it was "Royal Dutch Shell in London Global Scenario Planning"

The Art of the Long View
http://www.amazon.com/Art-Long-View-Peter-Schwartz/dp/0385267312

...to invade every ten or twenty years, and depart quickly. US military led nation building has proven to be the dumbest idea ever for the fifth-and-a-half time (Vietnam, Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan).

What about Japan, Germany, Italy, Korea? Hawaii?

Read across the reports from the Wartime Contracting Commission, Bing West's latest book, "Wrong War," and the continual message about the lack of planning, adequate research, and strategy, coupled with the wholesale ineffectiveness of US AID strategies, and you have an enterprise that has no capacity to effectively understand or engage challenges in front of it.

As a civilian planner joining the Iraq Surge, I was shocked at how little the US actually knew about Iraq, and how tactics and programs consistently shot at the wrong mark, and hit something all together different. These organizations do not even know what they do not know, and the "faking it" is just getting too old.

It took two days of traveling around Bayji the supposed Oil Center in Northern Iraq for any competent analyst to have determined that, by 2003, you could have toppled the entire Iraqi economy with a puff of wind. How could you ever seriously maintain a WMD program when only two stacks of the five at Bayji's power generator could not be lit; one of the other two was "lit" by oil poured into the pan to make smoke come out the top to keep the locals happy; the only one actually operating was so inefficient that it took more energy than the amount used. Where were the analysts, the great minds, the research? Smart power meant precision targeting of what to hit and how, and had nothing to do with large deployments.

Reality pouring out the flat screen reminds us that the world is increasingly becoming urban, and much more complex and inter-related. Delusions that modern urban citizens cannot manage themselves without some stupid US "capacity building" program is a hoax---look at Benghazi. Urban populations, issues are very different, as are the strategies, tactics, tools, and organizations to deal with them. The Department of Defensive Food Security? The Department of Emergency Oil Threat Responses and Remediation?

What is needed is a very much more complex analytical approach than just 1+1=2 vs. calculus. The whole structure is set wrong. Gates provided little insight into what's needed, but a great critique of what is not.

Maybe we can honor your loss by moving to much more effective approaches?

To just get some simple damn sanity into this process. I'm afraid that stumble-bum is the legacy and it continues to set the precident.

I have a story of personal loss, as do so many others-Americans, Iraqis, Brits, Afghanis, Canadians, French, Germans, the list goes on. But its no longer about the individuals, its about the community. I can not, for the life of me, understand why we Americans reinvent the wheel with our dealings around the world. I believe that this country believes the North American bubble reflects gold back upon ourselves or some such thing, we are certainly not learning any lessons about simple peaceful co-existence, understanding, cultural interchange and the like. The American tradition seems to be just throw a bigger hammer and the beggars will quit. The world is so much more complex than that.

I recently received an email, from someone I thought was smarter, one of those take-it-out-of-context things. Early Obama had gone to Europe and confessed American arrogance from the recent past. That phrase made the email--America never confesses arrogence to Europe!! followed by photos of all the cemeteries scattered throughout the western euro-continent. But, what the man said was, basically, yes we F'd up (big time) but you guys did too. Let's get the act together and get this right. Simple, direct analysis of the need to advance.

I have written of my desire to see those of the past administration face the legal system. I have lamented about Obama's move forward not backward response to calls for GWB Cabal heads, or at least their asses in jail. But, sometimes I wonder, given the fractious state of our people--maybe he's right. We screwed the pooch so badrecent, the only way is forward. The Clinton impeachment was a huge joke, the trial of GWB might just cause a funk we would not recover from any time soon.

GSF,

I don't need to tell a pirate from a potato farmer, because no one in the US cares. Again, I think a lot of this goes back to some obsessive fetish our political and military leaders have with being counter-intuitive geniuses and subtle architects of international political change. The politicians all want to be Machiavelli and the Generals all want to be Jason Bourne. We need Bob Vila. "Hey Bob, I have this nail here. I've been trying to coax it into this board all day, but it's just not going. Do you think you can take this suitcase of money to a Chinese-made bolt we know and ask it to threaten the nail's family? Oh, you just want to use a hammer and hit the nail really hard? Well, it's not especially sexy, but whatever."

Meanwhile, no, I really don't want to go back to Mogadishu, but how is this new initiative to "remove from the battlefield" Joseph Kony and his band of merry men any different? I believe that little foray by the Obama administration also proves my whole "no one cares" argument.

I'm a bit skeptical of Steve's view that securing the oil flow is primarily a maritime affair at this point. Them thar revolutions are taking place on solid ground. Then again, China seems to be doing quite well in Africa, and you don't hear about them doing peace keeping operations to maintain good ties. Additionally, there are currently 20 million Libyans deployed in North Africa. If they can't sort things out in that country, do we really think 20 thousand American troops can?

I've said it before. If the compound is overrun by aliens, there's no point sending in a dozen space marines. Back off and nuke it from orbit. It sounds to me like that's the force Gates is building-- a dozen marines instead of a battalion, backed up by a death star. Just use the death star.

My way solves the problem. The other way gets a bunch of Americans on their sailboat killed.

Those tanks were pretty damn important during the first assault weren't they? I am a tanker at heart but I was trained as an Infantryman from the beginning and I know who supports who.

MAJ Edge Gibbons, IN said it best in 1993 when educating a bunch of IN LTs who thought they were the center of the universe. "Tanks are good...tanks are like pu$$y. You need to get some."

In the end when things get nasty the IN are quite happy to spoon with those tankers as they attack into harms' way together. They also love to dry their clothes and warm up behind those million dollar microwaves.

Armor may have been great...60 years ago. But an uparmored HMMWV with a TOW missile can kill a tank just as easily as the reverse at 1/10 the cost in money and weight. And dont even get me started on soldiers equipped with Javelins or Predator drones.

This idiotic inclination with using weapon systems that worked well during WW2 needs to stop.

The Chinese have figured out that guided missiles work better than multimillion dollar boondoggles. So should we.

my guess is that everyone saying armor is useless has never had the distinct pleasure of hearing the cavalry (read: tanks, brads) come clattering down the road when you need it. in my experience, the bad guys would shoot EFPs at mraps all day long...but send a bradley down the road and the streets are free and clear.

also...a tank can "reach out and touch someone" from a much greater distance than a hmmwv...the optics and the sheer speed of the round are unbeatable. tow missles...bah.

Both MBTs and IFVs are susceptible to EFP attacks. IFVs especially provide little protection against well built copper lined EFPs. Even M1 tanks can be destroyed - including killing several of its crew members - if the EFP enters the tanks fuel cell or ammunition storage. I have seen the results of an EFP hit an M2 first hand and let me tell you, it ain't pretty.

And the idea that tanks can see further than HMMWVs is bunk. MRAPs and HMMWVs are equipped with packages that contain the same technology as many tanks, and there are better packages available which can be implemented quicker and cheaper. And you didn't even bring up the point that HMMWVs have smaller signatures than armor, or that a Pradator UAV can do a far better job than both.

And have you ever examined a TOW. There have been multiple variants, and even many of the old ones have ranges in excess of two miles, equivalent to that of an M1.

And nothing you have stated discusses the strategic immobility of tanks or their excessive cost.

Hey I commanded a Light CAV SQDN. Had all those HMMWVs with TOW (ITAS), M2s, and MK19s. And LRAS3 to boot - awesome. Great kit, all of it, and we were the most heavily armed outfit in our IBCT, and the only ones with real internal mobility.

But none of that matters, because sometimes you want and need a tank (long time ago I commanded a Abrams company too, and a Brad platoon before that). Our LRAS as good as it was wasn't slaved to our weapons so you lost alot of utility there. (Of course it's real virtue is Call For Fire, CAV Scouts de rigeur order du jour). And those EFPs are equal opportunity killers. HMMWVs blow up real good too. Better chance of making it out alive in the tank or Brad everytime, and plenty more killing power to boot.

I'd love to see a medium/light tank, but we can't seem to conceptualize a good vehicle that does a few things well instead of a mediocre vehicle that trys to do everything and fails. (Witness FCS, GCV, and whatever will follow GCV).

No one is saying one HMMWV is going to outgun or outlive one tank. You put 70 tons of DU, ceramic armor and steel up against a glorified four wheeler, and the HMMWV/MRAPs are going down. The point is though that UAV/CAS and the GM suite now employed by HMMWVs and dismounts can provide better firepower than an armored force provides at a fraction of the cost in money and strategic movement assets....and damage to HN roads.

And on my last tour most of my supported BNs tanks were mothballed on the JSS I was operating out of. Granted that was due to ROE, but remember the creed, "Ready and Relevant". Armor definitely does not fit that.

And I doubt we'll see a medium/light tank in the near term (Stryker MGS excluded). That's because the last time the Army fielded a light tank, the M551 Sheridan, they found out that making the gun big enough to kill an MBT necessitated a platform that couldn't really be considered "light".

"Again the whole point of the conversation is being missed
No one is saying one HMMWV is going to outgun or outlive one tank."

Let me condition this by saying it always depends on the circumstance of the battle. Just like days of yore when Shermans had to flank around Tigers, the same conditions apply here. Any reasonably modern ATM can do it from the right direction and in some cases the front as well (i.e. the Javelin and its top down fire pattern).

"We sent damn good Marines and Army forces to Vietnam in 1965 but the political leadership never comprehended the nature of the war there thus could never agree on the logic and purpose of the mission. "

JPWREL, that quote from you sounds a lot like the old Dolchstoss argument that the Germans came up with after losing WW1. After Vietnam, much the same was said by the military about the perfidious politicians, media, spineless students, etc. on the home front.

I think there's a lot of historical writing now that argues that it was the military in Vietnam that never comprehended the nature of the war there, which was basically a counter-insurgency war, and a war of independence -- in short, a limited war to prop up one side in a civil war. Instead, Westmoreland and the military leadership (with disagreement by the Marines and the SF) saw the war as a classic war of attrition, calling for use of massive and indiscriminate firepower in the South and the most intensive bombing campaign in history in the North.

... and political decisions are made by the dominant economic actors.

Our militarized foreign policy is hugely profitable to a relative handful of powerful profiteers. That’s why military/security procurement should be a not-for-profit activity.

"....And.....200 years." New York Times

Suddenly, a Rise in Piracy’s Price
By JEFFREY GETTLEMAN
Published: February 26, 2011

Mr. President, let us hope the appropriate Executive Orders are being issued. Piracy should disappear by sunset in the Indian Ocean and in the banks worldwide.

...or a Japanese imperial prince...kunino?

One should use one's real name given by their parents regardless of whom else may use it. Pleased that Bill Keller shares it.

And grammar instructors are always appreciated as we are a society of form over content, chimerical over real. Maybe without union benefits, I am afraid. Snarky?...that is pushing the language a bit. We do all believe in the value of free speech, even with syntax issues. This is a blog and not little schoolhouse on the prairie. God Bless You.

as I have avoided reading them...there is something unethical about them and unprofessional about many of the classifiers and SIPR participants. Don't get the sense that a concept of proprietary information, an architecture of restricted access and a pyramid of responsibility exist
among its administrators. Likewise I have a suspicion that the classification system and access management suffer from the character deficiencies of those who play patronage under its cover.

Please understand that I am a firm believer that the name is one's sole possession that comes with and exists with the duration of life. Dith Pran is a singular example of a person retaining its use through the cruelty of Pot's killing fields. No title, no award, no penalty, no embarrassment is superior in value.

My submissions come through a very restricted availability of reliable connections and perfect editing must be sacrificed lest the input is lost. Sorry for the inconvenience.

My understanding is that after the attack the pirates agreed to take the money Jefferson offered them, Just like they had been taking the money when we were part of the British fleet.

There is much merit to what you say FG42, but there is plenty of blame for those that didn't wear the uniform, in positions to influence national policy as well.

Early on, after Diem's overthrow, there was an opportunity to fight from a much more favorable strategic position, if that's what one wanted to do. The JCS and other military leaders repeatedly advocated an invasion of North Vietnam. LBJ and his civilian advisers rejected this advice on the grounds that an American invasion of the North would lead to a war between the U.S. and China.

Historians, much smarter than me, generally concur in the assessment that Chinese intervention was likely, however, that might not be quite correct, looking back and taking into account the fact that the Chinese, even in 1965, were still suffering from their losses during the Korean War, may only have protested. A protest that might have been hard to level, since they were supporting one country’s aggression against another internationally recognized sovereign country to the south.

You may not know your history, but Hanoi always felt the Chinese had betrayed them with the partitioning of the country at the 17th parallel, vice the 16th, at Geneva.

Ok, having stated that, if the domino theory was in play, and seen as valid back then, without declaring total war, we should not have escalated the it, to other than the minimalist approach that was conducted under JFK prior to Johnson. And with that in mind, those in uniform at the JCS level, should have stepped forward and made it clear to LBJ, absent total war, Viet-Nam was non-winnable. They did not have the moral courage to do so.. . .damn them.

In closing let me say, our experience in Viet-Nam was not just that of a counter-insurgency, it was for all practical purposes a civil war between Hanoi and Saigon, a proxy war between Moscow and Washington, that followed along Mao's protracted war theory, that included conventional battle as well, throughout our involvement, finally seeing a conventional advance from the North Vietnamese toppling the government in the South.

The debate on who ultimately lost the Republic of S. Viet-Nam will go on until all Viet-Nam vets have croaked. But as I said in the beginning of my spiel, there is plenty of blame to go around. Don’t forget, our involvement kept escalating under five presidents. You can’t entirely blame everything on the military. But neither can the military blame it on the home front or the civilian leadership.

FG42, you and I are not that far apart. Of course the military made their share of operational and tactical mistakes in Vietnam, I am not trying to take them off the hook. MACVN and the Pentagon tried to turn the war into something it was not and also purposely mislead the political authorities along with themselves.

However, I still stand by the historical veracity of my remarks that the political authorities in fact made the larger strategic decisions to go into Vietnam to escalate the war and to persist in the war and not the military. At anytime Kennedy, Johnson or Nixon could have issued different orders thus altering the course of the war. Of course like hapless Obama in Afghanistan that would have required a most robust moral courage to call a spade a spade that is not a common feature of politicians.

I also stand by my remarks that we sent one of the highest quality Marine and Army forces into Vietnam in the early days and not a forlorn Task Force Smith. The troops (unlike in most our wars) were well trained, motivated and equipped. The fact that they would after a few years find themselves in an untenable position was Lyndon Johnson’s fault not theirs.

On the lighter side of logistics JPWREL, what a funny way to fight a war? We are much more professional now. . . aren’t we?

The U.S. wanted to hold the amount of black market activity down, so they issued MPC (military pay currency) which was about the size, and look of monopoly money, and is what one used when back in the rear. Of course the rear was subjective as to who and where one was, as the club and PX might consist of a connex box stuck in the ground, to protect it supposedly from NVA gunners.

Ration cards were issued, but for Marine grunts up in I Corps, it didn't matter, as there was nothing to buy anywhere, probably by design, or we would have tried to haul it around with us. However, if one was lucky enough to be around the Danang area, there was stuff to buy. Unfortunately, our support brethren made sure every place closed early so we couldn't get in and buy-up the place, just prior to our arrival.

A favorite was the care packages the Red Cross distributed, that contained playing cards, baby powder, etc., along with letters from ladies of all ages from 6 to 60. Correspondence, both romantic and platonic would ensue, and baked goodies were sent over in Tupperware, arriving after weeks, or months, all crumbly. . .but we loved it anyway.

News from home was important, I recall asking a new asst. S-3 officer if Dr. Kimbell on the Fugitive TV series had found the one armed man yet. The new S-3 sheepishly mentioned he hadn't followed the series, and didn't know. I believe I was heard to have walked away muttering, "what good are you anyway?"

Last but not least, was being rewarded with choice duty: one of my platoons got convoy security as a reward for something or other, in which we rode up Highway 1, sitting on sandbags to protect our rumps from shrapnel flying-up through the trucks, while tossing-off cases of rusty steel can Ballentine beer, to grunt outfit along the way, while breathing and getting covered with that nasty red dust, never to be rewarded with such choice duty again. . .give a grunt a good deal and he’ll screw it up every time! : )

Now what does this all have to do with not putting big land armies in S.E. Asia or anywhere for that matter? Nothing, but I personally think SecDef Gates is on to something. . . duh!

Eric....Your succinct question is an uncomfortable one, because maybe it hits too close to the mark. In my Marine Corps career (E-1 to O-6) I was as gung-ho as anyone. We Marines were a "band of brothers," nearly a "monastic order," believing in Duty, Honor and Loyalty. But after retirement, and especially seeing our wars in Vietnam and the Middle East with the advantage of hindsight, I've begun to wonder whether the troops are mere pawns to the politicians, as well as the military leadership, and maybe even the Military-Industrial Complex. Are the troops being used? As an officer responsible for leading and taking care of these young people (and they were young!), was I a pawn too? Very disturbing questions that came to my mind only after I turned 60 -- maybe that's why wars can only be fought by the young! I don't know the answers, but your great question does raise thoughts that a soldier or Marine never had while on duty. Keep up the good work -- I've read every one of your books. Semper Fi