They didn't call him Old Iron Tits for nothing (above and beyond his famous grenade taped to his shirt pocket)!

Some may not be aware that during the general's tenure as Army Chief of Staff, he did America a behind the scenes favor, by doing end-runs around the Chairman, JSC, Admiral Radford, who some believe, had the Admiral his way, he might have convinced Ike to intervene with ground troops, and an air-campaign on behalf of the French at Dien Bien Phu ((the Admiral did receive the ok to ready a two carrier strike force and amphibious force for such, out of Subic Bay)

How much traction in reality Radford, an otherwise fine Chairmen and naval officer actually had, is subjective, but Ridgeway obviously not too far removed from Korea, understood the peril first hand., and wasn’t taking any chances.

Something like [Maxwell] Taylor would slit your throat and think nothing of it, Ridgway would slit your throat and burst into tears, and Gavin would slit your throat and laugh.

It always amused...the key was that any of the three would slit your throat...

Something like [Maxwell] Taylor would slit your throat and think nothing of it, Ridgway would slit your throat and burst into tears, and Gavin would slit your throat and laugh.

It always amused...the key was that any of the three would slit your throat...

Ridgway was also far more proactive on the issue of racial integration than MacArthur. As soon as he replaced Mac in Korea, he asked the Pentagon for permission to officially integrate all units under his command. (Unofficial, ad hoc integration had been taking place for months). He did so for both moral and practical reasons. As he later wrote in his memoir:

“It was my conviction. . . that only in this way could we assure the sort of esprit a fighting army needs, where each soldier stands proudly on his own feet, knowing himself to be as good as the next fellow and better than the enemy. Besides it had always seemed to me both un-American and un-Christian for free citizens to be taught to downgrade themselves in this way, as if they were unfit to associate with their fellows or to accept leadership themselves.” (From Ridgway's "The Korean War", p. 193.)

the last time I saw a picture of an American general wearing a wrinkled uniform.

My second cousin Bernie (whom I never met) was one of those that got thrown in around Pusan. KIA. I can't remember, but I think he was with the 25th.

Years ago I met an old Marine who told me that at Inchon, the North Koreans didn't start firing at them until the fourth or fifth wave. That sounded like total surprise to me, like Alexander-at-the-Persian Gate-level surprise, which was alright with the the Marines.

And for MacArthur, to go from triumph to humiliation in the space of, what, five weeks? Sounds like a Greek epic.

I suspect Ridgeway was referring to Mac's personal flaws, his elitist ego and his spending much time in the Manila nightlife scene prior to the war running around with a Mestizo bar girl and a Chinese one before that.

Not only was Mac brilliant at Inchon, but his landing at Leyte as well. Months were spent preparing for landing on Mindanao in the south when Mac got word that few Jap troops were on Leyte, so he quickly ordered a landing there even though it was beyond land-based air support that was deemed essential.

Contrast that to the Navy/Marines who went ahead with landing at Peleliu after that was no longer needed. Then there was the disaster at Iwo Jima that remains mostly covered up to this day. Half the Marine Corps' combat force was mauled and no longer combat effective after that senseless and poorly executed disaster. Marines are not permitted to discuss this, lest they face excommunication.

I'm sometimes surprised that a commentator as knowledgable and experienced in military affairs as Tom Ricks views certain historical figures in as narrow a way as he sometimes does.

MacArthur would have been a very consequential figure in American military history had World War II and Korea never been fought, for good and ill both. Following notable service in one of the first American divisions to go toe to toe with the German Army, he was one of the most influential commandants West Point ever had, fundamentally overhauling a curriculum that by the time he arrived had grown antiquated and rigid. It was MacArthur who was largely responsible for the disgraceful use of Army troops against the "bonus army" in 1932. As Chief of Staff, MacArthur's extreme right-wing views and many admirers in the Republican Party led Franklin Roosevelt to consider him one of the two most dangerous men in America (the other being Huey Long). Roosevelt eventually dealt with the problem by sending MacArthur to the Philippines as military governor, a task he performed with distinction prior to the onset of war with the Japanese.

All this is apart from MacArthur's service as military governor of Japan after te war, perhaps the crowning achievement of his career and one we are prone to take for granted today. In each of these positions, MacArthur relied heavily on the theatrical qualities that, at the end of his career, served him so badly when the Communists attacked South Korea. His command of allied forces in that war was a disaster, leavened by a success at Inchon that owed much to dumb luck -- but there was a reason why a general past 70, in an army with many talented and experienced combat commanders, was thought capable of leading American forces in a third major war. MacArthur was a formidable and complex personality who exerted an outsized influence on the institution he served, and it has always puzzled me that Tom Ricks dismisses him so easily.

Reading through this interesting thread raised some factual questions for me (for example, when Ridgway got promoted to MG, those sorts of things), so i took the historians’ expedient method and did a quick read of the wikipedia entry on Ridgway and came across this interesting point and quote from Ridgeway on previous combat experience:

"A year after he graduated, he was assigned to West Point as an instructor in Spanish. He was disappointed that he was not assigned to combat duty in World War I, feeling that 'the soldier who had had no share in this last great victory of good over evil would be ruined.'"

In preparing for an upcoming Normandy staff ride with cadets the number of senior American generals in World War II who did relatively well in their positions never saw combat in World War I (e.g., Ridgway, Eisenhower, Bradley, and many others), especially compared to their German counterparts and to other British generals (Montgomery) as well.

Which brings about for me the fascinating question about the role of past combat experience--not just in generalship, but in other layers of command and as an organizational aspect too--in present and future combat. For example the famed British 7th Armored Division (the desert Rats) who fought against Rommel in North Africa for nearly two years and were credited with forcing him out, basically got their tails handed to them in the first days at Normandy at Villars-Bocage when a regiment of theirs was man-handled roughly by in effect a German Tiger tank platoon under Michael Wittman.

I mention this question of combat experience because American army generals today are fond of talking about the so-called "battle hardened" army as if recent combat experience (which of course is of a very discrete and specific kind) will compensate for the atrophying of combined arms competencies and thus produce success in any kind of operations the us army finds itself in the future.

gian

Great subject! Sorry I was over at Coronado and missed most of it. In my view the career of Matt Ridgeway one again demonstrates that a really top-flight commander does not need to demonstrate acute and disturbed personality disorders such as Montgomery, Patton, and MacArthur to be effective. Like Ridgeway, great leaders such as Chester Nimitz, Roy Geiger, Lucian Truscott, Ray Spruance, Archie Vandergrift all provided deeply competent command leadership without all the absurd theatrics of the above.

Oh yes, one more thing that somebody else touched on that Inchon was unnecessary – very true. The plan was not that great and rather half assed and rushed and only the Marine grit and a lucky roll of the dice made it work. The same result could have been obtained more safely by keeping those forces in Eight Army in order to make its northward counter-offensive even more powerful.

1. His attack on the bonus marchers
2. His indifferent record in building a Philippine defense force
3. His failure to anticipate Japanese invasion of the Philippines, and his poor handling of the subsequent campaign
4. His indifference regarding Eighth Army readiness prior to the Korean War
5. His appointment of Almond to command X Corps, while keeping his post as FECOM CofS
6. His communications w/ the JCS in Oct-Nov 50
7. His insistence on resuming attack to the Yalu in mid-Nov 50
8. His orders to X Corps to push west into the mountains in late Nov 50
9. His panic in Dec 50, when he threatened to evacuate the peninsula if he did not receive immediate reinforcements
10. His assumption during his Congressional testimony that the JCS would support his strategy of widening the war

When considering the impact of WWI experience on success, Corps Commanders are probably a better sample than looking at the likes of Ike-Bradley-Macarther -- which is really too small a sample to really assess.

There is a very interesting Leavanworth study by Dr Robert Berlin (google-able) that looks at the biographies of the 34 Corps Commanders in WWII'

According to Berlin, 23 of the 34 Corps Commanders had some degree of service in France in WWI, and two more saw combat in the Siberian intervention.

Only 16 of those saw significant combat.

Among highly considered Corps Commanders, those who served in France in WWI include Patton, Troy H. Middleton, Calrence Huebner, Alexander Patch, Wade Haislip, Leonard T. Gerow (though both served primarily in General Staff positions), Walton Walker, and Edward H. Brooks.

Bradley, Truscott, Ridgway, and Collins didn't.

16 of 34 is a pretty inconclusive stat in my view. But I think there are enough officers who excelled in both wars to counter the hypothesis that WWI experience was a handicap to success in WWII.

RRB:

Nicely stated and agree.

My only point is that previous combat experience is not necessarily a determining factor in success or failure in current combat operations, especially if the type or form of combat is very different hence my use of the British 7th Armored Division in Normandy. Likewise I think it is foolish to think that certain types of combat experienced gained by parts of the American army today in Iraq and Afghanistan automatically means we will be able to transition fairly easily to high intensity combat, perhaps hypothetically on the Korean peninsula.

gian