There are several different editions on Amazon.

Dear Gold Star Father -- there are different versions of the book on Amazon and the hard copy has significantl more reviews and majority are highly favorable. Look a little closer.

Signed - son of the author ;)

But, I'm still laughing over the "Obama and the other REMF's" comment.

The first shots of the so-called Tet offensive occurred at 2200 hours, January 30, 1968. Long's death and the action in which it occurred were routine in context of the time and place. Long was CO, 5/7 Cav. The other battalion commander was LtCol Richard Sweet of 2/12 Cav.

Both battalions (5/7 Cav under LtCol James Vaught) were used in separate actions, one after the other, to help seal the Hue battlefield during the effort to turn out the VC and NVA forces there. The overlapping battlefields were to the west of Highway 1 between Hue and the ARVN base as PK (Poste Kilometer) 17.

I'm not sure what relevance any of this has on topics normally discussed here, but I was fortunate to interview Generals Sweet and Vaught, and several key officers of both battalions, while putting together my Hue combat narrative, Fire in the Streets.

As a squint into how the history sausages are made, I never knew Charlie Krohn existed until his book came out. Sometime after that, some of the 2/12 officers I knew intimated that his motivation had at least a little to do with umbrage he had taken at my coverage of his battalion's travails. My view was, and remains, that I handled a sidelight of what, to me, was a portrait of urban battle, in the context of the technique involved in sealing an urban battlefield. As a matter of fact, my editor at the time wondered why I squandered so many pages on a pair of actions so far removed from my book's center of gravity.

This goes to show how a lot of people can't figure out the purpose of the book in front of them. I've grown too old and too beat to hell to debate this crap. If Krohn was moved by what he sees as my shortcomings to produce a book focused on what he considers important enough to bear the effort, then the purpose of History is served that much to the better.

Eric, years pass and memories fade, but I don't recall taking issue with you. And if I did, it was misplaced. I know that Tet didn't begin "officially" until the end of Januiary 1968, but I hold that the major attack on LZ Ross on 3 Jan 68 was aimed at drawing our forces from the coastal areas into the remote western regions, thus making the cities on the coast more vulnerable to NVA plans to trigger events that would collapse the Saigon government. The purpose of my book, however, is to explore the decision-making process within the 1st Air Cavalry Division that resulted in 2/12th Cav being ordered to attack an entrenched NVA regimental-size force without air or artillery support. Meanwhile, I place high value on you and your commentary.

Charlie, you're right, memories do fade, and mine is as apt to be as faded as the next guy's. After I posted last night I got the feeling that you and I put all this to rest in a phone conversation, way back when. I also recall that Dick Sweet worked on me to write a book about the 2/12th Cav. I might have, but I was already mapping out my next venture, and then your book came out.

As to when Tet started, early contacts at Khe Sanh and elsewhere, are signs that Giap was setting the stage, literally. He was indeed ordering contact in isolated areas pre-Tet to draw large units to strategically useless areas all through South Vietnam. His aim was not so much at U.S. forces as at GVN forces, which had to be crushed to make the offensive politically meaningful and set conditions for the General Uprising. The Cav and 101st were particularly off balance at the start because (a) Giap was screwing with them, (b) the AO was completely new to them, and (c) both divisions (and both Marine divisions) were strung out from moving.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Street_Without_Joy

Sir, you are a heartless bastard. You honor the wars over the warriors.

I apologize for my previous "bastard" comment, that was wrong of me, but I stand by with "heartless".
If we lose our humanity, even regarding dogs and the trauma of widows, when we analyze the policies of the USA, we have lost our right to civilly interact with the rest of the world.

The danger in skimming responses and not following posted links is that one can miss the intent of the poster. Tom is suggesting that CMEYERGO is 'an ideologue looking to score points' when, upon further investigation, CMEYERGO is actually the 'human being [and veteran] seeking understanding of difficult subjects'.

CMEYERGO states in his link: "Ignoring these losses does great disservice to all those brave men who fought and died in these battles, as well as those now dying in Iraq and Afghanistan."

As a Gold Star Father you, GSF, identify as one who has suffered lost. I would think that you, sir, more than anyone else, would have an interest in seeing that observations and, yes, opinions about the conduct of wars and the function/dysfunction of our military see the light of day. Especially if those observations/opinions come from a veteran. Our observations and opinions seem heartless only because they generally do not mimic the constant barrage of public cheerleading, flag waving and, as CMEYERGO aptly, but inelegantly, puts it, 'corporate fluff'. Your grief and loss, GSF, is often used to perpetuate egregious errors in foreign policy. The recent documentary "The Tillman Story" is a supreme example of this.

My understanding of CMEYERGO's message is that he's not disparaging your trauma but pointing out that the comments we all make are sometimes more enlightening than what's allowed or chosen to be printed by the masthead. Tom Ricks may drive this bus but that doesnt stop us passengers (readers) from having a conversation in the back end.

If I haven't apologized to CMEYERGO enough for my blurt of yesterday, I do it again. But what you say is correct:
"Your grief and loss, GSF, is often used to perpetuate egregious errors in foreign policy. The recent documentary "The Tillman Story" is a supreme example of this."

I don't look for sympathy for my own personal experience, nor do I expect it. If you have followed my posts, you will see that my concerns are with the disparagement of my country. If I can use my own loss as a metaphor at risk of someone reading my intents wrongly, it is a risk I run. Because I have lost a son in Iraq, my opinions seem to be jaded any way. I can't do any thing about it. I care nothing about poor-me sympathy. I can't save my son or the thousands of others lost in foolish war, but I can complain, and I will continue to do so, about the status of my country vis a vis the rest of the world. We went wrong, horribly wrong, and I wish to see things better. I felt this way prior to my son's loss--the war upon Iraq was wrong in so many ways.

I don't care if people crap on me, just don't belittle the widows.

CMEYERGO, I was wrong if my previous posts implied that you don't consider the loss of brave troops. Semper Fi Sir.