tell me what I can't do in Libya. Tell me what you can do."
Tom:
You've been channeling U.S. Grant. Good for you.
Haven't we been down this road before?
Suppose we "do something" about Libya? Regardless of what that "something" turns out to be, there are precedents that have been set time and time again that seem to have all too many negative outcomes. Perhaps our biggest national security mistake for the last 50 years is to have the "do something" mentality.
For argument's sake let's look at the options. Covertly send in weapons and advisors like the mujahadeen model. So how well did that work out? Hmm, drove out the Russians, left a big power vacuum that neighboring Pakistan decided would best be filled by a group they thought they could control, the Taliban. Fast forward to 2011 and we have 100,000 troops bogged down still trying to fix that mess.
Using spec ops troops to corner and kill Qadaffi. Isn't that just an extended version of option number one with the outcome still in doubt? You could even argue that killing Saddam Hussein had little or no effect with many of his followers still fighting the good fight in places like Fallujah.
No-fly zone. We won a limited skirmish in 1991 that didn't really resolve anything, made a bunch of empty promises to Shiites, allowed the dictator to crush a rebellion we encouraged, but didn't actively support, then were stuck flying holes in the sky for 10 years without any end in sight until President Bush used 9/11 as a false pretext to finish the job in a very large and messy way. Lot's of people died, American prestige and its economy were ruined. Some would argue the outcome to that situation is still largely in doubt.
So say we do intervene in some way. Say we even succeed killing or ousting Qadaffi. Then what? What about his son? What about those in his army who do not wish to so easliy relinquish power and influence? What's our desired endgame and how much are we willing to devote to get there? Seems to me we've spent the last 10 years going through this same drill on multiple fronts with no strong resolution in sight. Before we take one more step into sub-Saharan quick sand we need to seriously consider the "what next" aspect. Our military can easily crush anything Qadaffi can send at us, but crushing any army hasn't been the problem. Having a solid gameplan to settle the aftermath has always been the hard part and I don't hear any of the so-called smart people thinking that far ahead.
@Tom,
Do you really think Admiral Mullin has not done this already? I don't think he would have earned his stars if he had not thought it through and provided the president with options, and for that matter not had some ready when asked.
Mr. President we can conduct a naval blockade to ensure that foreign arms do not reach Libya. We'd say Cordon Sanitaire but we're tough guys and we have a strict No French Policy here in the tank.
This COA has the appearance of "doing something", it is pretty low risk, and since we're pulling out historical examples we think the Brits may have won WWI by the tactic of distant blockade.
That's it; that's my message: We're at the hubris juncture again.
to see so many of those who continually denigrate our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan be so willing to jump into another conflict at the drop of a hat.
Not a one of you, Tom included, has made a persuasive case for intervening in this conflict.
Make no mistake, intervening in the affairs of another country isn't something which overly concerns me, but I would like to know what our national interest is here. As long as the oil keeps flowing, why is it our concern?
Ah, but sweet oil's not flowing, and expat oil workers have fled
The situation is reportedly deteriorating. The fighting is concentrating near the oil installations, which are the strategic center of a civil war. If that fighting continues, the damage will take months to replace/repair, and could be righteously sabotaged, a la Kuwait '91.
That's why the momentum for intervention is building among the W. Euro's. The banner on the cable-news says '24-7 Nato air surveillance' has begun, which sounds big, if true. That could mean satellite, but the message is formulated to sound like a foot in the door. If the surveillance is legal and risky, then self defense is the cops usual excuse to go lethal.
My input on this is to say that if NATO is going in, let's use the good stuff first, and that's not ordnance. It's info warfare, and it's already happening. But NATO needs to get the intel straight. The kinetic phase is to deny the regime easy communication and military coordination, to take out his info hubs, one way or another, while offering the opposition 'connection.'
'Forced' entry with pixels and bytes, not bombs. Joe Goebels knew that a coup should start with the media outlets. Instead, Team Gadaffy, SOB's who study on fascism and stalinism, is controlling MY cable feed by allowing Western reporters into Tripoli, where they see his paid crowds, use his uplink permissions and feeds. Go figure. Sell ads.
It does seem that the Euros are rousing to do something, and the best for us would be to stay completely out of the borders, offer only offshore and technical Infowar support. And humanitarian assistance.
Egypt is a different deal, because it is our project, and a large number of US gov't employees and citizens in the mix.
But you are talking about temporary disruptions, and the Saudi's can more than make up for it. That argument isn't persuasive.
Your 'where's our vital interest' argument IS persuasive 'Stang
But possibly not decisive.
The public diplomacy trend is moving toward intervention, but again, possibly not decisively. The gaps are narrowing, Benghazi council waving 'the mercenaries' issue at Ankara.
Here's the best (albeit shallow, breaking) round-up of diplomatic side of the intervention discussion that I've unearthed.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/middle-east/NATO-launches-24-hour-air-surveillance-of-Libya/articleshow/7651739.cms
NATO launches 24-hour air surveillance of Libya
'Temporary disruption' is relative, makeup not guaranteed
The oil biz is funny, the pipeline/transportation biz funnier, and the financier's view of investment re-payments is decidedly unfunny.
Lost production time is seen as revenue lost forever. Like water over the dam, harvest delayed, runway behind and altitude above; you can't go back and make better use of that capacity later.
There will come a day when 'the Saudi's will make up any shortfall' won't work anymore. We'll see that day in the rearview mirror, ruefully. Russia and Arabia are the high volume winners of any shortfall/price hike, but not the only ones.
You are correct and the Saudi's won't be able to make up the difference. But they still can, so that is the best option in this situation.
I'm in the Krauthammer school of international relations, and I'm in favor of getting rid of bad guys like Q whenever we can. Thing is, this guy has been around for 40 years and we missed the boat a long time ago. Let the Libyans take care of it. It's an internal power struggle. It'll be brutal, but in the long run, it'll be better if we don't interfere.
Additionally, unless P4 is in charge, the U.S. military hasn't established that they can do it without screwing it up. Lest all you favoring intervention have forgotten, their recent record isn't so great.
This whole thing smacks of the same kind of thinking in the lead up to the Iraq war. Everyone was for it until it got hard and we figured out that the Phase IV planning was hosed. Then everyone is set to throw in the towel and call it a day, call the Prez a liar and string up some Pol's and some generals by their you know whats. And all that time, and all that wasted effort, should have been better directed towards looking in the mirror and trying to figure out why you were so easily misled and so easily influenced. But no, these people haven't learned a damn thing and here they are 8 years later calling for another intervention. Haven't learned a damn thing. The power structure starts beating the drums and the drool starts rolling out of your mouths. (Note WW, the "you" stuff isn't directed towards you specifically. It's a general comment)
A Democratic 'war president' can be as dangerous as neocons, and us 'yellow dog' party faithful just as culpable. Not to be trusted in my generation or yours. The out party is never happy with the sitting admin's command decisions.
The odd thing about this Libyan NFZ pep rally is that our line infantry and SOCOM are fully committed for the forseable future. It's the USAF/USN tactical airedales with the idle hands, ready to go to war and prove 'air power' can still do the job.
This might be the first time i've disagreed with mr. Ricks.
We really should do NOTHING militarily about LIbya...nothing. What we SHOULD do, is put an American face on all the aid flowing into the region. We should have the military providing medical care (hospital ship), we should provide some funds and supplies, and we should pressure the other African countries to intervene.
with regard to your 3 options:
#1: What I said. Except avoid providing any arms beyond RPGs and AKs.
#2: BAD IDEA. Sending in a kill squad is something that has a HIGH probability of failure, I think that this option boarders on science fiction. This would happen in a bad B movie. I would imagine we have very little intel on the ground, and both sides seem to be fairly hostile towards us. How exactly would this SF team find, close with and destroy Mumar?
#3: No fly zone is a stupid, overly expensive, manpower heavy operation that achieves limited, and somewhat useless results.
how about this. Option #4: Don't do anything. Conserve our military forces for when we WILL have to intervene if and/ when the sh&$^ hits the fan in Saudi Arabia.
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